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To my mother, my father, and my sister. All my joy and love

JORDAN AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
A CASE STUDY FOR ARAB COUNTRIES
BY
Bashar Hikmet Malkawi
ABSTRACT
Arab countries are attempting to broaden their engagement in the multilateral trading
system in a manner that has many implications. Not only have some Arab countries either
acceded or are in the pipeline of acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but
their new commitments coincides with reorientations in their economic strategies. The
purpose of this dissertation is to examine the implications on Arab countries.
Given Jordan's accession to the WTO and its free trade agreement with the United
States (U.S.), the country serves as an ideal candidate for other Arab countries. Jordan
applied for WTO membership in 1994. After a lengthy and costly process of negotiations,
Jordan became a WTO member in 2000. Furthermore, in 2000, the U.S. and Jordan
concluded a bilateral trade agreement.
My thesis is that acceding to the WTO and signing a bilateral trade agreement with
the U.S. is like choosing between Scylla and Charybdis, because onerous trade
liberalization commitments ensue from such actions. The WTO system as an institution
may not be perfect. There are deficiencies in the system. However, membership in the
WTO could afford better chances compared with bilateral trade agreements like the one
ii

between the U.S. and Jordan. Membership in the WTO could help Jordan, in cooperation
with other Arab countries, preserve its rights. In current bilateral trade agreements,
economic hegemonies such as the U.S. dictate the rules and weave them to their
advantage. In sum, I make the case that the alternative to the WTO system is bilateral
trade agreements with the U.S., and they are trade agreements in which Arab countries
are bound to be disadvantaged.
The dissertation analyzes Islamic law and economics and their relevance to
international trade. It studies some of the obstacles Arab countries face in acceding to the
WTO. The dissertation also examines the commitments Jordan undertook in its accession
to the WTO as a case study for other Arab countries. Finally, the dissertation scrutinizes
the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the implications of the international
trading system to Arab countries. Given Jordan accession to the WTO and its free trade
agreement with the United States (U.S.), the country is an ideal candidate to serve as a
case study for other Arab countries. Jordan applied for WTO membership in 1994. After
a lengthy and costly process of negotiations, Jordan became a WTO member in 2000.
Furthermore, in 2000, the U.S. and Jordan concluded a bilateral trade agreement.
My claim is that acceding to the WTO and signing a bilateral trade agreement with
the U.S. is like choosing between Scylla and Charybdis, because onerous trade
liberalization commitments ensue from such actions. The WTO system as an institution
may not be perfect. There are deficiencies in the system. However, membership in the
WTO could afford better chances compared with bilateral trade agreements like the one
between the U.S. and Jordan. Membership in the WTO could help Jordan, in cooperation
with other Arab countries, preserve its rights. In current bilateral trade agreements,
economic hegemonies such as the U.S. dictate the rules and weave them to their
advantage. In sum, I make the point that the alternative to the WTO system is bilateral
trade agreements with the U.S., and they are trade agreements in which Arab countries
are bound to be disadvantaged.

1
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Historically, the study of international trade (law) in Arab countries was an obscure
subject for a handful of economics specialists. This dissertation will help pinpoint the
lacunae in this kind of scholarship by cutting across many subjects, using multiple
methodologies and interdisciplinary approaches, such as religion, naked economics, and
law- international as well as domestic. The dissertation will pave the way for a new
scholarship that involves international trade legal economists in addition to agricultural
economists, industrial economists, political economists, or econometricians. Therefore,
it is hoped that this dissertation will contribute to an understanding of the under-studied
international trade law in Arab countries.
ROADMAP
The dissertation will proceed in five chapters. Chapter I analyzes Islamic law and
economics and their relevance to international trade. It discusses Islamic thought on
matters such as reciprocity, taxes, subsidies, price mechanisms, and role of the state.
Chapter I concludes by proving that Islamic law is inclined toward free trade. However,
Islamic law sets out limitations on free trade. International trade in Islamic law is trade
with what might be termed as Islamic purifier.
Chapter II explores trade patterns of Arab countries. It addresses some of the
obstacles Arab countries face in acceding to the WTO. Chapter II also examines the
effects of accession to the WTO on selected sectors such as agriculture and oil for Arab
countries. Chapter II concludes that Arab countries are not active participants in the WTO

' No graphs, equations, or complex diagrams will be used, just plain English. See Richard C. Wydick, Plain
English for Lawyers (4th ed., Academic Press 1998). Most economics texts rely far too much on algebra
manipulation, complex diagrams, equations, excessive use of mathematics, and inaccessible jargon.
For more see Charles Wheelan, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science X, XVII (Norton &
Company 2002).

3

work. Arab countries also lack effective missions in Geneva solely dedicated to the work
of the WTO. Moreover, the dream of Arab regional trade agreement or common market
has not come true, despite the fact that free trade once profoundly reigned in the region,
and despite the fact that many Arab countries are bound together by ties of common
culture, ethnicity, and language.
Chapter III addresses the status of international trade agreements into the domestic
law of Jordan. It also tackles the relationship between the National Assembly, the
executive branch, and the judiciary in respect of international trade, and the bodies in
Jordan that have the power to enter into international agreements. It touches on the legal
effects of international agreements, and the cases where international agreements prevail
over domestic law. Chapter III also offers insights into Jordan's accession to the WTO.
Further, it uncovers commitments Jordan undertook in its accession to the WTO as a case
study for other Arab countries. Chapter III concludes that government agency conflict in
Jordan appears in the overlapping jurisdictions of the different executive authorities
rather than between the executive and the National Assembly. In its accession, Jordan
undertook onerous terms and conditions as a price for accession to the WTO. Jordan did
not benefit from any transitional period in its accession to the WTO except in
implementation of commitments on tariff reduction. Jordan met some of its WTO
commitments at the time it entered the WTO. However, Jordan was committed to meet
other requirements after accession over time. Many areas of implementation of the WTO
agreements require heavy administrative and financial investment.
Chapter IV scrutinizes U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement including its
environmental and labor provisions. Chapter IV concludes that the bilateral trade

4

agreement between the U.S. and Jordan will lead to trade dependency on the U.S. market.
The approach adopted in drafting the bilateral trade agreement is a cut and paste approach
in which U.S. laws were incorporated into the agreement with few changes in article,
numbers or words. The entire bilateral trade agreement was an adhesion or
unconscionable contract submitted by the U.S. as a fait accompli. Jordan was a "ruletaker" rather than a "rule-maker". The parties in the trade agreement entered into
asymmetrical commitments in areas such as services and intellectual property.
Chapter IV concludes that the free trade agreement between the U.S. and Jordan
would have been of little value, giving the volume of trade between the parties, except for
including environment and labor within the text of the agreement. The U.S. acted as
demander for including labor and environment within the free trade agreement. The
environmental and labor provisions of the free trade agreement represent material steps in
advancing the environmental and labor agenda by linking the free trade agreement with
non-trade provisions. However, these articles fall short of expectations. The trade
agreement does not prohibit the parties from encouraging trade by relaxing domestic
environmental and labor laws. Instead, the free trade agreement simply urges the parties
not to relax their laws. Free trade agreement does not define the relationship between the
trade agreement and the multilateral environmental agreements. The free trade agreement
includes a scapegoat clause that allows each party not to effectively enforce its
environment or labor laws on the basis of reasonable exercise of discretion or bona fide
decision to allocate resources. Chapter IV concludes that environment and labor will be,
as they have traditionally been viewed, secondary to trade agreements. The U.S. should

5

not use Jordan as a pawn to advance its own agenda on environment and labor. In Islamic
jurisprudence, there are historical links to trade.

CHAPTER I
ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
I. Links to the Past
As for the sea, we hold it is as the way of dry land. Allah said:
Allah it is who subdued to ye the sea that vessels may sail thereon by his
command and that ye may seek of his bounty. Therefore, he has given
permission that he who wills may trade thereon and I hold that no
obstacle shall be placed between it and any of the people. For the dry land
and sea alike belong to Allah. He has subdued them for his servants
to seek of his bounty in both of them. How then should we intervene
between Allah's servants and their means of livelihood?
Muslims believe that Islam is the last religion. Islam is called the seal of religions.
Islam, unlike the Talmud for Orthodox Judaism or Bible in Christianity, not only covers
moral or spiritual teachings, but also it covers every aspect of life such as trade. Islamic
shari'a places religion as well as economics in the consciousness of Muslims. Therefore,
Islam is comprehensive in coverage. Some rules in Islam may be stretched out to meet
2

The perspective presented in this chapter is neither perfect nor an oversimplification of a complicated
topic. This chapter will not involve a process whereby selective ideas are extracted from Islamic law to
claim that Islam and free trade are the same. This chapter is suitable for Westerners who may not have
heard about Islam and free trade until recently, but not Arabs who may know it well. This chapter also
serves to endear the topic to the ears of Arabs because they do need to look back in order to move forward.
Moreover, the purpose is to write a chapter that would invigorate the reader to explore, beyond the scope of
the chapter, the question of trade and Islam.
3

Caliph 'Umar Ibn 'Abd Al-'Az"iz, Sermon, Trade, in Al-Khal~ifah Al-'~adil 'Umar Ibn 'Abd Al-'AzIz,
Kh"amis Al- Khulafa' A R~ashid~in [The Fifth Rightly-Guided Caliph 'Umar Ibn 'Abd Al-\ 'Az"iz], LiAb~i Muhammad 'Abd AlFah Ibn 'Abd Al-Hakam; Riw~ayat Ibnihi Ab~I 'Abd All~Ah Muhammad,
Mur~aja'ah Wa-taTiq Ahmad 'Abd Al-Taww~ab 'Awad 101 (D~ar al-Fad~ilah 1994).

6
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current issues while maintaining certain core principles as static.4 Indeed, Islam is a
durable living force.
Free trade is about people selling and buying as they want without barriers or
obstacles. Free trade has links in Islam. This proposition is to refute any doubt that free
trade is alien to Arab countries and a response to the myth that Islamic law is passe or just
is not applicable to modern trade law. This proposition is also an opportunity to discuss
matters beyond interest, the centerpiece of Islamic economics.5 However, Islamic law and
economics do not adopt free trade as the single theorem per se or economic code of
Islam. There are limitations on free trade in Islam such as prohibition of trade in pork and
alcohol. International trade in Islam is trade with an Islamic "purifier". This is an Islamic
market economy.
According to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w), the pursuit of trade
and profit are not inferior but honorable.6 Allah's choice of prophet, who was a trader by

4

These core principles are stated in the discussion of sources of law in Islam, infra p. 15.

5

See Timur Kuran, The Discontents of Islamic Economic Morality, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 438, 439 (1996)
(Islamic economics is dedicated to restructuring economic thought and practice on the basis of fundamental
Islamic teachings. Its founders were Indian Muslims in the 1940s. Sayyid Abu i-A'la Maududi coined the
term "Islamic economics" around the time of India's partition. Afterward, Pakistanis have made the largest
contribution to the literature. The blanket prohibition against interest became the centerpiece of Islamic
economics. Attention then turned to issues such as rules of barter, rights of slaves, and transactions. The
intended effect of Islamic economics is to reform human nature. The goal of Islamic economics is to
transform selfish and acquisitive Homo economicus into a paragon of virtue, Homo Islamicus). Although
interest and Islamic banking is the first and perhaps the most interesting application of Islamic economics
relevant to modern times, interest and Islamic banking has been written about to death.
6

S.A.W letters are abbreviations for the Arabic words "Salla Allahu 'Alaihi Wa Sallam". It is an Islamic
term of respect typically following a reference to the name of the Prophet Muhammad. "Peace be Upon
Him" is used by English speaking Muslims. However, "Peace be Upon Him" does not give full meaning to
"Salla Allahu Alaihi Wa Sallam" words. Therefore, the words "Salla Allahu Alaihi Wa Sallam" should be
used. See Glossary of Islamic Religious, Banking & Financial Terms, 6 J. Islamic L. & Culture 135, 148,
150 (2001). To determine if profit is profiteering, there must be an analysis of prevalent market prices and
trading practices among similar merchants.

8

profession from a trading society, highlights the importance of trade.7 The dominant tribe
in Mecca, Quraysh, earned its livelihood for decades selling commodities for a profit.8
Camel caravans, originating in the Middle East, are well known in history for travel along
major trade routes.
The holy Qur'an is filled with numerous verses using the language of trade. For
instance, it states, "O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in
vanities; But let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good will". This verse
signifies trade on the basis of mutual consent free from undue interference. The Qur'an
also states, "For the covenants (Of security and safeguard Enjoyed) by the Quraysh, Their
covenants (covering) journeys by winter and summer- Let them adore the Lord of this
House, Who provides them With food against hunger, And with security Against fear (of
danger)".10

See Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions and Modern
Business, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 81, 92 (2000) (a long-standing tradition of Islamic civilization is its
association with and the centrality of trade. The tradition relating to the other great monotheistic epigones
in the figures of Abraham and Jesus does not acknowledge the centrality of trade and commerce in any
similar way. In the case of Jesus, the episode of the Temple merchants even points in the opposite direction,
with the mercantile pursuit of wealth depicted in a derogatory manner. Neither classical Christianity or
Judaism seems to have extolled the virtues of commerce in such a detailed or enthusiastic argument for the
commercial professions as did Dimashqi in his Mahasin al-tijara, The Virtues of Commerce).
See Gene W. Heck, The Economic Dynamic of the Early Islamic State 43-44 (1995).
9

See Qur'an 4:29. See also Qur'an 2:282, 17:66, 24:37, 35:28, and 62:11.

10

Id. at 106:1-4. The historical background of these verses is that the Quraysh, the dominant tribe in
Mecca, conducted international trade by setting out two caravan journeys, one from Mecca to the warmth
of Syria in summer and the other to the cooler Yemen in winter, to sell cheaper leather and clothing than
those made in Syria and Yemen. Thus, trade provided them with a living. However, for the safety of these
caravans, trade agreements were concluded with the tribes on the routes. In return, the Quraysh, agreed to
collect these tribes' goods to sell, and on the way back hand them over other goods. See Patricia Crone,
Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam 109, 205-209 (Princeton U. Press 1987).

9
Discussion of international trade and its relevance will be limited to Islamic law.
However, before discussing Islamic law and its relation to international trade it would be
helpful to provide a background of Islamic law, one of the world's major legal systems
along with Jewish law (Halacha), civil law, and common law. The Discussion of Islamic
law and its sources is essential to understanding the importance of these sources on the
relationship between free trade and Islam.

A. Sources of Law in Islam
The law or shari 'a in Islam may be thought of as being composed of at least two
parts: revealed and non-revealed.12 The revealed form of shari 'a has two proper sources:
the Qur'an (the holy book) and the sunna (traditions based on the hadith, sayings and
actions of the prophet).13 Non-revealed sources of shari 'a, developed by Muslim jurists
after the revelation of the Qur'an and the sunna, include ijma (consensus of Muslim
scholars on a point of law) and qiyas (a sub-ijtihad species of strict analogical reasoning).
These are the authoritative sources of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh).

Usui al-fiqh

11

For a Christian biblical and theological themes on international trade see Daniel Rush Finn, Just Trading:
On the Ethics and Economics of International Trade 47-87 (Abingdon Press 1996) (stating that it would be
a serious mistake to expect to find in the biblical sources a neatly transferable ethic of international trade
for Christians today. At the same time, however, it would be a mistake to presume that international trade is
a purely modern phenomenon).
12

Shari 'a is an Arabic word meaning way. The shari 'a was compiled during the first three centuries after
Muhammad's (s.a.w) death. See Ahmed Zaki Yamani, The Eternal Shari'a, 12 N.Y.U. J. Intl. L. & Pol.
205,205-06(1979).
13

The Qur'an is divided into 114 chapters, known as surahs. Each surah is divided into verses, called
"ayas" which mean "signs", referring to signs from and of Allah. There are roughly 6000 verses. See infra
n. 21.
14

See William M. Ballantyne & Howard L. Stovall, Arab Commercial Law: Principles and Perspectives
28-30 (ABA 2002). See also John Walbridge, Logic in the Islamic Intellectual Tradition: The Recent
Centuries, 39 Islamic Stud. 55, 68 (No. 1, 2000) (Islamic law is divided into two disciplines:^/;, which

10
incorporates both deductive (from broad general principles in the law to a particular case)
and inductive (from a particular case to general principles) methods of reasoning.
Other sources of non-revealed shari'a include ijtihad (individual intellectual effort and
wider independent reasoning), istihsan (equity or juristic preference), istishab
(presumption of continuity), istislah or maslaha (opinion based on public interest),
darura (necessity), urf (custom), and fatwa giving (responsa) of muftis (jurisconsults)
such as the Egyptian grand mufti Muhammad 'Abduh.
To establish direct support for a legal proposition a Muslim legal scholar should be
able to pinpoint to a verse of the Qur'an, or at least a tradition or hadith of the Prophet
Muhammad (s.a.w). While the Qur'an provides the written law, the sunna supplies a sort
of case law, consistent with the Qur'anic text. The sunna embodies the application of the
Qur'an's written law to concrete disputes and hypothetical questions that arose during the

the content of the sacred law, and usul al-fiqh, the principles by which it is deduced. Usui is a system of
rules by which new law is derived from a fixed body of source materials. It deals with such problems as
how to derive a general rule from a known particular case, how words can legitimately be interpreted, and
so on).
15

See Hasbullah Haji Abdul Rahman, The Origin and Development of Ijtihad to Solve Modern Complex
Legal Problems, 43 The Islamic Q. 73, 75-76 (No. 2, 1999) {ijtihad must not be exercised as to the
existence of Allah, the truism of the prophets of Allah, and the authenticity of the Qur'an. To exercise
ijtihad a Muslim has to be knowledgeable of the Qur'an, sunna, and usul al-fiqh. A Muslim also must be a
good Muslim, pious and law-abiding, and not influenced by heresy, just, and reliable). See also Islamic
Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas 4-32, 286-296 (Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. eds., Harv.
U. Press 1996) (a fatwa is a nonbinding advisory opinion to an individual questioner {mustafti) in
connection with ongoing human affairs. A fatwa may cover issues concerning mosques, intergenerational
transmission of property, and marriage of children, and banking operations and interest. Fatwa began as a
private activity that was independent of any state control before being transformed into a mechanism of
religious legitimization. The formulation offatwa is patterned after a question-answer model. Important
muftis in the pre-modern era were Mu 'adh b. Jabal, Ibn 'Abbas, and Ibn Rushd. Modern era muftis include
Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, grand mufti of the Egyptian Republic and head of Dar al-ifta', Makhluf
{Fatwa Office), al-Qaradawi, and 'Abd al-'Aziz b. 'Abd Allah Ibn Baz.). An example of the use of fatwa
as a mechanism of religious legitimization is the plan of Egypt's Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2004 to
connect all 5,000 of Cairo's mosques to a city-wide wireless network, so that five times a day the Muslim
call to prayer [adhan] could be broadcast in a single voice, in the same instant. To counter criticism for the
idea as bid'a (irreligious innovation), the Ministry obtained several fatwas.

11
prophet's life. Some sunna cases simply explain the Qur'anic principles and rules. Some
cases interpret the Qur'anic text by providing new insights into the written law. Some
provide new principles and rules, supplementing the Qur'an's protected knowledge.
If direct support of a legal proposition in the Qur'an and sunna is not possible, then a
Muslim legal scholar seeks an instance when all legal scholars or jurists agree on a
particular point of law or interpretation. Consensus may be relied upon as a valid source
of law. Use of analogical reasoning, qiyas, is quite strict. First, one must find averse in
the Qur'an, a sunna of the prophet, or a rule on which consensus was achieved as the
point of departure. Then the direct cause, purpose or rationale, narrowly conceived, must
be determined, and the relationship between the two concerns, the one in which there is a
rule and the one to which one is considering extending the rule, must be elucidated in
such a way as to demonstrate that the rule should be extended. For example, the Qur'anic
prohibition of drinking wine extends to other alcoholic beverages without concern about
gray areas. On the other hand, the relaxation of the duty to fast in cases of illness and
traveling cannot be extended so easily.16 Applying the concept of hardship to the
deliberation is not helpful because travelers would not always find fasting a hardship.
Moreover, hardship is a very broad and fuzzy concept. The divine purpose or cause of
the rule is not mere hardship, and so extension of the relaxation would not be discrete or
defined.
All Muslim scholars agree that the Qur'an is the core of Islamic law. However, there
is disagreement among them about the rank of other sources of Islamic law.

See Gamal M. Badr, Islamic Law: Its Reaction to Other Legal Systems, 26 Am. J.Comp.L. 187, 189
(1978).
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Consequently, there have arisen four main schools of law in Sunni: the Hanafi, Maliki,
Shafi'i, and Hanbali.17 Hanafi scholars rely on reason and opinion, using analogy and
equity as sources of law. The Maliki school requires strict application of the sunna of the
Prophet and minimizes the role of opinion. The Shafi'i school has tried to reconcile the
Maliki and Hanafi principles.18 The Hanbali school is well known for its strict adherence
to the text of the Qur'an and the sunna. Analogy is recognized as a source of Hanbali
law.
The shari 'a tries to describe all possible human acts, classify it as obligatory,
recommended, neutral, objectionable, or forbidden by Allah (s.w.t), the supreme
legislator.19 Islamic law addresses matters ranging from the timing of daily prayers and
prohibitions against eating certain foods to marriage, inheritance, and commerce. The
Qur'an speaks much more explicitly and completely about personal status (marriage and

Islam embraces two principal branches: Sunnism, the majority faith, and Shi'ism. The most important
group in Shi'ism is the Twelvers. Other Shi'ism schools include Ismailism and Zeydism. See Yann
Richard, Shi'ite Islam: polity, ideology, and creed 1, 5-9 (Antonia Nevill trans., Blackwell 1995) (Shi'ites
are Muslims, like the Sunnis, but there are differences between them. Unlike Sunnism which insists on the
arbitrary will of Allah, Shi'ism proclaims that Allah can only act within the bounds of justice. The Imam in
Shi'ism plays a fundamental role in the relations between Allah and man. Moreover, Shi'ite doctrines are
based on collections of traditions quite distinct from those of the Sunnis. Shi'ite doctrine varies noticeably
from Sunni as regards inheritance and marriage). See David Bonderman, Modernization and Changing
Perception of Islamic Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1169, 1174 (1968) (schools of law in Sunni appeared in the
first and second centuries of Islam. They developed initially due to geographical separation-one at Medina,
one at Kufa in Iraq, one in Syria- for example. After a few centuries, each school became personalized and
took the name of its leading scholar. Each school developed its own body of legal doctrine, but they were
similar in broad precepts. They disagreed as to particular points of law).
18

Al Shafi'i, the founder of al- Shafi'i law school, has been known as the founder of Islamic jurisprudence.
He was the first jurist to compile and systematize Islamic sources of law.
19

S.W.T letters are abbreviations of the words "Subhanahu Wa Ta 'ala" which means that Allah is purified
of having partners or sons. When the name of Almighty Allah is pronounced, a Muslim is to show his
respect to him by reciting these words. See Glossary of Islamic Religious, Banking & Financial Terms,
supra n. 6, at 153.
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inheritance), morality, and an individual's relationship with Allah (s.w.t) than it does
about commerce.
With respect to the daily, private lives of all Muslims, Islam has five pillars that are
the essential obligations. These are: (1) the profession of faith (the Shahada which
affirms monotheism in its first part, and the authenticity of Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) in
its second part as it states that "There is no God but Allah; Muhammad is the messenger
of Allah"), (2) regular prayer (called salat which is performed five times a day), (3)
compulsory charity (called zakai), (4) fasting during the month of Ramadan (called
71

sawrri), and (5) pilgrimage (the Hajj).
II. The Role of Islamic State
Medina, known previously as T abah, was much poorer than Mecca because its
people were not merchants. Medina had no pilgrimage destination like the Ka'ba. Medina
also experienced deep-rooted enmity between groups of its citizens.22 After his arrival in
Medina, Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) established a Mosque (Masjid) for worship and

For an interesting discussion of Islamic law see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah:
Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. Islamic & Near E. L. 135, 149 (2002) (the Qur'an
and the sunna contain the greater number of norms applicable to the areas of criminal law, family law,
contracts and obligations, procedure, and inheritance law as compared to other subjects within the
mu 'amalat category (societal relations and individual interactions). Being a book [Qur'an] of spiritual
guidance and not a legal code, it is not surprising to find only 500 verses with legal content).
See Raj Bhala, Theological Categories for Special and Differential Treatment, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 635,
677 (2002). Muslims, both Sunnis and Shi'ites, are under the ritual obligation to accomplish hajj to the
holiest sites in Mecca at least once in their lifetime. Shi'ites give importance to visiting the tombs of saints.
The great centers of Shi'ite pilgrimage in Iraq are Karbala, Najaf, Samarra, and Kazemeyn. The great
center of Shi'ite pilgrimage in Iran is Mashhad. See Richard, supra n. 17, at 8-9.
See Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Understanding the Life of the Prophet Mohammad 155 (Intl. Islamic Fedn.
Student Org. 1997). Due to the sanctuary of Mecca, trade created an environment where rivalry was
foregone even among enemies. Qur'an states, "Nor wickedness, Nor wrangling In the Hajj. It is no crime in
you If ye seek of the bounty Of your Lord (during pilgrimage)". See Qur'an 2:197-198.
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education. His next act was to create a new set of trade regulations. These were based on
the principles of no restrictions.23 Neither did Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) nor did the
four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Al-Rashidin) who succeeded him, directly engaged in trade
and competition.24 They regulated trade so as to prevent unfair trade, deception or
fraud.

However, later Islamic governments tempted by profitability, competed with

enterprises to the detriment of their societies.
In Islamic society, like in most others, some have more resources than others and
some are gifted with more abilities than others.2 In other words, people are not equal in
terms of resources and abilities. The role is for the individual himself to make an effort in
the direction of increasing his share.27 Many Muslim jurists agree that a Muslim must do

After the persecution of the newly Muslims at the hand of the people of Mecca became unbearable, Allah
ordained the Muslims to migrate, Hijra, to Medina. See Abd Assamii Al-Misry, Al-Masrif Al-isl Am i
llm iyan Wa- 'Amal iyan [Islamic Bank in Theory and Practice] 7 (Maktabat Wahbah 1988) (ranking free
trade as the first characteristic of the new regulations in Medina followed by justice, avoidance of cheating,
and monopolies).
24

Caliph Umar said that the ruler should not trade because when he involves himself in trade he has it
entirely for himself and to the detriment of others, even if he does not like to do so. See 'Awad supra n. 3,
at 103.
25

Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) objected to some cases of deception, known in Islam as Najsh, when one
raises the prices of goods, in an auction, without the intention of buying. He considered the practice
improper. See infra n. 42. Other example of objections involved alteration of measure and weight in goods.
The Qur'an commands that full measure and weight be given fairly in trade. The Qur'an states, "Woe to
those who when they have to give by measure or weight to men, give less than due". See Qur'an 83:1-3.
Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) acted in determining the measures upon verse 83:3. A special institution was
established in Islam, known as al-hisba, to regulate standards and measures of goods to prevent deception
for consumers. Additionally, Islamic jurisprudence prohibits selling below market price. For example,
Caliph Umar bin al-khttab directed another person, who sold goods below the price available in the market,
and demanded him either to raise the price or to leave the market. See infra n. 48.
26

The Qur'an states, "It is He Who hath made You (His) agents, inheritors of the earth: He hath raised You
in ranks some, above others". See Qur'an 6:165. The Qur'an also states, "Allah has bestowed His gifts Of
sustenance more freely on some Of you than others". See Qur'an 16:71, 4:32. See also Sayyid Abu 'L-A'la
Maududi, Towards Understanding the Qur' an, Vol. IV 344, 345 (Zafar Ishaq Ansari Trans., Islamic
Found. 1988).
See Qur'an 62:10.
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his utmost to earn a livelihood.28 They assert the negative effects of subsidies. Muslim
jurists tend not to support the arguments made for subsidies that they alleviate poverty
and increase equality and efficiency.29 By the same token, infant industries should not
depend on state subsidies. Subsidies should be temporary. Nevertheless, the Islamic state
has the role of addressing social injustice through available mechanisms such as Zakat,
Islamic rules of inheritance, and taxes. These mechanisms can be used to redistribute
wealth.
The role of the early Islamic state was confined to provide necessities such as public
services and law enforcement.

The state should be a minimal state in terms of being

involved in trade. The state should not be in the business of making profit. When the
Islamic state relaxes its grip on trade, prosperity may flourish for society.

28

The Qur'an stresses "Will Allah change the condition Of a people until they Change their own inner
selves". Id. at 13:11. Caliph Umar emphasized that no one should refrain from seeking a livelihood and
say, O Allah! Give me sustenance, for the sky will certainly not rain gold and silver. For more on opinions
of jurists see M.Umer Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge 232 (Islamic Found. 1992).
See Chapra, supra n. 28, at 292.
30

Government may need to deliver public services because of free-rider problems, otherwise these services
would not be produced.
31

For discussion on the role of the government see Muhammad Akram Khan, Public Finance in Islam, 40
Islamic Stud. 227, 231, 251 (No. 2, 2001) (public expenditure in Islamic economy will follow hierarchy of
needs giving priority to essentials, followed by complementaries, and desirables. The government should
refrain from performing all the functions that the private sector can perform. On the whole, shari 'a is tilted
toward free trade).

16
A. The Administration of Tariffs in the Early Islamic State
The most visible barrier to trade is a tariff, a tax imposed on imported products at the
border.

Islam recognizes a number of taxes. These taxes fall into four main categories.

The first is Zakat, an obligatory religious tax, calculated annually on a minimum of
possessions at a fixed rate paid to assist the poor as commanded by the scripture.33 The
second is Sadaqa, a voluntary tax on every Muslim.34 Each Muslim, if he agrees to pay
Sadaqa, pays from his own money according to his capacity and for the benefit of the
eligible, such as the poor. The third is Ghanima which is the share of the Islamic
government from the proceeds of war.36 In modern times, where war may be rare,
Ghanima is inapplicable. The last tax is known as Jizya, a tax imposed on the people of
17

religions other than Islam for their protection. Beyond these four main religious taxes,
no other taxes formed any source of public revenue for the early Islamic state.

Ibn Khaldun explained that tariffs, maks in Arabic, seem to come from custom or habit. Tariffs are
imposed by the state degree by degree to the extent that they exceed the just limit and they become a
custom. See Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldun [Introduction of Ibn Khaldun], Mahhada Lah a WaNashar Al-Fus ul Wa-Al-Faqar atAl-N aqisahMin Tab" atih a, Wa-Haqqaqah A Wa-Dabat
Kalim atah a Wa-Sharahah a Wa-'Allaqa 'Alayh a Wa-'Amilafah arisah A "Al i "AbdAl-W ahid
W af~i, Vol. II, 668-669 (Lajnat al-Bay~an al-'Arab i 1957). For an English translation in three volumes
of Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah see Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History LIV (Franz
Rosenthal trans., Princeton U. Press 1958) (Ibn Khaldun wrote his masterpiece, Muqaddimah, in 1377. Ibn
Khaldun's Muqaddimah is the first volume of seven volumes which comprise his book "Kitab al- 'Ibar". In
Kitab al- Tbar, Ibn Khaldun discussed events of the pre-Islamic world and Arab and Eastern Muslim
history. He also discussed the history of the Muslim West).
33

SeeQur'an2:43, 83, 110, 177,277,4:77,9:5, 11, 18, 60, 71, 73:20, and 98:5.

34

Id. at 2:263. 264, 271, 280, and 57:18.

35

Id. at 2:267, 65:7, and 9:60. Those eligible for Sadaqa are the poor, the needy, workers of charity, newly
converts, slaves, debtors, warriors, and travelers. In some instances, Sadaqa is mandatory for example, in
the case of non-fulfillment of an oath. Id. at 5:89.
36

M a t 8:41
Id. at 2:29.
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The question that comes to mind next is, if Zakat, Sadaqa, Ghanima, and Jizya were
the only taxes imposed in the early Islamic state, then how were the subsequent
expenditures of the Islamic state financed, especially after its enlargement? An Islamic
state has the right to impose other taxes according to Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) Hadith
"in your money, there are taxes besides Zakat". However, a tax system ought to be
based on equity, efficiency, and simplicity.
The Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) condemned the imposition of tariffs in the strongest
words. He said in a Hadith; "One who wrongfully takes an extra tax (Sahib Maks) will
not enter Paradise".40 The Hadith addresses customs duties specifically as well as Zakat
taken by the tax collector on above what is due. Moreover, the Hadith places a blanket
prohibition on tariffs regardless of the citizenship, or religion of a trader, or local content
of Muslim goods.
The Hadith of Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) regarding tariffs not only set out the
doctrine, it was also practiced. Trade in Medina remained duty-free for nearly seventy
years until customs duties were levied during the reign of Caliph Mu 'awiyah Bin Abi
Sufyan. Customs duties were abolished in the reign of Caliph Umar Abd Al-Aziz.
However, later in time, when it came to his knowledge that Muslim goods were subject to

38

Taxes are not the only source of revenue for the government. The government can impose user fees for
delivering its service, fines for violations, and charges for renting its buildings. Moreover, the government
can raise money through borrowing, domestically or internationally.
39

Toward the end of the Umayyad ruling of the Islamic world (661-750 C.E), rulers overburdened Muslims
through taxes. See S. M. Hasanuz Zaman, Economic Functions of an Islamic State: The Early Islamic
Experience 115 (2n ed., The Islamic Found. 1991).
40

See Ahmad Hasan, Sunan Abu Dawud, Vol. II, Chapter 1095, p. 830 (Sh. M. Ashraf 1984). Maks, an
Arabic word, is defined as toll or customs duty. See H.A.R.Gibb & J.H.Kramers, Concise Encyclopedia of
Islam 317 (4th ed., Brill Academic Publishers 2001).
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duty in other states, Caliph Umar Abd Al-Aziz imposed ushur, 10 percent duty on their
imports.41 Today, by way of analogy, if other countries impose tariffs on trade of
Muslims, Muslims may impose tariffs on them. The early Islamic state tariff policy was
one based on reciprocity.

B. Market Agents and Forces in Islam
After the expansion of the Islamic state beyond Medina, vast lands came into the
hands of Muslims. Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) and his followers recognized individual
entrepreneurship, the basic premise of free trade. They encouraged the maximum utility
of barren land.42
Islam also cherishes the inviolability of private property.43 Private property is limited
only by the realization of others' rights and public interest. Some argue, correctly, that

41

See Al-Manhaj al-iqtis_ad i f i al-Isl_am : bayna al-fikr wa-al-tatb~~iq / al-Mu'tamar al-Ilm I al-Sanaw i
al-Th~alith, al-Q ahirah 9-12 Ibr il 1983. [The Islamic Economic System between Theory and Practice].
436 (J~amf at al- Mans urah, KulFiyat al-Tij~arah 1983). Verse 2:193 of the Qur'an authorizes retaliation,
in kind, if Muslims are subject to actions. Some old books treat the term Ushur the same as Maks, though,
Maks is more indicative as a customs duty. Ushur is defined as the tenth or tithe levied for public
assistance, frequently used in the sense ofZakat and Sadaqa. See Gibb & Kramers, supra n. 40, at 611.
42

Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) is reported to have said that who revives dead land, it is for him. See Zaman,
supra n. 39, at 33. Caliph Umar Al-Khattab said that who restores dead land, owns it. See also Heck, supra
note 8, at 122. Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) said, "There is none amongst the Muslims who plants a tree or
sows seeds and then a bird, or a person or an animal eats from it, but is regarded as a charitable gift for
him". See Muhammad Muhsin Khan, SahTih Al-Bukh~ar~i, vol. 3, 295 (4th ed., D ar al-'Arab iyat li-iTib a'at wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawz ir 1985).
43

The Qur'an states, "And do not eat up Your property among yourselves For vanities, nor use it As bait
for the judges, With intent that ye may Eat up wrongfully and knowingly A little of (other) people's
property". See Qur'an 2:188. Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) in his farewell pilgrimage said, "No property of a
Muslim is lawful to his brother except what he gives him from the goodness of his heart, so do not wrong
yourselves". See AL-Ghazali, supra n. 22, at 457.
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economics of Islam is based on mixed ownership. Since Allah (s.w.t) owns all natural
resources, the Islamic state can exercise control over anfal such as land, water, and
mineral deposits. Thus, Islamic economics embraces a dual ownership concept. In other
words, even though private ownership is guaranteed, the owner of such property acts as a
trustee or agent for Allah (s.w.t), the ultimate owner.
Interestingly, Islamic law lacks clear substantive rules on the protection of
intellectual property.46 Perhaps because of the nature of ideas as incorporeal objects, there
can, according to Islamic law be no absolute legal rights to intellectual property. The
Islamic state is not obliged to protect intellectual property. Protection of intellectual

See Sohrab Behdad, Islamization of Economics in Iran Universities, 27 Intl. J. Middle East Stud. 193,
201 (1995). The Qur'an states, "Unto Allah belongeth whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in
the earth". See also Qur'an 3:129.
45

46

See Behdad, supra n. 44, at 202.

See Steven D. Jamar, The Protection of Intellectual Property Under Islamic Law, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev
1079, 1082, 1093 (1992) (protection of intellectual property in Islamic law is neither mandated nor
prohibited. There is lack of any express statements about it). See Amir H. Khoury, Ancient and Islamic
Sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the Middle East: A Focus on Trademarks, 43 IDEA 151,
187-202 (2003) (Islamic law does not directly address the issues pertaining to intellectual property rights.
The possible hurdles to intellectual property protection within Islamic law appear to emerge from a moral
and ethical basis in Islam. Intellectual property rights grant a monopolistic benefit to their owners while the
"Maslaha" (public good or interest) doctrine in Islam calls for distributive justice. The prevailing Islamic
approach to copyright has been that there should be no obstruction to the duplication of original materials
since the most widespread dissemination of knowledge is for the good of all). See also Ali Khan, Islam as
Intellectual Property "My Lord! Increase me in Knowledge, "31 Cumb. L. Rev. 631, 632-635, 649-650
(2001) (Islam itself as protected knowledge is a unique form of intellectual property. The Qur'an, the
Sunna, and the unique marks and symbols of faith such as mosque and the greeting of assalam-u-alaikam
(peace be upon you), together constitute the protected knowledge of Islam. However, there are differences
between the well-known kinds of secular intellectual property rights such as copyrights, patents, and
trademarks, and knowledge-based Islam. The former is the product of human intellect, innovation, and
effort. In contrast, Islamic assets cannot be created by human. Intellectual property is often commercial in
nature and protected for a short duration. Unlike intellectual property, the protected knowledge of Islam is
not for sale or commercial exploitation and it is timeless. The protected knowledge of Islam is universal
free for the benefit of all. Copies of the Qur'an may be freely made and published without any prior
permission and without paying royalties to any person, family, or nation. It has been copyrighted in
perpetuity as Allah's authentic work. No individual, no family, and no nation can claim proprietorship of
these assets. In fact, no concept of ownership applies to the knowledge-based assets of Islam, as it does to
intellectual property).
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property would fall into the category of permitted action. The Islamic state, based on its
discretion, can "honor" intellectual property.47 Islamic law concentrates first and
foremost on material objects as property, thus reducing incorporeal objects to second or
third degrees of importance.
Prices in Islam should be determined solely on the basis of the market, the law of
supply and demand. The cheapness or dearness of prices is in the hand of Allah (s.w.t),
who fixes the prices. Prices should not be fixed, but left to divine guidance.48 hi an
anecdote, Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) refused to interfere in market prices, which had
risen abnormally in Medina, even though the people asked him to. However, the available
Islamic literature reveals some cases in which Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) exercised his
authority as head of the Islamic state and interfered. In one case, Prophet Mohammad
(s.a.w) knew that people met the caravans away from the market to buy the goods and
then sold them at a higher price in the market.49 This case was considered at the time a
kind of deception or illegal trading practice.5 The obligation not to interfere in setting
prices is not unfettered. There are situations in which government involvement is needed

The state can protect intellectual property under its powers to regulate human activity in a manner
consistent with Islamic law. See Jamar, supra n. 46, at 1083.
48

See Munazzmat Al-Mu'tamar Al-Islami, Islam Wa Al-Niz~am Al-Iqtis~adi Al-Dawli AlJad~id [Islam and the New International Economic System] 118, 161 (D~ar Sir~as li-i- Nashr 1982).

Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) advised not to go ahead to meet the caravan (for buying the goods) (but wait)
till it reaches the market. See Khan, supra n. 42, at vol. 3, 207.
50

Al-Majallah (The Book of Rules of Justice) introduced the concept of deception in several of its articles.
See Al-Majallah, arts. 18, 30, 165, 286 (1879). The Majalla was part of the reform movement in the
Ottoman Empire that started in 1839. The Majalla is based, in part, on the Hanafi school of law. The
Majalla codified, rather than modified, the Islamic rules which served as the civil law of the Ottoman
Empire. It consists of an introductory section and sixteen books each treating a different subject: sale, hire,
guarantee, transfer of debt, pledges, trust and trusteeship, gifts, wrongful appropriation and destruction,
interdiction, constraint and preemption, joint ownership, agency, settlement and release, admissions,
actions, evidence, and administration of oath and administration of justice by the court.
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to remedy market failures when the market does not operate efficiently because of
informational deficiencies.

III. Limitations on Free Trade in Islamic Law
Freedom of trade in Islam is not absolute. There are some moral or religious
strictures. The first limitation in Islam is the prohibition of illegitimate goods, those that
are haram (forbidden), such as pork and alcohol. In other words, the source of goods in
Islam must be legally permissible and not harmful or corrupt.
The other limitation to free trade in Islam is riba. Riba is translated into English as
usury.52 It involves unjust profit or advantage.53 Islamic law and modern trade come into
conflict when addressing riba.54 Islamic theory holds that money should be used in a
financial system only to facilitate the purchase or sale of goods and services, but should

51

SeeQur'an5:3,90, 2:219.

52

The Qur'an states, "Allah has made buying and selling lawful and usury unlawful". See Qur'an 2: 275278. From a comparative viewpoint, Judaism and Christianity have prohibited riba as well. See JeanFrancois Seznec, Ethics, Islamic Banking and the Global Financial Market, 23-SPG Fletcher World Aff.
161, 165 (1999) (interest and usury are discussed in the Bible in Ezekiel 18:8 and Deuteronomy 23:19.
These paragraphs, which apply to Jews and Christians, clearly forbid the use of usury in dealing with
people. For centuries, Christians had a very strong prejudice against interest, which they used however
reluctantly. The Catholic Church only lifted the ban on interest in the mid-nineteenth century. Today, there
are banks in Israel that cater to Jews who refuse to take or pay interest). There is an exception to the
prohibition of usury in Judaism which permits Jews to charge and pay interest to non-Jews.
Riba is of two kinds: riba al-fadl, in which a person acquires an unlawful, excessive profit, and riba alnasi'a, in which a person gains an unlawful advantage by speculating on uncontrollable risks. Riba alnasi'a is form of gharar.
54

Great amount of literature is devoted to riba as to its definition and impact. The core of the debate is
what constitutes riba. Some classical Muslim jurists define riba broadly to include any interest or increase.
Other modest jurists define it narrowly to include excessive interest or doubling beyond the real value of
money if the borrower defaults during specific time. In the latter view, excessive interest should be
prohibited and not any mere increase. Prohibition of riba is applied variably in Muslim countries such as
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. For more see Barbara L. Seniawski, Riba Today: Social Equity,
the Economy, and Doing Business under Islamic Law, 39 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 701, 707-720 (2001).
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not for example be "commoditized" by depositing money with banks for a guaranteed
return over time. In other words, Islamic law encourages enterprise rather than the
hoarding of money.
The debate is squared on the issue of whether Islamic law should assign quantity
value or time value for money. An example of the quantity value would be when one
person lends $100 in singles to another person for three months. On the one hand, when
the money is due, then the second person ought to return the $100 in singles without
regard to its value. On the other, according to time value or pure time preference theory,
the second person ought to return the $100 in singles as well as a bit more. Charging a
"bit more" could be justified on the basis that if the first person did not lend money he
could have invested the money elsewhere in something profitable. Alternatively, during
the three month period, the currency may be devalued. Therefore, $100 three months ago
may worth $50 three months later after indexation.55
To avoid the issue of riba, new alternatives have been developed to make trade and
to finance international trade possible. These alternatives are mudaraba, musharaka, and
murabaha. All these alternatives include the concept of sharing profit and loss.56

The "bit more" presumes devaluation of currency. However, there could be a scenario where the price of
the currency increases. As such, the lender would perhaps receive double the amount he gave. In this case,
the terms of the agreement between the parties ought to be adjusted to ensure fairness.
56

Islamic finance is based on the concept of profit and loss sharing with Islamic banks being willing to take
on risks associated with title and to participate in the financial structures established for their clients. It is
not based on the concept of guaranteed return without any notion of risk or participation. Ahmed A.M.S.
Al-Suwaidi, Finance of International Trade in the Gulf'42-43 (Graham & Trotman 1994) (trade finance
represents the majority of Islamic banking transactions. More specifically, murabaha (cost-plus financing)
accounts for 70 percent of Islamic finance transactions). Some Muslims believe that these alternatives are
interest-based devices but under different names.
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Mudaraba (trust finance) is a business undertaking in which a person participates
with his money and another with his effort and skill.57 The owner of the capital is known
as rab 'ilmal and the other partner is known as mudarib. In other words, it is a contract in
which an investor (Islamic bank) entrusts his money to another party called an
CO

entrepreneur for making profit.

Therefore, it is a form of a business association.

Musharaka can be defined as a partnership between two or more persons. It can be
divided into two forms: contractual partnership and non-contractual partnership. On the
one hand, non-contractual partnership comes into existence when two or more persons
get joint ownership of some asset without entering into a formal relationship, when two
persons receive an inheritance for example. On the other, in a contractual partnership
parties enter willingly into a partnership. Contractual partnership includes four kinds.
First, a contractual partnership could be a partnership whereby two persons pool their
physical and/or mental labor without sharing capital investment. Any profits will be
shared according to their agreement.5 Second, contractual partnership could also involve
partners who use their reputation and goodwill rather than capital. The third kind of
contractual partnership enjoys equality in the areas of capital, management, and right of

Mudaraba is a pre-Islamic custom used to finance the caravan trade in Arabia. It is an example of a
commercial arrangement identical to the economic and legal institution which became known in Europe as
the Commenda. Id. at 73.
58

The investor will have his capital and a predetermined profit between himself and the entrepreneur. The
profits, if any, are shared upon in advance, but not as a guaranteed return. Thus, the profits are uncertain in
this case. The loss, if any, is borne only by the investor and must not exceed the amount of capital, unless
the loss is due to negligence by the mudarib. If the loss is equivalent to the capital, the Islamic bank will
receive nothing. Id. at 75.
59

Id. at 79.
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settlement. All profits and losses are shared equally among the partners. The fourth kind
of contractual partnership involves partners that need not be equals in their contribution
of capital or management. However, an additional share of the profit will be granted to
the partner who manages the enterprise. In this kind of partnership, there is no set
formula for profit sharing and each case is dealt with on its own merit. The amount of
liability is limited to the percentage of his share in the enterprise. Again, musharaka is a
form of a business association.
Murabaha can be defined as the purchase price of goods plus a fixed profit.

It is a

kind of sale contract in which the final price includes the cost plus profit, which is known
to the parties in advance without any deception. An example of this type of Islamic
finance is a form of auto finance. If a person wants to buy a car, he can request an Islamic
bank to purchase it from a supplier and resell it to him at the original purchase price plus
a negotiated profit on agreed terms. The negotiated profit, or mark-up, would compensate
the bank for its time and effort spent for communication, currency exchange, etc. One
downside for murabaha is if the bank ends up with the car because the person defaults on
payment or refuses to accept the car. The Islamic bank, as a title holder, will bear any risk
to the goods during the time of its ownership up to the time the person examines and
accepts it.
Murabaha is the main product of Islamic finance compared with mudaraba and
musharaka instruments. The reason for this is that in conventional lending a bank is
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Id. at 80.
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Id. at 98.
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concerned with the creditworthiness of a borrower, hi contrast, in mudaraba type of
lending, an Islamic bank would be concerned with more than creditworthiness. It would
be concerned with profitability since the Islamic bank would enter into profit/loss sharing
arrangement. An Islamic bank would be careful to double-check the profitability of an
enterprise before putting its capital in. Therefore, it would be difficult for an Islamic bank
to check bookkeeping of an enterprise or for an entrepreneur to declare himself as less
profitable which might be true as a matter of fact.
Another limitation to trade in Islamic law is gharar (uncertainty or speculation).63
Gharar involves future contracts in which goods are not determined at the time of
contracting, such as the sale of fish in the sea before being caught, day trading, or life
insurance. To give an example, suppose that a person purchases life insurance to secure
his family's well-being in case of an unexpected event. In Islamic law, some would argue
that life insurance is a kind of betting on that person's life.64 Allah (s.w.t) has the control
over and knowledge of that person's life. 5 From time immemorial, Allah (s.w.t) predetermined each person's fate and destiny. On the other hand, other Muslim scholars

3

See AL-Manhaj Al-Iqtis ad i F iAl-Isl am: Bayna Al-Fikr Wa-Al-Tatb iq, supra n. 41, at 616.

64

See Samir Mankabady, Insurance and Islamic Law: The Islamic Insurance Company, 4 Arab L. Q. 199
(1989) (some Muslim scholars differ on the legality of insurance. Abu Zhra, a Hanafi scholar, believed that
cooperative insurance is legal. Other types of insurance could not be placed under the groups of contracts
known in Islamic law: sale, donation, and hire). See Mohd. Masum Billah, Life Insurance? An Islamic
View, 8 Arab L. Q. 315-319 (1993) (other grounds against the validity of life insurance include riba since
the beneficiaries of the assured will gain more than the assured has paid to the insurer. This additional gain
is riba). See also Ahmad A. Al-Ghadyan, Insurance: The Islamic Perspective and its Development in Saudi
Arabia, 14 Arab L. Q. 332-335 (1999).
SeeQur'an31:34.
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would argue that modern life in society is complex and unpredictable, which makes life
insurance important to individuals.
To secure a person's family in case of an unexpected event, alternatives to life
insurance there exist in Islamic society such as laws of inheritance, Zakat, and social
security. Moreover, Islamic insurance, known in Arabic as takaful, as opposed to
conventional insurance, can operate in line with Islamic concepts.66 Aside from the life
insurance debate, if the theory ofgharar were applied narrowly, it would make economic
life impossible. After all, there is an element of speculation and uncertainty in
everything. It would be appropriate to develop a benchmark against which "excessive"
speculation is considered gharar.

IV. Ibn Khaldun and the Theory of Commercial Policy
The wealth of nations, according to Adam Smith, is derived from specialization and
trade. Nations can gain economically from specializing in production and trading the
surplus produce. Specialization and trading in surplus produce would generate multiplier
effects, known as the doctrine of mutual gains from trade in the form of increased

Islamic insurance functions like conventional cooperative insurance. In cooperative insurance, resources
in insurance companies are pooled whereby policyholders are considered shareholders sharing in profits.
However, in a takaful company, policyholders and shareholders are distinct in which both own capital and
share in annual profits. Retakaful insurance also functions like conventional reinsurance.
67

For more on this matter see Sajjad M. Jasimuddin, The Stock Exchange and Islamic Finance: Some
Thoughts for a Reconsideration, 14 The Islamic Q. 105, 108 (No. 2, 2001) (some Islamic scholars found
stock exchange objectionable because Islamic law does not permit the sale of an article until one has the
physical possession of it. Trading in stocks is usually done without their physical possession and there is an
element of chance. Therefore, trading in shares, bonds, and debentures is objectionable. Stock exchange is
further objectionable for its elements of speculation. On the other hand, other Islamic scholars argue that
speculation in the stock exchange is a process that involves the intelligent forecasting of future prices. This
is not the same as tossing dice).
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national income, higher consumption, and an improved standard of living. British
political economist David Ricardo expounded, in his 1817 publication of Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation, by stating that specialization and trade were based on
comparative advantage (relative costs) rather than primarily on absolute advantage
(production costs) as had been thought earlier.68
Similarly, it is a source of pride that Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 C.E), Adam Smith of
the Arabs and the great Islamic sociologist-cum-economist, was among the pioneers who
analyzed the economic problem scientifically and tried to resolve it.69 However, if he had
discussed his economic ideas in a separate treatise rather than in a scattered manner,
among many other subjects in his masterpiece Al-Ibar, he could have been recognized as
the father of free trade.70 Ibn Khaldun, nevertheless, deserves to be listed as one of the

See Jagdish Bhagwati, Political Economy and International Economics 3-34 (Douglas A. Irwin ed., MIT
Press 1991) (classical free trade theory rested on a number of crucial but questionable assumptions. These
include there being perfect competition, perfect information, labor and capital are not mobile
internationally, production process exhibits constant returns, market prices will accurately reflect relative
real costs, and absence externalities. Over the years, the traditional model of international trade has been
supplemented and to some extent supplanted by new models. These models include neo-classical theory
[Pareto superiority and optimality and its follow-up criterion of Kaldor-Hicks compensatory principles],
Hecksher-Ohlin model, endogenous growth theory, factor price equalization theorem, and StoplerSamuelson theorem. Free traders acknowledge some divergence from free trade such as optimal tariff,
infant industry, second best, and externalities arguments).
9

The researcher uses the terms Adam Smith of the Arabs and sociologist-cum-economist in referring to
Ibn Khaldun to highlight the contributions made by Ibn Khaldun.The economic problem consists of managainst-nature struggle, scarcity of resources, and the inability of individual in his limited capacity to
satisfy all of his needs.
70

One of the differences between Ibn Khaldun and Adam Smith is that Ibn Khaldun discussed different
topics in his Muqaddimah such as the rise and fall of state, dynasty, arid Bedouins while Adam Smith
focused on economics in his book, The Wealth of Nations. When Ibn Khaldun discussed division of labor
he did so in chapter one (titled human civilization in general) of Muqaddimah not in chapter five (titled on
the various aspects of making a living such as profit and the crafts) which deals with economics. The other
difference between Ibn Khaldun and Adam Smith is the concept of human nature. For Adam Smith,
harnessing human nature means every man working for his own selfish interest will be led by an invisible
hand or spontaneous order to promote the public good. See Abdol Soofi, Economics of Ibn Khaldun
Revisited, 27:2 Hist. Pol. Econ. 387, 391-400 (1995) (discussing the coherent Khaldunian economics theory
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great economists of all time along with Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other great
thinkers.
Ibn Khaldun stated that Allah (s.w.t) created man in a form that can live only by
food. Allah (s.w.t) guided man to a natural desire for food and enabled him to obtain it.71
Ibn Khaldun also called for specialization. For example, if a tailor has the skill necessary
for his job, he has, neither, the necessary skills, nor, the time to be a carpenter or builder.
Even assuming that he could be skilled in crafts, he would not be efficient in both of them
at the same level.72 Specialization and social organization of labor would allocate
resources to their most efficient uses.
Specialization and division of labor would lead to a surplus of production which can
be used for trade. Therefore, international division of labor can also be applied to trade
among countries. The basis of trade is to make a profit by producing goods at a lower

of production based on human labor, theory of value based on labor input, theory of distribution based on
optimum of salary, profit, and taxes, and theory of population and public finances cycles). Although Adam
Smith is considered the father of free trade, his work did not escape criticism. See also Robert A. Blecker,
The "Unnatural and Retrograde Order": Adam Smith' Theories of Trade and Development Reconsidered,
64 Economica 527, 529 (1997) (stating that Adam Smith for nearly two centuries has been considered a
poor trade theorist for failing to discover the law of comparative advantage. He had some interesting but
disconnected ideas about the benefits of free trade. Adam Smith has three separate theories of trade based
on absolute advantage, market-widening, and vent-for-surplus).
71

Ibn Khaldun stated that the power of the individual human being is not sufficient for him to obtain the
food he needs, and does not provide him with as much food as he requires to live. Even if we assume an
absolute minimum, that is food enough for one day, for example a little of wheat, that amount of food could
be obtained only after much preparation, such as grinding, baking, and cooking. Each of these three
operations requires utensils and tools than can be provided only with the help of several crafts such as
blacksmith, carpenter, and potter.. .Through cooperation, the needs of a number of persons, many times
greater than their own number, can be satisfied. Ibn Khaldun, supra n. 32, at Vol. I, 272, Vol. Ill, at 859.
Id. at Vol. Ill, at 884, 930.
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price and selling them at a higher price. Profits could be accrued by supplying goods to
other countries where demand for these goods is greater than in the home country.73
There is disagreement among Muslim scholars on the role of state. Ibn Khaldun was
suspicious of the state.74 He maintains that commercial activity on the part of the ruler is
harmful to his subjects and ruinous to the tax revenue. The ruler has the job of protecting
citizens from aggression of other nations.75 In contrast to Ibn Khaldun''s "government
hand-off approach, Ibn Hazm, a Muslim scholar, has called for government
intervention.76
The economic ideas of Islamic jurists may seem not to have a systematic
methodology. However, one can argue that each of these Islamic jurists had a different
approach to the economic problem of the Islamic state in their respective eras. Second,
they approached their solutions within the parameters of the Islamic shari 'a. Hence, there
could be no difference in the substance of their positions, but a difference in the form.
Therefore, it is possible for Muslim jurists to develop different views of the same rule
within the overall framework. Even assuming that each Islamic jurist lived at the same
time, it would not obscure the fact that their ideas are neither completely right nor

" M a t Vol. Ill, at 915.
74

See Syed Farid Alatas, Introduction to the Political Economy of Ibn Khaldun, 45 The Islamic Q. 307, 320
(No. 4, 2001) {Ibn Khaldun theory is founded on the assumption that the state is a problematic entity that
acts in a way that creates the very conditions for economic misfortune).
75

See Ibn Khaldun, supra n. 32, at Vol. I, 273. Some Muslim scholars could argue on the basis of Ibn
Khaldun's statement in which he declares that the ruler has to protect his citizens from aggression of other
nations, and that the ruler could also exercise unlimited authority in regulating trade. However, Ibn
Khaldun statement must not be interpreted because it is used in referring to military rather than economic
affairs.
76

See Al-Manhaj Al-Iqtis~ad~i F"i Al-IsFam: Bayna Al-Fikr Wa-Al-Tatbiq, supra n. 41, at 104.
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completely wrong. The issue is not to allow one approach (state control of means of
production) to encroach aggressively on the other (free trade). At the present time,
countries adopt elements of both approaches. Therefore, there is no such thing as pure
free trade.
Islamic economics have called for avoidance of israf (waste or extravagance).
Indeed, the term iqtisad (economics) implies the concept of moderation. Islamic
economics is not against materialism per se; rather, it is "excessive" materialism that
Islamic economics shun. Ibn Khaldun also warned of the "obsession" of excessive
materialism. Excessive materialism breeds a culture in which the typical individual
becomes materialistic and luxury-oriented.77 In this kind of culture, the animalistic side of
the human being takes precedence. Based on materialism, a growing individualistic
-70

egoism is bound to be born with the society's social solidarity undermined.

In other

words, individualism, characterized through actions of autonomous and separate persons
within a state, undermines collectivity in which an individual is positioned within a social
context of family or community.

77

See Mahmoud Dhaouadi, An Interpretation of the Implications of Human Nature for Ibn Khaldun's
Thinking, 32 The Islamic Q. 10, 20 (No. 1, 1988) (Ibn Khaldun's position seems to be in line with the
outlook on development in the third world. The emphasis is on human development instead of only on
economic development).
Id. at 20.
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Conclusion
Not only does Islam cover morality and individual's relationship with Allah (s.w.t),
but also does cover trade. Islam regulates every aspect of life including trade. The fact
that the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) started his career as a merchant is unique to the
Islamic Prophecy.
Islamic law is inclined toward free trade. Islamic law condemned imposing tariffs on
trade with other states. Even when tariffs were imposed, they were imposed based on
reciprocity. Moreover, Islamic law provided thought on free trade in areas such as price
mechanism. In general, prices in Islam should be determined on the basis of market
forces. Islam also protects private property. Early Islamic governments did not directly
engage in trade because they understood profitability and competition as self-serving.
The role of early Islamic governments was limited to prevent unfair trade, deception or
fraud. Additionally, the role of the early Islamic states was confined to providing
necessities such as public services and law enforcement.
Although Islamic law is inclined toward free trade, there are certain limitations.
These limitations include the prohibition of trade in illegitimate goods such as pork and
alcohol. In other words, goods that are in conformity with Islamic teachings are
acceptable. Otherwise, these goods and services are prohibited. The other limitation to
free trade in Islam is riba. To avoid the issue of riba and finance trade, new alternatives
have been developed. These alternatives are mudaraba, musharaka, and murabaha. All
these alternatives include the concept of sharing profit and loss. Islamic law also sets out
limitation to trade concerning gharar (uncertainty or speculation). In sum, international
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trade in Islam is trade with an Islamic "purifier". Islamic law embraces Islamic market
economy.
Ibn Khaldun, considered to be the Adam Smith of the Arabs, examined and explored
specialization and social organization of labor. Ibn Khaldun explained that man in his
individual capacity could not satisfy all his needs. However, through division of labor
man can maximize his satisfaction. Division of labor can also be applied to trade among
countries. Specialization and division of labor would lead to increase in production.
Goods could be traded with other countries where demand for these goods is greater than
in the home country. As Ibn Khaldun phrased it, commercial activity on the part of the
ruler is harmful to his subjects and ruinous to the tax revenue. The role of the ruler is to
protect citizens from aggression of other states. In addition, Ibn Khaldun warned of
excessive materialism, whereby the individual becomes materialistic and luxury-oriented.
Excessive materialism leads to individualism which weakens the social solidarity of
society.
Enough resources exist in Islamic jurisprudence that can help Arab countries
integrate into the modern multilateral trading system while abiding by Islamic teachings.
The dimensions of the multilateral trading system must be recognized as an opportunity
and challenge. Arab countries will not steer away from the multilateral trading system as
represented by the WTO

CHAPTER II
ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Chapter I discussed how trade was an integral part of the early Islamic state. The
founder of Islam, Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) was himself a merchant. Islamic law and
economics have rich intellectual heritage as they relate to international trade. While
Islamic law and economics covered areas such as reciprocity, trade finance, taxes,
subsidies, price mechanism, and full measure and weight, they also set limitations on free
trade such as prohibition against trade in alcohol and riba. Arab countries can become
70

integrated in the WTO while abiding by Islamic doctrines.
The proposition in Chapter II is that the WTO is not a perfect institution. However,
the WTO could and must integrate Arab countries in the work of the organization through
accepting membership of Arab countries into the WTO at an accelerated rate, hiring more
staff from Arab countries at the WTO Secretariat, and using Arabic, a language spoken
by 280 million people as a working language along with the other three working
languages (English, Spanish, and French) in the trade body. Additionally, Arab countries
could use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to guard their rights. In light of the
proliferation of regional trade agreements worldwide, it is time for the unfinished
79

For purposes of this dissertation, Arab countries as existing today will be defined as: Algeria, Bahrain,
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Gaza Strip
and West Bank, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
Wherever the term "Greater Syria" is used indicates current Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq.
Whenever the term "Transjordan" is used indicates the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Whenever relevant,
reference will be made to Iran and Afghanistan.
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common Arab economic project to be revisited seriously. A critical examination of
current, bilateral or regional Arab trade agreements must be pursued to identify different
forms of effective economic integration. Current Arab trade agreements are flawed in
part because they exclude sectors or products from their coverage, adopt weak
institutions, and incorporate sloppy enforcement mechanisms.
I. History of International Trade in Arab Countries
Although trade plays a unique role in the history of Islam, it has existed in all
civilizations dating back to ancient times. Trade agreements have come alongside with
trade. For example, Egypt and Babylonia entered into an agreement on payment of
on

tariffs.

The current international trading system is based on the principle of free trade

which dates back to the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and others. The watershed
event in the history of international trade occurred by the repeal of British Corn Laws of
1846 and the conclusion of Cobden-Chevalier trade agreement between Britain and
France in 1860. Other European countries concluded a series of free trade agreements.
However, the ascendancy of free trade did not last long since by the late nineteenth
century European powers engaged in tariff wars.

Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of International Trade Agreements 16 (U. Toronto Press 1992).
1

British Corn Laws were complex speculative regulations on exports and imports of corn which controlled
the entry of corn depending on annual harvest. At the center of the British Corn Laws was the debate
between liberalism and mercantilism which materialized, for the first time, as theories with specific agenda
and membership. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Free Trade: The Repeal of the Corn Laws XIV (Thoemmes
Press 1996). See also Andrew Marrison, Free Trade and its Reception 1815-1960 , Vol. I, 37-43, 70-74,
173 (Routledge 1998).
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Shift of agricultural comparative advantage from Britain to the New World, increase foreign imports and
competition, growing sentiment of nationalism, rise of interest groups, industrial downturn, and eruption of
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At the same time when free trade was in ascendancy in the West, Arab countries in
the East, as a whole, fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for nearly four centuries.
The Ottoman Empire adopted a semi-free trade policy by allowing imports into the
Empire but letting nothing out. This policy created a persistent trade deficit. The Ottoman
Empire adopted such a trade policy based on misinterpretation of religious and economic
rules.83 On the domestic side of trade policy, the Ottoman Empire formed a customs
union, with the exception of Egypt, where all goods were traded duty free.84 Had the
Ottoman Empire allowed exports to flow freely outside the Empire, it would have formed
a stronger customs union and trade negotiating power. Unfortunately, misinterpretation of
religious and economic rules put Ottoman domestic industries at a disadvantage.
The Ottomans concluded trade agreements with the Persians and Europeans. The
most important of those was the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838 between Britain and
the Ottoman Empire.85 The Anglo-Ottoman Convention was followed by series of trade

World War I led to Britain's abandonment of free trade and decline in international trade. See Marrison,
supra n. 81, at 254-255. All of these factors prove that free trade is susceptible to contraction.
83

In pursuing semi-free trade policy, the Ottomans believed that exports impoverish the Empire, low prices
of domestic goods creates favorable export balance, sale to the infidels is immoral, and pressure should be
on the foreign consumer if he wishes to buy Ottoman goods. See Charles Issawi, An Economic History of
the Middle East and North Africa 18 (Columbia U. Press 1982). One wonders if the Ottomans had not
known that increased exports create favorable trade balances since foreign consumers would pay in their
own currencies for imported goods which would ultimately find their way to Ottoman manufacturers; and
Islam nowhere prohibited trade with people of other religions.
84

Ahmad Al-Shirb in i, T ar ikh al-tij arah al-Misr iyahfi 'asral-hurr iyah al-iqtis ad iyah, 18401914 [History of Egyptian Trade in the Age of Free Trade, 1840-1914] 409 (Al-Hay'ah al-Misr~iyah al'"Ammah lil-Kitab 1995).

85

The Anglo-Ottoman Convention prohibited domestic restrictions in the Ottoman Empire. It also imposed
12 percent ad valorem tariff on exports and 5 percent ad valorem tariff on imports. Later on, tariffs on
imports were raised to 8 percent and lowered on exports to 8 percent. See Issawi, supra n. 83, at 19.
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agreements with Iran and France.86 The Ottoman emperors opened the door wide to
foreign producers who enjoyed non-reciprocal access to the Ottoman Empire.87
Egypt rendered itself as a special case in the trade policy of the Ottoman Empire. In
theory, Egypt, as part of the Ottoman Empire, was subject to any international trade
agreement signed by the Ottomans. However, Muhammad Ali adopted a mercantile
policy.88 He wanted to build up an independent military "Egyptian Empire" to secede
from the Ottoman Empire. In pursuing such a political goal, Muhammad Ali created
monopolies, restricted imports to protect domestic industry, used administrative measures
to delay the application of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention in his region, controlled land
distribution and crops plantation, controlled prices of raw materials, directed agricultural
and industrial production to military-related activities such as cloth production for
military personnel.89 In sum, Muhammad Ali centralized the economy.
Muhammad Ali used trade policy to promote his drive of independence from the
Ottoman Empire and then conquered new lands. During his reign, trade became an agent
for the government aimed to amass money and ensure government supervision of
national resources so that they could best be channeled to the army. The trade policy of
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The trade agreement between the Ottoman Empire and France in 1861 imposed 8 percent ad valorem
tariff on imports and exports of the Empire with 1 percent annual reduction until tariff reaches 1 percent.
As for transit goods, the agreement imposed 1 percent ad valorem tariff. If a good in transit warehoused in
the Empire for six months for re-export, 1 percent tariff was applied. If 8 percent tariff had been applied,
good in transit was eligible for drawback in the amount of 7 percent. The trade agreement restricted trade in
weapons and tobacco. The Ottoman Empire and France agreed that the trade agreement expires in 28 years.
See Al-Shirb_in~i, supra n. 84, at 391.
87

Initially, Ottoman emperors made such concessions in order for foreigner manufacturers to produce what
the emperors needed of luxury goods. Id. at 257.
Muhammad Ali was an Albanian officer whom the Ottoman Porte named pasha (viceroy) of Egypt in
1805.
Id. at 12-18.
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Muhammad Ali brought him into conflict with the Ottoman sultan and Britain, since the
latter needed markets in the Middle East for its goods and sought to destroy the regime in
Egypt as a means of exerting influence on the region.90
In 1840, Britain pressed Muhammad Ali to conclude a trade agreement that extended
gradually, through most-favored-nation rule, to Austria and other European countries.
Foreign producers enjoyed concessions and unlimited access to the Egyptian market
while Egyptian producers were hampered by all sorts of barriers. Thus, local producers
were not afforded equal opportunities to compete with foreign capital and foreign
manufacturers controlled the economy.

The conflict that emerged between Muhammad Ali and the Ottoman sultan was settled in 1841. As part
of the settlement, Egypt was given a special status in concluding trade agreements. However, Egypt was
still obligated by the agreements, including trade agreements, concluded by the Ottoman Empire. Thus,
Egypt had the right to enter into trade agreements but within the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire. The
special status of Egypt was rendered useless since the Ottomans obligated Egypt by trade agreements they
concluded. Greece, after independence from the Ottoman Empire, concluded a trade agreement with Egypt
in 1884. Id. at 21, 394-401.
91

Concessions favored foreign manufacturers against nationals in laws and regulations. For example,
foreign producers were exempted from domestic taxes. On the other hand, domestic producers were subject
to all kinds of taxes that hampered their development. Local taxes were imposed on trade between a city
and another city in Egypt which led to higher costs of production. Foreign nationals had their own courts
which had the authority to impose very small fines in the amount of one Egyptian sterling and seven days
in jail and only in cases of misdemeanor. Foreign producers controlled government procurement, especially
in the supply of the army. Domestic factors such as prohibition on riba, limited investment in Sectors other
than agriculture, and government mismanagement and corruption contributed to the plight of the domestic
industry. Some religious leaders would issue fatwas claiming that investing money in companies is haram.
Banks in Egypt were controlled by foreigners as Egyptians believed that collecting interest is forbidden by
Islamic law. In the absence of domestic banking, interest rate on loans given to cotton farmers in Egypt was
sixty percent. Egyptian producers enjoyed growth in cotton production. As a result, Egyptian producers
bought more land. They thought it was more secure to invest in land and agriculture, yet neglecting other
important sectors of the economy. Id. at 31, 52-56, 66-69, 76-80, 94-101. Even though domestic taxes
provided a source of revenue for the government, they also killed the domestic industry. If phase-out
periods or preferential treatment were available in trade agreements of the Ottoman Empire, some domestic
industries would have been more likely to survive. Prohibition on riba is not a sufficient excuse not to
enroll in the banking sector and compete with foreign banks. Egyptian producers needed to diversify
production and export. One would have imagined a scenario if a pest attacked cotton crops in Egypt. It
would have been on the brink of famine akin to the Irish potato famine in the nineteenth century.
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By dependence on foreign trade, Britain had transformed from an advocate of free
trade to imperial power. In 1882, Britain occupied Egypt. Egypt specialized in the
production of cotton as a raw material. On the other hand, domestic producers of
manufactured cotton in Egypt faced tariff restrictions when exporting to Britain.94
Complaints arose in such trade environment created by Britain.

5

It is interesting to note that how quickly the icons of free trade, Britain in the
nineteenth century transformed into colonial powers once they no longer enjoyed to the
fullest their earlier comparative advantage. Trade policy of colonial powers was to find
new land from which raw materials can be obtained and exploited that land's cheap labor.
These raw materials would be manufactured in the imperialist countries and then reexported to the colonies.
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In 1878, Gladstone condemned the concept of occupation as immoral and unnecessary. Additionally,
Cobden, a Manchester industrialist and leading member of the anti-corn league, believed that free trade
should not lead to imperialism.
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In 1849, cotton exports from Egypt were 31 percent of total exports. After the British occupation, cotton
exports were 81 percent of total exports. In terms of trade volume, in the nineteenth century Britain
received 43 percent of Egypt exports. From 1885-1889, Egypt received 63 percent of its imports from
Britain. Id. at 25, 51, 247, 282, 342, 384.
94

Britain has lost its title as "workhouse of the world" as a result of growing competition, increased
imports, and high percentages of unemployment. Therefore, Britain focused on its colonies as markets for
its production. In order to achieve this, Britain had to restrict the development of the colonies' native
industries so as not to compete with the mother country. The U.S. emerged from the civil war with an
industrial revolution in its perspective. It closed its market to foreign goods. See Marrison, supra n. 81, at
190-191. In the 1890s, Britain along with France applied their protectionist policy toward their colonies in
Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
95

One Egyptian pamphlet said, "who among you can trade in Britain. . . . who among you works in Paris
Customs service . . . as we have here. .. . even if you trade in Paris you see a French man who buys from
you even if the goods are not available in his country". Al-Ahram newspaper wrote that domestic
consumers, the rich, followed the taste and the clothing of the Europeans. Al-Ahali newspaper also wrote,
"Egyptians were affected by the customs of the west. . . this killed the eastern Egyptian industry . . . before
that Egyptian was Egyptian in his clothing, food, and drink . . . .". See Al-Shirb in i, supra n. 84, at 56,
257, 403.
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By early twentieth century, trade was pursued on a bilateral basis in the absence of
international agreements or institutions. The U.S., one of the biggest trade policymakers
of that time, passed the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 which increased tariffs significantly
and encouraged retaliation from other trade powers in Europe. Subsequently, many
conferences were held to restore the world's confidence in the trading system, but with
little success.96
During the 1930s, Arab countries applied high tariffs. Arab countries also introduced
new mechanisms such as quotas, exchange controls, and import and export licensing.97
From the 1930s and onwards, each Arab country followed its own trade policy in seeking
to achieve the take-off stage of economic development.
Recognizing the devastation created by protectionist trade policies, the Allies held
the Bretton Woods conference.98 The Bretton Woods institutions initially envisioned to
include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the International Trade
Organization (ITO). The ultimate goal for the Bretton Woods institutions was to abandon

96

Some of the conferences were the International Financial Conference in 1920, the Genoa Conference in
1922, and the World Monetary Conference in 1933. See Rondo Cameron, A Concise Economic History of
the World 358-359 (3rd ed., Oxford U. Press 1997).
97

98

See Issawi, supra n. 83, at 22.

On July 1-22, 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference was held in the resort town of Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire. Some 700 delegates from 44 states participated in the Conference. The participants held a
preparatory process for the Bretton Woods Conference in U.S. in cities such as Atlantic City, New Jersey.
See Raymond F. Mikesell, The Bretton Woods Debates: A Memoir 30 (Princeton U. 1994).
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protectionist trade policies, rebuild the deteriorating world economy, and regulate the
economic relationship especially among the major economic powers at that time."
In October 1945, the United Nations (U.N.) was established.100 The Bretton Woods
institutions are part of the U.N system.

In 1947, representatives of fifty-seven countries

met in Havana, Cuba to negotiate the Havana Charter which was intended to create the
1 07

ITO.

The Havana Charter would have complemented the roadmap of the international

economic order.103 However, the U.S. Congress never ratified the Havana Charter.104 The
ITO was pronounced dead in 1951.

Harry D. White, a leading U.S. economist of that era, envisioned the IMF as an institution designed
chiefly to prevent the disruption of foreign exchange, strengthen monetary and credit systems, and help in
the restoration of foreign trade, whereas the World Bank was designed chiefly to supply huge volume of
capital to the United Nations and associated nations needed for reconstruction, relief, and economic
recovery. Id. at 30.
100

The charter of the U.N determined, among other goals, the establishment of international relations based
on principles of equality among nations and cooperation to resolve the economic and social problems.
Moreover, the charter established the Economic and Social council. The purpose of the Economic and
Social council is to achieve prosperity, stability, and justice. See U.N CHARTER art. 1, para. 3, art. 2, para.
1. The first meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the U.N was in 1946. The meeting called for an
international conference on trade and employment, establishment of preparatory committee for a
convention on promoting free trade, and the establishment of the ITO. See U. N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Plenary
Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/22 (1946).
101

However, in practice, the Bretton Woods institutions operated separately from the U.N.

1

The process of drafting a charter for the ITO passed through four stages: 1) the original American draft
of Sept. 1946, 2) draft charter revised at the London meeting of the preparatory committee of the
international conference for trade and employment between Oct.-Nov. 1946 (the London Draft), 3) further
revised draft in Geneva in Apr.-Aug. 1947 (the Geneva Draft), and 4) the charter revised in Havana in Nov.
1947-Mar. 1948 (the Havana Charter). See Jonathan Reuvid, A Handbook of World Trade: A Strategic
Guide to Trading Internationally 5 (KoganPage 2001).
103
See U.S. Dept. State, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (Off. Pub. Affairs 1948).
The Havana Charter provided commitments on Tariffs, Preferences, Internal Taxation and Regulation (arts.
16-19), Quantitative Restrictions and Related Exchange Matters (arts. 20-24), Subsidies (arts. 25-28), State
Trading and Related Matters (arts. 29-32), General Commercial Provisions on Freedom of Transit, AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties (arts. 33-39), Special Provisions for Free Trade Areas and Customs
Unions and Consultation (arts. 40-45), Restrictive Business Practices (arts. 46-54), and Inter-Governmental
Commodity Agreements (arts. 55-70).
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Signatories of the Havana Charter included some Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq,
Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Transjordan, and Tunisia. Had the U.S. Congress ratified the
ITO Charter at its birth, those Arab countries would have become members of the ITO.
Arab countries would have become integrated in the world economic system.
In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was concluded in
Geneva as an interim agreement until the creation of the ITO. 05 Many articles of Havana
Charter 1948 and GATT 1947 duplicated each other, though the Charter was more

The U.S. President submitted the ITO draft charter to Congress in 1948 but it did not move beyond a
vote in the Senate. In 1951, the President announced that he would no longer seek approval. The death of
the ITO was attributed to the domestic political situation in the U.S. The Truman administration
confronted a new protectionist and isolationist Republican Congress. The U.S. refused to join the ITO
because of perceived threats to national sovereignty and the danger of too much ITO intervention in
markets. Congress feared that the ITO would be too much supranational. It was feared that there would be
double delegation of power from Congress to the U.S. President and from the President to an international
organization, thereby usurping the functions of Congress. In other words, an international organization
would establish a World Government. Also, the U.S. Congressional support for the ITO was conditioned
on dismantling of the British Imperial Preference system (Commonwealth system) devised at the Ottawa
Conference in 1932; a system which was enacted partly in response to the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Act,
because, as the U.S. contended, it contravened the most-favored-nation rule. Because of the British
Commonwealth system, U.S. economic interests were excluded from the British market and its satellite
countries or dominions, such as South Africa, Canada, and India. The British refused to yield their
position unless they received assurances from Congress to lower American tariffs. However, the U.S.
administration did not lower its tariffs and stood for its pledge to Congress by dismantling the British
Commonwealth system [despite an earlier agreement between the U.S. and Britain, the Lend-Lease
Agreement in Mar. 1941, which mandated dismantling trade barriers]. The linkage between the mostfavored-nation rule and the Commonwealth system was a factor for loss of support for the ITO. Moreover,
the U.S. constitution authorizes congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. See U.S. Const, art.l,
5 2. Therefore, the U.S. Congress considered the Executive had exceeded its mandate under the
constitution. In the 1950s, there had been an agreement for the establishment of the Organization for
Trade Co-operation (OTC) that would take over the GATT and police world trade. See George Bronz, An
International Trade Organization: The Second Attempt, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 440, 447-449, 473-476 (1956).
President Eisenhower asked Congress to allow the U.S. to become a member of the OTC. However, again,
there was difficulty shepherding the OTC bill through Congress.
105

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Al, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187. The GATT has no formal relationship to the U.N. The GATT is not a U.N agency. However,
GATT maintains close relation with the U.N. For example, the Geneva-based International Trade Center is
run jointly by GATT and UNCTAD.
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comprehensive.

Since the ITO never came into existence from its inception, the GATT

had to operate as an agreement and as a de facto organization for decades.1 7
GATT 1947 was negotiated by twenty three countries. As an agreement, it never
itself came into force. GATT was always applied provisionally through the Protocol of
Provisional Application.,uo GATT 1947 was a code under which countries will conduct
their mutual commercial relations. The purpose of the GATT was to establish an open
system of world trade between the contracting parties.
The non-discriminatory provisions of article I (MFN Treatment) and article III
(National Treatment on InternalTaxation and Regulation), article II (Schedule of
Concessions), and article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) in GATT
1947 are the "key" provisions which express its basic structure.109 GATT 1947 includes

If the ITO came into existence, GATT 1947 would have been incorporated in the ITO. Drafters of the
GATT contemplated that once the Havana Charter entered into force, and with it the ITO, Part II of the
GATT, which contains the bulk of the international legal commitments (other than the most-favored-nation
obligation and tariff commitments), would be suspended. Countries in the ITO are referred to as
"members" while under the GATT 1947 they are referred to as "contracting parties". If an article denotes to
all parties of the GATT, then contracting parties is written in capital letters "CONTRACTING PARTIES".
If, however, an article denotes to one party to the GATT, then contracting party is written in lowercase
"contracting party". See id. at art. XXV. 1. U.S. negotiators, under the mandate of domestic law, invented
the term "contracting party" in GATT 1947 to avoid the suggestion of an organization.
107

When Congress failed to ratify the ITO Charter, the GATT was renewed every three years until it was
made a permanent organization in 1955.
108

In order to enter into force, article XXVI.6 of GATT 1947 requires governments with a minimum share
of world trade to deposit their instruments of acceptance. However, only a few countries did so. Therefore,
the GATT was applied through the Protocol of Provisional Application. See Protocol of Provisional
Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, 55 U.N.T.S.
308.
109

Article I of GATT requires each contracting party to extend, immediately and unconditionally, any
advantage, favor, privilege, and immunity given to a product of a contracting party to the "like product" of
all other contracting parties. The GATT includes seventeen provisions using the words like product, like
commodity, and like merchandise. Decisions on what constitutes like product are made on a case-by-case
basis after applying a variety of criteria that GATT panels have found to be relevant, including product
characteristics, consumer tastes and habits, and product end-uses in a particular market. In general, like
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articles that support and extend articles I and III.110 GATT 1947 includes other articles
that qualify articles I and III.,

There are other articles concerned with special cases.112

GATT 1947 includes procedural articles that govern the application of the GATT.113

II. Lebanon and Syria in GATT 1947
Of the twenty-three original contracting parties to the GATT 1947, only two,
Lebanon and Syria, were from the Arab Middle East.114 However, Lebanon withdrew

product has a broader interpretation when it is used in GATT 1947 basic obligations, such as the MFN
treatment, and a narrower interpretation in GATT 1947 exceptions, such as article VI regarding antidumping and countervailing duties. See Rex J. Zedalis, A Theory of the GATT "Like Product" Common
Language Cases, 27 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 33, 45-51, 78-83 (1994). Article II requires each contracting
party to apply to products of other contracting parties tariff concessions stated in its schedule. Tariffs
concessions could be easily nullified if a contracting party was allowed to impose internal taxes,
regulations, or laws on imported products different from those imposed on domestic products once
imported products pass the borders of the importing country. Article III protects the "competitive
opportunities" enjoyed by imports vis-a-vis like domestic products in the importing country. For illustrative
cases under article III of GATT 1947 see Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 Wis. Intl.
L.J. 421, 432, 433 (1998). Article XI of GATT 1947 provides for tariffication of non-tariff trade barriers,
except under specific conditions.
Articles IV (Special Provisions Relating to Cinematograph Films), V (Freedom of Transit), VIII (Fees
and Formalities Connected with Importation and Exportation), XIII (Non-Discriminatory Administration of
Quantitative Restrictions), and XVII (State Trading Enterprises) support the non-discriminatory provisions
of GATT 1947.
Articles VI (Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties), XII (Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of
Payments), XVIII (Government Assistance to Economic Development), XIX (Emergency Action on
Imports of Particular products), XX (General Exceptions), XXI (Security Exceptions), XXIV (Customs
Unions and Free-Trade Areas), and XXVIII (Modification of Schedules) qualify the operation of the nondiscriminatory provisions of GATT 1947.
Articles VII (Valuation for Customs Purposes), IX (Marks of Origin), X (Publication and
Administration of Trade Regulations), XXIII (Nullification or Impairment), and part IV (Trade and
Development) address special circumstances. Part IV of GATT 1947 was added in the Kennedy Round to
meet the interests of developing countries. See Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Cases and Materials
104 (Michie 1996).
113

Articles XXV (Joint Action by the Contracting Parties), XXVI (Acceptance, Entry into Force and
Registration), XXX (Amendments), XXXI (Withdrawal), XXXIII (Accession), and XXXV (NonApplication of the Agreement between Particular Contracting Parties) govern procedurals matters in GATT
1947.
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from GATT four years later. Six months after Lebanon's withdrawal from the GATT,
Syria followed suit.115 Today, neither are members of the WTO because they withdrew
from the GATT in 1951. Lebanon and Syria did not attempt to join the GATT/WTO until
1999 and 2001 respectively.116
In 1950, Lebanon notified the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to
withdraw from the GATT.

7

The only hint for withdrawal was the need for "readapting".

A contracting party under the provisions of GATT 1947 is not obligated to clarify its
reasons for withdrawal from the GATT.118 Moreover, since GATT was applied through
the Protocol of Provisional Application, any contracting party can withdraw from the
Protocol on sixty days' notice rather than the six months' notice required by article XXXI
of the GATT.

In addition to Lebanon and Syria, there were eight other developing countries as follows: Burma,
Ceylon, Republic of Chile, Republic of China, Republic of Cuba, India, Pakistan, and Southern Rhodesia.
115

See Notification of Withdrawal of the Government of Syria from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, June 7, 1951, 90 U.N.T.S. 324.
116

The Working Party on accession of Lebanon was established in Apr. 1999. A formal request for
accession under Article XII of the WTO was sent to the Director-General of the WTO by Syria on Oct. 10,
2001 and was circulated to WTO members on Oct. 30, 2001. See Working Party on the Accession of
Syrian Arab Republic, Request for Accession Pursuant to Article XII, WT/ACC/SYR/1 (October 30, 2001).
11

Then Lebanese Foreign Minister Philippe Takal communicated his government intention to withdraw
from GATT 1947 without further elaboration for the reasons of withdrawal. In his communication he said,
"I have the honor to inform you that owing to the necessity of readapting decided to denounce the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade signed in Geneva on 30 Oct. 1947, and this is in conformity with
Paragraph 5 of the Protocol of Provisional Application signed on the same date. Lebanon wishes
nevertheless to remain a member of the General Conference of the ITO". See Notification of Withdrawal of
the Government of Lebanon from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Dec. 27, 1950, 77 U.N.T.S.
367.
See GATT, supra n. 105, art. XXXI.
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One may suspect that.the reason for Lebanese withdrawal was the consideration by
Israel to join the GATT.119 In 1947, the government of the United Kingdom, acting as a
mandatory power for Palestine, opened negotiations for the accession of Palestine to the
GATT. Negotiations for Palestine's accession resulted in Schedule XIX that contained
concessions granted by the government of the United Kingdom. However, after the
United Kingdom ceased to be a contracting party to the GATT with respect to the
customs territory formerly included in the Palestine mandate, Israel made no declaration
indicating its willingness to be bound by the GATT.120 Therefore, Israel (the successor
state) was not bound by the concessions negotiated by the United Kingdom (the
predecessor state). It was not until 1962 when Israel assumed full status in the GATT.121
Lebanon had at its disposal an alternative option that it could have invoked rather
than an outright withdrawal. The non-application clause of article XXXV of the GATT
clearly stipulates that the GATT will not apply between a contracting party (Lebanon in
that case) and an acceding country (Israel) if either one of them does not agree to its

Israel was established as an independent state on May 14, 1948. See Israel's Present Position in
Relation to G.A.T.T., 2 Econ. News 75, 76-78, Dec. 1949 (The advantages of Israel's adherence to the
GATT would mean that, within the framework of the MFN doctrine, it would find itself in possession of
rights similar to those of other GATT states. The main disadvantage of acceding to the GATT is the
restriction of freedom to enter into bilateral agreements affecting trade policy. Since Israel was only at the
first stages of developing its economy, it might be premature to give up already now Israel's liberty to find
out which principles it has to choose as definite).
See GATT Secretariat, The Position of Palestine in Relation to the Agreement: Item 8 of the Agenda to
theAnnecy GATT Conference, GATT Doc. No. GATT/CP.3/17, page 1, Apr. 29, 1949 (The doctrine of
state succession in international law is not well defined, but generally speaking, the authorities agree that
there is no automatic succession to obligations arising from commercial treaties such as the GATT. The
fact that the obligations under the GATT are far-reaching and important reinforces the conclusion that there
should be no succession).
121

Israel was party to the GATT through the application of provisional accession in 1959. See GATT
Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice 961 (6th ed., Contracting Parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994).
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application of the other party "at the time of accession".122 Resorting to article XXXV is
more convincing especially as article XXXV was added at the first session of the
Contracting Parties in 1948, well before Lebanon's withdrawal.123 Therefore, Lebanon
could have employed article XXXV if Israel was to accede to the GATT.

III. Arab Countries and UNCTAD and WTO
From the birth of the GATT in 1947 until 1993, few Arab countries have joined the
GATT-type multilateral trading system.124 Like many other developing countries, Arab
countries, after the end of colonialism, called for a new world economic order that would
take their development needs into account.125 Thus, the United Nations Conference on

122

India set a precedent when it became the first country to invoke article XXXV in 1948 with respect to
South Africa. See Id. at 958. Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia invoked article XXXV of GATT with respect to
Israel upon their accession to the GATT. See Ariel M. Ezrahi, Opting Out of Opt-Out Clauses: Removing
Obstacles to International Trade and International Peace, 31 L & Poly Intl. Bus. 123, 138 (1999).
123

See supra n. 121, at 961.

124

Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia were the only countries to join the GATT 1947. For
example, Egypt and Tunisia first acceded to the GATT provisionally. Provisional accession means that the
GATT contracting parties extend the GATT rights including tariff concession to acceding countries if the
latter reciprocate. However, acceding countries did not have a direct right regarding tariff concessions
negotiated prior to their accession to the GATT. In other words, acceding countries were not entitled to
compensation in case tariff concessions were withdrawn.
125

The main reason for not joining the GATT system was the doctrine of reciprocity embedded in the
GATT. The doctrine of reciprocity obliges countries to reciprocate their concessions. See Adeoye
Akinsanya & Arthur Davies, Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order: An Overview,
33 Intl. & Comp. L. Q. 208 (1984). See also Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)
(the new international economic order should be founded on full respect for preferential and non-reciprocal
treatment for developing countries, wherever feasible, in all fields of international economic cooperation
whenever possible).
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Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was born. The UNCTAD was set up as a permanent
organ of the U.N General Assembly in 1964, and it meets every four years.126
In UNCTAD, negotiations were conducted by the bloc approach, with "the Group of
77" representing the developing countries.127 UNCTAD can be best described as the
developing countries' GATT. Over the span of its life, UNCTAD's most cited
achievement is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) whereby developed
countries give preferential, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory treatment to
developing countries trade.12 Although the GSP has functioned with relative success, its
limited coverage of beneficiary countries and products, coupled with conditions that
beneficiary countries must meet before being eligible for such a preferential treatment led
to disgruntling feelings on the part of the recipients. Moreover, many of UNCTAD tasks
now fallwithin the contours of the WTO whose membership is essentially the same.

' UNCTAD held its first meeting in 1964 in Geneva, Switzerland. See Kele Onyejekwe, International
Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the European Union and the United States, 26 St. Mary's L.J.
425, 447 (1995) (the foundation of the new international economic order movement was the theory of
"structuralism" which called for a fundamental realignment of the international order to correct deep
imbalances between developed and developing countries that would, if uncorrected, perpetuate
underdevelopment).
There were four lists. African countries, Asian countries, and Yugoslavia fell under List A. List B
contained the developed capitalist countries. Latin American and Caribbean countries were under List C.
List D included the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Countries on Lists A and C formed the Group of
77. In reality, the number of countries in the Group of 77 is more than 77. Id. at 447.
128

Other UNCTAD achievements included concluding codes of conduct such as code of conduct on
transfer of technology, code of conduct on liner conferences, and code of conduct on restrictive business
practices and commodity agreements for products such as sugar, copper, and coffee. Many of those codes
and commodity agreements fell by the wayside either due to objections from List B developed countries
who were outvoted in the approval of those codes or disagreement among developed and developing
countries over their share in commodity quotas.
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However, UNCTAD still has a role to play even though the WTO made UNCTAD
relatively anachronistic.
Arab countries are believed to have little enthusiasm for the general free trade agenda
that the WTO encourages.130 In practice, the majority of Arab countries are protectionist
1^1

and are likely to stay that way for the years to come.

Arab countries are interested in

guarding their sovereignty and protecting domestic industry from flood of foreign
imports. Arab countries do not acknowledge the benefits the WTO offers.132 Trade
liberalization is perceived as a threat to cultural traditions.
The WTO created a new reality, and Arab countries cannot afford not to join.134 One
can pose the following question: can Arab countries imagine getting engaged in the

129

See Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration,and
Democracy 29-35 (MIT Press 1998) ("recalling the glory of UNCTAD under the leadership of Raul
Prebisch, was an institution ahead of the curve. The memory of the institution has faded in OECD countries
where it has become commonplace in some influential quarters to think of UNCTAD as if it was instead
UNWASHED and UNKEMPT. It has been criticized that the institution focuses on politics rather than
economics, and it is too partisan"). The reasons for the OECD displeasure with UNCTAD may be the fact
that it encompasses a majority of developing countries with strong voting power.
130

See David R. Karasik, Securing the Peace Dividend in the Middle East: Amending GA TT Article XXIV
to Allow Sectoral Preferences in Free Trade Areas, 18 Mich. J. Intl. L. 527, 545 (1997).
131

For example, Arab countries adopt fixed exchange rates, impose customs duties on manufactured goods,
restrict access to service suppliers, and institute preferential government purchasing programs. Even if the
idea of free trade has been accepted, the practical application of its principles might be highly unpopular
among politically sensitive groups across Arab countries. Id. at 545.
132

M a t 545.

133

Prince Bandar Bin Salman Bin Mohammad Al-Saud remarked that each country has its own experience
and the way it deals with foreign investment, e-commerce, and WTO which corresponds with its system,
culture, and belief. See Opening Remarks, Strengthening Relations with Arab and Islamic Countries
through International Law: E-Commerce, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and Foreign Investment,
Papers Emanating from the Fourth PCA International Law Seminar, October 12, 2001 (Intl Bureau,
Permanent Ct. of Arbitration ed. 2001).
The following are the Arab countries that joined the WTO: Bahrain (Jan. 1, 1995), Djibouti (May 31,
1995), Oman (Nov. 9, 2000), Qatar (Jan. 13, 1996), United Arab Emirates (Apr. 10, 1996), and Jordan
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multilateral trading system without being part of the WTO? With the world becoming
more and more economically integrated, Arab countries will have the chance to be
1 T C

involved and their interests represented appropriately.

t

In an era of internationalizing

the economy, any Arab country which does not join would be isolated.
Adhering to the rules of the WTO may enhance global confidence in the Arab
countries, and thus likely to increase foreign direct investment.

As for the individual

Arabic citizen, one can imagine how consumers would be if all those goods not made in
his home country became available at his fingertips. The loss of sovereignty is not
specific to Arab countries but for all countries joining the WTO.137 Membership in the
WTO would ensure Arab countries a fair forum for settling their potential trade disputes

(Apr. 11, 2000). In addition there are seven other Arab countries in the process of joining: Algeria, Iraq,
Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen.
135

Developing countries had noticeable impact on developed countries in the WTO. For example,
Guatemala and Ecuador, not satisfied with the settlement of the banana dispute, blocked the proposal of the
EC to obtain a waiver for the Fiji Convention that gives preferential treatment for African, Caribbean, and
Pacific (ACP) countries. Developing countries played an important role in the debate over the selection of
Director General for the WTO to replace Renato Ruggeiro in 1999. Additionally, developing countries
aired their concerns toward the green room negotiations module in Seattle Ministerial meeting. See Debra
P. Steger, Peace and Prosperity Through Trade, supra n. 133 at 182-183.
136

The cornerstones of economic freedom include: personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to
compete, and security of privately-owned property. In a study conducted on economic freedom in the
world, Jordan ranked 36 in 2002, Bahrain ranked 31, Morocco ranked 83, and Egypt ranked 74 . See James
Gwartney & Robert Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World: Annual Report 53, 81, 107-120 (2004) (The
Fraser Inst. 2004).
137

The U.S. and other developed countries have much more to worry about in terms of sovereignty since
they have many great issues at stake. For more on sovereignty see Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political
Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 Stan. J. Intl. L. 195, 203, 208 (2004) (despite the long history of the
sovereignty concept, it has always been a term in search of a definition. The notion of sovereignty has
always been problematic and ephemeral. The U.S. approach toward sovereignty is grounded on the legacy
of American exceptionalism. For the U.S., joining the WTO met with opposition and suspicion. Joining the
WTO amounted to the surrender of U.S. sovereignty. On the other hand, for small countries, accession to
regional and global bodies gives them more sovereignty). Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, any
member of Congress can offer a joint resolution every five years to have the U.S. withdraw from the WTO.
This is an example of U.S. concern over ceding its sovereignty by joining the WTO.
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with other members who may wield more trading power. Reviewing some of the WTO
1 ^8

cases would reveal this fact.

WTO agreements have safety valves such as antidumping

measures that can be used provisionally to counter imports.
IV. The Uruguay Round
The GATT 1947 was the beginning of a series of negotiations that ended up with the
establishment of the WTO in 1994. Countries held eight rounds of negotiations which led
ultimately to the birth of the WTO fifty years later with the successful conclusion of the
Uruguay Round negotiations.139 Over the span of eight rounds, there has been an increase
in the number of the participating countries in those rounds, time lapsing between the
starting of the negotiations and their conclusions, change of the venue of negotiations
from developed countries to developing countries as the number of participating
developing countries increased, and a variety of items discussed at the negotiations
table.140
In earlier years, countries held negotiations on a product-by-product basis. In the
Kennedy Round, countries adopted across-the-board method.

Countries shifted from

138

See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1996).
139

For a list highlighting the eight rounds of negotiations see appendix 1, table 1, p 333. For more on the
Doha Development Agenda see Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System 68, 115
(Mike Moore ed., Cambridge U. Press 2004) (the study, conducted by the WTO Advisory group set up by
former WTO Director General Mike Moore, addresses the challenges facing the WTO and the development
dimension of the multilateral trading system).
140

Even though negotiations may first start in a developing country, subsequent negotiations are held in
Geneva.
141

See G.J.Lanjouw, International Trade Institutions 10 (Open U. Netherlands 1995). In the Tokyo Round,
participants adopted a mathematical tariff reduction formula applied on industrial tariffs, known as the
Swiss formula. It works as follows:
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negotiating tariffs reductions to negotiating non-tariff barriers as they are being erected
such as voluntary exports restraints or orderly marketing agreements.142
Despite the obvious achievements of the GATT rounds, there were loopholes in the
trading system.143 The GATT operated as an agreement and a pragmatic institution. For
example, although article XXV (3) & (4) call for one vote per nation and decisions to be
taken by majority vote, in practice consensus was developed among parties. Consensus
means that any party can block the adoption of a decision or an agreement. For example,
any Arab country can prevent the adoption of a panel decision.
To avoid the "free rider" problem, countries adopted the code approach.144 Under the
code approach, countries in the Tokyo Round created two level trade regimes: the GATT
1947 and the codes themselves. Since codes were open to whoever accepted them,

z = ax/x + a where z is post-Tokyo Round tariff rate, x is the pre-Tokyo Round tariff rate, and a is a
constant. In other words, the Swiss formula means products with higher tariffs would be subject to deeper
cuts, thus bringing them closer to lower-tariff products by incorporating a non-linear approach and forming
the degree of cuts on the basis of a single agreed coefficient. Under the Swiss formula, the smaller the
coefficient figure, the greater the cuts required.
142

Voluntary exports restraints or orderly marketing agreements are classical examples of new
protectionism. Those agreements are theoretically not barred by the GATT. Voluntary exports restraints or
orderly marketing agreements are self-imposed restrictions on trade by an exporting country rather than
discriminatory quantitative restrictions by an importing country, which would be prohibited. For an
explanation on the reasons for the use of non-tariffs barriers and the shift in trade policy of the U.S. see
Edward John Ray, The Political Economy of International Trade Law and Policy: Changing Patterns of
Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariffs Barriers, 8 Nw. J. Intl. & Bus. 285, 294-298,
303-305 (1987).
143

The first Secretary-General of the GATT, Eric Wyndham White, referred to the GATT as "It is anything
but neat and orderly". See Gardner. Patterson & Eliza. Patterson, The Roadfrom GATT to the MTO, 3
Minn. J. Global Trade 35, 37 (1994). As the acronym of the GATT indicates, GATT scope was limited
only to tariffs and trade in goods. It did not contain rules aimed at the liberalization of trade in services and
other sectors.
144

According to the MFN doctrine in GATT 1947, any concession agreed between two parties will extend
automatically and unconditionally to a third contracting party without the latter's adherence to any
obligation.

52
membership in these codes was at variance.145 Therefore, codes were open only to those
countries that were prepared to accept the rights and obligations contained in them. The
code approach eroded one of the basic principles of the GATT, viz, the unconditional
MFN doctrine. The rights and obligations under those codes were not extended to all
members of GATT, but only to those who accepted them.
The GATT gives special treatment to the developing countries.146 However, in
practice, developing countries' needs have not yet been met in the trading system.1 7
Since justice demands that equals be treated equally, it also requires that unequals be
treated unequally, at least, in proportion to the inequality to achieve equality among all in
the end. Therefore, the GSP was created to meet the demands of developing countries.

14

See Paul Demart, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade
Organization, 34 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 123, 128-129 (1995). While most developed countries were
signatories to the codes, many countries, especially developing ones, remained outside. For example, the
number of developing countries which signed on to the following codes were: Technical Barriers to Trade
14, Subsidies 13, Import Licensing 10, Customs Valuation 9, Antidumping 9, and Government
Procurement 3. See Beverly M. Carl, Trade and the Developing World in the 21ST Century 85 (Transnatl.
Publishers 2001).
146

For example, article XVIII authorizes a country to restrict imports for the establishment of a particular
industry or for balance of payment purposes. Developed countries should not expect reciprocity in
concessions from developing countries. Article XXVIII.a bis stipulates that the needs of less-developed
countries for the use of tariffs to protect their economies and for revenue purposes must be taken into
account. Moreover, an enabling clause was developed so as to give permanent preferential treatment to
developing countries during the Tokyo Round. The so-called "Enabling clause" was developed through a
decision taken by the contracting parties to the GATT. The text of the clause states that contracting parties
"may" accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries. Abdulqawi A. Yusef,
Differential and More Favorable Treatment: The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J.W.T. 488 496-498, 506
(1980).
147

Part VI, was qualified by many words that rendered it aspirations rather than legal binding
commitments. For example, under article XXXVII. 1, developed countries can apply preferential treatment
to the "fullest extent possible." See Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law
and the promise of Development, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1715 (1995).
148

The GSP was seen as an ex gratia favor on the part of the developed countries. For more on the views
of the critics and proponents of the GSP see Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in
the Law of GATT: Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading System, 18 Cal. W. Intl.
L. J. 302, 315, 322 (1987/88). Ten Arab countries are designated as beneficiaries of the U.S. GSP: Bahrain,
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However, as trade negotiations reduce tariffs further, the MFN rate will equal the GSP
rate. Thus, benefits for developing countries would be eroded.149
GATT 1947 contained general provisions regarding how to settle disputes in articles
XXII and XXIII. Formal legal actions in the GATT were seen as unfriendly. Therefore,
the GATT developed the diplomacy rule.

The EC took the view that dispute settlement

under the GATT should be a natural consequence of the negotiation process, known as
the pragmatic approach.151 On the other hand, the U.S. viewed the dispute system under
the GATT as a rule-based system in which violations are exposed and subject to
sanctions, known as the adjudication approach.

The consensus approach applied

Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. See Carl, supra n. 145, at
522-523, 341. Country membership in OPEC would disqualify them from GSP benefits. On the other hand,
U.S. GSP identifies as ineligible for GSP any country that belongs to a group of countries that "withholds
supplies of vital commodity resources or to raise the price of such commodities to an unreasonable level,
and to cause serious disruption of the world economy. This condition includes the implicit OPEC reference.
As the list indicates the GSP system is not a general system. The GSP is established on the basis of pick
and choose. The GSP list can be changed from time to time upon the occurrence of certain conditions.
149

Although the assumption of erosion of preferences might have been true for GSP products, it did not
hold true for non-GSP covered imports from developing countries that could have benefited from MFN
tariff reduction at the end of the Tokyo Round. See Bela Balassa, The Tokyo Round and the Developing
Countries 14 J.W.T. 98 (1980).
150

For review of the legal action and diplomacy approaches and the drawbacks of the GATT 1947 dispute
mechanism see Richerd G. Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 Duke L.J. 829, 835-838, 840-848 (1995). Harold H. Koh, The Legal
Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 12 Yale J. Intl. L. 193, 194-197 (1987) and Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the
Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 Intl. L. 389, 392-405 (1995).
151

Countries advocating the pragmatic approach, highlighted the ambiguity of GATT rules, the political
sensitivity of trade disputes, and the complex trade-offs of competing interests that go into the formulation
of any trade rule. Thus, those countries argued that GATT dispute resolution should not be formal, legal, or
adjudicatory. See David K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth and International Economic Order, 26 Harv. Intl. L.J. 533
(1985).
152

The U.S. argued that the GATT rules will become more clear and predictable if the GATT dispute
resolution is characterized by rule-based decisions rendered through an adjudicatory dispute resolution
process. The adjudication approach will increase compliance with the GATT standards and will alleviate
protectionist pressures. See John H. Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations:
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practically by the GATT meant that any decision taken by the GATT Council could be
blocked even by the challenged party at any level of the dispute.
Against this background, the GATT parties decided, at their 1986 Punta del Este
Ministerial meeting, to launch the Uruguay Round. The agenda covered traditional
GATT subjects such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers, subsidies, and safeguards. It also added
intellectual property, services, and trade-related investment measures. It also specifically
provided that the results of the Uruguay Round "shall be treated as parts of a single
undertaking".153 In other words, participants would accept all the results or nothing.154
Almost seven years later, the Uruguay Round came to an end. It brought with it
legalization of world trade politics after the GATT was considered a geopolitical
document created to contain the spread of non-market ideology to other countries.155 In
addition to all areas covered in the negotiations, the WTO institution was established.
The functions of the WTO, as set out in Article III of the WTO Charter, are to provide the
framework for the implementation of all the agreements that had been or might be

Cases, Materials, and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational Economic
Relations 339 (3rd ed., West 1995). Adjudication approach advocates could be called "trade litigators".
One can imagine if the EC approach was followed how developing countries would be harmed otherwise in
the adjudication approach. By and large, the most important achievement of the WTO 1994 is to have a
panel and Appellate Body making no difference between small or big trading countries. All is equal. The
cases decided so far by the WTO panels and Appellate Body bear witness that no bullying by big countries
in the system is tolerated any more.
153

Single undertaking is known also as the principle of globality or single roof policy. See Demart, supra n.
145, at 134. See also generally Thomas J. Dillon, The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade? 16 Mich. J. Intl. L. 349 (1995).

154

The Punta del Este Declaration recognized the need to establish legal basis for new dispute settlement
procedures, new institutional framework for the Secretariat, and cooperation with other international
organizations to the end of ensuring greater coherence in global economic policy-making. See Ministerial
Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Sept. 20, 1986), 25 I.L.M. 1623.
155

At some point, U.S. officials declared GATT a Western-type of document.
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negotiated. In addition, it provides the forum for future trade negotiations, and administer
the dispute settlement system and the trade policy review mechanism.156 The function of
the WTO as a forum for future trade negotiations allows for further evolution of the
international trading system to include new multilateral agreements between its members.
The Uruguay Round results both clarified and extended existing GATT obligations
in virtually every facet.157 Many of the WTO Agreements establish specific treatment for
developing and least developing countries. Special treatment for developing and least
developing countries takes the form of a prolonged transitional period accompanied with
lesser obligations normally imposed on countries participating in these agreements.
In one of its most impressive successes, the WTO provides a unified dispute
resolution regime in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the

The covered agreements of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round include, in addition to the WTO
Charter, the Multilateral Trade Agreements. The Multilateral Trade Agreements are: the GATT 1994,
which includes, with certain exceptions, GATT 1947, its subsequent agreements and many of its decisions
and waivers, GATS Agreement, TRJPs Agreement, Dispute Settlement Understanding, and Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (hereinafter the Multilateral Agreements). See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, arm. 1A, IB, 1C, 2 & 3, Apr. 14, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3. Countries in the
Uruguay Round concluded Plurilateral Trade Agreements. These were: Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft and the Agreement on Government Procurement (hereinafter Plurilateral Trade Agreements). Id. at
ann. 4. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements create neither rights nor obligations for those countries who have
not accepted them.
157

GATT 1994, which incorporates GATT 1947, excludes the Protocol of Provisional Application, which
limited GATT's application in national law. For illustrations of changes and clarifications of the different
agreements such as safeguard, antidumping, and countervailing see Demart, supra n. 145, at 138 -155.
158

For example, under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), export subsidy
prohibition, as mentioned in article 3.1.a. of the Agreement, does not apply to least developing countries
designated by the U.N as such and some developing countries having GNP per capita less than one
thousand dollar annually such as Bolivia, Egypt, and Morocco at the time the WTO came into effect.
According to article 27.4, other developing countries have to phase out their export subsidies progressively
within eight years from the date the WTO enters into force upon fulfilling certain conditions.
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Settlement of Disputes (DSU).159 The DSU expressly prohibits the "jungle rule" so a
country does not take its rights into its own hands.

Perhaps, it is fair to say that the

dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO is the only rule-based body in the
system.161
When a dispute arises, parties first consult. Where consultation fails to bring about a
mutually agreeable solution, a party to the dispute may call for the establishment of a
WTO panel.

Panel reports may be appealed to the Appellate Body for review of legal

issues. Establishment of panels and the Appellate Body and adoption of their decisions
are to be achieved through inverted consensus.

In other words, panel decisions are

The Tokyo Round established separate dispute resolution procedures in some of the separate codes
negotiated during the Tokyo Round such as the code on subsidy and anti-dumping. As such, the GATT has
been described as the centerpiece of a solar system of independent agreements with their own dispute
settlement mechanism. For an excellent historical review on the different approaches to the dispute
resolution under GATT and the Tokyo Round see Miquel Montanai Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins
over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 103, 107, 123128, 129-136 (1993). See also John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MW System: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 Law & Policy Intl. Bus. 21 (1980). The DSU of the WTO applies to all the covered
agreements. See Final Act, supra n. 156, ann.2. art.l.
160

Article 23 of the DSU states, "When members seek the redress of a violation . . . they shall have
recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this understanding." See Final Act, supra n. 156, art.
23.1, at 1241.
161

The WTO covered agreements adopt many concepts and proposals advanced by the U.S. and EC during
the Uruguay Round such as tariffication in agriculture.
162

The DSU created the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to administer the rules and procedures of the
Understanding. A respondent to a dispute may prevent the establishment of a panel in the DSB meeting.
However, if a complaining party requests the establishment of a panel at the following DSB meeting, a
panel would be established. Id. at ann. 2. arts. 3 & 6, at 1227-1230. DSU rules also stipulate that cases
should be resolved within nine months if there is no appeal, or within twelve months of establishing a panel
if the case is appealed. Id. art. 20, at 1237-1238. One novelty in the DSU is the adoption of arbitration as an
alternative method in resolving disputes of issues clearly defined. However, it is unclear in the text how the
arbitration will be conducted, under which law or agreement, and whether the members have the freedom
to choose their own arbitrators. The fact that any panel decision can be appealed means that the Appellate
Body could be flooded with decisions from first-level panel.
Id. at art. 16.4 & 17.14, at 1235, 1237.
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adopted unless all WTO members present at the meeting of the DSB decide by consensus
not to adopt panel decisions. Thus, establishment of panels and adoption of their
decisions are assured in all cases. The remedies available to a complaining country are
first conformity of the violating member's measures with the DSB adopted decision.

If

conformity is not achieved within the time required by the decision, then the complaining
party may request compensation.165 If the parties do not agree on compensation, then the
complaining party may request retaliation in the sector subject matter of the dispute, and
if it believes that retaliation in that sector would be unsatisfactory, it may then request
retaliation across sectors and/or agreements.
The enforcement of obligations under DSU proves elements of legal proceedings
with a depoliticized nature. Over eight years of the DSU's existence, panels have issued
almost 30,000 pages of decisions. Reviewing the myriad of these decided cases reveals a
deeper legal quality of the system.
V. The League of Arab States and Boycott to Israel
The Arab League trade boycott of Israel has a profound impact on the relationship
between Arab countries and the WTO.1 Additionally, the question of concern is whether

lM

Id. at art. 21.1, at 1238.

165

W. atari 22.1, at 1239-1241.

166

See Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy Excuse
Discriminatory Sanctions! 4 Chi. J. Intl. L. 283, 285-286 (2003) (recounting evasiveness of Saudi Arabia
in describing the status of the boycott in its accession materials and concluding that allowing nations that
enforce a boycott to accede would undermine the WTO's commitment to free trade. The free trade system
was designed to promote not just prosperity but peaceful and amicable relations between member states.
The Arab League trade boycott on Israel defeats one of the major goals of the WTO. Thus, the U.S. should
use its considerable clout in the accession process to require Arab boycotting nations to abandon the
secondary and tertiary prongs of the boycott as a condition of membership). As an "informal" condition for
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the Arab boycott of Israel is legitimate or not, and if so, whether it could be subject to a
dispute settlement case before the WTO. Therefore, discussion of the League of Arab
States and its trade boycott of Israel is merited.
The League of Arab States was formed as a part of a United Arabia project. It is a
watered-down version of that project. On September 25, 1944, a Preparatory Committee
composed of Arab states met in Alexandria to discuss various proposals for the
scheme.1 7 On October 7, 1944, a protocol was signed by all members of the Preparatory
Committee. The protocol provided for the establishment of the League of Arab States for
I /TO

independent Arab countries who desired to join the organization.

Based on the

Alexandria protocol, a charter was drafted and approved by members of the Preparatory
Committee in 1945.169 Since then, the charter formed the constitution of the Arab League.
Currently, the Arab League is made up of 22 countries where it provides a forum to
promote economic, political, and cultural cooperation.170

joining the WTO, some Arab countries were "expected" not to attend meetings of the Central Boycott
Office of the Arab League. Some Arab countries were also "expected" not to invoke article XIII of the
WTO Charter which would have allowed an acceding country not to apply its commitments to another
WTO member.
167

For more on the Arab League see Majid Khadduri, The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement, 40
Am. J. Intl. L. 756, 763 (1946) (tracing the history of the Arab League to the pan-Arabism movement that
revolted against the Turkish domination. The debate among members of the Preparatory Committee
focused on the nature of Arab unity scheme as whether they shall opt for a full union or federal union).
168

The Arab League would be governed by the Council of the League whose membership is based on
sovereign equality of member states with one nation, one vote. The Arab League is also composed of the
General Secretariat and various committees to address social and economics concerns. Id. at 765.
169

One of the conditions for membership in the League was full independence. Therefore, the original
signatories were Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Id. at 766-768
(discussing the concept of full independence and how it applied to the original members).
170

The Arab League, headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, comprises: Comoros, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Gaza Strip and West Bank,
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The League of Arab States boycott of Israel is based on the League's resolution in
1 71

1954.

For decades the Arab League has boycotted Israeli goods. No Israeli goods may

be imported into the Arab League states and no Israeli firms may do business with firms
from Arabic countries. In addition, the Arab League has maintained a secondary boycott
against companies from third countries that do business with Israel which contribute
significantly to Israel's economic and military development. For example, a member
state, or its firms, of the Arab League would not do business with a U.S. company that
has a business relationship with Israel. A further prohibition is imposed on dealing with a
company that deals with another company which in turn has a relationship with Israel.
Foreign companies may be required to provide information about the names and
nationalities of the companies' board of directors and officers to determine whether they
are Jews or not.172 One Arab boycott blacklist included 1500 U.S. firms, among them
Coca Cola, Ford, and Xerox. There is also an informal boycott on the part of Arab

Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia,, Algeria, Mauritania, Somalia, and Djibouti. In 2003, Syria
sponsored Turkey to become an observer at the Arab League.
See Preston L. Greene, Jr., The Arab Economic Boycott of Israel: The International Law Perspective, 11
Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 77, 79 (1978) (the resolution is a direct response for what the Arabs perceive as the
wrongful expropriation of their land for the creation of the state of Israel. The most potent enforcement tool
of the boycott is blacklisting). Before placing a company on the blacklist, the company has to be placed on
the watch list. In general, the blacklist is not publicly available.
172

A blacklist of companies that violated the boycott's guidelines such as failing to comply with
certification procedures or to complete a questionnaire is maintained at the boycott office headquarters, a
specialized agency for the Arab League. Each Arab Country maintains a national boycott office in certain
ministries such as foreign affairs, commerce, or finance ministry. Id. at 78. Currently, the well-staffed
Central Boycott Office of the Arab League, which is headed by a Commissioner General, is located in
Syria. The Central Boycott Office meets twice a year to update its blacklist. In recent years, some Arab
countries had declined to attend the biannual meeting of the Office.
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consumers who decide to punish U.S. and Israeli goods regardless of whether a formal
boycott is maintained or not.173
In response to the Arab boycott of Israel, the U.S. introduced over time several
measures designed to undercut it.174 For example, at first, the U.S. encouraged under the
Export Administration Act voluntary reporting by U.S. concerns of demands placed on
them to comply with the Arab boycott on Israel.175 Then, the voluntary reporting turned
into mandatory reporting. The Internal Revenue Code provides for reduction in several
tax benefits such as foreign tax credit or domestic international sales corporation program
for any firm that participates in the Arab boycott.17 Moreover, the U.S. set up an Office
of Antiboycott Compliance in the Commerce Department to follow up and interpret the
anti-boycott regulations.

77

Any U.S. concern found in violation of anti-boycott rules

could be slapped civil and/or criminal fines.178 These measures are some of U.S. anti-

With regard to consumer perception, some Arab anti-normalization lobbies have for a long period
actively discouraged consumers from purchasing Israeli or U.S. products. The anti-American sentiment and
media publicity could strain trade and investment between Arab countries and the U.S. with potential
backlash affecting the sale of U.S. products in Arab countries. Consumer boycott is not the subject of
discussion in this section. The focus is only on formal boycott of Israel.
The Arab League boycott on Israel received prominence especially in the years following the 1973 oil
crisis.
175

See Roy M. Mersky & Michael L. Richmond, Legal Implications of the Arab Economic Boycott of the
State of Israel: A Research Guide, 71 L. Libr. J. 68 (1978).
176

Id. at 69.

1

The Office of Antiboycott Compliance depends on U.S. companies' self-declaration audits as well as
selected auditors that would help it in discovering any violation and fraud.
178

For example a $5,000 fine was imposed on an attorney, in the course of assisting a client, violated the
anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration Act by completing and submitting a form to Saudi
Arabia for trademark registration in which the applicant declared that he had no relations with Israel that
would violate the Saudi Arabia boycott. The attorney did not inform the Commerce Department of the
boycott declaration which is prohibited under U.S. law. See U.S v. Meyer, 864 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir.
1988) (although the attorney did not intentionally support the Saudi boycott, his awareness of the
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boycott devices.

Usually, the U.S. Department of Treasury issues a quarterly list of

Arab countries that may require participation in or cooperation with the boycott on
1 RO

Israel.

The U.S. Executive is the only authority to enforce the Export Administration

Act. There is no private right of action for damages.181

applications' boycott declaration supports a finding of violation). Other examples include imposing a
$4,500 fine in 1990 on Chrono-Log, an exporter of medical equipment, $6 million in 1993 on Baxter
International Inc., a medical supplies firm, $31,200 in 1994 on the Arab Bank Pic, New York branch office,
and $6,000 in 2001 on Perry Equipment Corp, a drilling company.
179

Other anti-boycott compliance measures include warning letters, denial of export privileges, potential
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws such as the Sherman and the Clayton Acts, the Federal
Trade Commission regulations for letters of credit of U.S. banks, and disclosure requirements mandated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Additionally, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act allows the
U.S. president to take into account foreign country participation in the Arab boycott in determining whether
to sell U.S. military to such a country. See The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of United States v.
Bechtel in Light of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1440, 1441, 1444
(1979) (American firms which comply with the boycott may violate U.S. antitrust laws. The Department of
Justice had taken this position in United States v. Bechtel Corp. in 1979 in which it asserted that
compliance by Bechtel, one of the world's largest construction firms, made Bechtel a party to a conspiracy
that constituted a "concerted refusal to deal" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Group boycott
and refusal to deal are forms of per se illegality under the Sherman Act. The Department of Justice's
enforcement policy toward Arab boycott-related activities is founded under the extraterritorial reach of the
Sherman Act. In order for U.S. antitrust law to apply extraterritorially, U.S. courts have required domestic
"effects" on American commerce. Domestic effects should be direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable). To limit the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law, American companies may argue on the
basis of act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines.
180

For example, the list of Arab countries for the fourth quarter in 1994 included: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Republic of
Yemen. See List of Countries Requiring Cooperation with an International Boycott, 59 Fed. Reg. 65, 572
(Dec. 20, 1994). See also List of Countries Requiring Cooperation with an International Boycott, 69 Fed.
Reg. 75, 604-01 (Dec. 17, 2004) (the list includes: Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Republic of Yemen). Some Arab countries are on and off the list
several times. For example, Jordan was removed from the list in 1995.
181

A case involved a joint venture of an Israeli corporation and another company in which it tried to
acquire a financially troubled U.S. aircraft company. The principal lender to the aircraft company, which is
a subsidiary to a Japanese bank, based on instructions from its parent Japanese bank refused to deal with
the Israeli corporation because of the Arab boycott. The U.S. court denied the Israeli corporation's request
for relief. See Israel Aircraft Indus. Ltd., v. Sanwa Bus. Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1994) (the
Export Administration Act did not create a private right of action in favor of victims of foreign boycotts.
The Act does not authorize private litigation. It does not mention any particular class of beneficiaries).
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The Arab League formal boycott has changed drastically after the launch of the
peace process in the Middle East in the 1990s.182 The Arab League boycott of Israel may
be collapsing on its own weight or relic of the past as more and more Arab countries are
ignoring it.183 For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council announced in 1994 that the
secondary and tertiary boycott is no longer a threat for the Council members' interests for
all practical reasons. Jordan enacted legislation on August 5, 1995, which repealed
Jordan's compliance with the boycott.184 Despite these trends, complete end of the
boycott by all Arab countries has not been officially declared. A state of war in its
different manifestations is a fact of life in that region. The Arab League boycott is linked
to the political situation in the region. Therefore, any discussion of the Arab league's
boycott of Israel has been and is important and not symbolic or historical as some would
lead us to believe.185

182

See Robert A. Diamond, U.S. Antiboycott Law and Regulations, 830 P.L.I./COMM. 721, 730-731
(2001) (the number of boycott requests reported to Office of Antiboycott Compliance by U.S. firms fell
during the years 1990 to 1996 from 11,026 in 1990 to 2,493 in 1996. Prohibited requests fell during the
same period from 2,812 to 1,025. Total boycott requests from all countries for 1997 and 1998 were 1,666
and 1,780 respectively, with prohibited requests at 532 and 526 for the two years. In 1999, there was a
decline in total requests to 1,358 with prohibited requests down to 402. In 2000, there was a further decline
to 1,271 total requests and 355 prohibited requests).
183

Perhaps Syria is the last stronghold of the Arab boycott.

184

Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, Iraq, and
Libya still have Israel boycott laws. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Pakistan also have their
own boycott laws. Id. at 730.
1

It can be argued rightfully that the Arab boycott of Israel is symbolic since there is no much direct trade
between Arab countries and Israel. Therefore, the economic impact of the boycott on Israel may be
minimal.
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It has been the ritual for the USTR to issue a report periodically stating that the Arab
boycott to Israel is an impediment to U.S. trade.186 U.S. firms are being hurt, especially
by the secondary and tertiary boycott, since the boycott distorts with whom they trade or
source their inputs from. U.S. firms may be at a competitive disadvantage with other
Asian or European firms whose countries do not have stringent anti-boycott laws and
enforcement. It is the secondary and tertiary Arab boycott that has extra-territorial
application because it punishes U.S. companies. The U.S. ought to publish, alongside
with its periodic reports, specific figures regarding affected companies and dollar damage
that would help readers understand how much trade or potential trade has been lost due to
the boycott in order to measure the real impact.187 Additionally, the report ought to detail
the implications of this boycott through country-by-country analysis with their
activities.188
From a narrow legal viewpoint, the Arab boycott may be illegal. GATT articles I and
III, among others, ban discriminatory treatment among like products of WTO members
and between imported and domestically produced products. The Arab boycott singles out
Israeli products compared with other trading nations. However, one must bear in mind

See USTR, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers 2004,
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2004/arableague.pdf (accessed July 15, 2004). The National Trade
Estimate Report is mandated by the 1974 Trade Act. Barriers identified in the report are intended to form
the basis for trade negotiations and sanctions.
187

The only time the USTR had quantified lost opportunities and profits arising from the Arab boycott was
in 1994. The International Trade Commission study, requested by USTR, showed that U.S. companies lost
more than $410 million in potential sales during 1993 as a direct result of the Arab boycott. The cost of U.S.
companies for compliance with U.S. antiboycott laws estimated to be an additional $160 million. The effects of
the boycott included delays in concluding transactions. See U.S.I.T.C, Effects of the Arab League Boycott of
Israel on U.S. Businesses, USITC Inv. No. 332-349 (Nov. 1994).
188

The section on the Arab boycott of Israel in National Trade Estimate Reports on Foreign Trade Barriers
is usually two pages long of a version of the boycott which is copied from a previous year with no new
substantive information.
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that the purpose of the boycott is not to protect the Arab domestic industry. Rather, it is
grounded on foreign policy reasons. Therefore, there might be no violation of WTO nondiscriminatory articles.
If one would justify the Arab boycott on the basis of article XXI.c of GATT 1994, it
may not pass the exception test. Article XXI.c allows a member to take any "action" in
pursuance of its obligations under the U.N charter for the maintenance of peace and
security. The U.N did not directly authorize the Arab economic boycott of Israel
compared with that imposed on Iraq in the 1990s. However, one can counter-argue that
the Arab boycott is legitimate because it can be tacitly based on the U.N Security Council
resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories of Arab
countries. This sort of argument adopts a tacit approach. The Arab embargo is just taking
note of the U.N resolutions.
Moreover, article XXI.b.iii permits a member to take any action which "it" considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests in time of war or emergency
in international relations. The use of the word "it" clearly states that it is for every
country to judge on the question of what it is related to with regards to its own essential
security interests. The second prong of article XXI.b.iii requires that the action is taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations. Although there is no direct war
between Israel and some Arab countries, an emergency situation has been the case in that
region for quite a time. Thus, under the broader term "other emergency", the Arab
boycott may be valid.
The Helms-Burton Act provides also a precedent that would further the argument of
the legality of the Arab boycott under the WTO. President Kennedy imposed a trade
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embargo on Cuba in 1962 under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The
Trading with the Enemy Act reinforced the embargo imposed on Cuba under the
authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. These regulations are still substantially
in effect and now codified in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
known as the Helms-Burton Act.189 Title I of the Helm-Burton Act strengthens the
provisions of the prior economic boycott against Cuba.

It prohibits the importation of

Cuban goods into the U.S., and Titles III and IV of the Act deal with sanctions against
persons who use property in Cuba that U.S. nationals assert has been confiscated from

Although the EC filed a complaint with the WTO challenging the secondary boycott
provisions of Helms-Burton Act, a WTO panel did not have the chance to rule on the
boycott. After trade skirmishes between the U.S. and the EC, the matter was settled
before the first submissions were due to the WTO dispute settlement panel.
The U.S. economic boycott on Cuba has both similarities and differences with the
Arab boycott on Israel. The U.S. boycott to Cuba has been in existence, and strengthened

Shortly before the passage of Helms-Burton Act, named after its sponsors Sen. Jesse A. Helms (R-NC)
and Rep. Dan Burton (R-IND), Cuba shot down two American aircraft. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can
Helms-Burton be Challenged Under WTO? 27 Stetson L. Rev. 1313, 1323 (1998). As part of the embargo
against the Castro regime, the U.S. Congress enacted a provision that denies protection to trademarks that
were seized by the Cuban government after the revolution of 1959, unless the original owner assents. In
2000, Congress passed a legislation intended to facilitate sales of medical and agricultural products to
Cuba. The legislation, Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, permitted
agricultural sales to Cuba through payment of cash in advance but prohibited Credit agricultural sales. See
The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7210 (2000).
190

191

See Spanogle, Jr., supra n. 189, at 1318.

Section 110.a of Helms-Burton Act prohibits the entry into the U.S., not only of Cuban sugar or rum, but
also of goods of other countries which are made in part of Cuban sugar or rum. Id. at 1320. The Act is
enforced through civil damages actions by the owners of the property and by visa restrictions on foreign
nationals.
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over time, since 1962. It has direct and extraterritorial application. U.S. law prohibits the
entry into the U.S., not only of Cuban sugar or rum, but also of goods from other
countries which contain Cuban sugar or rum. Thus, U.S. boycott forces foreign countries
to change their trade patterns and sources of their production inputs. The intent of the
Arab boycott is national security determined collectively by the perceived threat of Israel.
In contrast, Cuba "threat" is determined unilaterally by the U.S. Although, the U.S.
claims the Cuban boycott is relevant based on national security grounds, the U.S.
Department of Defense has stated that Cuba is no longer a threat to the U.S. national
security defense.192
The U.S. claim of passing the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 solely on security grounds
solely may be doubtful. An althernative purpose for the boycott was pleasing the U.S.
Cuban community in an election year. In addition, the claim of preventing transacting in
confiscated property owned by U.S. nationals may be doubtful. Some of those U.S.
nationals at time of confiscation were Cubans who only later on obtained their U.S.
citizenship.
So where do we depart from here? Since the Arab trade restrictions are just taking
note of the U.N Security Council resolutions, it would be more than likely that a WTO
panel excuses those restrictions as "action in pursuance of obligations under the United
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security," according to
article XXI.c of the GATT. Moreover, Arab trade restrictions are actions taken in time of

Id. at 1329.
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emergency in international relations. They are considered necessary for the protection of
Arab countries and essential to Arab security interests.
The legality of trade sanctions have never been adjudicated under GATT or the
WTO. Therefore, it is unlikely for the Arab boycott to come under scrutiny by a WTO
panel if the U.S. were to challenge the boycott. It may also be very difficult to bring a
case against the Arab boycott drawing on the precedent of the Helms-Burton Act. Even if
a case could be brought before a WTO panel, there may be reasons for not doing so.
There may be a concern regarding potential future abuses of article XXI national security
exceptions. It is also the worrisome having the WTO, a trade institution, addressing a
sensitive issue with political ramifications.
It is ironic for the USTR to declare that Arab League's boycott of Israel is restriction
on trade, but not the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The U.S., which assumes the leadership
mantle for free market, must be aware of that no government has either the power or the
right to prevent other independent countries from determining their national security. The
U.S. would never permit any other country to interfere with its own national security, so
it is bound to respect others in that freedom of national security that she asserts for
herself.

Arab countries have a sovereign right to impose trade sanctions.

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair, Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade said, "Therefore,
the U.S. Government's right to make decisions about our own foreign policy and our national security is
absolute and cannot be abrogated or interfered with by any foreign entity . . . He [EC] who lives in a glass
house should not throw stones [at the U.S.]". See H.R. Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and
Trade of the Comm. on International Relations, Hearing on Interfering with U.S. National Security
Interests: The World Trade Organization and the European Union Challenge to the Helms-Burton Law,
105th Cong. 1st Sess. 2-3 (Mar. 19, 1997).
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VI. Arab countries Accession to the WTO: Playground of Politics
The absence of some Arab countries, and some Islamic countries for that matter,
from participation in the WTO is due to the fact that the U.S. is blocking the
establishment of working parties to examine their applications.194 Since 2000, Jordan and

To join the WTO, a working party needs to be established to negotiate terms of accession, and the
General Council, which operates by consensus, must agree to form the working party. See Raj Bhala,
Challenges of Poverty and Islam Facing American Trade Law, 17 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 471, 508
(2003). Islamic countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan are not yet members of the WTO.
Although Afghanistan did not have an observer seat at the WTO it requested accession to the WTO twice.
Afghanistan first requested accession in Apr. 2003, a request which lacked the back up of the Afghani
government. In Dec. 2004, Afghanistan also requested accession. On Dec. 13, 2004, WTO members agreed
to commence accession negotiations with Afghanistan. Afghanistan, a developing country with few
tradable items such as silk, fruits, nuts, spices, tea, and textiles, took several bold steps to promote its
integration in the global economy despite a conflict that, among other things, threatened its traditionally
strong agriculture sector and its gene- banking system. See Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan Craves for
Investment, Wall St. J. A10 (Dec. 1, 2004). See Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter Money
Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 4, 2002). See Major Drug Transit or Major
Illicit Drug Producing Countries for FY0 5, 69 Fed. Reg. 57809 (Sep. 28, 2004). The U.S. adopted several
initiatives to boost the Afghani economy by granting Afghanistan normal trade relations status ("NTR") in
May 2002. NTR obliges the U.S. to apply tariff rates on Afghani imports at levels equivalent to those
enjoyed by other U.S. trading partners. See Restore Nondiscriminatory Trade Treatment (Normal Trade
Relations Treatment) to the Products of Afghanistan, 67 Fed. Reg. 30535 (May 7, 2002). In 2002,
legislation (S.3151) has been introduced in Congress to negotiate FTA with Afghanistan. Additionally, the
U.S. in Jan. 2003 provided products made in Afghanistan duty-free access to its market under the GSP
scheme. In Sep. 2004, the U.S. and Afghanistan signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
Iran has submitted its application for membership in WTO since Sept. 1996. In May 2001, Iran's request
for establishing a working party on accession was for the first time placed on the agenda of the General
Council. Earlier, such request had not made it to the General Council agenda. As of 2004, Iran requested
accession nineteen times. However, the U.S. still blocks Iran's request on three grounds: Iran supports
terrorism, encourages Arab trade embargo on Israel, and develops nuclear weapons. In 2005, however, a
WTO working party was established to examine Iran's membership in the trade body. See WTO Agrees to
Begin Accession Talks with Iran, Taps Lamy as Next DG, Inside U.S. Trade (May 27, 2005) (the U.S.
signaled a shift in its position in March, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the U.S.
would drop its objection to Iran's WTO application in an effort to support EU efforts meant to convince
Iran to drop its development of a nuclear weapons program). The U.S. maintains executive orders. Some of
these executive orders are extensions of the national emergency with respect to Iran announced in 1979.
These executive orders prohibit the importation of goods or services of Iranian origin as part of the
International Emergency Economic Power Act of 1988 which gives the U.S. president the authority to
regulate or prohibit any foreign exchange transaction. Moreover, the U.S. maintains legislation, the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, which imposes penalties on companies, including foreign
companies, doing business in the Iran. The ILSA authorizes the U.S. president to impose economic
sanctions against foreign companies that invest more than $20 million in Iran to develop its petroleum
resources. U.S. companies are barred from doing business in Iran directly, although their foreign
subsidiaries can work there. The ILSA is renewed continuously. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996,
50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). See also Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R § 560 (1996). Of the fifteen
ex-Soviet states, Turkmenistan has had observer status in the GATT/WTO since 1992.
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Oman were the last Arab countries to accede to the WTO. Five years have passed so far
and no other Arab country has joined the WTO. If the U.S. is sincerely engaged with
Arab countries, it should allow them entry into the WTO at accelerated rate.
Of the 148 current members of the WTO, there are only eleven Arab countries.
Algeria, Comoros, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Authority, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, the Sudan, Syria, and Yemen have all lined up for accession to the WTO.
However, applications of some of Arab countries for admission to the WTO are
"clinically dead".195 Other Arab countries' applications are at a "standstill".196 The U.S.
supports applications of accession for only handpicked Arab countries that are considered
"peaceful", however this term maybe interpreted.197

195

See U.S. Blocks Iranian WTO Application; Syria Preventedfrom Placement on Agenda, 19 Intl. Trade
Rep. (BNA) 36 (Jan. 3, 2002) (stating that Syria's request for membership in the WTO was blocked
because of Syria's backing for the Arab League trade boycott of Israel).
196

See U.S., EUPush Saudis to Improve Market Access Offers for WTO Entry, 17 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA)
1654 (Oct. 26, 2000). See also Progress Cited in Saudi Accession But Partners Still Waiting For Details,
20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1324 (July 31, 2003) (Saudi accession has dragged for a decade since 1993.
Saudi trading partners are concerned over Saudi legislation that restricts foreign investment in oil
exploration, production, insurance, telecommunications, and retail and whole-sale trade. Furthermore,
Saudi Arabia maintains import ban on alcohol and pork).
197

See U.S. and Saudi Arabia Sign Agreement that Could Lead to Free Trade Negotiations, 20 Intl. Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1353 (Aug. 7, 2003) (citing the term "peaceful countries" used by [former] USTR Robert
Zoellick).
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In a leapfrog move, Iraq became an observer at the WTO overnight.

It is possible

that Iraq will accede to the WTO in a short period of time. Iraq has already adopted
several orders that liberalize trade policy.19 For example, a new foreign investment law
was passed in 2003 permitting 100 percent foreign ownership of firms in all sectors of the
economy, apart from oil and other mineral extraction. Iraq has also modernized its
existing intellectual property regime, by using the laws of Jordan and United Arab
Emirates as examples, to bring it into compliance with international standards. Iraq's
overall purpose with these changes is to assist its participation in the WTO.

See Brussels Resists Demand for Iraq WTO Seat, Fin. Times 4 (Jan. 26, 2004) (the EC resisted demand
by the U.S. and Britain backed by U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney that Iraq be given WTO seat. The U.S.
argues that WTO seat for Iraq would help its reconstruction and adapt to market economy. On the other
hand, the EC argues that Iraq does not have a government that has control over its trade policy). Ultimately,
however, Iraq was granted, on a silver plate, a seat at the WTO as observer which would allow it to attend
WTO meetings but cannot participate in decision-making or table proposals for negotiations. See Iraq
Takes First Step to Join WTO, Fin. Times 14 (Feb. 12, 2004). Although formally Iraq cannot participate in
tabling proposals since it is an observer, it may do so in practicality. For example, China in 1980s was
permitted to submit proposals during the Uruguay Round negotiations. Currently, Saudi Arabia is permitted
to submit proposals in the Doha Round. Ahmad Al-Mukhtar, director
general of foreign economic relations at Iraq's Ministry of Trade declared his country's intention to start
accession negotiations as soon as possible. Indeed, in Oct. 2004, Iraq sent a letter to WTO Director General
Supachai requesting that its membership request be circulated to WTO members and be placed on the
agenda of the General Council in Dec. so as to commence accession negotiations. On Dec. 13, 2004, WTO
members agreed on starting accession negotiations with Iraq. Iraq's Trade Minister Mohammed Mustafa
Al-Jibouri expressed his government's hope to complete the accession negotiations as soon as possible.
199

See Judith Richards Hope & Edward N. Griffin, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq's Commercial Law is a
Necessity for Foreign Direct Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11 Cardozo
J. Intl. & Comp. L. 875, 877, 878 (2004) (citing the Coalition Provisional Authority order no. 12 which
liberalized trade policy by suspending a number of tariffs and trade restrictions. The Coalition Provisional
Authority also issued order no. 39 which instituted far ranging free-market reforms throughout Iraq in
every sector, except for natural resources [the government of Iraq still subsidizes gasoline by fixing its
price at very low rate], banking and insurance. For banks, after the end of a five-year period, there will be
no limitations on the entry of foreign banks). In Oct. 2004, the U.S. Ex-Im bank concluded a framework
agreement with Iraq's ministry of finance and Trade Bank of Iraq to finance U.S. exports to Iraq.
Discussions are underway for Iraq to enter into aid and economic-reform programs with the IMF and to
receive more aid from other countries to smooth Iraq's debt burden. The U.S. also planned for a major
write-off of some of Iraqi debt currently totaling about $120 billion. One has to question the imbalance in
the form preferential write-off of Iraqi debt over other neighboring countries such as Jordan.
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Opening the fragile Iraqi banking system, where lending to the private sector made
up one-half of 1 percent total commercial bank assets lending in 2004, would create a
regime more favorable to meg-foreign banks. Iraqi banks may not have enough
capitalization to compete with foreign banks. The subsidized agriculture sector is also set
for reform.200 Similarly to example of Iraqi banks, the reform in the Iraqi agricultural
sector would benefit the agri-businesses of the U.S. and other major agricultural
exporters. Likewise, Iraqi higher education is also slated for market-oriented reform. It is
no longer the responsibility of the government to find graduates jobs; graduates would be
responsible for their own career searches.
In a country ravaged by war, where only a small percentage of U.S.-appropriated
funds have been put into action and prime reconstruction contracts are limited to
companies from the U.S. led by Halliburton and Bechtel, Iraq and force-contributing
nations such as Australia and Poland has little time for WTO work.201 Furthermore, with

See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Iraqis Face Tough Transition to Market-based Agriculture, Wash. Post A10
(Jan. 22, 2004) (Iraq has 5 million agricultural workers mostly family farmers. In old Iraq, the state
provided seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, sprinklers, and tractors at low cost. The Coalition Provisional
Authority is determined to create a capitalist economy where the state provides little, if any, support. The
U.S. and Australia [major agriculture exporters] are taking the lead in rehabilitating the Iraqi agricultural
sector. After first purchasing and then destroying Iraqi wheat in 2003 because it was of low quality, the gap
in food supply was made up with $190 million worth wheat from Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, courtesy
of the U.S.).
201

See Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes 23-29 (The International Bureau of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration ed., Aspen Publishers 2004) (discussing, in part, the tragic looting of many of Iraq's
museums as a recent example of how vulnerable cultural property is to theft, damage, and destruction. As
time went by, legal rules have developed for the protection of cultural property during hostilities
represented in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict. One of the obligations included in article 5 of the Convention is that occupying forces must as far
as possible support the competent national authority of the occupied country to protect cultural property. It
is an obligation of stewardship. This did not take place in Iraq. Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. is party to the
Hague Convention. The experience of UNESCO in many conflict situations shows that only the tiniest
fraction of looted materials will be returned). For more on the dispute between the U.S. and EC over
procurement bar from bidding on $18.6 billion in reconstruction projects in Iraq see USTR Argues Iraq
Contract Exclusion Fall within WTO Rules, Inside U.S. Trade (Inside Wash. Publishers) (Dec. 12, 2003)
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many decades of a paternalistic cradle-to-grave government policy, it is hardily
perceivable that such reforms would make life easier for Iraqi citizens. Iraq needs
gradual, not an instant trade liberalization, to advance from a closed economy dominated
by state-owned monopolies and subsidies toward a competitive and modern economy
open to world trade.
Algeria has been seeking WTO membership for seventeen years, beginning in June
1987. Its accession negotiations are moving at snail's pace.

A sticking point is dual

price energy (gas and electricity), which the U.S. and EC claim
provide an indirect subsidy to industrial producers and give them an unfair advantage
over foreign competitors. For example, prices of some fertilizers are directly linked to the
price of energy. Algeria may want to argue that WTO agreements do not address or
prohibit dual price energy policies. If Algeria's argument proves fruitless, it will have to
agree to language that requires energy prices to be set according to commercial
considerations (production costs and profit), staged increases in gas prices for industrial
users, and/or allow exceptions to permit current energy policies for non-industrial users
and households, which would be based on social considerations. Another sticking point is

(the U.S. argues that Iraq's Coalition Provisional Authority, along with Defense Department which are
responsible for awarding procurement contracts, is not a listed entity covered by the WTO GPA. As such
there is no need to invoke [article XXIII of the GPA] "essential security" exception to justify the use of
noncompetitive procedures in awarding these contracts. In the alternative, the U.S. can argue that these
contracts are foreign aid which is not subject to the U.S. commitments under GPA).
202

See WTO Members Discuss Accession of Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq Explores Membership Process, 20 Intl.
Trade Rep. (BNA) 2079 (Dec. 18, 2003) (Algeria talks stumbled over its dual price for energy and ban on
imports of alcohol. Dual energy policy allows domestic firms to buy gas at lower price than what Algeria
charges on the international market. The Algerian parliament introduced a ban, which was proposed by
religious factions, on imports of alcohol as part of the budget bill that would expire at the end of 2004).
Other stumbling issues in Algeria's accession to the WTO include introducing new agricultural export
subsidies, application of tariff-rate quotas, special safeguard on farm imports, and whether WTO
agreements would automatically take precedence over any conflicting internal regulation.
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the import ban on alcohol.

Due to these hurdles, it seems that Algeria might top China

in terms of the length of time it has to endure before being able to secure WTO
membership.
Lebanon talks are still at early stage. The working party on Lebanon accession met in
2003, for the first time since 1999.204 If one can draw on the experience of China and
Taiwan (or Chinese Taipei as China's delegation to the WTO prefers to the Taiwanese
contingent) accession to the WTO, Lebanon may not accede except after Syria's
accession to the WTO. Alternatively, Lebanon and Syria may accede to the WTO
simultaneously to reduce tensions between the two neighbors. Either way, Lebanon
efforts would be handicapped by Syria's own accession.
Libya submitted its accession application in November 2001.205 Nonetheless, the
application was blocked by the U.S. because Libya allegedly supports terrorism. On July
27, 2004, WTO members agreed to set up a working party to examine Libya's accession.
However, despite headways in the US-Libyan relationship, Libya still has a long road
ahead. The U.S. has adopted a step-by-step approach toward Libyan accession.206 The

Other WTO members are likely to argue that the basis of the import ban on Alcohol is not religious but
rather to protect the Algerian brewery industry, especially wine.
204

Lebanon tabled its offer for market access in goods and services. Lebanon would reduce tariffs on
agricultural and industrial goods to 12.5 percent. Further, Lebanon promised to liberalize mobile phone
services, fixed-line telecommunication, and port services. Id. at 2079.

205

A ministerial committee has been established to prepare for negotiation with the WTO immediately after
Deputy Director-General of the WTO concluded his visit to Tripoli in Oct. 2001.
20

The U.S. Liaison Office in Tripoli stated that the pace of travel to Libya is still hampered by visa
difficulties. Thus, the U.S. Liaison Office advises those who plan to travel to Libya to apply for visa three
to six weeks in advance. See U.S. May Soon Lift Ban on Travel to Libya, Bowing to Pressure from
Business, Congress, 21 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 289 (Feb. 12, 2004). In Apr. 2004, the U.S. terminated the
application of the ILSA to Libya. In Sept. 2004, the U.S. lifted its eighteen year ban on trade between the
two countries, terminating the need for license from the Treasury Department to trade with Libya, allowing
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U.S. would help Libya modernize its economy and infrastructure, which is largely
dependent on gas and oil, and invigorate a working private sector. In this process, Libya
would open up oil exploration, privatize roughly 360 states-owned enterprises, and ease
price controls. One reason for the U.S. taking these steps is that it wishes to maintain its
competitiveness in the Libyan market.
In 2001, the Palestinian Authority sent a twenty-four member delegation for a twoday visit to the WTO to address the issue of its own WTO accession.2 7 The Palestinian
Authority adopted foreign trade regime similar to that of Israel.

However, the U.S. and

Israel are still likely to oppose the Palestinian Authority application because of the
tension between the Palestinians and Israelis.209 In 2004, the U.S. downgraded the status
of the Palestinian Liberation office in the U.S.210 Even if tension did not exist between

direct air service and regular charter flights, and lifting the prohibition against financing through direct
loans, credits, and guarantees by the U.S. Ex-Im Bank and other government agencies. In addition, on the
same date, the U.S. terminated the national emergency declared in 1986 under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act with respect to Libya and released frozen assets belonging to Libya. New
Regulations were issued that would allow U.S. companies to interact with U.S. made products that were
illegally exported or re-exported to Libya before the U.S. trade embargo was removed. However, the U.S.
still bans programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in Libya. Moreover, the State
Department still classifies Libya as state sponsor of terrorism thus prohibiting, with the exception of farm
products and medicine, purchasing U.S. military equipments such as radioactive materials and explosives
and restricting, through export controls, U.S. high-tech and encrypted exports such as computers and
software. In order for Libya to be taken off the list of countries supporting terrorism, there must be efforts
by the State Department, notification of Congress, and formal/informal congressional consent.
See Palestinian Authority Prepares to Pursue WTO membership; Observer Status First Step, 18 Intl.
Trade Rep. (BNA) 869 (May 31, 2001) (the visit was financed by the U.S. Agency for International
Development).
208

Id. at 869. As a result of the peace truce, a customs union is formed between Israel, the West Bank, and
Gaza Strip.
209

Id. at 869. The U.S. and Israeli objections prove that WTO accession is not a rule-based process but
rather power-based.
210

The downgrading was based on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. See Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 604, 116 Stat. 1350, 1395 (2002).
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the Palestinians and Israelis, the U.S and Israel may raise a technical point in opposition
to Palestinian accesssion. While under article XXXIII of GATT 1994, a "government"
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations was required
for accession, article XII of the WTO Charter allows "state[s]" or "separate customs
[territories]" to join its membership ranks. The Palestinian Authority is clearly a
government, but whether the Gaza Strip and the West Bank form a state is an open
question.211
Saudi Arabia has been an observer since 1986. It formally submitted its admission
application in 1993. One would question why the Saudis have extended the period
accession to the GATT/WTO despite the fact that they are a prominent player in the
World Bank and the IMF, which mandate and advocate liberalization policies.
Whether Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO in 2004 is "imminent reality", the fact
remains that one cannot predict when it might happen.213 Saudi Arabia was finally
admitted to the WTO in December 2005.

211

Israel usually refers to Gaza Strip and the West Bank as the Territories or Areas. If the U.S. and Israel
raise the technical point, the Palestinian Authority may argue that the U.N gave its predecessor, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), an observer status, a position that allowed the PLO to
participate in its discussions. See Press Release G.A. 9427, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 89th mtg. (1998).
Moreover, the U.S. extended its GSP scheme to cover Palestinian goods. As such, Palestinian goods would
enter the U.S. at preferential rate. Therefore, this implies a statehood status. See Amendment to the
Generalized System of Preferences, 60 Fed. Reg. 25266 (Mar. 17, 1995). Finally, the Palestinian Authority
can counter-argue that WTO agreements are trade agreements and discussions of broader international law
issues should be left to other forums.
212

One can speculate that due to the nature of the Saudi economy and its potential impact on world trade,
WTO members are taking tougher stance in its accession to the WTO. See Tomer Broude, Accession to the
WTO: Current Issues in the Arab World, 32 J.W.T. 147, 153 (1998) (stating that Saudi economy ranks
among the twenty largest economies in the world and among the fifteen largest importers).
213

The accession negotiations grounded to a halt in early 2001 after Saudi Arabia published a negative list
on investment prohibiting access to foreigners in key sectors such as oil exploration. However, Saudi
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With respect to its WTO application, Saudi Arabia has opened its markets to gas
development projects, telegraph and fax services, Vsat and GMPCS services, Internet
provision services, and online information and database retrieval services to non-Saudi
operators. Saudi Arabia has also passed several trade-related laws, including regulations
that liberalize capital markets. However, as a result of the Saudis putting some 100
reservations in market access where liberalization would not apply, negotiations might
take a sharp turn.214 Some of these reservations presented by Saudis can be qualified as
measures to preserve Islamic values and traditions. As an example, Saudi Arabia's media
interests (audiovisual), which are state-censored for content, are occupied with patriotic
programming and are off-limits to non-Saudi interests. Global media interests such as
Viacom will not be allowed to own shares in TV production companies or invest in joint
production projects with Saudi media companies. If other WTO members raise objections
to these reservations, Saudi can argue that France was permitted a "cultural exemption"

Arabia's accession to the WTO received a new momentum after the departure of Osama Faqih, former
Saudi commerce minister who was considered an obstacle for moving the accession talks, and the
appointment of Hashim Yamani as the new one. Moreover, the conclusion of some sixteen bilateral deals
with trading partners including the one with the EC in Sep. 2003 provided another impetus for negotiations.
Some trade diplomats suspect that Saudi Arabia may wrap up negotiations in 2004. See In Push to Finalize
WTO Accession Deal in 2004, Saudis May Hold Talks Past Dec. 19, 20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 2077 (Dec.
18, 2003) (the most contentious negotiations is with the U.S. over market access in financial services and
insurance [branching rights for foreign insurers. Generally, branching is preferred over establishing
subsidiaries since the latter require more capital and are less efficient]. Feeling sense of urgency the Saudis
are ready to travel to capitals to resolve outstanding issues. The Saudis push for accession is due in part to
the desire to improve the strained relations with Washington after Sep. 11). An interesting point in Saudi
Arabia's accession to the WTO is whether it should be classified as a developing, advanced developing
country, or developed country. If it is classified as a developing country, it may qualify for benefits, if any,
accruing to developing countries in their accession to the WTO.
214

See Saudi Flexible on Easing Investment Curbs During WTO Accession Talks, Report States, 21 Intl.
Trade Rep. (BNA) 288 (Feb. 12, 2004) (the latest draft report of WTO's working party on accession cites
that foreign investment in audiovisual, satellite transmission, land/air transport, real estate are off-limits.
The report's annex sets out some seventy-three products that are prohibited from importations. They
include alcohol, pork, satellite internet receivers, mobile phones fitted with cameras, video boosters, animal
fertilizers, asbestos, used tires, mobile phone chips, prepaid mobile phone cards, and electronic greeting
cards).
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clause during the Uruguay Round negotiations. Other Saudi reservations, such as prepaid
mobile phone cards, may be more suspicious for justifications as exemptions from trade
liberalization on religious grounds.
There are several other concerns with respect to the Saudi application. Dual price for
energy and gas is a one issue. The application of customs valuation, import licensing, and
precedence of international law over domestic law are also major concerns for trading
partners of Saudi Arabia. Other obstacles include the huge subsidies paid to rich farmers
for growing wheat in the Saudi desert. In addition, Dominican Republic and Honduras
sudden requests for bilateral talks with Saudis mean further delays. Some U.S.
congressmen oppose Saudi accession because of its support of Arab trade boycott of
Israel, the Saudi human rights record, and fears about terrorism. Finally, the U.S. State
Department's designation of Saudi Arabia, under the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, as a Country of Particular Concern could prove as a sticking point in
negotiations.
Regardless of Saudi progress towards trade liberalization, realistically, after
accession, Saudi Arabia may need one to two years at minimum to learn the mechanics of
the WTO, and develop a large legal staff to assist in pursuing effective membership in the
WTO. The latter point seems illusive considering that many Arab countries have small
delegations dedicated to the WTO. In addition, Saudi Arabia may need more time to
familiarize itself with the thousands pages of WTO trade rules.
The Sudan, usually a forgotten country when speaking about international trade even
though it is an important exporter of Arabic gum and the largest country in the African
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continent, is outside the club.215 The Sudan has adopted an open-oriented policy that
includes trade liberalization.216 However, the Sudan is unlikely to accede to the WTO
anytime soon, especially in light of sanctions imposed on it due to suspicion it supports
terrorist organizations. Moreover, proposed legislation (H.R 5414) in the 108th and 109th
U.S. Congress could cut off foreign tax credits and tax deferrals to U.S. companies doing
business in the Sudan until it ends the genocide in Darfur region. Similarly to Syria, the
Sudan is usually considered a pariah state.
Comoros, a small island state, is another forgotten Arab country when speaking
about WTO membership. Comoros has been recipient of preferential treatment from
developed countries, such as under the Canadian Least Developed Country Tariff
treatment and by the U.S. under the GSP program and the African Growth and
Opportunity Act.217 Furthermore, Comoros has taken several steps to reform its trade
regime.
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Since Comoro has a vulnerable economy with weak supply capacity, WTO

The WTO had set up a working party on Sudan's accession since 1994.

216

The policy of Sudan focuses on enhancing the agricultural sector, which employs about 70 percent of
the population, attracting foreign investors, including Islamic and Arab funds by reducing taxes and tariffs,
reducing the inflation rate from 166 percent to less than 7 percent, and keeping currency prices stable.
Nonetheless, over 90 percent of Sudanese people live below the poverty line. See Jim Phipps &
Christopher H. Johnson, Foreign Law in Review: 2001, 36 Intl. L. 901, 939 (2002).
217

See Trade and Development Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 3721 (2000). Comoros is dependant on the
exports of basic commodities such as spices and official development assistance.
218

In 1996, Comoros accepted article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement which requires countries to
refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international
transactions, engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements, or multiple currency practices without the
approval of the IMF. Comoros agreed to pursue sound economic policy. Comoros also took trade reforms
as part of the IMF-supported programs such as Structural Adjustment Facility. For example, in 1994,
Comoros received $ 1.90 million credit under Structural Adjustment Facility to support its economic
reforms. See Robert Sharer et. al, Trade Liberalization in IMF-Supported Programs 9, 30 (IMF 1998)
(Comoros began Fund-supported programs with relatively restrictive trade regime. However, there was
marked reduction in its trade restrictiveness).
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members must be moderate in their demands with respect to its membership application
in the trade body if it requests to join.
Somalia has also been largely overlooked in the context of the WTO. Somalia has
undergone market-oriented policies.219 After years of conflict and chaos, Somalia is
experiencing more political stability that would help it revives its shattered economy and
rebuilds it manufacturing sector. Since many of its industries would not be competitive
internationally, WTO members, when considering Somalia's accession to the global trade
body, must also be moderate in their demands for accession.220
Syria has taken several steps on the path of economic reform. These include
increased imports, such as vehicles, and permitting the private sector to venture into such
fields as banking, telecoms, TV production, and higher education. In the context of these
reform initiatives, Syria applied for WTO membership in October 2001. However, four
years have passed since it submitted its application and its pplication is at a standstill.221
Syria is a rogue state, and the U.S. State Department claims that it supports international
terrorism and the Arab trade boycott on Israel and harbors elements of the former Iraqi
regime.
It is unlikely that Syria's application to the WTO will be welcomed anytime soon,
especially after the U.S. Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese

219

See U.S. Dept. Com. Somalia: A Country Study (Lib. of Cong. 1993) (stabilization and macroeconomic
adjustment programs had been implemented during 1980s under auspices of international credit and aid
agencies. There has been a privatization of wholesale trade and financial services).
220

221

Crop and livestock production, forestry, and fisheries are Sudan's main items of exports.

On Feb. 11, 2004, the day Iraq was granted observership seat at the WTO, Syria circulated a note
expressing its interest in joining the organization.
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Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. 2n The Act orders the U.S. President to impose
sanctions against Syria by blocking U.S. exports of any item on the U.S. Munitions List.
Moreover, the U.S. President must also choose two or more sanctions from a menu of six
options, including: prohibiting all exports of U.S. products to Syria, with the exception of
food and medicine; prohibiting U.S. business from operating or investing in Syria; calling
for U.S. financial institutions to sever dealings with the Commercial Bank of Syria;
freezing assets belonging to certain Syrian individuals and government entities; and
prohibiting aircraft of any air carrier owned or controlled by Syria to take off, land in, or
fly over the U.S. The President has the flexibility to waive sanctions if he determines it is
in the U.S. national security interest. U.S. trade sanctions on Syria may have little impact
on its economy since trade between the two countries amounted to only $472 million in
2003. Additionally, Syria neither does operate flights to the U.S. nor does it receive U.S.
aid.
Yemen is another Arab country that is still out in the cold. Modern laws have been
enacted that are comparable with those of other Arab countries.

Islamic law has been

codified in Yemen covering trade, among other areas. Among trade reforms, Yemen
removed import restrictions for many products, introduced four-band tariff structure with
rates ranging from 5-30 percent, and harmonized excise tax rates. Additionally, Yemen
opened its wheat trade and distribution of petroleum products and removed a price-fixing

See Syria Sanctions Bill Passes Senate with Lugar Amendment, Inside U.S. Trade (Inside Wash.
Publishers) 13 (Nov. 14, 2003).
See Phipps & Johnson, supra n. 216, at 953.
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cartel in the trucking sector. Yet, Yemen's accession to the WTO will still face many
obstacles.
There have been calls by Arab countries to grant the Arab League as an observer
status at the WTO. These calls have so far been received by deaf ears. Admitting the
Arab League to the WTO would strengthen the position of Arab countries in the
organization. Furthermore, the Vatican has been setting as an observer since 1997
without the intention of applying for membership. It is preposterous to delay granting the
Arab League a seat to observe the WTO at work.
As to the boycott on Israel, a precedent exists permitting an Arab country to accede
to the GATT while simultaneously maintaining its boycott on Israel. This was the case of
the accession of the United Arab Republic, a union between Egypt and Syria, accession
to the GATT.224 Therefore, accession of Arab countries to the WTO should not hinge on
dismantling their trade boycott on Israel.

VII. WTO Technical Assistance and Arab Countries
Arab countries, like other developing countries, face a limited capacity to negotiate
and implement complex international trade agreements.225 An indication of this is the

The Arab boycott was justified as a reasonable measure considering the state of war between the United
Arab Republic and Israel. During the accession negotiations, some contracting parties raised concerns that
the United Arabic Republic was participating in the Arab League boycott of Israel. Members of the
working party supported the concept that such a boycott did not preclude accession, as long as it was for
political purposes and not a disguised trade protection measure. See GATT Analytical Index, supra n. 123,
at 602-03.
2

It is no clear than in the Doha Ministerial Declaration which states, "We shall continue to make positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure
a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the need of their economic development. In this
context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well-targeted, sustainably financed technical
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dearth of quality research on Arab countries and the WTO. No extensive publications are
available in Arabic. Most publications are based on meetings and conferences. In
English, writing articles about Arab countries and international trade in learned
journalistic periodicals is a largely new development. Traditionally, articles about Arab
countries and international trade in English were limited to a few general and sporadic
lines. Today's scene has changed especially, after the September 11th terrorist attacks on
the U.S. This proliferation seems to have occurred because of political and commercial
reasons. The Arab reader has a quality menu of scholastic articles to choose from.
The WTO uses some of its resources, whether through its regular budget or offbudget, to help developing countries improve their involvement in the WTO work.
The broad objectives of technical assistance are to provide general information on the
multilateral trading system, improve the country's participation in this system through
training on negotiating techniques, use of the Integrated Data Base, and encouraging

assistance and capacity-building programs have important roles to play". See Doha Ministerial Declaration,
Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc. No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, at para. 2.
226

There are four mechanisms employed by the WTO to implement the WTO Agreements: capacity
building, monitoring, supervision, and enforcement. The WTO defines the objectives of technical
assistance and cooperation as to improve knowledge of multilateral trade rules and WTO working
procedures and negotiations and to assist in the implementation of commitments in the multilateral trading
system and full use of its provisions, including the effective use of the dispute settlement mechanism.
These objectives will be administered by the WTO Secretariat and reviewed by the members. The
Committee on Trade and Development approves a three-year plan adjusted on an annual basis, including
the budget consideration, and submit the plan to relevant WTO bodies for implementation. See Xin Zhang,
Implementation of the WTO Agreements: Framework and Reform, 23 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 383, 387, 395
(2003) (the functions of the WTO will be fundamentally undermined if the majority members cannot
implement the WTO Agreements due to lack of capacity). Discussion will be limited to capacity building.
Following the Doha Ministerial Declaration's instructions to develop a plan ensuring long-term funding for
WTO technical assistance, the General Council adopted on Dec. 20, 2001, a new budget that would
increase technical assistance funding by 80 percent and establish a Doha Development Agenda Global
Trust Fund with a proposed core budget of CHF15 million.
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participation in dispute settlement courses.227 The further objective is to deepen
beneficiary countries' knowledge of the trading system through specialized workshops or
seminars. The WTO also organizes a variety of technical assistance activities all over the
world. Technical assistance is mainly delivered in the following forms: courses, seminars,
workshops and technical missions covering a range of subjects, briefing sessions,
Reference Centers, and daily advice to delegations. Examples include Short Trade Policy
courses, Dispute Settlement workshops and courses, Trade Negotiation simulations, and
establishment of WTO Reference Centers.
Many Arab countries are recipients of the buzzword "capacity building" or technical
assistance.229 One can argue that technical assistance is fairly distributed geographically
among Arab countries. The WTO announced cooperation with the Arab Monetary Fund
in 2002.230 Arab officials are also participants in Doha Development Agenda Short Trade
Policy courses, Dispute Settlement courses, Trade Facilitation course, and other regional
seminars/workshop s.231

227

Id. at 395.

228

Id. at 395.

229

For example, Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates are usual participants in Trade Policy courses and
specialized courses. Many Arab countries also have been provided assistance for Trade Reference Centers.
For more on the nature of these courses see Committee on Trade and Development, Technical Assistance
and Training Plan 2004, WT/COMTD/W/119/Rev.3, para.27 (Feb. 18, 2004) (the WTO Secretariat plans
to hold regional trade policy courses in regions not yet covered from the year 2005 such as Arab countries).
230

A close cooperation is undertaken with the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), the Islamic Development Bank
(IsDB) and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA). Id. at
para. 97.
231

Seminars/workshops average 19-48 participants and run over 1-5 days. The number of Arab participants
for instance increases to 48 in sanitary and phytosanitary course. Id. at annex. There seems to be more
focus and interest in sanitary and phytosanitary course than others. This is logical since many Arab
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Even more, in the context of collaboration between Arab countries and the WTO, an
important step has been taken to establish an "unofficial" Arabic language website to
translate all WTO documents into Arabic.232 Though it is a welcome gesture, there are
two drawbacks for translating these documents into Arabic. First, the information on the
website is not updated very frequently.233 Because it takes a longer period of time to
translate documents from English into Arabic. There are certain trade terms and/or
phrases for which it might be impossible to translate their intrinsic and subtle nuances
into Arabic. As such, the meaning of the whole word or phrase could be lost in the
translation. Second, is the reality that reading WTO information available at its Arabic
website will not develop comprehensive knowledge or expertise in international trade
law. The scarce resources directed toward the WTO Arabic website might be put to better
use if they were used for training on international trade, especially considering that
English is the language of international trade.
Although WTO technical assistance is appreciated, it is not enough. Generally, the
technical assistance is funded by the WTO budget. Contributions to the WTO budget are
based on a trade-weighted basis. This means that bigger trading countries, such as the
U.S, EC, Canada, and Japan, have a stronger say on the allocation of their contributions.

countries face difficulties in implementing the different aspects of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement which lead to lost export sales. At the Doha Ministerial Conference of 2001, WTO members
along with several multilateral organizations including the Food and Agriculture Organization launched a
mechanism known as Standards and Trade Development Facility to help countries meet the complexities of
food and animal health standards.
232

The Arab based Talal Abu-Ghazaleh & Co. foundation is administering the website. It can be accessed
at < http://www.wtoarab.org/>.

It is unclear how many hits the website receives or how many documents are downloaded from the
website. These indicators may measure the popularity of the website.
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In this way, technical assistance may be limited in scope depending on the availability of
funds. In some cases, technical assistance might be affected by the whims in the WTO.
For example, the WTO staff initiated a "work to rule" campaign in which they refuse to
provide administrative support outside normal hours.234 Another example is China's
blocking of the WTO technical assistance and training plan for 2005 in the Committee on
Trade and Development unless provisions are removed allowing the issue of textiles and
apparels to be discussed at WTO-financed regional seminars. This is an evidence of the
undependable nature of technical assistance delivered by WTO Secretariat.
Up until now, technical assistance to Arab countries can be summarized in two
words: translation and some international trade courses. With respect to translation, WTO
members have established an unofficial website in Arabic. However, the WTO is shy of
saying that although 280 million people speak Arabic in the Arab countries, Arabic is not
a working language along with the other three working languages (English, Spanish, and
French) in the trade body. The memorandum of understanding to translate WTO
documents into Arabic proves once again the superiority of the WTO, meaning one must
receive the blessing of the WTO before translating its documents into another
l i e

language.

In this way, the WTO has resorted to a backdoor policy of pretending to

See Staff Action to Push Pay Raise Interrupts Several WTO Meetings, 19 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1985
(Nov. 21, 2002) (the U.S. and Germany leading the tough line in keeping WTO budget to a minimum).
235

Perhaps, the WTO needs to protect its own copyrighted materials from deceptive practices of others who
copycat them. The Yes Men, an anti-globalization organization, established a website nearly identical to the
WTO website with Andy Bichlbaum acting as the WTO spokesperson who mistakenly on several
occasions was invited as speaker in conferences in which he praised slavery and decried Ghandi.
Conference organizers thought Andy Bichlbaum was from the WTO Secretariat. In reality, Andy
Bichlbaum is an imposter. The web address for the "fake" WTO is available at <www.gatt.org>. See Jerry
Useem, Will the Real WTO Please Stand Up? 145 Fortune 34 (Jan. 21, 2002).
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deliver technical assistance to Arab countries but not, in reality, accomplishing very
much.
As to WTO trade courses, these are shallow courses. They can be best described as
introductory-level undergraduate college courses. Arab participants may not have the
chance to delve as deeply as possible into the world of international trade.
Furthermore, these courses cover areas that may not be of interest or use for Arab
countries. For example, offering an antidumping course to Jordan may not be of help
since it uses safeguard measures all the time. In addition, any trade course that is not put
to use may be less beneficial because unless Arab countries are involved extensively in
international trade on a regular basis, the information may fade away with time. Only the
efficient delivery of technical assistance to Arab countries will provide them with the
skills needed to successfully negotiate with developed countries.
The WTO is working on a strategy for Arab countries, which is aimed at raising
awareness of the WTO in the region and better integrating it into the current multilateral
trading system.

In other words, the WTO would launch a "public awareness"

campaign. Although Arab countries are appreciative for the wishful thinking of the WTO,
such a strategy would have to include technical assistance that is frequent, informationrich and deep, and relevant to their trade needs. Moreover, WTO technical assistance

However, some trade courses that are delivered in Geneva could be beneficial since Arab participants
have first hand experience of the WTO.
See U.S. Blocks Iranian WTO Application; Syria Prevented from Placement on Agenda, supra n. 195, at
36 (citing a statement of [then] WTO Director-General Mike Moore).
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must be presented in local languages and spread out throughout each country's region,
not strictly concentrated in capitals.
Some WTO technical assistance is confined to a particular event. For example,
before WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003, there was a local workshop in
Jordan covering several WTO Agreements. However, such type of technical assistance
has its own limitations. If there is a setback at the Ministerial Conference and stalemate,
as it happened, any earlier technical assistance directed at that particular event would not
be relevant.
Arab countries are offered different sorts of technical assistance from other
international institutions and international donors.238 These institutions and donors
include the Beirut-based IMF Technical Assistance Center for the Middle East; UNDPfunded regional projects; ITC matchmaking for business people; UNCTAD programs;
US AID technical assistance programs, especially in the area of intellectual property; and
non-profit entities such as the International Intellectual Property Institute. The mission
statements of all these institutions are directed toward different goals and different
methodologies. Each international institution or donor has its own "agenda" that can lead
to confusion, redundancy, and lack of uniformity.
An Arab institution, perhaps named the Inter-Arab Academy for International Trade
Law, could be created to fill in the gap in the WTO technical assistance programs. The
institution will have a budget funded by contributions and donations of Arab countries

2

See Tamara Cofman Wittes, The Promise of Arab Liberalism, Policy Rev. 61, 63, 67 (July 2004) (the
Middle East Partnership Initiative launched in 2002 meant to promote, in part, economic reform. Through
the initiative the U.S. is supporting WTO membership bids for several Arab countries. Some of the
initiative funds, about $1 million, are allocated to translating Algeria's documents submitted to the WTO
into English). Once again, the focus of WTO-related technical assistance is on translation.
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proportionate to its economic development. The purpose of the Academy would be to
send Arab candidates, such as government officials, academia, or representatives from
the private sector, from Arab countries, nominated by their countries based on
qualifications and not on political affiliation, to be trained in different areas of
international trade in different international institutions. Over several years, those Arab
candidates will become human capital (knowledge and skill) and would be able to
reinforce the ability of Arab countries to defend their interests. These candidates will also
be able to transfer their knowledge to others in the Academy, thereby strengthening the
ability of Arabs as a group to participate in the international trade regime.

VIII. The Venue of the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference: Qatar (2001)
The WTO must hold its Ministerial Conference at least once every two years. The
General Council of the WTO decides on the date and venue of the Ministerial
Conference.239 The Gulf state of Qatar voluntarily offered to host the WTO Ministerial
Conference during the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference. The fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference held in Doha, Qatar brought the WTO ever closer to Arab countries and was
the largest international meeting in the region.

There are many factors considered in selecting the venue of the WTO Ministerial Conference. Those
include the capacity to host the conference, proximity of the conference venue to corporate hotels such as
Marriott, Sheraton, and Hyatt and airport(s), transportations, local assistance, and security arrangements.
Usually, WTO Secretariat officials visit the prospective city to determine its infrastructure ability to host
such a large meeting.
240

The other WTO Ministerial Conferences were consecutively: Singapore (Dec. 9-13, 1996), Geneva
(May 18-20, 1998), Seattle (Nov.-Dec, 30-3, 1999), and Cancun (Sep. 10-14, 2003). The sixth Ministerial
Conference will be held in Hong Kong (Dec. 13-18, 2005). The usual date for WTO Ministerial
Conferences is the Nov. to Dec. period. During this period in 2001, the Islamic month of Ramadan would
come. Being sensitive to Islamic values, it was decided to hold the fourth Ministerial Conference earlier
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Qatar is a small country, and it is not an active member of the WTO as other
members such as Canada, Chile, Singapore, or South Africa. Despite these limitations,
Qatar was found to have the required infrastructure to host the meeting. 41 Since Qatar is
not an active member of the WTO, Qatari trade minister, Yousef Hussain Kamal, did not
likely have the experience necessary to chair the conference. In practice, the old
experienced guards of WTO members would run effectively the procedures of the
conference. It is possible that Qatar was chosen for reasons other than its infrastructure
and the WTO claim of wanting to integrate Arab countries into the WTO system.
The 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference was a blow to the efforts of WTO members
to launch the "Millennium Round".24 The WTO could not sustain another failure. As
such, Qatar was the proper venue to remove the Seattle stain. In terms of geography,
Qatar is a far way from the anti-globalization protestors and anarchists that disrupted the
Seattle Conference.243 Even if protestors decided to travel to Qatar, they were unlikely to
flock in large numbers considering travel expenses and other logistical hurdles.

(Nov. 9-13). If WTO members did not decide so, trade negotiators would be hungry. Trade negotiators
would not provide the anticipated outcomes.
241

See Chile, Qatar Signal to WTO Interest in Hosting Ministerial Meeting Next Year, 17 Intl. Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1888 (Dec. 14, 2000) (Qatar was prepared to make available 4,440 rooms for attending officials
some in terms of luxury villas and cruise ships. The proposed venue was the Sheraton Doha Conference
and the International Exhibition Center).
242

There are many reasons for the failure of the Seattle meeting. At this point, external factors will be
counted. Violent protests against the WTO resulted in 600 arrests, $3 million in property damages, and
between $12 million and $22 million in lost business for Seattle merchants. Id. at 1888. Protestors delayed
and disrupted several Seattle meetings.
243

The largest jam ever in Qatar in which police interfered was the McDonald-Burger King price war. The
two fast-food restaurants engaged in price war after Burger King opened in Qatar.
244

While if the WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Vancouver, Canada, protestors would have
flocked in vans by thousands just across the U.S. borders.
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Protestors were likely to have a low key profile in Doha. Therefore, to outflank Seattle
reoccurrence, Doha was chosen as it is far from demonstrations, riot police, tear gas, and
downtown arrests.
Over the course of several WTO Ministerial Conferences, delegations of some Arab
countries to the Conferences were small in number. Generally, Arab delegations
consisted of a trade minister and with two senior trade officials. This reflects the fact that
Arab countries do not have enough financial resources to send full-fledged delegations.

5

The small numbers of Arab delegations could be easily compared with hundreds of trade
negotiators representing other countries.246 Delegations consisting of small numbers put
Arab countries at disadvantage, especially when due to an imbalanced calendar, several
meetings were held at the same time.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are permitted to attend WTO Ministerial
Conferences.247 NGOs are subject to accreditation process by specifying how their
activities are linked to the work of the WTO and source(s) of finance.

However, these

requirements are also a potential drawback for NGOs from Arab countries.

245

The WTO provides three travel tickets, for more you buy your own ticket. Other international agencies
may handle travel expenses such as WIPO or US AID.
246

For GATT Brussels Ministerial Meeting in 1990, the U.S. sent an army of 600 personnel and Japan 300.
Perhaps out of security reasons, U.S. trade delegation to the Doha Ministerial Conference had a low turnout
of less than 100.
247

NGOs' attendance is limited to plenary sessions but not other meetings.

248

See Press Release, Non-Governmental Organizations Facilities Provided During the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Singapore, PRESS/TE 012 (Aug. 26, 1996). An obvious reason for the accreditation process
is to prevent NGOs with "hidden agenda" from participating.
Coincidentally, the title of the document refers to trade and environment. One assumes that some
environmental NGOs have hidden agenda.
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Over the course of the five WTO Ministerial Conferences held so far, few Arab
business associations and NGOs have participated/Moreover, they are limited in
representation to one or two personnel. For example, in the third Ministerial Conference
held in Seattle in 1999 among approximately 739 associations and NGOs that took part
only three were from Arab countries.250 The number of Arab associations increased
dramatically in the fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha in 2001.251 The lack of
expansive Arab associations and NGOs participation in WTO Ministerial Conferences
can be attributed to lack of interest or understanding of the WTO mechanics or more
importantly due to lack of financial resources.
Inter-governmental organizations also participate in WTO Ministerial Conferences.
For example, in the Doha Ministerial Conference of 2001, sixty-two inter-governmental
organizations were permitted to participate. One noticeable group that was missing from

Perhaps, some Arab NGOs might be interested in the work of the WTO although their activities are not
linked to the work of the WTO.
2

° Two were from Egypt (Group of Fifteen-Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Services
and the Central Agricultural Co-op Union) and one from Sudan (Sudanese Business Men and Employers
Federation).
2

' Out of approximately 365 associations and NGOs participated in the Conference, 12 Arab association
participated: six were from Jordan (Arab Knowledge Management Society, Arab Society for Certified
Accountants, Arab Society for Intellectual Property, Licensing Executives Society-Arab Countries,
National Society for Consumer Protection, PhRMA East/Africa Committee ), one from Lebanon (Arab
NGO Network for Development), three from Egypt (Centre for Trade Union and Workers Services, Group
of Fifteen-Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Services, National Association for Human
Rights and Development), one from Syria (International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions), and one
from Saudi Arabia (Women and Children International). The number of Arab associations and NGOs in the
fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003 dropped back to 8 out of 1002: three from Egypt (AfroAsian People's Solidarity Organization, Center for Trade Union and Workers Services, Federation of
Egyptian Industries), two from Jordan (Arab Knowledge Management Society, Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America-Jordan), one from Lebanon (Arab NGO Network for Development), one
from Iran (Confederation of Iranian Industry), and one from Tunisia (Union Tunisienne de 1'Agriculture et
de la Peche).
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participation in WTO Ministerial Conferences was the League of Arab States, one of the
oldest regional organizations of states in the world. Despite various attempts by the
League to obtain an observership seat at WTO Ministerial Conferences, as well as
various meetings, the League's efforts have thus far been fruitless.252 Several WTO
members have objected to such requests on the pretext that the League of Arab States'
promotion of boycott of Israel is contrary to WTO rules. Clearly, the objections of these
members are politically motivated rather than legally justified. WTO rules provide the
means for integrating the functions of international, regional, and country-specific intergovernmental organizations, inclduing the IMF, World Bank, and the OECD (the holy
triangle of industrialized countries).25 In return for blocking the League of Arab States
application for observership, Arab countries such as Egypt blocked applications of other
inter-governmental organizations.254 For example, U.N Commissioner for Human Rights
was not granted an observer status in the Council for Trade in Services.
At the end of the Ministerial Conference in Qatar, members marked the launch of
new round of multilateral trade negotiations. Apart from being considered "developing

For instance, the League of Arab States was not permitted to participate as an observer in the WTO
Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003. Hussein Hassouna, Ambassador of the League of Arab States to
the U.S., Address, The League of Arab States and International Law (Am. U. Sch. L., Apr. 21, 2004) (copy
on file with author). On the other hand, Qatar courteously hosted Israel delegation in the Fourth Ministerial
Conference in Doha. Usually, the WTO issues invitations to members and other organizations to attend its
Ministerial Conferences.
253

Article V.l of the WTO Charter states that the General Council shall make "appropriate arrangements"
for effective cooperation with other inter-governmental organizations that have responsibilities related to
those of the WTO. Thus, members of the WTO recognized, though without any specific reference for any
inter-governmental organization, other legal entities as part of the wider economic order.
254

See Robyn Eckersley, The Big Chill: The WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 4 Global
Envtl. Pol. 24 (May 2004) (admission of observers has been dealt with on ad hoc basis. The continuing
impasse on the observer problem can be resolved only at the General Council level).
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countries," the question that arises is what had Arab countries achieved during the
meeting. One of the immediate benefits, at least from the perspective of Qatar, is that the
new round was dubbed "the Doha Development Agenda".255 Additionally, Qatar boosted
its domestic tourism industry, even if such a boost was only temporary.256 However, there
have not been any long-range economic benefits from hosting the Conference. As for
other Arab countries, they are now faced with the daunting task of understanding the
complex and extensive trade negotiations in which they will participate over the next
several years, while still digesting the raw deals of the Uruguay Round.

IX. Trade Patterns of Arab Countries
Despite the fact that Arab countries collectively represent approximately 5 percent of
world's population, they are not as integrated in the world economy as other countries.
The share of Arab countries in world trade is effectively de minimis. It amounted to about
3 percent of export and about 2.4 percent of import in 1999. hi total, international trade is
about 5.4 percent of all trade in Arab countries. According to the Economist, the region's
total GDP is at $531 billion yearly, which less than that of Spain.257 Despite the fact that
Arab countries are geographically giant, they are still economically tiny.

The "Doha Development Agenda" will enter the history of trade rounds along with the Tokyo Round
and the Uruguay Round. It is of notice that the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 uses the term "work
program" instead of the politically sensitive term "trade round". For example, the term "work program"
was used seventeen times while round was referred to only one time in the context of the Uruguay Round.
See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra n. 225.
2

25

Qatar may have built facilities such as rooms that cost million of dollars to be used only for one time.

See Special Report: Self-doomed to Failure-Arab Development, Economist 24 (July 6, 2002)
(unemployment is about 15 percent of the labor force and growth is stagnant. Arab countries poor
performance is not for lack of resources but for shortage of three essentials: freedom, knowledge, and
womanpower).
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Intra-regional trade, that is, trade among Arab countries, represents just 10 percent of
total Arab trade. These figures clearly indicate that external and intra-Arab trade is
negligible. There are several explanations for the poor trading performance of Arab
countries. One suggestion is that regional conflicts and political tensions, along with large
military expenditures, have prevailed over the years.258 The combination of small markets
and high barriers to trade is another factor.259 Another theory is that Arab countries have
not sufficiently diversified their exports, with the exception of oil.

Some Arab

countries impose cabotage restrictions by limiting the ability of their transportation
companies to operate in other countries with full freedom.
Tariff rates in Arab countries are still higher than other regions. For example, the
weighted average tariff in Egypt is 28 percent compared with 14 percent in Latin
American countries.2 2 In Lebanon, tariff accounts for 44 percent of total government
revenue, the largest contributor to the budget. Therefore, the revenue impact of trade
liberalization differs from country to country, depending on the total tariffs' contribution
to the budget. In addition, Arab countries use different forms of para-tariffs that have the
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Bernard Hoekman & Patrick Mersserlin, Harnessing Trade for Development and Growth in the Middle
East 7 (Brookings Instn. Press 2002).
259
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«.atll.

Id. at 12.
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A survey of companies in Arab countries found that costs of trading in these countries are about 10.6 of
value of trade. These costs include slow customs clearance, additional payments to customs officials, and
large number of documents and signatures required for processing. Id. at 14, 53-56.
See Trade Policy Developments in the Middle East and North Africa 118 (Bernard Hoekman & Hanaa
Kheii-El-Din eds., World Bank Publications 2000).
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equivalent effect of tariffs.263 Examples of para-tariffs include stamp taxes and consular
fees, which increase as the value of imports increases or do not reflect the actual service
rendered.264 Arab countries would have to streamline these para-tariffs, if they have not
already done so, in the process of acceding to the WTO.
Internal barriers to intra-Arab trade also leave many economies of scales
unexploited. Arab trade usually takes the form of homogenous products (textiles and
apparel) competing in the same markets (the U.S. and EC).265 Finally, one should not
ignore developed countries protectionism that contributes to the lack of Arab countries
integration in the world market.
The structure of exports and imports of Arab countries clearly indicates that oil
products amount to more than half of the total of exports from Arab countries.267 This is
followed by manufactured products, which amount to 15.8 percent. Machinery absorbs
the lion share of imports, 34.2 percent, followed by manufactured products, 30.5 percent.
In terms of geographical distribution of trade, the EC is the largest Arab trading partner in
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Id. at 168.

264

Jordan, for example, imposed fees for customs overtime wage at 0.2 percent of the CIF value of imports
or traffic administration fee. Tunisia imposed TD 2 as a computer data word-processing fee on each page of
the customs declaration. Egypt imposed statistical tax of 1 percent on all imports. See M. M Kostecki & M.
J. Tymowski, Customs Duties versus other Import Charges in the Developing Countries, 19 J.W.T. 269281 (1985) (some Arab countries such as Libya, Algeria, Egypt, and Mauritania impose taxes on foreign
trade transactions in the form of compulsory foreign exchange levies and advanced import deposits. Such
taxes are not reported in the financial statistics on import taxes).
2

Since the U.S. and EC markets account for much of Arab countries exports, trade policies and practices
in these two countries would have a profound impact on Arab countries trade.
266

If trade in textiles and apparel, agriculture, oil, and movement of people are restricted, one would
wonder what Arab countries can trade in.
See appendix 1, table 2, infra page 334.
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terms of exports and imports, followed by the U.S. and Japan, which means that there is a
trade dependency on the U.S. and EC markets.
The divided circumstances of Arab countries are so varied that generalizations are
rendered difficult.268 However, some trends in export structures are ascertainable. In
terms of exports, Arab countries can be divided into two categories.

The first category

includes countries that depend primarily on oil exports.27 For example, oil exports
amount to 95 percent of Kuwait's total exports and 87 percent of Saudi Arabia's total
exports.271
The second category includes countries that export foodstuffs, agricultural, and
manufactured products.272 Most manufactured products exported from Arab countries are
clothing and textiles. The clothing sector, in pre-Uruguay rounds, was subject to
quantitative restrictions imposed by several developed countries.

The clothing sector

268

There is no single formula that would determine how to classify Arab countries. Many Arab countries
differ in size, degree of development, trade pattern, and income.

269

A third group of Arab least-developed countries can be added. It includes Comoros, Djibouti,
Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan. In the WTO there is no specific definition for developed, developing, and
least developing countries. Each country may self-select its status, but this does not mean that it would
automatically qualify for such status in the WTO bodies. The U.N usually classifies countries as such.
270
This category includes Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United
Arab Emirates.
271

See Said El-Naggar, The Effects of the WTO on Arab Countries, U.N. Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/ESCWA/CAB/2001/6 (2001) (Arabic Version).
272 .

' The second category includes Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Id. at 3.

273

The industries of developed countries were unable to face competition from imports of developing
countries. The normal action to protect developed countries' industries, if there was an injury to the
domestic industries, was to apply article XIX of GATT 1947. However, according to article MFN
treatment, safeguard would have to apply to all countries which in that case would have counteracted by
other developed countries. Hence, the Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, known as the
Multi-Fiber Agreement, came into existence. It prescribed import quotas for developing countries which
signed the agreement.
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finally came under the jurisdiction of the WTO.274 Arab countries are likely to benefit
from further liberalization in the clothing sector.275
A pattern of countertrade has developed in Arab countries. In 1995, the U.N Security
Council, for humanitarian purposes in Iraq, adopted Resolution No. 986, also known as
the "Oil for Food Resolution".27 It provides for the export of specified quantities of Iraqi
oil with the proceeds being deposited in an escrow account that may be used for the
import of goods, products and technology necessary for Iraq's economic and social
development. In other words, it is a trade of a product for another product. This sort of
partial barter-trade is beneficial for Arab countries that are under economic embargoes
and may not have enough foreign exchange to finance imports.

X. The Impact of the International Trading System on Arab Countries
This section will briefly summarize the implications of WTO on Arab countries in
certain sectors.277 From the outset, it is important to indicate that the multilateral trading
system will have profound effects on the Arab countries collectively. For those countries
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The liberalization of the clothing sector extended over ten years period ending in 2005. The WTO
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing contains an annex which has a list of articles that are covered by the
liberalization action.
275

Many developing countries have expressed their dismay as to the pace of the application of the WTO
Textiles and Clothing Agreement in its early stage. The phase-out schedule under the Agreement was
backloaded so that industrialized countries could maintain nearly half of their quotas until the final
implementation period. Therefore, value-added textiles and apparels were not covered until the later stage
of liberalization.
276

277

See Mark Turner, Iraq and the U.N., Fin. Times 3 (Mar. 26, 2004).

Measuring the impact of WTO accession on Arab countries in different sectors such as services,
employment, and telecommunication, just to mention few, requires extensive studies and analysis that are
beyond the limits of this section. For some sectoral studies on the WTO and Arab countries see Opening
Doors to the World: A New Trade Agenda for the Middle East (Raed Safadi ed., Intl. Dev. Research Ctr.
1998).
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that joined the WTO, this means that they will have to abide by its rules. For those that
are outside the WTO, this means that they would have to undertake regulatory reforms.
The effects of the WTO on different sectors can be summarized as follows. Benefits are
likely to materialize once the Arab countries enact a broad package of laws and
regulations. This does not mean that some Arab industries are not likely to be negatively
affected. A price must be paid for joining the WTO (no pain, no gain). However, any
negative impact on Arab import-competing industries may be compensated by exportable
industries. Regardless, one cannot for sure say what the full-portrait of the negative or
positive effects will be since these are probabilities.

A. Agriculture
Until the Uruguay Round, agriculture was under softer disciplines. The WTO
Agreement on Agriculture contains new regulations in this sector. The WTO Agreement
on Agriculture covers market access, export subsidies, and domestic support.

The

WTO Agreement on Agriculture also establishes a special safeguard mechanism that
allows WTO members to impose restrictive measures when facing surging farm imports.

Without going into the details of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, restrictions on market access of
agriculture were in the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. WTO members agreed to tariffy non-tariff
barriers in binding recorded schedules with tariffs resulting from this process are to be reduced by average
36 percent in case of developed countries and 24 percent for developing countries, with minimum
reductions for each tariff line required. This process is known as the Uruguay Round formula. Regarding
export subsidy, developed countries committed to reduction at a level of 36 percent below the 1986-1990
base level and the quantity of subsidized exports by 21 percent over the same period. In case of developing
countries the reductions are two-thirds of those of developed countries. The implementation period is six
years for developed countries starting Jan.l 1995, and ten years for developing countries regarding direct
export subsidy. Some WTO members calculated very high levels of equivalent tariffs in replacement of
non-tariff barriers. To alleviate such a problem members provided three approaches: current market access,
minimum access quotas where current access is less than 3 percent of domestic consumption, and special
treatment for some products such as rice. For more on the WTO Agriculture Agreement see Melaku
Geboye Desta, Food Security and International Trade Law: An Appraisal of the World Trade
Organization, 35 J.W.T. 450-452 (2001).
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Arab countries' agriculture sectors are in primitive stages. Arab countries are facing
an ever increasing challenge to acquire adequate food to feed their populations. Arab
countries are experiencing a lack of young farmers. Many farming households derive
most of their income from non-agricultural activities. Although some parts of the region
have been historically exporters of agricultural products nowadays they are, to large
extent, dependent on staple food imports.

Many Arab countries post a trade deficit in

farm products.
There are many reasons for the decline of agriculture in Arab countries. First, farm
policy in Arab countries, which is different from developed countries, plays a role in this
state of affairs.

Second, Arab agriculture sectors are relatively subsidy-free while

developed countries provide massive agricultural subsidies, thus causing lower prices and
harming farmers in Arab countries. Moreover, Arab agricultural technology, such as
mechanization and large farm operations, is also not at the same level as that of their
foreign counterparts, which results in high output costs and low international

See Roni N. Halabi, Stability in the Middle East through Economic Development: An Analysis of the
Peace Process, Increased Agricultural Trade, Joint Ventures, and Free Trade Agreements, 2 Drake J.
Agric. L. 275, 284 (1997) (twenty Arab countries purchased $27.3 billion worth of agricultural products in
1993).
For example, Arab countries tax farmers so as urban population would purchase these farm products at
lower prices. In order to compensate for taxing farmers, Arab countries subsidize inputs such as irrigation
thus providing artificially low-cost water. However, with taking on economic reforms under the aegis of
international agencies, subsidizing inputs is no longer a viable approach. Moreover, Arab countries lack
foreign exchange to subsidize agriculture. On the other hand, developed countries, such as the EC, tax
urban population to insure income support for farmers. Rather subsidizing inputs, developed countries
subsidize agriculture output. Therefore, domestic Arab farm products priced higher than imported ones. Of
course, developed countries agricultural exporters are more than happy to fill in the gap and "dump" their
surplus productions in Arab countries markets. Thus, further eroding what is remaining of the agriculture
sector in these Arab countries. Water scarcity in the region is another reason for the decline in agriculture.
However, although it is valid, this is not all true. Further reason for insufficient grain harvest could be due
to giving more emphasis on value-added crops such as fruits and vegetables. One could argue that this
works for Arab countries comparative advantage since they have large pool of labor and little arable land.
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competitiveness. Additionally, exports of agriculture and fishery products from Arab
countries face a myriad of safety and environmental regulations in foreign markets. For
example, Oman was allowed to export wild shrimp to the U.S. in 2005, only after the
State Department certified that its fishing operations do not threaten endangered sea
turtles because Oman harvests shrimp using manual rather than mechanical means to
retrieve nets.281 Other regulatory measures imposed by the U.S. include mandatory
country-of-origin labeling for meat and meat products. Safety and environmental
regulations make it burdensome for agriculture and fishery products from Arab countries
to penetrate foreign markets.
Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have undertaken programs to become selfsufficient in agriculture. To achieve this goal, Arab countries may want to increase farm
spending which has little impact on trade and thus does not run afoul of WTO rules. For
example, Arab countries could establish support programs that include measures such as
income insurance and income safety nets, agricultural research, restructuring aid, disease
control, and regional assistance. These support programs could also include certain forms
of direct payments to farmers as long as these payments are not linked to the type or
amount of crops being grown.
Trade in genetically modified or bioengineered foods involves complex factors.
These factors include lack of scientific certainty on the possible impact of agriculture

281

Under U.S. law, wild shrimp imports are barred if harvested in ways harmful to endangered sea turtles.
However, the import bar is inapplicable if the State Department certifies that the harvesting nation has
taken steps to reduce the incidental taking of turtles in shrimp trawl operations such as the use of sea turtle
excluder devices or has fishing environment that poses no threat to sea turtles such as fishing in cold water
regions not frequented by sea turtles. The shipment of shrimp must be accompanied by the State
Department form DS-2031 signed by the exporter, importer, and government official from the harvesting
nation. See Appropriations Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (2005).
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biotechnology on human or animal health and the environment, involvement of huge
economic interests in the biotech food trade, and the links that biotech food has to ethical
and religious concerns and biodiversity preservation. Arab countries, such as the Sudan,
have imposed import bans or tight restrictions on genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) products. These Arab countries fear the contamination of local crops by GMO
strains that could affect their ability to export agriculture products to the EC, where there
are strict controls on bioengineered foods. Arab countries may need to approve
biotechnology in order to boost food security. Bioengineered crops provide protection
against pests or tolerance to chemicals. For example, in 2004, Algeria and Tunisia
experienced a slow-down in economic growth due in part to a locust infestation that
curbed agricultural output. Approval of bioengineered crops could be accompanied by
adequate labeling laws put in place such as have been put in place in Saudi Arabia. The
areas of GMOs crops under cultivation could be separated from other areas of
conventional crops. In addition, as a safety measure, GMOs could pass through safety
and risk assessments before entering Arab countries.
Accession into the WTO would force the opening up of the domestic agricultural
commodity markets. Moreover, as a result of further liberalization in agriculture, it is
expected that the price tag of imported food products will increase. Arab net foodimporting countries would likely to face some difficulties.282 Therefore, in WTO trade

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture recognizes the negative effects of agricultural liberalization. For
this reason, WTO members adopted the Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible
Negative Effects of the Reforming Program on Least-developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries. Statistics show that food prices rose sharply after entry into force of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture. Since then prices have been on the decline. For more on discussion the Ministerial Decision
and the effects on food security see Desta, supra n. 278, at 465-467. The list of net food-importing

negotiations, one could anticipate that some Arab countries would be in a defensive
position or low profile proponents of agricultural trade liberalization. Any reduction in
subsidies by developed countries for their agriculture exporters would translate into a
higher food import bill for Arab countries.
In WTO trade negotiations, Arab net food-importing countries could be proponents
of special and differential treatment in agricultural export credits, offered through export
credit agencies of developed countries, by arguing for longer maximum repayment terms,
minimum annual repayment of principal and interest, favorable interest rates, and
premium terms for food imports. Some Arab countries, such as Jordan and the Sudan,
currently are recipients of food aid. As such, these Arab countries could argue for
continuing food aid in the form of in-kind donations and cash payments when negotiating
new WTO rules regarding the use of food aid. Any agriculture trade reforms should not
lead to a reduction in food aid delivered to Arab countries. Arab countries should resist
any proposals that would limit food aid given in grants rather than credits and food aid
that takes the form of cash donations, rather than in-kind food donations. Cash donation
may take a longer time to reach targeted groups as compared with in-kind donations.
Moreover, Arab countries could argue that food aid should not be restricted only to
defined emergencies and humanitarian crises.

countries includes Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. See
Committee on Agriculture, WTO List of Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, G/AG/5/Rev.5 (Mar.
26, 2002).
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B. State-Owned Enterprises
Arab countries face the dilemma of the public/private sector dichotomy. State-owned
enterprises (SOEs) are perceived as a drag on the economy and the budget. Some
officials in Arab countries believe in smaller government by reducing the number of civil
servants. It is also perceived that Arab countries' economic future depends upon the
reform of SOEs. Usually, the public sector opposes trade liberalization and the private
sector backs it. When SOEs were set up in 1960s, they were arms of the state, and they
generate 40 percent of GDP.

These SOEs account for a large share of urban

employment.284
The arguments then proceed along the following lines: These SOEs suffer from an
inability to reduce overmanned offices coupled with bloated payrolls. In these
enterprises, political skills are far more important than educational or managerial skills.
The dilemma of public/private sector is further complicated if the civil service in Arab
countries has ethnic majority, while the private sector has different ethnic structure. SOEs
maintain advantages in obtaining government subsidies, land rights, loans from state
banks, and legalized monopolies in sectors such as aviation and power. To put it bluntly,
the private sector may not enjoy a level playing field.

See Doing Business with Egypt 11, 17-25 (Marat Terterov ed., Kogan Page 2001).
2

See Yitzhak Reiter, The Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in
Jordan, 58 The Middle East J. 72, 77 (2004) (the top 500 private-owned enterprises has JD5,814'million
worth of assets with total employment of 44,839). From this article, one can inversely draw the conclusion
regarding the large number of employees in public enterprises in Jordan. See also Doing Business with •
Saudi Arabia 5, 21 (Anthony Shoult ed., 2d ed., Kogan Page 2002) (the Saudi economy is currently in a
state of transition as a consequence of the need to move from a focus on public to private sector activity.
Annual government spending represents one-third of Saudi GDP. For example, in 1994, income payments
to public sector employees accounted for around 50 percent of total government spending).
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The balance between the public/private sectors also means that it takes a longer time
for reform to maintain the socio-political balance. Taking into account the abilities of the
private sector and of all these private/SOEs, the reality is that few may spring out as
conglomerates in a nasty international market that recognizes only one thing: being lean
and mean. The goal should not be to squeeze one sector over the other. Rather, there must
be a potentially a long-term partnership on broad range of activities between private
enterprises and SOEs based on communication through workshops, cooperation, shared
accountability, and mutual benefit.2 5 In other words, a national economy must be a
private/public sector-led economy. Moreover, creating a few large SOEs may lead to
some Arab multinationals that would be globally competitive and that have reduced their
inefficiencies.
The ability of Arab countries to compete in international trade depends on
productivity, investment in human and physical capital, and research and development.
Several indicators suggest a decline in Arab countries competitiveness. Intra-industry
trade between 1985 and 1997 had been relatively slow and show little change when
compared with Brazil, Taiwan, and Malaysia.286 Many firms in Arab countries are
dominated by individuals, compete based on price alone, and lack managerial and
technological resources. Some domestic industries are mostly composed of family-owned

Long-term partnership may include outsourcing of non-essential functions to private sector companies
so as to allow SOEs to focus on their essential functions. For example, notary services may be outsourced
to private companies.
286

See Globalization and Firm Competitivenes in the Middle East and North African Region 191-195
(Samiha Fawzy ed., The World Bank 2002).
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small and medium-sized enterprises.287 They are concentrated in traditional laborintensive industries such as textiles and apparel, wood products, and non-metallic mineral
products. There are no available data on overall expenditure in research and development
or the number of patents awarded in Arab countries.
Arab countries should focus their efforts on developing high-tech industries. Arab
countries should also boost their support for research and development and improve their
engineering and science education. Competition will lead to increases in efficiency and
creativity, which will force domestic industries to adapt with the new climate.288

C. International Trade in Oil
Oil is the largest primary commodity traded internationally.

Some Arab countries

are top suppliers of oil. They have a comparative cost advantage since oil in these
countries is cheap to pump. Therefore, oil-Arab producing countries that are not yet
members of the WTO such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia may have concern
over subjecting oil to market forces. In acceding to the WTO, these countries may have to
bind their tariffs on oil imports, meaning that tariffs cannot increase above certain ceiling.

287

For example, in Jordan 93 percent of establishments are small and medium-sized enterprises. Id. at 195.

288

Through mergers companies could be able to compete, invest in their production systems, and
strengthen their financial position.
289

Fuel exports in 2002 stood at $615 billion accounting for 9.8 percent of world merchandise trade. See
WTO Secretariat, International Trade Statistics for 2003 (2003).
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Also, this implies that other oil-importing countries would reduce and bind their tariffs
based on reciprocity, thus giving an advantage to oil-Arab exporting countries.290
It is a misconception to claim that oil trade, whether crude oil or oil derivatives, is
not covered or excluded by the WTO agreements. Over the years, developed and
developing countries have increased the number of goods governed by the disciplines of
multilateral trading system.291 As a matter of fact, Kuwait associated itself with a 1987
GATT case that was concerned with oil trade.292 If oil trade is not governed by GATT,
then the GATT panel would not have exercised jurisdiction in the matter. However, that
case was limited to the consumer/importer side of the oil trade. There has not yet been a
case involving the producer/exporter country side for reasons, such as setting prices or
production targets.293 Additionally, oil trade is subject to domestic trade remedy laws.2 4

For much of the twentieth century the U.S. maintained a tariff on oil imports to protect its petroleum
industry against lower-priced competition from abroad. See Michael A. Toman, International Oil Security:
Problems and Policies, 20 Brookings Rev. 20, 21 (2002).
291

In its accession to the WTO in 2001, China committed to allocate tariff-rate quotas for crude oil. China
agreed to allow in prescribed amounts of oil at lower tariff levels. Oil imports above the quota levels are
subject to higher tariffs.
292

The Superfund case was brought by EC, Canada, and Mexico. A 1987 GATT panel found that tariffs
mandated by the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, known
as Superfund legislation, was in violation of article III.2 of GATT (the non-discriminatory article). The
U.S. charged imported oil at rate of 11.7 percent per barrel. On the other hand, it charged domestic oil at
rate of 8.2 percent. The case is cited briefly in Kwan kiat Sim article. See Sim, infra note 1895. The other
oil-related case is U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline case of 1996. However, the Reformulated Gasoline case was
primarily concerned with an environmental measure. For more on this "environmental" case see
Reconciling Environment and Trade 163-292 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., Transnatl.
Publishers 2001).
293

See DeFazio Asks for WTO Case against OPEC Production Cuts, 21 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 565 (Apr.
1, 2004) (Rep. Peter DeFazio, along with over 30 other House members filed a letter with President Bush
asking to launch a WTO case against OPEC. The letter alleges that OPEC supply restrictions are disguised
restrictions on international trade violating article XI of GATT 1994. Moreover, the letter states that article
XX exception allowing restrictions for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources is inapplicable
since OPEC is not restricting oil production due to conservation concerns or to preserve an exhaustible
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For example, in 1999, a consortium of independent U.S. crude oil producers alleged that
companies in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, among other countries, were dumping crude oil that
was subsidized by the Saudi and Iraqi governments in the U.S. market.295
However, one certainly can claim that oil trade is an "ambivalent" trade.

On the

one hand, oil trade is supposedly covered by WTO agreements. On the other hand, some
oil production is managed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
707

through supply control measures such as price targets or production quotas.

There are

supply). If a WTO case is filed, although it is unlikely for its political and economically-destabilizing
ramifications, it would be the first WTO case on the producer/supplier side.
294

Oil trade includes here crude oil, oil derivatives, and oil country tubular goods that are used in the oil
and gas industry such as tubes and drill pipes.

295

The U.S. Department of Commerce denied the petition on the ground that there was no sufficient
support from the domestic industry to initiate an investigation since opposition from U.S. producers
exceeded support. On appeal, the CIT and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of
the Commerce Department. See Save Dom. Oil, Inc. v. U.S., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2002)
(stating that this was the first case the Commerce Department had rejected a petition at the filing petition
level). See also Save Dom. Oil v.U.S., 357 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (the Commerce Department
does not have a standard practice applicable to all industries of disregarding the opposition of domestic
importer-producers with import levels beyond a certain percentage. There is an industry-specific analysis).
One may speculate that the Commerce Department rejected the dumping petition because imposing an antidumping order would lead to political backlash from oil-producing countries as well as to increase in the
price U.S. consumers would pay at the pump.
2

See Francis N. Botchway, International Trade Regime and Energy Trade, 28 Syracuse J. Int'l. L. &
Com. 1, 11, 12 (2001) (some of the theoretical reasons for the apparent ambivalent attitude Of
contemporary international trade regime to energy trade include the definition of energy as good or service
which in itself is not without controversy, location of energy at the heart of government economic thinking,
and energy as a vital national asset to be left to free international trade trajectories. Movements in
international regulation of energy are more likely to come from regional or industry-determined economic
blocs. The legal basis' for OPEC is article XX(h) of GATT which permits import or export restrictions
legislated by commodity agreements. However, OPEC was not submitted for approved of the Contracting
Parties as required by article XX(h) of GATT).
297

See Oil: A Burning Question, Economist 71 (Mar. 27, 2004) (citing the OPEC "cartel" and its kingpin
Saudi Arabia decision to cut production by 1 million barrel per day). The word "cartel" deserves a pause
since developed countries themselves established cartels through the Multi-Fiber Arrangement for textiles
with the approval of the GATT itself or through the on-going negotiations of multilateral agreement on
steel over-production with the aim of setting production quotas.

many factors that affect trade in oil.

The U.S. and other developed countries should

reduce their trade barriers such as high tariffs, discriminatory taxes on fossel fuels,
carbon taxes, subsidies for coal, and threats of antidumping orders.299

XL Data on the Application of Arab countries of Selected WTO Provisions
Based on data collected in February 2003, fourteen investigations on the application
of safeguard measures have been either self-initiated by the competent authority or
initiated upon petition from the domestic industries of Arab countries members of the
WTO. Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco are the frequent users of safeguard provisions. Of
those fourteen petitions, Jordan has investigated nine, Egypt has investigated three, and
Morocco has investigated two. Of Jordan's petitions, the competent authority found
serious injury in four, terminated four, and there is one outstanding investigation.

Of

For overview of trade in oil see James M. Day, Petroleum Prices, 1 Am. U. Bus. L. Br. 52, 53 (2004)
(discussing the petroleum industry and factors that affect the industry such as traders, weather reports,
expectations of war, OPEC, currency value, taxes, lack of refining capacity, and refiners' profits).
299

High tariffs are often maintained on processed products to keep value-added production and
employment in a certain market, while low tariffs are kept on raw products. This is known as tariff
escalation. Some oil-importing countries impose higher tariffs on processed oil in order to keep valueadded production and employment in their markets. Exporting raw products may constitute a threat to oilArab exporting countries' economic stability because they are natural resources with little value added.
300

Jordan found serious injury and applied safeguard measures on imports of biscuits and chocolates, (Aug
24, 2001, WTO Doc. No.G/SG/N/8/JOR/l, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/10/JOR/1), imports of unrecorded
media tapes (magnetic tapes) for sound recording or similar recording of other phenomena of a width not
exceeding 4 mm, (June 19, 2002, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/8/JOR/2/Corr.l, WTO Doc. No.
G/SG/N/10/JOR/2/Corr.l), imports of pasta in all its forms, (Jan. 27, 2003, WTO Doc. No.
G/SG/N/8/JOR/3, Feb. 24, 2003, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/10/JOR/3), imports of sanitary products in all its
forms and specifications, (Jan. 31, 2003, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/8/JOR/4, Feb. 21, 2003, WTO Doc. No.
G/SG/N/10/JOR/4). Jordan terminated safeguard investigation on chocolate containing over 5 percent of
coconut butter substitute, (July 3, 2001, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/9/JOR/1), imports of cooking appliances
and plate-warmers - for gas fuel or for both gas and other fuels, (Oct. 31, 2002, WTO Doc. No.
G/SG/N/9/JOR/4, G/SG/N/9/JOR/5), electric accumulators, including separators thereof, whether or not
rectangular (including square) lead-acid, of a kind used for starting piston engines, (Oct. 31, 2002, WTO
Doc. No. G/SG/N/9/JOR/3), and imports of Unglazed ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles;
unglazed ceramic mosaic cubes and the like, whether or not on a backing and glazed ceramic flags and

the three petitions of Egypt, the competent authority found merit in all of them.301 Of the
two petitions of Morocco, the competent authority imposed safeguard measures in one
and terminated the other without imposing any safeguard measure.302 Thus, almost 80
percent of the petitions resulted in import restrictions. Other Arab countries members of
the WTO have not taken any safeguard action.
Since their accession to the GATT/WTO, many Arab countries still impose
safeguard measures as trade remedy measures. There have been no major structural
changes in their respective trade remedy policies. If the purpose is to protect Arab
countries' industries, then it is more advantageous to use antidumping and countervailing
duty laws. For example, if Jordan uses its antidumping law to protect its domestic
industry, it can target a particular industry of a country rather than imposing a safeguard
measure against all countries as required by article 2.2 of the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards. In this way, Jordan will not upset its trade relationship with other countries.

paving (Oct. 31, 2002, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/9/JOR/2). There was an outstanding investigation on
imports of aerated waters containing added sugar or other sweeteners or flavors (Sep. 20, 2002, WTO Doc.
No. G/SG/N/6/JOR/9).
301

Egypt found serious injury on imports of matches, (Aug. 11, 1998, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/7/EGY/1,
Feb. 10, 1999, WTO Docs. No. G/SG/N/8/EGY/1, G/SG/N/10/EGY/1), imports of Common Fluorescent
Lamps, (Mar. 1, 2000, WTO Docs. No. G/SG/N/8/EGY/2, G/SG/N/10/EGY/2, Feb. 28, 2001, WTO Docs.
No. G/SG/N/8/EGY/3, G/SG/N/10/EGY/3), and imports of Powdered Milk (Sep. 26, 2000, WTO Doc. No.
G/SG/N/7/EGY/2, Apr. 3, 2001, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/8/EGY/4, G/SG/N/10/EGY/4).
302

Morocco took safeguard measures on the importation of Bananas (Nov. 1, 2000, WTO Doc. No.
G/SG/N/7/MAR/1, May 22, 2001, WTO Doc. No.G/SG/N/8/MAR/l, G/SG/N/10/MAR/1). Morocco
terminated the investigation without applying any safeguard measure on rubber plate and sheet products
(Jan. 10, 2002, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/N/9/MAR/1).
303

See for instance UAE (Feb. 3, 1998, WTO Doc. No. G/SG/Q1/ARE/2), Bahrain (Jan. 16, 1998, WTO
Doc. No. G/SG/Q1/BHR/2, 13. Oct. 2000, WTO Doc. No. Para. 26. WT/TPR/M/74), Qatar (Jan. 12, 1999
WTO Doc. No. G/SG/Q1/QAT/2), Oman (Apr. 10, 2001 WTO Docs. No. G/ADP/N/l/OMN/1,
G/SCM/N/l/OMN/1, G/SG/N/l/OMN/1), and Tunisia (Sep. 11, 2001, WTO Docs. No. G/ADP/Q1/TUN/5,
G/SCM/Q1/TUN/5).
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Moreover, Jordan does not need to provide compensation to the exporting country(s) in
the case of imposing antidumping duty, while under article 8.1 of the WTO Agreement
on Safeguard Jordan has to maintain the same level of concession in case it imposes a
safeguard measure. Finally, by imposing an antidumping duty Jordan will tell the world
that its industries are just as competitive but because other countries dump in its market,
it cannot compete. On the other hand, if Jordan imposes a safeguard measure, that is
similar to saying "we confess and declare that our industries are not competitive, so
would you please give us more time". Bluntly, safeguard law is a weak defense measure
for weak countries.
Based on reports submitted to WTO committees in various periods, no Arab country
undertook antidumping duty actions.304 Egypt is the only Arab country member of the
WTO that has taken an antidumping or countervailing duty action.3 5 Thus, history shows
that Egypt is the only Arab country that has launched and imposed antidumping
measures.306 This is ironic considering that other countries, such as the U.S., imposes
antidumping and countervailing duties on exports of Arab countries. For example, the
U.S. has imposed countervailing duty on imports of carbon steel wire rods from Saudi

304

See Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Semi-Annual Reports under Article 25.11 of
the Agreement, G/SCM/N/52/Add.l/Rev.5 (Oct. 18, 2002).

305

For example from the period 1996-2002 the following countries have submitted reports on whether a
countervailing duty action has been taken or not: Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, and United Arab
Emirates. No reports have been received from the following Members: Bahrain, Djibouti, and Mauritania.
See G/SCM/N/19/Add.l/Rev.lO.
306

See Press Release, WTO Secretariat Reports Significant Decline in Anti-Dumping Investigations,
PRESS/374 (Apr. 20, 2004) (the WTO Secretariat stated that in the later part of 2003 115 investigations
had been initiated. On the other hand, final antidumping duty orders imposed remained relatively constant.
For example, over the same period in 2002 there were 113 final antidumping orders compared with 107
final orders in 2003).

Ill
-107

Arabia.

The EC has also imposed antidumping orders of 40 percent on imports of urea

from Libya and Saudi Arabia.308
The Gulf countries, in their endeavor to comply with the WTO obligations, are
intensifying their efforts, to implement intellectual property protection.309 For example,
although the Kuwaiti Parliament did not make any significant progress from 1995 until
1999, when the parliament was dissolved, the Emir of Kuwait did enact laws regarding
foreign investment and copyright protection.310 The U.S. is concerned about patent
protection in Kuwait, especially that part which involves the so-called mailbox procedure
and market exclusivity.311

30

The case involved Saudi Iron and Steel Co. challenging the USITA methodology for determining the
amount of Saudi subsidy, loan in that case. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. U.S. 810 F.Supp. 318 (Ct. Intl.
Trade 1992).
308

The European Court of Justice overruled the antidumping order on the basis that the defendants were
denied access to information. See Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Co. & others v. Council, 1991 E.C.R.
1-03187(1991).
309

For example, the UAE passed a patent law upon compelling from the U.S. There are also extensive
efforts to eliminate software piracy and insufficient protection for pharmaceutical products. Bahrain also
acceded to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property. Kuwait informed the WTO that it would enact new laws at short
notice. However, no laws were passed. See Meyer Reumann, The Endeavours of Gulf Countries to Meet
WTO Requirements Vol. 16 A. L Q. 49, 50-52 (2001).
After the old parliament was dissolved, the new parliament rejected both laws on the ground that they
were not urgent and under the Kuwaiti Constitution, the Emir may decree laws only in urgent situations.
However, the copyright law was then resubmitted to Parliament, with few changes, and passed, but so far,
no new foreign investment law has been proposed. See Reema I. Ali & Loubna W. Haddad, WTO
Membership and Compliance in the Middle East countries, Vol. 22 Middle E. Exec. Rep. Newsltr.l 1 (Sep.
1999).
311
The mailbox system applies to WTO members that do not make patent protection available for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. Under this procedure, those countries must ensure that
an applicant who has filed a patent application under the mailbox procedure has the legal right to claim the
benefit of the actual filing date, regardless of when the application is examined. Additionally, Kuwait must
extend marketing exclusivity to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products that are the subject of an
application filed under the mailbox system.
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The WTO dispute settlement system has been in effect for nearly ten years. Over the
span of that period, of total ninety-two WTO members who participated in dispute
proceedings, no Arab country has ever initiated a case before a panel as a complainant.312
Further, through the end of 2004, Egypt has been the only Arab country that had been a
respondent in a case.

This state of affairs may indicate that Arab countries are not rule

breakers. Another interpretation is that Arab countries choose to settle their disputes with
other WTO countries through consultations. Reasons for this include high fees charged

However, four Islamic countries-Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey- initiated a dispute in the
WTO or were respondents in a dispute. See The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, supra n. 133, at 188, 205. See also Dispute Settlement Body, Overview of State of Play of WTO
Disputes, WT/DSB/W/209/Add.l (Nov. 18, 2002).
See Panel Report, Egypt-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, WT/DS211/R
(Aug. 8, 2002). That case involved definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Egypt on imports of
concrete steel reinforcing bar (rebar) from Turkey. Egypt divided foreign exporters for purposes of
antidumping investigation into cooperative and non-cooperative companies. The whole case evolved
around the relationship between what an investigating authority is obligated by the antidumping agreement
to do with regard to procedural issues in an anti-dumping investigation, and what interested parties must
themselves contribute in the way of evidence and argument. The panel found Egypt acted consistently with
its obligations under the agreement in some parts. However, the panel decided that Egypt acted in violation
of the agreement because the investigating authority had "examined" all the relevant economic factors in
article 3.4 of the agreement without "evaluation" of these factors. Id. at para. 7.42-45. The panel also found
that in respect of two Turkish companies (Icdas and IDC) out of five companies in the investigation, the
Egyptian authority did not provide the two with ample opportunity to defend themselves and inform them
that their submissions were being rejected, though they submitted, under article 6.8, all the necessary
requested information. Id. at para. 7.252-266. In that case, in which Egypt presented an excellent argument,
its counsel was Van Beal and Bellis of Brussels, Belgium. See The European Commission, Internet Chat
with E.U Commissioner Pascal Lamy and Egyptian Trade Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, New WTO
Round: Talking Trade-What's Going on?, http://europa.eu.int/comm/chat/lamy9/index_en.htm (Nov. 21,
2002). The other potential case in which Egypt would have been a respondent was under the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement. See Request for Consultation by Thailand, Egypt-Import Prohibition on Canned
Tuna with Soybean Oil, WT/DS205/1 (Sept. 20, 2000). Although the WTO document does not elaborate,
the case involved a decision by Egypt to prohibit imports of Thai canned tuna with soybean oil because it
suspects that the oil is made from genetically modified beans. Thailand is known to be technologically
capable of developing genetically modified organisms. Perhaps, Egypt wanted to protect its people,
environment, and organic produce. In that case both parties, Egypt and Thailand, started consultations on
the matter. However, it is unclear the results of those consultations. Perhaps, the parties did not proceed
further in requesting establishment of WTO panel due to the sensitivity of the issue. The case if advanced
would have been the first genetically modified organism case to be brought before the WTO.
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by international law firms for representation in the litigation or fear of spillover effects on
financial aid.
Lack of participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings may also be attributed
to the minuscule level of the Arab countries' contribution to world trade, contrasted with
$1 billion a day of trade between the U.S. and EC.314 However, this is by no means a
completely valid bar to litigation. Argentina, for example, which accounts for only 0.6
percent of world trade, is one of the most challenged nations before the WTO, after the
U.S. and the EC. Argentina has also filed 9 complaints in the WTO. Additionally, India is
an active participant in the WTO dispute settlement cases despite the fact that its share of
world trade is under 0.8 percent.
Another reason that Arab countries are not frequent users of the WTO dispute
settlement system is a lack of expertise and knowledge of complicated WTO law with
some complaints crossing between several WTO agreements. Bringing a case before a
WTO panel is an extensive process that requires preparing commercial data, which in
some instances may not be provided by the other party meaning that it must be obtained
from other sources, studies, econometric modeling, and substantial documentation.
However, with lapse of time and the growing knowledge of the WTO law, one might
expect more use of the WTO dispute settlement system. Moreover, litigating a WTO
case, which may take years, is very costly. For example, Brazil, in its 2004 case against
U.S. upland cotton subsidies, incurred an estimated $2 million in legal fees at the WTO

See U.S. Trade Policy Overlooks Middle East Region, Could Hurt War on Terrorism, PPI Study Says,
20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 323 (Feb. 13, 2003) (the Muslim world has experienced a 75% drop in its share
of world export since 1980. As of 2001, the entire Muslim world received only $13.6 billion in FDI, barely
more than Sweden all by itself).
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panel level alone.

Unless some Arab countries share the legal and financial burdens of

proceedings at the WTO it might be very difficult for a single Arab country to initiate a
case alone. Therefore, spreading the cost among Arab countries would make the process
more affordable for Arab countries to be involved.
In addition, power relations may play role in limiting Arab countries participation in
trade disputes. For example, Egypt may have been in a Scylla and Charybdis position
when it decided to settle its dispute with the EC out of court.316 If Egypt supported the
U.S. in the sensitive GMO case, it would have upset its relations with the EC. By the
same token, if Egypt did not support the U.S., it would have lead to a souring in trade
relations between the U.S. and Egypt. Ultimately, Egypt chose to settle the dispute with
the EC without litigation. Perhaps, without this pressure, Egypt may have pressed ahead
with the dispute against the EC.
Arab traditions and history may juxtapose all other reasons for the limited
participation by Arab countries in WTO dispute settlement cases. International litigation
is not a preferred choice for Arab countries. Negotiations and compromises are the
traditional path. It is a question of style. One hopes that in the future, the process may
become more confrontational so that the Arab countries press their interests in trade
disputes. Through litigation Arab countries would send a signal to other WTO members
315

On appeal, Brazil is likely to incur more costs. For more on the case see WTO Secretariat, United States
- Subsidies on Upland Cotton- Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Brazil,
WT/DS267/15 (May 23, 2003).
316

See U.S. and Egypt Beginning to See 'Eye-to-Eye" on Need for FTA but No Talks Scheduled Yet, 20
Int'l. Trade Rep. 1145 (July 3, 2003) (quoting Boutros-Gali, Egypt's [former] foreign trade minister,
saying that Egypt wants to begin the [US FTA] negotiations "tomorrow". However, the U.S. has been cold
toward negotiating FTA with Egypt. Some hint that this so because Egypt withdrew its support of the U.S.
in the Genetically Modified Organism case against the EC).
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that negotiation is one option for resolving a trade dispute, but it is not the only option.
Arab countries should employ litigation and negotiation at the same time because
litigation plays an important role in informing negotiations.
As some have alluded, Arab countries can participate in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings as a third party, as there is no explicit provision in the DSU requiring a
member to have a legal interest to participate.317 However, usually only countries that
have substantial interests at stake participate in these proceedings. Indeed, only Egypt,
among all Arab WTO members, has participated as a third party in a WTO case.

It

remains to be seen how the Appellate Body decision to amend its working procedures
regarding the rights of third parties to participate in its proceedings will help Arab
countries.319 Even if some Arab countries can participate as third parties to a dispute,
their oral representation would be limited to 3-5 minutes, as that has traditionally been
the practice. Also, Arab countries may have the chance to participate through amicus

317

Peter Van Den Bossche, former counselor to the Appellate Body of the WTO, citing the EC-Bananas III
case in which the Appellate Body decided that any member has a broad discretion to bring a case against
another member if it considers that this is "fruitful". See The International Bureau of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, supra n. 133, at 191. However, the Appellate Body qualified its statement by stating that not
one or more of the factors would be dispositve in another case.
31

Egypt participated as a third party in EC-Bed Linen case. See Panel Report, European CommunitiesAnti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000).
319

See Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2003, WT/AB/1, at 34-37 (May 7, 2004). The new amendments
gives a third party an automatic right to appear at the oral hearing even though no written submission has
been forwarded if there is a notification to the Body's secretariat compared with the previous practice
where a written submission must be filed first before appearing at the hearing. Although the new
amendments are a positive step, they did not elaborate or clarify whether WTO members with no
substantial interest at stake can participate in the Appellate Body hearing(s). Moreover, the decision to
allow a third party to participate in case in which it neither files a written submission nor notifies the
secretariat is left to the Appellate Body to decide on a case-by-case basis.
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curiae briefs.

Filing amicus curiae briefs does not, however, guarantee that WTO

dispute settlement panels will take them into account in deciding cases.
Arab countries can participate in WTO disputes through other venues. Article 17.3 of
the DSU requires that the Appellate Body membership be broadly representative of the
WTO membership. For this reason, two Arab panelists have sat on the bench of the
Appellate Body since 1995.321 In addition, there are nine cases at the panel level for

See The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, supra n. 133, at 191. One must
remember that the WTO is a government contract for governments and governments only. Morocco, as the
first Arab country and indeed the first WTO member, submitted amicus curiae in the EC-Sardine case with
Peru. The Appellate Body in that case allowed Morocco to submit its amicus curiae even though it did not
participate as a third party at the panel level. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade
Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, at para. 166-167 (Sep. 26, 2002). It seemed that in the Sardine
decision, the Appellate Body added more rights to and obligations on WTO members setting an example
for NGOs, academia, industrial associations to file large number of these briefs swaying the attention and
limited resources of the Body from resolving the dispute to answering these briefs.
321

These Arab panelists are: late Said El-Naggar of Egypt (served 1995-2000 in twelve cases: Japan-Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages, Oct. 4, 1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R,
Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb. 12, 1997),
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of
Banana, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sep. 9, 1997), Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998), Panel Report, European
Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/R (Mar. 12,
1998), Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R
(Oct. 20, 1998), Appellate Body, Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from
Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998), Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Program for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999), Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999), Appellate Body
Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999),
Appellate Body Report, Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products,
WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999), and Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing
Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United
Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000)), and George Abi-Saab of Egypt (served 2000-present in
fourteen cases: Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh , Chilled and Frozen
Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000), Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Countries, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000),
Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from
India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000), Appellate Body Report, United States-Transitional Safeguard
Measure on Combed Cotton Yard from Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R (Oct. 8, 2001), Appellate Body Report,
Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States,
WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001), Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation
of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, WT/DS103/AB/RW (Dec. 3, 2001), WT/DS113/AB/RW,
Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded
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which three Arab panelists were selected.

However, Arab panelists are outnumbered

by panelists from other developed countries such as New Zealand or Switzerland. This
indicates a limited pool of Arab expertise.
There are some provisions in the DSU that give special treatment for developing and
least-developed countries.323 An important step has been taken to assist developing
countries in WTO dispute settlement through the establishment of the Advisory Center on

Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 2002), Appellate Body Report, ChilePrice Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R
(Sep. 23, 2002), Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sep. 26, 2002), Appellate Body Report, United States-Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R (May 1,
2001), Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type
Bed Linen from India, WT7DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001), Panel Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/R (July 11, 2003), Appellate Body Report,
United States-Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Ja/7a«,WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2002), and Appellate Body Report, European CommunitiesConditions for the Granting of Tariffs Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2004)). For more on biographies of Arab panelists see Press Release, WTO Announces Appointments to
Appellate Body, PRESS/32 (Nov. 29, 1995). See also Press Release, WTO Completes Appointment of
Appellate Body Members, PRESS/179 (May 22, 2000).
322

These Arab panelists are: Maamoun Abdel-Fattah of Egypt, Magda Shahin of Egypt, and Nacer
Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco. As of Oct. 2004, Maamoun Abdel-Fattah participated in seven cases
(Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R (Oct. 17, 1996), Panel Report,
Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/RW (May 9, 2000), Panel Report,
Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999), Panel Report,
United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities,
WT/DS166/R (July 31, 2000), Panel Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000, WT/DS217/R (Sep. 16, 2002), Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R (Mar. 7, 2003), and Arbitrator
Decision, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 200-Original Complaint by the
European Communities-Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS217/ARB/EEC (Aug. 31, 2004)) while Magda Shahin participated in one case (Appellate Body
Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products,
WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998)) Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi chairs the panel that will rule on U.S.
complaint against EC customs practices (European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, Sept. 27,
2004, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS315/1).
323

For example, according to article 27.2 of the DSU, the WTO Secretariat provides assistance to
developing countries through legal advice of experts in dispute settlement. However, legal assistance of
WTO Secretariat is qualified "in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat". In other
words, legal assistance of WTO Secretariat is not full but limited to the extent that the Secretariat's
neutrality is not compromised.
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WTO Law.324 Four Arab countries are members of the Advisory Center.325 The Advisory
Center resembles a law office that specializes in WTO law. Despite several limitations on
the functions of the Advisory Center, Arab countries should consider becoming involved
in the Center until they have their own in-house counsels and expertise in international
trade law.326

XII. Representations in the WTO and Delegations of Arab Countries
Concerning Arab representation in the WTO Secretariat, out of the 550 employees,
who are mainly French and Britons, few are from Arab countries. There are three
Egyptians, one Moroccan, and four Tunisians.

However, the lack of representation at

the WTO Secretariat should not be apprehended negatively. Even if one appreciates

324

The Advisory Center on WTO Law has been established to alleviate article 27.2 of the DSU problem
which provides legal advice and assistance through the WTO Secretariat. To fulfill its mandate, the
Secretariat dedicated only two legal affairs officers and engaged two consultants who are available one day
a week. The Advisory Center is independent from the WTO established as a foundation under Swiss law.
The Advisory Center is open to all WTO members, but only developing countries and economies in
transition can use its services. The Advisory Center sources of income are: user charges, revenues from an
endowment fund, and traditional donor contributions. The Advisory Center organizes seminars on WTO
jurisprudence, offers legal advice on WTO law, provides support in WTO proceedings, and permits
internships for officials dealing with WTO legal issues. To function, the Advisory Center has an executive
director and four experienced professionals who have interest in advancing the interests of developing
countries. See Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and Equality,
2 J. Intl Econ. L. 723, 724-727 (1999).
325

Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Oman are members of the Advisory Center. Egypt and Tunisia are original
members of the Advisory Center which signed the agreement establishing the Center while Jordan was the
first country to accede to the agreement followed by Oman. Late Said El-Naggar of Egypt, former
Appellate Body member, held a seat in the management board for two years term starting 2001. See The
Advisory Center, http://www.acwl.ch (accessed Mar. 4, 2003).
One of the criticisms directed toward the Advisory Center is that there may be real duplication between
its work and the work of the WTO Technical Cooperation Division. Another criticism is the limited number
of professionals and estimated hours per case (700 hours for a simple case). Even more, the Advisory
Center executive director will have the power to decide whether a case brought to the Center by a
developing country has legal merit or not. See Van der Borght, supra n. 324, at 728.
See Bhala, supra n. 194, at 511.
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having a large number of Arab representatives at the WTO Secretariat, however one has
to take into account the breakdown of posts that Arab employees fill. It may not be
necessary to have Arab employees in the trade body if they fill in administrative or
secretarial (lower) positions rather than managerial or technical (middle and top)
positions.328 There must be a balance.
Even if an Arab representative(s) is selected to chair a WTO committee, such
representation might be just illusory. For example, in the annual rotation of WTO chairs
for the year 2004, Naela Gabr of Egypt, a member of Egypt delegation, was appointed as
chair for the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment ("CTE").329 One should say
"wow" too soon. The WTO CTE is to a large extent ineffective because of the political
sensitivity and complexity of the matters under its jurisdiction. The WTO CTE is limited
in its negotiating mandate and membership, and since its creation in 1994 has not
achieved concrete results.

So far, the creation of the CTE has resulted in issuing

reports.331 Thus, the CTE is academic in nature. Much more important chairs include the

328

Currently, Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh of Egypt holds a senior position as head of the WTO Secretariat's
Service Division. The only other time there was a chance for an Arab candidate to fill in the would-be
vacant WTO Director General post was in 1999. Among the candidates that were waiting in the wings to
succeed the outgoing Director General of the WTO Renato Ruggiero, a former Italian foreign trade
minister, Hassan Abouyoub, former trade and investment minister who led his country's accession to
GATT, of Morocco was a candidate. Cutting a long story short, it was decided to end the show by splitting
the Director General term into two terms between Mike Moore of New Zealand and then Supachai
Panitchpakdi of Thailand.
329

See Press Release, WTO Chairpersons for 2004, PRESS/371 (Feb. 11, 2004).

330

The mandate of the CTE covers, among others, facilitating the transfer of environmental technology to
developing countries, receiving input from non-governmental environmental organizations, and studying
the relationship between environmental policy and the multilateral trading system.
331

See WTO and UNEP Secretariats, Committee on Trade and Environment-Compliance and Dispute
Settlement Provisions in the WTO and in Multilateral Environmental Agreements, WT/CTE/W/191 (June
6, 2001).

General Council, the negotiating group on agriculture, and the DSB.

Finally, albeit that

Arab representation in the WTO Secretariat is important, it is of greater importance to
have potent and effective Arab delegations who are able to conduct negotiations. The real
work is done by the delegations.
A major hindrance facing Arab countries' full participation in the work of the WTO
is insufficient human resources dedicated to WTO work. Arab countries representation is
limited to a single or a handful of officials. Moreover, delegations of Arab countries in
Geneva do not cover the work of the WTO exclusively, but they also participate in otherGeneva based organizations such as U.N and its specialized agencies including
UNCTAD, WIPO, ITU, and ISO. Egypt, with its ten professional staff members, has the
i l l

largest delegation among Arab countries.

The following list represents the number of

professional staff in Geneva-based delegations for other Arab countries: Bahrain- two;
Djibouti- one; Jordan- two; Kuwait- two; Morocco- five; Mauritania- four; Oman- two;
Qatar- one; United Arab Emirates- two; and Tunisia- three.
Financial resources may constraint the ability of some lower-middle income Arab
countries to have full professional staff devoted to the WTO in Geneva, which is one of
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The WTO developed a practice in which, during the annual rotation of WTO chairs, the chairman of the
DSB heads the General Council in the next rotation. For example, in 2004 Amina Mohamed of Kenya
chaired the DSB while Shotaro Oshima of Japan chaired the General Council. In 2005, Amina Mohamed
should chair the General Council.
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Egypt is one of a handful of developing countries within the WTO that has an ambassador in Geneva
appointed by the ministry of foreign affairs and a trade mission, located in different premises in Geneva,
whose staff are appointed by the ministry of trade and headed by a minister plenipotentiary. The two
ministers and missions have divergent views on trade that lead to internal as well as external conflicts. See
Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade
Negotiations 21, 171 (Zed Books 2003).
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A Geneva-based Arab trade diplomat provided information on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Djibouti.
(Mar. 18, 2004) (on file with author).

the world's most expensive cities. What is puzzling, however, is the fact that the United
Arab Emirates, a high-income country, has only two professional staff. Mauritania, a
low-income country, has four professional staff. This is more than the United Arab
Emirates! An issue may arise in the future if poor Arab countries such as the Sudan and
Somalia accede to the WTO, they may not have the capabilities to have full-fledged
delegations m Geneva. In that scenario, "obligations with representation" would apply. '
Being small is only one part of the equation. The other interlinked part is having
skilled and versatile delegation. Many of the trade negotiators in Arab delegations are
"flying negotiators," attending daily meetings after meetings without the ability to
develop, much less maintain mastery knowledge.336 Arab countries must dedicate even a
small portion of their annual budgets, despite their constraints, to train their lawyers if
they want to take part in the WTO effectively and avoid being onlookers.
All in all, one can say that Egypt is the only active Arab country active at the WTO.
It is a user of trade remedy measures, WTO dispute settlement, and has a large Genevabased delegation. Egypt also is a member of the G20 countries, which was established to

To avoid this scenario, Somalia and Sudan could pool their resources with one or several Arab WTO
delegations to represent them in certain meetings.
336

Staffing is very critical because of the need to participate in numerous meetings, often taking place at
the same time. The WTO has sixty-seven bodies including thirty-four standing bodies open to all members,
twenty-eight accession working parties, and five plurilateral bodies. In 2001, there were nearly 400 formal
meetings of WTO bodies, 500 informal meetings (meetings with no records of discussions such as the
green room meetings), 90 workshops and seminars sponsored by the WTO. Officials in South Korean
delegation complain about the workload of the WTO despite the fact that they have thirty staff. See Jawara
& Kwa, supra n. 333, at 22. One might add also numerous negotiating groups if WTO members launch a
new round of trade negotiations.

counter US-EC agriculture proposal before the Cancun Ministerial Conference.

Even

more, Egypt is the only Arab country that is usually invited to WTO mini-ministerial
meetings.

This means that other Arab countries are marginalized. Views of Arab

countries may be communicated to Egypt and might find their way to other WTO
members at these mini-ministerial meetings. However, one must remember that WTO
members are rational. Each country pursues its own interests, and Egypt is no exception.
XIII. Arab Public Opinion and the WTO
Although globalization has no specific definition, the most used meaning is
economic globalization. Trends of Arab public opinion regarding globalization, and the
WTO specifically are mixed. In public, Arab government officials speak the jargon of
economic reform and free trade. In contrast, there are some reported incidents of an Arab
anti-globalization movement and its visible presence, the WTO. In 2002, Arab activists
from Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories met in Beirut and
established a permanent Arab network, called the Arab Forum, to resist globalization and
implicitly the WTO.339 The Arab Forum spelled out its objectives: to exchange and

Although membership in G20 has been changing, other gang members include: Brazil, China, India,
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa,
Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
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WTO mini-ministerial meetings are new phenomenon at the WTO, usually held in the run-up to
ministerial conferences, in which "key" WTO members are invited to review progress and resolve key
issues. It is unclear who organize such meetings whether the WTO or the host country. Other forum with
limited membership is the Five Interested Parties in agricultural negotiation that include the U.S., EC,
Australia, Brazil, and India.
See Mustafa Abdalla Abulgasem, Presentation, The Arab-Mediterranean Countries between the
Conditions of the Barcelona Process and the WTO: A Comparative Study (Conference on Arab Countries
and the World Trade Organization, Inst. Arab & Islamic Stud., U. Exeter, U.K, Sep. 23, 2002) (copy in file
with author).

coordinate information among the organizations of Arab civil society; to represent a
unified Arab position from an unofficial Arab perspective; and to lead protests.
Even though there might not be an effective way to determine the pattern of Arab
public opinion regarding globalization and the WTO, there is an evidence leading to the
conclusion that anti-WTO/anti-globalization sentiment exists among a large portion of
the Arab population. For example, the majority of the population in Jordan has less
confidence in globalization than the populations of India, Mali, Argentina, and Bolivia.34'
Arab activists fight against corporate greed that is destroying jobs and wages. Arab
activists consider trade as a threat to jobs. The WTO, as an institution, needs an overhaul
to be able to address the interests of Arab countries. Otherwise, the WTO will poison
Arab public opinion on globalization and free trade and this is likely to provoke backlash
against more open economies.
XIV. Arab Countries Regional Trade Initiatives
Arab countries face the challenge of coordinating among various, often competing,
bilateral and regional trade arrangements. These include for example the United StatesJordan Free Trade Agreement, the association agreements with the EC, free trade
agreements with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the Arab Free Trade

See Alan M. Field, Can Trade Bridge the Gap? J. Com. 18 (July 21, 2003) (a study found that
Jordanians ranked last among the forty-four countries surveyed when it came to assessing the effects of
globalization on their country. Sixty-four percent of Jordanians said it was bad compared with only twentyseven percent who said globalization was good).

Area.

There is "Arab free trade agreements congestion". Of all these competing

arrangements, there may not be time to focus on the WTO.
Some of the trade agreements signed by Arab countries are U.S., EC, and EFTAcentric bilateral trade agreements. In other words, these trade agreements are U.S.-plus,
EC-plus, and EFTA-plus trade agreements. For example, the U.S. sets certain criteria,
standards and linkages to the global war on terror that must be fulfilled to initiate trade
talks with Arab countries such as the potential U.S.-Egypt free trade agreement. The EC
association agreements include prerequisite provisions concerning the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. One example of these agreements is the EC-Syria
Association Agreement of 2004. Moreover, the EC association agreements adopt
selective agricultural import policies by setting limits as to the type and volume of
imported farm products into the EC market. EFTA trade agreements, such as the EFTALebanon Free Trade Agreement of 2004, include intellectual property provisions that
restrict the rights of poor farmers and limit access to generic medicines. These provisions
include patent extensions, 5-10 years of exclusive periods for brand name medicines,
patenting biotech inventions that allow for patenting animals and plants, and joining the
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The Arab Free Trade Area of 1998 is the latest attempt among Arab countries for economic integration.
The early attempts were the League of Arab States of 1945, Arab Common Market 1964, Trade Facilitation
and Development Program 1981, Gulf Cooperation Council 1981, Arab Maghreb Union 1989. The Arab
Free Trade Area provides for gradual elimination of internal trade barriers within ten years. For a
discussion of Arab economic integration especially the Arab Free Trade Area of 1998 see Catching up with
Competition: Trade Opportunities and Challenges for Arab Countries 286-288 (Bernard Hoekman &
Jamal Zarrouk eds., U. Mich. Press 2000). The Arab Free Trade Area is not amenable to effective followup or monitoring and there is lack of information on its practical implementation. It is not even known
whether Arab countries have ever made a notification of the agreement to the WTO pursuant to article
XXIV.7.a of GATT 1994 or if they obtained a waiver under article XXIV. 10 of GATT 1994 since the
agreement includes non-WTO members. There is no official journal to follow up and cover the process of
integration.

International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, which restrict the
ability of farmers to trade seeds without permission.
The underlying purpose of bilateral or regional Arab arrangements is to achieve freer
trade. However, Arab free trade initiatives can be characterized as "to talk and talk".
For example, the Arab Common Market, which supposed to eliminate tariffs, non-tariff
barriers, and set a common external tariff regime, did not mature.343 The bottom line is
that Arab free trade initiatives have imperfections that burden intra-regional trade. These
imperfections include a lack of political will, exclusion of certain sectors (farm products)
from free trade agreements, weak institutions, absence of serious consequences for
violating these agreements, sloppy compliance-monitoring schemes, and external forces
that do not support such agreements.344 Earlier attempts at Arab regional integration were
largely politically based on the premise of Arab unity.
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Based on poor record, one is opted not to discuss and analyze extensively pathetic Arab trade
agreements that are just inked on paper.
343

344

See GATT Working Party Report, Apr. 6, 1966, B.I.S.D. (14th Supp.) at 20 (1966).

Regarding external forces, one should not forget "divide and rule" tactics and "fight the enemy with the
enemy" technique employed by other countries. "Fight the enemy with the enemy" technique applies also
in other areas such as the 1980s Iraq-Iran war. The well cited example of successful integrationist policy is
the EC. However, one must not forget how the U.S., through billions of dollars in loans and grants, helped
that enterprise. The reason for U.S. help was to help the EC contain the spread of communism in Europe.
See Mario Esteban Carranza, South American Free Trade Area or free Trade Area of the Americas? Open
Regionalism and the Future of Regional Economic Integration in South America 15 (Ashgate 2000) (the
United States promoted Western European integration as an effective strategy to counter the Soviet threat.
The central reality was that West European integration was rooted in a wider security framework). A trade
conflict between the two superpowers across the Atlantic, the U.S. and EC, is just an intra-family affair.
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Conclusion
The effectiveness of the multilateral trading system may be examined by considering
what would have happened in the absence of such a system. Let us assume that the WTO
disappears overnight. Arab countries would probably not be better off. The Arabic citizen
opinion which criticizes or doubts the WTO, even if he is right to a certain extent, may be
able to identify what is wrong. However, that Arabic citizen opinion may be unable to
provide a workable alternative. The only other alternative is to perpetuate the mass of
hegemony-centered bilateral trade agreements between the U.S. or EC and Arab
countries where Arab countries are at disadvantage.
Institutions are never perfect. How the WTO, as an institution, runs its business may
not be perfect either. Certainly, the WTO needs a tune-up so as to project a new image
towards Arab countries. The WTO should permit accession of Arab countries into the
organization at an accelerated rate. In addition, the WTO Secretariat should hire more
staff from Arab countries. If the WTO were to hold a future Ministerial Conference in an
Arab country, it should do so in a genuine and appropriate manner. To illustrate, the
fourth Ministerial Conference was held in Qatar because of fears that anti-globalization
protestors would disrupt the proceedings of the Conference, as it happened with the
Seattle Ministerial Conference, not because the WTO wanted to integrate Arab countries
further into the multilateral trading system, a claim advanced by WTO members.
Although for practical reasons the WTO uses "mini-ministerial" meetings, where dozens
of members are invited, the WTO should minimize their use, since they exclude Arab
countries. The WTO should include Arabic, a language spoken by 280 million people, as
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a working language along with the other three working languages (English, Spanish, and
French) in the trade body.
The path to joining the WTO is a two-way street. Adhering to the rules of the WTO
may enhance global confidence in the Arab countries and will likely result in increased
flow of investments. Consumers in Arab countries would enjoy access to a wide variety
of products that would otherwise be unavailable. Thus, trade can have an overall positive
effect. However, the dilemma is how to minimize any losses and capture any benefits that
the multilateral trading system has to offer. Economic reform and trade liberalization
must also take into account the potential for social upheaval if hundreds of thousands of
SOE employees are tossed out of work quickly without adequate guaranteed pensions.
There will be losers among Arab import-competing industries, but hopefully winners
among exportable industries should compensate for any losses. For example, exportable
industries and governments can aid those who could face dislocations because of
increased competition by insuring better access to capital. Additionally, government of
Arab countries should establish health insurance coverage and training programs to
develop the skills of those dislocated.
Legally, all Arab countries should be able to accede to the WTO. According to
article XII of the WTO Charter, any state that has full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations may accede to the WTO. This article begins the accession
process. However, pragmatically, there are prerequisites for accession, such as protection
for human rights, religious freedom, and democracy, and not having any trade boycotts.
Since Arab countries have their own cultures and do not share all Western values, they
are essentially banned from joining the WTO. It seems that WTO accession is a power-
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based process, rather than a rule-based process, as some legal scholars and WTO
members claim. The U.S. backing-up of Arab countries to accede to the WTO is based on
American foreign policy rather than commercial considerations. Syria, for example, is an
important trade player in the region but it is still outside the WTO club. Until other Arab
countries join the trade body, the universality theme of the WTO is simply a Utopian
dream.
As Max Weber stated, "Technical knowledge is of extraordinary power." The
agreements covered by the WTO and its judicial decisions are voluminous. The results of .
the Uruguay Round, for example, cover some sixty agreements, which amount to over
30,000 pages. It is understood that every word, sentence, and decision in the context of
WTO documents could, by itself, become the subject of an article or a book, without
exaggeration. It is important to develop a deep understanding of the WTO texts and their
effects on Arab countries and Arab industries to determine what are the benefits and
challenges of membership. It is not enough to skim through WTO agreements in two
hours in conferences and public seminars. There must be in-depth study and analysis of
these over time by Arab experts. Moreover, Arab countries have to balance, as in the case
of Egypt, between building their own expertise in WTO law, which is a long-term
objective, and their current dependence, for an immediate need, on legal services
provided by foreign law firms, which is a more immediate need.
An Arab institution, a kind of Inter-Arab Academy for International Trade Law, may
be needed to fill in the gap left by the WTO technical assistance. The Academy would
have a budget funded by contributions and donations from Arab countries proportionate
to their economies. The purpose of the Academy would be to send Arab candidates to be

trained in different areas of international trade and in different international institutions.
These candidates could include officials, academia, or representatives from the private
sector nominated by their countries based on qualifications not on political affiliations.
An important issue is how to use the WTO rules similarly to other developed
countries. That is not to say that Arab countries should adopt protectionist policies. It is
rather how to find their way through the current rules of the WTO agreements. Arab
countries could use antidumping measures to protect their domestic industries from
imports and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to guard their rights. Arab countries
could form a peer group for an extension of special and differential treatment.345 Arab
countries could use the political mechanisms of the WTO, which include decisions taken
by consensus, to block trade matters that may run counter to their development interests
of Arab countries.
Arab countries must ensure effective representations in the different meetings of
WTO councils and committees. At these meetings, no light decisions would be taken on
world trade. How Arab countries would guard their rights would depend on how much
their interests are represented at these meetings. Since some Arab countries may not be
able to afford the expenses of having "effective" missions in Geneva that are solely

One may not reasonably understand what is economically common between Jordan, Tunisia and
Canada, among other countries, alliance, and Jordan and India alliance in negotiating positions. Canada is a
leading country in the Cairns Group which advocates greater agriculture liberalization. On the other hand,
Jordan is a net food-importing country, which means that further liberalization in world agriculture will
lead to increase in the price of imported food bills. Another alternative interpretation of such an alliance is
to achieve a common negotiating position is by logrolling. Perhaps, Jordan and Tunisia agree to support a
long list of negotiating objectives, only one or two of which they have an interest in, to get Canada to
support their own concerns. However, there seems little incentive to form an Arab alliance. See Christian
Bjornskov & Kim Martin Lind, Where Do Developing Countries Go After Doha? An Analysis of WTO
Positions and Potential Alliances, 36 J.W.T. 3, 556 (2002) (many countries in cluster 3, which includes
Jordan, do not have official positions on most issues. There was insufficient information on 24 WTO
members including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.).
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dedicated to the work of the WTO, Arab countries should form an Arab alliance so that
each Arab country is represented by Arab trade experts. The representation in this
alliance shall not be limited to privileged personnel or certain elite individuals. Nothing
in the WTO agreements prevents forming an Arab alliance. This alliance should afford
the help requested by its constituent members. The presidency of such an alliance would
rotate, every year for example, so that each country is responsible to avoid any political
sensitivities and to promote the voice of each Arab country. Additionally, Arab trade
ministers could become more active early in the process of trade negotiations to provide
the necessary feedback and not just leave trade matters solely to Arab trade officials in
Geneva.
Intra-trade depends on three factors: economic size (per capita GDP and population),
economic distance (transportation costs), and production structure. Arab countries would
likely qualify in terms of economic size and economic distance. However, the problem
may be in production structure. Restructuring small and medium-sized Arab industries is
necessary to increase the competitive conditions of these industries through specialization
and division of labor. This could be achieved through consolidation in sectors such as
banking and pharmaceutical, automation, downsizing, and the streamlining of production
operations. If restructuring small and medium-sized Arab industries does not occur, then
bankruptcy looms for inefficient producers.
The unfinished common Arab economic project that began in the 1940s should be
revisited seriously, especially in light of the worldwide proliferation of regional trade
agreements. The illusive dream of an Arab regional trade agreement has not yet occurred,
despite the fact that free trade once profoundly reigned in the region and many Arab
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countries are bound together by ties of common culture, ethnicity, and language. A
critical examination of current bilateral and regional Arab trade agreements must be
pursued to identify different possibilities of effective economic integration. Achieving
this kind of critical examination of Arab trade agreements leads to a more realistic and
practical approach for economic integration and overcoming political barriers to such
initiatives.
To improve the competitive position of the region, Arab countries will have to be
creative in generating alternative ideas and new solutions. The model of future regional
Arab free trade agreements must be one that is grounded in economics, not politics. The
model should cover agriculture, transportation, financial services, business facilitation,
and specific-sector initiatives. The model should move beyond classic tariff reductions to
cover unnecessary impediments that currently compromise trade flows between Arab
countries. For example, Arab countries must engage in regulatory harmonization for
different testing requirements, controls, and inspections. Arab countries should increase
labor mobility by lifting visa requirements for certain nationals of these countries.
Moreover, Arab countries should enter into mutual recognition pacts where regulatory
agencies would agree to accept certification processes carried out in other Arab countrie
to eliminate the burden of seeking approval in each country.

CHAPTER III
JORDAN BID FOR ACCESSION TO THE WTO
Chapter II argued that the WTO is not a perfect institution. In Arab countries
accession to the WTO, politics matters more than trade. To remedy the imperfections, the
WTO should involve Arab countries in the work of the organization by accepting
membership of Arab countries into the WTO at accelerated rate, hiring more staff from
Arab countries at the WTO Secretariat, and using Arabic as a working language along
with the other three working languages (English, Spanish, and French) in the trade body.
Chapter III discusses the characteristics of the Jordanian economy and the status of
international trade agreements in the legal system of Jordan. In addition, Chapter III
analyzes, in detail, the main commitments Jordan undertook in its admission to the WTO.
Chapter III contends that the terms and conditions for Jordan's accession were extensive.
Jordan enjoyed a special and differential treatment in few areas such as tariff reductions.
I. General Background
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the Arab countries sandwiched in a
rowdy neighborhood, bordered by Syria on the north, Saudi Arabia on the South, Iraq on
the east, and Israel and West Bank on the west.34 Due to its geographic location as an
entrepot between the east and the west, many civilizations, on one time or another,
346

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the official name of Jordan.
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resided in Jordan. These civilizations range from the Sumerian, Persian, Nabateans,
Greek, to the Roman civilization, just to name a few.347
The early inhabitants of Jordan depended on hunting for subsistence. However, with
the climatic change and the settlement in communities, the relative peace brought by the
Egyptians Pharaohs encouraged international trade, especially with the Mediterranean
region. Since the seventh century, Jordan has been ruled by various Arab and Islamic
dynasties such as Umayyad of Damascus, Abbasids of Baghdad, Fatimids, Ayyubid,
Mamluk of Cairo, the last being the Ottoman Empire (1516-1918).348 During the rulings
of Arab and Islamic dynasties, castles were constructed or rebuilt, and caravan houses
were built to host pilgrims and strengthen lines of communication and trade.
Excessive taxation, persecution, and abandoning the pan-Islamic policies by the
Ottomans, led to feeling of distrust by the Arabs. During World War I, the Ottoman
Empire sided with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria) against
the Allies (Serbia, British Empire, and the U.S.). (STzan/Hussein Bin Ali, Emir of Mecca
and King of the Arabs, launched the Great Arab Revolt as he saw it an opportunity to
liberate Arab lands from Turkish oppression and trusting the honor of British officials
who promised their support for a unified kingdom for the Arab lands. However, the
Allies failed to honor their promise after the victory in World War I. Instead, what was
called Trans-Jordan in 1920 was placed under the British mandate by the League of the

Peter Gubser, Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 5-7 (Scarecrow Press 1991).
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Nations.349 The British mandate expired in 1946 through a series of Anglo-Trans-Jordan
treaties, and since that time Trans-Jordan, now called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
has been governed as a constitutional monarchy.350
According to the 2001 census, Jordan's population is estimated at 5.1 million.

The

kingdom's area covers about 89.3 thousand sq. km (35 thousand sq. mile). Only 6 percent
of Jordan's land is suitable for agricultural use. Jordan is divided into 12 administrative
zones.

Jordan has, to a variable degree, mineral resources the most common of which

are phosphate and potash. The labor force in Jordan amounts to 1.2 million, of which 400
thousand are non-Jordanian workers, where the majority of them are from Egypt. The
percentage of illiteracy in Jordan is 10 percent of the population. The contribution of the
service sector to the economy amounts to 71.4 percent, followed by manufacturing 21
percent, agriculture 3.8 percent, and mining 2.9 percent.353 Per capita GDP hovers at US$

349

Id. at 39-40. See Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the League of
Nations, 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1007, art. 2 (1922). According to the Mandate for Palestine, the
British created unilaterally a separate state to the area east of Jordan River as "Trans-Jordan". Trans-Jordan
would be administered under the control of Emir Abdullah.
350

See Gubser, supra n. 347, at 18.

351

See Jordan Department of Statistics, Size of Population, Jordan in Figures, 1 (No. 4, 2002). Jordan's
population tripled over the years, from the addition of almost 800,000 Palestinians in post Arab-Israeli wars
(1948 and 1967) to the addition of about 300,000 Palestinians in post Gulf war (1990).
352

Id. at 5. These administrative zones are the capital Amman, Zarqa, Balqa, Irbid, Karak, Ma'an, Aqaba,
Mafraq, Tafileh, Jerash, Madaba, and Ajloun. Aqaba is Jordan's outlet on the Red Sea. Jordan's climate is
characterized by being the climate of the Mediterranean region, warm and dry in the summer, moderate and
rainy in the winter.
See appendix 1, table 4, infra p. 335.

1,703.

These figures reflect low level of economic development and dependence on

limited number of exports such as phosphate and potash.

II. Characteristics of the Jordanian Economy
Jordan is a small country in terms of geographical area and population.

These two

factors make Jordanian economy a limited market with limited production capability.
Despite these limitations, Jordan has maintained relatively open economy which is
greatly affected by external factors such as regional conflicts that are beyond its control.
Jordan's economy is characterized by limited resources, reliance on the service sector,
continuous budget deficit, dependence on foreign aid, and excessive foreign debt. What
follows is a general discussion of these salient features of the economy and development
patterns in Jordan starting in 1980s that would help shed the light on the challenges and
implications associated with its WTO accession.
With the exception of a number of mineral resources, such as phosphate and potash,
the prevalent feature in Jordan is limited resources, if not absolute absence of mineral
resources.35 These ecological factors contribute partly to Jordan's lagging behind other

Per capita income in Jordan is a fraction of the $30,620 per capita GDP of the hydrocarbon-rich Qatar in
2000. For more on the Gulf state of Qatar see Business in Qatar, Economist 64, 70 (Mar. 26, 2004). See
also Saudi Arabia on the Dole, Economist 47 (Apr. 22, 2000) (with growing population, Saudi Arabia's
income per person tumbled from $16,650 in dear-oil 1981 to $6,526 in cheap-oil 1998). Jordan per capita
GDP is closer to that of many Arab countries. For example, Algeria's per capita GDP was almost $1,600 in
1999 while Egypt's was almost $1,400. Morocco scored last with per capita GDP $1,200 in 1999. See
Morocco: Down in the Dumps, Economist 48 (Mar. 4, 2000).
355

However, within Jordan, differentiation exists where some urban regions such as Greater Amman are
highly developed, while others are economically less developed. For example, in 1988, a survey of world's
expensive cities compiled by Business International Corp., ranked Amman along Geneva, Tehran, and
Washington as expensive cities.
3

Jordan suffers from shortages in water resources whether in terms of annual precipitation fallings or
surface water. Jordan is below the Water Stress Level of 500 cubic meters per person per year. See Hillel I.
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countries in the region. In 1970s and 1980s, Jordan invested heavily in human resources.
Remittances from Jordanians expatriates, especially in the Gulf States, have been one of
the government's largest sources of foreign exchange.357 Although Jordan is a major
exporter and importer of labor, participation in labor force is limited. Small rigid labor
market,358 high population growth rate,359 high percentage of youth, growing number of
working-age adults entering the labor force at a late stage due to high tendency for higher
education,360 and low percentage of female participation in the labor force, are among the
limitations in the Jordanian labor market.361
Jordan's economy is a service economy despite growth in the manufacturing sector.
For example, the service sector grew at unprecedented rate from 67.5 percent in 1995 to

Shuval, Approaches to Resolving the Water Conflicts between Israel and her Neighbors: A Regional
Water-for-Peace Plan, 17 Water Intl. 133 (1992). One of the points of contention in the peace process
between Israel and Jordan was the issue of water. Like many other countries, Jordan depends on ground
water.
See The Role of the State in the Globalized Economy, with Egypt and Jordan as Case Studies, U.N.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, at 55, U.N. Doc. E/ESCWA/ED/2000/2/ Add. 1
(2000). However, expatriate remittances, among other social illusions, created a social spillover represented
in large consumption-based phenomenon (a good recipe for laws and economics of behavior). Logically, if
individual's income is $600, he cannot consume $1000 worth of goods or services unless he borrows
money or receives grease payments. After all, what an individual consumes is what he produces.
358

Some of the rigidities of the labor market include fixed wages and full-time positions.

359

In 1999, population growth rate amounted to 3.9 percent while economic growth rate was 2 percent.
Thus, population growth posed challenge in terms of growing pressure on limited resources. During the
planning years, Jordan introduced family-planning programs to alleviate soaring population growth.
3

° See Yitzhak Reiter, Higher Education and Sociopolitical Transformation in Jordan, 29 British J. Middle
East Stud. 137, 141 (2002) (Jordan's higher education system has undergone an enormous expansion. The
number of students, some admitted through affirmative action policy, has increased 23 fold in 30 years). It
is hardly anymore to see higher education as limitation on the labor market especially in the light of the
new economy where knowledge is an asset with higher potential of return. To address unemployment, there
must be improvement in education and training. Jordan also must address the rigidities of the labor market.
361

See United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, supra n. 357, at 54.

71.4 percent in 2000.

The growth rate of agriculture is in decline while overall modest

output is recorded in some industrial sectors such as construction and mining.
Unfortunately, rapid expansion in the service sector has not generated adequate
employment opportunities to absorb the growing labor force.
The civil service continues to play a major role in the economy compared with
limited private sector base, although this trend has been changing in recent years. One
should not also overlook the contribution to Jordan's GDP of the informal economy,
known also as gray economy, parallel economy, underground economy, or shadow
economy, such as petty traders, industrialists, self-employed, and street vendors. There
are no statistics that capture the contribution of the informal economy to total GDP.
Jordan faces chronic budget deficit. In the fiscal year 2001, for instance, budget
deficit reached JD233 million or 6.9 percent of GDP.363 Jordan also faces trade deficit.364
In addition, Jordan experiences heavy debt burden. For example, at the end of 2002,
foreign debt stood at $8.5 billion compared with $7.1 billion in 1995 with debt-service
ratio of 14.4 percent.

5

Jordan receives foreign aid that includes grants, foreign

(concessional) aid, and loans.366 Foreign aid helps reduce budget deficit.

362

See appendix 1, table 4, infra page 335.

363

See appendix 1, table 5, infra page 335.

364

See appendix 1, table 6, infra page 336.

365

To reduce the problem of foreign debt and avoid default on maturity date, the Jordanian government resorted to several measures such as debt buyback to restructure debts. The reason for repurchasing debts is
the fact that by buying the debt at a discount than the original amount of debt, foreign creditors might be
able to recover part of their money, otherwise would have not been able due to Jordan's inability to pay the
whole outstanding debt. Generally, since the end of the Cold War, there has been decline in foreign aid
through loans. The decline in foreign aid is the result of a belief that further new loans would be used to
pay old loans and their services. Therefore, new loans will not contribute to the industrialization of a
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III. Economic Reform
Jordan faced an economic crisis in late 1980s due to reduction in foreign aid,
increase in foreign debt, inability to pay debts and debts services, and decline in foreign
exchange reserves.367 In addition, higher population growth coupled with slow economic
growth led to decline in standards of living and rise in unemployment.
As part of the structural adjustment program, the IMF and World Bank pushed
Jordan to reorient its economy with an emphasis on export-led growth and
privatization.368 Due to Jordan's political position during the Gulf crisis in 1990, Jordan's

country and is a waste for the lender. For on new strategies of delivering foreign aid see Amy McFarlane,
In the Business of Development: Development Policy in the First Two Years of the Bush Administration, 21
Berkeley J. Intl. L. 521, 536 (2003) (discussing the U.S. overture on Mar. 14, 2002 for a governmentsponsored trust called the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) that conditions the receipt of foreign aid
funds upon the recipient's ability to produce measurable results such as adopting good governance,
investing in health care and education, and maintaining free markets. The new strategy is built upon
outcomes-based approach which may not necessarily lead to efficient allocation of funds. The MCA
proposal affirms the long history of the U.S. avoidance of a multilateral forum regarding foreign aid.
USAID changed its philosophy toward free-market approaches to development aid. The agency acts as
venture capitalist. Even interestingly, Andrew Natsios, Bush's appointee to head USAID, proposed to drop
the term "sustainable development" from the department's official lexicon). In addition, as part of its debt
reduction efforts, Jordan resorted to debt forgiveness (write-off), rescheduling debts at concessional interest
rates with longer time to pay, or debt-swap agreements. See Debt-Swap Agreement Signed with France, 36
Econ. Rev. of the Arab World 7 (May 2002) (under Jordan's debt-swap agreement with France a portion of
Jordan's $64 million total debt was converted into investments). The types of investments that would result
from debt-swap conversion depend on the priorities of Jordan and the desire of investors. Debt relief
schemes may induce investment thus increase the rate of debt repayment. For the first time in its history,
perhaps due to its debt repayment rate among other factors, Jordan in 1990s was given international credit
ratings by international rating agencies Moody's and Standards & Poor's assigning Ba3 and B+
respectively. These ratings are indicative of Jordan's trustworthiness in the international market.
366

See appendix 1, table 7, infra page 336.

The dependence on foreign aid and expatriate remittances during the 1970s and 1980's resulted in a
failure to develop productive basis for private industries. In addition, Jordan's trade regime was based on
strategy of import substitution or export pessimism which could be characterized by government's reliance
on tariffs and other import fees for a high percentage of the state's revenue and to protect infant industries.
See Timothy J. Piro, The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan 11, 40, 63 (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers 1998). State planning in Jordan took the form of comprehensive "five-year or three-year plans".
Structural adjustment program involved, in toto, slashing subsidies on basic foodstuff and agricultural
resources, reducing public investment and expenditure, reducing budgetary allocation for social spending
and development, controlling inflation, and freezing public hiring. Additionally, the structural adjustment
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economy was hit with a severe blow. Overnight, exports markets to Iraq and the Gulf
states were shut. Moreover, the returning of almost 300.000 workers and their families to
Jordan raised unemployment level to 25 percent.

9

Thus, the would-be economic reform

program was interrupted. After the early 1990 crisis, Jordan adopted several economic
reform programs.

As a clear signal to the international economic market of its

commitments to outward market policy Jordan decided to accede to the WTO.

program involved price rationalization, deregulation, and de-bureaucratization. Structural adjustment
programs were financed by loans and donations. For example, the IMF extended $295 million worth of
special drawing rights in 1996 under the extended fund facility to support Jordan's economic reform. See
IMF Extends Credits to Jordan, 13 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 305 (Feb. 21, 1996). International cooperation
is needed in the area of structural adjustment due to social, economic, and political implications. Jordan,
therefore, cannot afford to pay the price alone. Cutting subsidies, which included increase in prices of
certain basic commodities such as bread and launching consumption-based taxes such as sales tax, led to
social unrest exemplified in riots in southern Jordan initially started in Ma'an in Apr. 1989. The middle
class of Jordan spent, and still spend, a large portion of their income on food. Central to their food
consumption was bread. Therefore, the price of bread was key to the cost of living. The introduction of
consumption-based taxes such as sales tax would cause higher prices for consumer goods and services
since sellers would pass the tax burden to consumers. Rather than military crushing of the social unrest, it
had been wisely decided to hold national election for a new parliament in 1989.
369

370

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, supra n. 357, at 56-58.

For example, the 1992-1998 and 1999-2001 economic reform programs differ from earlier periods of
three to five years development plans which were based on government intervention. Generally, the
purpose of these economic reform programs is to stabilize the economy from external shocks, broaden the
role of private sector, and liberalize trade. Other goals include increasing investment, stabilization of
exchange rate, decreasing reliance on external and internal loans, and proceeding with privatization
programs. Since 1996, Jordan has been implementing privatization program in order to give the necessary
momentum to the private sector. Jordan has completed some 60 privatization transactions netting proceeds
of $1,214 million. Some of the sectors that were privatized are: The Jordan Electricity Authority (1996),
Amman Water and Wastewater treatment management (1998), Jordan Cement Factories Company (1998),
Aqaba Railways Corporation (1999), Jordan Telecommunications Company (1999), Airports Duty-Free
Shops Company (2000), Jordan Flight Catering Company (2001), and Jordan Airline Training and
Simulation. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Jordan 23-25 (2002). Additionally, the
postal service, Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, Arab Potash Company, and the national carrier (Royal
Jordanian) are in the process of being privatized. It is unclear how sectors are selected for privatization
purposes. Factors in the selection process may include the size of the enterprise (small, medium, and large),
salability, potential market, and profitability. Privatization is one of the few means by which the Jordanian
government can generate revenue without incurring more international debt. The government can reallocate
the privatization revenue into the state budget to fulfill its needs. Market forces, infrastructure upgrades,
and professional management could improve the efficiency of some sectors in Jordan. However, social
pressure of civil servants, no clear rule about the responsibilities of private investors to civil servants, long
history of subsidized services, and the issue of foreign control may slow the process of privatization. To

Before discussing Jordan's accession to the WTO, it is worthy to analyze the legal
institutions in Jordan and their relevance to international trade. The analysis will be
accomplished in comparison with the U.S. legal system.371 This, it is important, while the
main focus of this part is Jordan's accession to the WTO, to explore the legal system of
Jordan.
IV. International Trade Regulation in Jordan
Under the Jordanian constitution, the executive power is vested in the king who
exercises his authority, as a head of the cabinet and the executive power, through the
ministers.

Legislative power rests with the king and the National Assembly which

consists of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, Jordan's equivalent of the U.S. House of

combat poverty and unemployment, the government may want to create a social protection program to
extend help to the poor and the disadvantaged in Jordan through cash fund, institutional infrastructures such
as schools and medical centers, and job training. For more on strategies for privatization see Ronald A.
Cass, The Optimal Pace of Privatization, 13 B.U. Intl L. J. 413 (1995) (discussing the concept of
privatization in terms of economic efficiency by assessing the benefits as well as the costs that, other things
equal, maximize the benefits of privatization at the lowest cost. Privatization is defined differently
depending on the country in question. Different strategies for privatization can be employed by selling a
state-owned enterprise in its entirety, either by a negotiation with a single buyer or by a public offering of
equity shares through an established market for share purchases and sales. Free and discounted stock
offerings to employees of companies targeted for privatization, which both reduce resistance to
privatization and increase incentives for post-privatization efficiency, have become a common feature of
privatization in many countries). Linking privatization with the capital market, where investment funds act
as financial intermediaries by offering a state enterprise as shares, would energize the capital market and at
the same time create popularism for privatization. Other means of privatization include restructuring stateowned enterprise into joint stock or limited liability companies that remain in the state hands but managed
separately from the state budget with the state appointing board of directors who are primary shareholders
in the company.
371

The WTO Appellate Body functions like an American court where U.S. lawyers feel more comfortable
and familiar in adjudicating cases. See Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law, 14 Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 845, 848 (1999). The Americanization of the WTO Appellate Body is not
limited to stare decisis. The Americanization also covers amicus curiae and open panel proceedings.
DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 26 (Jordan).

Representatives.

Various committees, with different membership, exist in the National

Assembly to examine different issues.374 The most important committees are the Finance
and Economy Committee in the Senate and the Finance and Economy Committee in the
^75

Chamber of Deputies.

Their principal role is to deal with the economy with matters

such as budget, foreign debt, and fiscal laws. Their jurisdictions also include
unemployment, national housing, and social security. It is unclear from the internal
regulations of both houses whose committee is responsible for international trade.376 The
Cabinet in Jordan consists of the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister, who
must be appointed by the king. Ministers are appointed by the king with the advice of the
Prime Minister.

3

Id. at art. 25, 63 & 67. Jordan is divided into a number of constituencies and each constituency is
allocated seats specified in a schedule attached to the election law (currently there are 110 deputies).
Electoral Districts Regulation No. 42 of 2001, art. 2, al Jaridah al RasmiyahNo. 4498 (Official Gazette)
(July 23, 2001). The Senate, whose members are appointed by the king, consists of not more than one-half
the number of the Chamber of Deputies members including the speaker of the Senate (55 senators). The
U.S. Congress is divided into two houses: the House of Representatives and the Senate. The number of
representatives in the House of Representatives varies according to population. Some 435 members of the
House stand for election every two years, most of them in individual districts into which states are divided
on the basis of population, but for some of them by statewide vote. The Senate consists of 100 Senators on
the basis of two senators from each state. U.S. Const, art I, § 2. In addition, 3 delegates represent the
District of Columbia in Congress. Thus, bringing the total number of members of Congress to 538.
4

The Chamber of Deputies has fourteen permanent committees with eleven members in each committee.
Among these committees are the legal committee, administrative committee, and international and Arab
Affairs committee. Membership in these committees is for two years term. In addition, the National
Assembly may prescribe other permanent or temporary committees as it deems necessary. Internal
Regulation of the Chamber of Deputies of 1996, art. 35 & 50, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4106 (Official
Gazette) (Mar. 16, 1996).
375

In the House of Representatives, the full Ways and Means committee is the most powerful committee
for overseeing trade policy. The Ways and Means committee has several subcommittees such as Trade and
Oversight Subcommittees. In the Senate, the Finance committee has similar power with regard to trade
policy.
376

Internal Regulation of the Chamber of Deputies of 1996, supra n. 374, art. 37.
DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 35 (Jordan).
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The executive power in Jordan has the right to enter into negotiations of international
o
agreements without the prior approval of the National Assembly.378 In Jordan, as a
unitary country, the sub-divisions authorities in localities such as municipalities are not
responsible for matters related to foreign trade such as subsidies, taxation, or other trade
measures.

Obviously, the reason that sub-divisions authorities in Jordan do not have

power in trade relations is to ensure a coherent policy. A country with a federal system of
government such as the U.S. faces the dilemma of conciliating states laws and practices
with international trade agreements and at the same time preserving states' rights to
legislate on local jurisdictions and set public standards.380

3

Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations. In addition, Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce among the
several states and with the Indian Tribes. It also has the authority to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises". See U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 1. For more on the Commerce Clause see Michael Conant, The
Constitution and the Economy: Objective Theory and Critical Commentary 11, 87-114 (U. Okla. Press
1991). The U.S. executive must have the authority, delegated by the Congress, in order to negotiate. In
United States V. Guy W. Capps, Inc, the court said "We, think, however, that the executive agreement was
void because it was not authorized by Congress.. .The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in
Congress, not in the executive or the courts". See US V. Guy Capps Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir.
1953).
379

See Working Party Report, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, WT/ACC/JOR/33,
para. 43 (Dec. 3, 1999).
States have no authority to enter into agreements or compacts with foreign nations without the consent
of congress. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 10. However, some U.S. states such as New York or California have
economies larger than all but a handful of nations. The WTO agreements cover areas in which U.S. states
are actively involved such as services, government procurement, product standards, and subsidies.
Therefore, states and local governments may act in international trade arena. See Matthew Schaefer,
Twenty-First Century Trade Negotiations, The US Constitution and the Elimination of US State-Level
Protectionism, 2 J. Intl. Econ. L. 71, 72 (1999). The federal government can preempt state laws. However,
U.S. federal officials are reluctant use the constitutional power of the Supremacy Clause in their relations
with states because of political considerations. The U.S. federal government prefers to encourage voluntary
states' compliance.

The king of Jordan is the one who concludes and ratifies treaties and agreements.
Since the WTO accession package and other trade agreements involve financial
commitments of the treasury and affect the public or private rights of Jordanians, the
National Assembly must subsequently approve such agreements to give them the status
of domestic law.

Thus, by the language of the Constitution, these kinds of agreements

are not executive agreements. Also, one can assume that since these kinds of agreements
regulate customs duties, which are taxes, they must be approved by the National
Assembly.

In order for any international agreement such as WTO agreements to be

enforceable the competent authorities must publish the agreement in the Official Gazette
so as it is known to the public. Then, and only then, the agreement has the force of law

381

The king declares war, concludes peace and ratifies treaties and agreements. Treaties and agreements
which involve financial commitments to the Treasury or affect the public or private rights of Jordanians
shall not be valid unless approved by the National Assembly. In no circumstances shall any secret terms
contained in any treaty or agreement be contrary to their overt terms. DUSTOUR Al-URDUN
[Constitution] art. 33 (I), (II) (Jordan). Before modification, article 33 incorporated the right to enter into
"trade agreements". One might argue that such agreements, after modification, could fall under the sole
jurisdiction of the king without the approval of the National Assembly. However, closer look at the precise
language of the current article indicates that the approval of National Assembly is necessary since they
affect the treasury. In addition, the practice supports this conclusion. The words "treaties and agreements"
in the Jordanian constitution are very broad to include also international trade agreements. There are
executive agreements that do not require the approval of the National Assembly. For example, agreements
of technical details of diplomacy, agreements detailing the implementation of already approved
agreements, or executive agreements that fall within the sole jurisdiction of the executive power. In other
words, any agreement that does not affect the treasury is not subject to approval by the National Assembly.
382

See Id. at art. 33 (II) & 91. The High Court of Justice in Jordan decided that "The king is the one who
ratifies treaties provided that the National Assembly approves therein if they would alter the country's
lands, or deprive its sovereignty, or involve financial commitments on the treasury.. .Thus, the agreements
concluded between the minister of economy and the U.S. representative to Jordan in 1954 were not
operational because they were not approved by the authority prescribed by the constitution". See Decision
No. 55/27, Journal of the Jordanian Bar Association p. 622 (No. 11 1955). Also in another decision the
High Court of Justice held that the economic and transit cooperation agreement concluded between Jordan
and Lebanon was not operative without the National Assembly approval. See Decision No. 57/24, Journal
of the Jordanian Bar Association p. 487 (No. 3 1957).
383

A law must be passed for imposing tax or duty, whether the draft law is self-initiated by the National
Assembly or by the Council of Ministers. See DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 111 (Jordan).
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and every local authority, judicial authority, and the individual is obliged to abide by it.
The approval requirement by the Jordanian National Assembly for treaties is designed to
protect individual rights that treaties might be restricted by granting the Assembly some
control over the treaty making power of the executive.
A question arises as to whether every agreement that affects the treasury must be
approved by the National Assembly, even if such an agreement is concluded with a
private entity for example an international bank or loan agreement with another
IOC

country.

The Constitution is silent on the question of the number of votes necessary for

the approval of international agreements. One can argue that since passing draft laws or
resolutions requires a majority of votes of the members present in each the house of

384

See Law Sanctioning Jordan's Accession to the World Trade Organization No. 4 of 2000,
al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4415 (Official Gazette) (Feb. 24, 2000). The law sanctioning Jordan's accession
to the WTO means that the National Assembly had approved WTO multilateral agreements. Plurilateral
WTO agreements were not approved since Jordan is not member to any of them yet. There is no need to
approve the "Trade Policy Review Mechanism" of the WTO because it is procedural. In Mexico, the
president is authorized to enter into international treaties that are consistent with the constitution, but must
be ratified by the Senate to become effective. See Constitucion Politicia de los Estados Unirdos Mexicanos
[Constitution] art. 133 (Mexico).
385

The High Tribunal for the Interpretation of the Constitution is a tribunal that consists of the Speaker of
the Senate, as President, and eight members, three of them are selected by ballot by the Senate from its
members and five members selected from judges of the highest civil court in order of seniority. See
DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 57 (Jordan). The High Tribunal for the Interpretation of the
Constitution faced the question whether the National Assembly approval was necessary for loans. The High
Tribunal took a different approach and decided that public loans do not need the approval of the National
Assembly. The High Tribunal stated "As to the fact that public interest requires loan agreements be subject
to approval of the National Assembly, it requires modification the constitution rather than concluding a
decision from the letter of the constitution. It is the task of the High Tribunal to interpret the current
provisions of the constitution but not to add new provisions that are within the jurisdiction of the
legislator". See Muhammad 'Abd al-Sal am & Han i Khayr, Ahk am Al-Dust ur Wa Al-Swa biq AlBarlama niah [Rules of the Constitution and Parliamentary Precedents] 725-726 (1971).
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Senate and Deputies, then international agreements must be approved by majority of the
members present.386
Another problem arises when an agreement conflicts with a provision of the
Jordanian Constitution. The answer is not clear. There are no cases right on the spot.
However, one can maintain that the Constitution supersedes any agreement because if an
agreement is given priority over the Constitution, it would mean that the Constitution
could be amended by the conclusion of an agreement, which contradicts with the
Constitution, without following the prerequisite procedures.

This is contrary to the

basic doctrine of the sovereignty of people that is regarded as one of the fundamental
doctrines in the Constitution.388 To assume that an agreement prevails over the
Constitution would mean that any fundamental right provided in the Constitution could
be overlooked if the Council of Ministers enters into an agreement that invalidate such
right.
The relationship between national laws and international treaties depend on the
constitutional law of each country.389 There is no specific statement for transformation of

386

DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 84(11) (Jordan). See also Internal Regulation of the Chamber
of Deputies of 1996, supra n. 374, art. 76.
387

Any proposed amendment to the Constitution must be passed by a two-thirds majority of the members
of each of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, or by two-thirds majority of members of both houses if
they convene in a joint session. See DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 126(1) (Jordan).
388

389

The nation is the source of all powers. See DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 24(1) (Jordan).

See Paul Reuter, Operational and Normative Aspects of Treaties, 20 Is. L. Rev. 123. 129-130 (1985).
(There are two systems that demarcate the relationship between international agreements and national law.
These are: dualism and monism). In dualism, one imagines international agreements located in somewhere
in metaphysical place that need an act of transformation to bring them within the domain of national law. In
monism, once an international agreement is concluded it becomes a national law without an act of
transformation. In other words, in monism country there is automaticity in the application of an

international treaties into Jordan's legal system.

When WTO agreements and domestic

laws have conflicting provisions, WTO obligations prevail over domestic laws.391 This
means that international agreements in Jordan have a quasi-constitutional or
constitutional status in the sense that every international agreement prevails over
domestic law.392
Although the triumph of international agreements over domestic law may lead to
coherence and effectiveness in international law, the hands of the government of Jordan
could be tied especially if the international agreement is concerned with economic
activity. If Jordan desires to enact legislation, it must take into account the international
agreement in question. For example, if Jordan proposes a legislation that runs afoul of an
international agreement, it must refrain from enacting the desired legislation. This will

international treaty which becomes directly applicable or self-executive. Additionally, in monism, an
international agreement prevails in case of conflict over domestic law and even the constitution.
3

The National Assembly could enact specific legislation to incorporate a treaty or even enact a legislation
that is influenced by an international treaty. For example, the National Assembly enacted specific
legislation that approved Jordan's accession package to the WTO. See Law Sanctioning Jordan's Accession
to the World Trade Organization No. 4 of 2000, supra n. 384. An example of a legislation that is influenced
by an international treaty is UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration that was
adopted in Jordan by the Arbitration Law No. 31 o 2001. See also Draft Law on Arbitration of 2001, AdDustour 5 (June 23, 2001).
391

Law Sanctioning Jordan's Accession to the World Trade Organization No. 4 of 2000, supra n. 384, art.
2 (a). When any provision of the WTO found to be not fully applied, the central government will enforce it
without requiring the affected parties to bring a case before local courts. See Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at para. 43. The High Court of Justice ruled that an international
agreement prevails if it conflicts with a provision of domestic law. Even though Jordan is a civil law
country, in the case of absence of clear language in the Constitution, the decisions of higher courts serve as
guidance. It seems that the amount of confidence that the judiciary and policymakers have in international
institutions relative to Jordan's national institutions has important influence on their thinking about these
issues. The approval of the National Assembly for international agreements may provide the necessary
checks and balances.
392

The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice held that international treaties are superior to federal law but
subordinate to the Constitution. See "Sindicato Nacional de Controladores de de Trafico Aereo,"
LXXVII/99 Semanario 46 (9a epoca 1999).

impose rigidity on future government actions. By the same token, some might consider
the prevalence of international agreements over national law as an advantage since it
would restrain later domestic political attempts to overturn or erode trade liberalization
commitments.
A treaty in the US is the supreme law of the land meaning it is on the same footing as
the Constitution or a federal statute.393 The U.S. is a dualist state. In other words, the U.S.
Congress must incorporate, implement, or transform them into domestic statutes in order
to have the legal effects of domestic law.394 This indicates that a free trade agreement by
itself is not domestic law.
Jordan does not have a basic trade law. Trade policies are formulated and
implemented through specific laws and regulations.395 The National Assembly must
approve all trade legislations, but the executive power holds much of the responsibility
for formulating and implementing trade laws.396 For example, according to the Customs
Law, the Council of Ministers decides on matters of tariffs changes upon advice from the
Customs Tariff Council. The latter is comprised of Minister of Finance (as chairman),

The U.S. Constitution states: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. See U.S. Const, art. VI, cl.
2.
394

See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993, 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (2000). See
An Act to Implement the Free Trade Area Agreement between the United States and Israel of 1985, 19
U.S.C. §2112 n. (2000).
395

For complete list of the various trade and trade-related laws see http://www.jftp.gov.jo/main.htm (last
accessed December 24, 2002).
396

However, the National Assembly holds the responsibility of taxes and duties. "No tax or duty may be
imposed except by law". See DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 111 (Jordan).

Minister of Industry and Trade, Minister of Supply, and Director General of Customs
Department.

The Council of Ministers is also empowered to restrict exportation or

importation of certain goods, restrict totally or partially the right to import or export
goods to certain entities, or exempt goods from import and export licensing requirements
upon proposal of the Minister of Industry and Trade.
In the area of foreign or international economic policies, there has been relatively
little role played or opposition raised by the two houses of the National Assembly. One
reason for this is that these policies are technical and the National Assembly members do
not have expertise or interest in the field. In the U.S., the role of the Congress in
international trade policy is strengthened by the explicit constitutional grant of power of
the Commerce Clause.
The relationship between the executive and the National Assembly in Jordan is based
on mutual cooperation and trade policy conflict has rarely emerg ed.399 Most of the
controversies in the Jordanian National Assembly revolve around political issues such as
the October 1994 Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel and certain social laws such as
personal status law.400 Tensions on trade policy surface among the different ministries
and agencies. These tensions are not reported.401

j9

' Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, art. 13 (b), Official Gazette No. 4305 (Oct. 1, 1998).

m

Id.

at art. 15.

399

In fact, nothing in the Constitution prevents a minister from concurrently holding the office of his
ministry and a membership in either house of the National Assembly. See DUSTOUR Al-URDUN
[Constitution] art. 52 (Jordan). This could attribute to the rarity of conflict.
400

See Glenn E. Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, 30 Intl. J. Middle East Stud. 387, 393396, 405-407 (1998) (the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was approved by fifty-five out of eighty in favor
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Jordan's main agency responsible for regulating international trade is the Ministry of
Industry and Trade (MIT). Proposals for national and foreign trade policy usually
emanate from the ministry and undergo discussions among relevant ministries before
being formulated ultimately by the Council of Ministers.402 The Foreign Trade Policy
Department (FTPD) is the core unit in the ministry to provide assistance for formulating,
negotiating, and implementing trade policy.403 The FTPD consists of seven divisions.404
Trade in Goods Division, Trade in Services Division, Trade Policy Review Division, and
Reference Center (sort of trade library). These divisions cover the multilateral trading
system. Additionally, there are the Economic and Trade Relations with Arab Countries
Division and Economic and Trade Relations with Foreign Countries Division. These two
divisions cover bilateral trade matters. Finally, there is a Legal Affairs Division covering
multilateral and bilateral matters.

and discussing the consequences that emerged in the aftermath of passing that treaty with the widespread
popular opposition to Jordan's 1994 peace treaty with Israel).
King Abdullah II, chaired the Economic Consultative Council on December 21, 1999, called on
government ministries to avoid "sensitivities" warning that he "will not accept from anyone to place
hurdles" on the path of much-needed reforms. Saad G. Hattar, Economic Council Sets Deadlines for State
Institutions to Present Reform Plans, Jordan Times 1 (Dec. 22, 1999).
Telephone Interview with Maha Ali, Director of Foreign Trade Policy Department, Ministry of Industry
and Trade (May 18, 2004).
403

The FTPD was established as the WTO Unit in 1998 to coordinate Jordan's accession to the WTO.
Then, the FTPD was elevated in 2000 to a status of a department. In the year 2003, the FTPD merged with
the Economic Cooperation Department. Now, the FTPD is responsible for bilateral as well as multilateral
trade agreements. It is composed of 10 professional and supporting staff (on file with author). With nobrainer, it is the unfortunate reality that the FTPD is undermanned considering the huge mandate it has to
cover. At present, economists by profession and some other relevant specialties proportionately play a
major part with only one lawyer at FTPD. In the years to come, the FTPD needs more staff, litigators as
well as negotiators, to negotiate and enforce trade agreements.
404

Id.
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Although a procedural issue, one of the mismanagement of the Jordanian delegation
for the accession to the WTO was selecting private individuals, heads or members of
associations as part of the official delegation.
accommodate governments.

The WTO forum is only designed to

The WTO is an inter-governmental organization. Private

entities are excluded from the official negotiating process although they can approach in
the negotiating process informally. To bring private interests into the negotiations, Jordan
can create a trade advisory committee(s).
The Judiciary branch in Jordan is divided into three categories: regular courts,
religious courts, and special courts.407 There is no one special court that hears all WTO
related cases in Jordan. However, there are few specialized courts that hear trade cases.
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During WTO accession negotiations, the Jordanian government attempted to obtain the views of the
private sector through contact with Jordanian business associations to be in a better negotiating position.
Representatives from the chamber of commerce and the chamber of industry were following closely the
negotiations. However, on different occasions, private sector representatives attended the formal meetings
of accession negotiations as government contractors to provide consultancy for the government, albeit they
did not negotiate. Their presence was solely for the purpose of providing negotiators with the position of
the private sector. Telephone Interview with Fakhry Hazirrieh, Counselor of Economic Affairs, Permanent
Mission [now Delegation] of Jordan to the WTO and U.N (July 9, 2004). Although, the WTO Secretariat
allowed Jordan to have private sector representatives in the negotiations, the U.S. team objected to and
rejected participation of some members of Jordan's delegate because they are not government officials. It is
understandable that trade negotiators are economists or lawyers who perhaps never traded in reality.
Therefore, private sector representatives provided insights for Jordan's trade negotiators of their needs and
options. However, rather than selecting persons with a broad range of views such as consumer groups or
unions, or farmers having private representatives from selected associations may indicate less-open trade
policy with narrow focus. Moreover, private sectors representative could have been briefed outside the
negotiations room. One also wonders if private sector representatives or other interested persons outside the
circle of Amman were consulted.
406

There is neither formal provision in the GATT/WTO that permits representatives of private industries
direct participation nor in the practice of any of the multilateral negotiations held within the GATT/WTO.
DUSTOUR Al-URDUN [Constitution] art. 99 (Jordan).

151
For example, administrative decisions related to customs duties and customs-related
cases are subject to review before the Customs Court of First Instance.408

See Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, supra n. 397, art. 222.
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Conclusion
Duality characterizes Jordan's economy. On the one hand, Jordan has a large pool of
trained manpower. On the other, Jordan's socioeconomic disparities and the level of
poverty have significant implications. Jordan is constrained in its economic development
by the small size of the domestic market, small population, and low level of income. The
discussion in this section attempted, mainly to tackle the questions of the status of
international trade agreements into the domestic law of Jordan. It also attempts to
highlight the relationship between the National Assembly, the Executive Power, and the
Judiciary in respect of international trade, the bodies in Jordan that have the power to
enter into international agreements, the legal effects of an international agreement, and
the cases where international agreements prevail over domestic law.
Once the National Assembly approves an agreement it becomes a source of law and
even prevails over domestic law. The institutional conflict in Jordan appears in the
overlapping jurisdictions of the different executive authorities rather than between the
executive and the National Assembly. Fortunately, this turf conflict is somewhat bridged
through consultation and reference. This helps the executive power formulate regulations
of international trade in Jordan. Additionally, local authorities do not have a role in
formulating Jordan's trade policy. Therefore, the executive power is centralized. In
contrast, the constitutional and political structure in the U.S. leads to a maze. The U.S.
Congress has a greater input into the formulation of U.S. trade policy-making process.
The different states in the U.S. have, to some extent, a role in formulating foreign trade
policy, especially with regard to evaluating credentials and qualifications for service
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suppliers. It is fair to say that forming an international trade policy in Jordan is more
predictable than that in the U.S.
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V. Jordan: The Process of Accession to the WTO
Before the WTO came into existence, a country became a contracting party to the
GATT through the article XXXIII full accession procedure and the article XXVI
"sponsorship procedure".409 Article XXXIII provided the general framework for
accession to GATT and established the process of accession for countries that are not
founding members of GATT. Article XXVI. 5 (c) of GATT created a different procedure
for accession for customs territories that have full autonomy in the conduct of its external
commercial relations.410 An existing contracting party that is responsible for the customs
territory can sponsor it for membership.411 Most Arab countries acceded to GATT
through the sponsorship procedure.412 For example, if England sponsored Jordan, Jordan
would have been a contracting party to GATT. Article XVII of GATT 1994, which
referes to state monopolies, also provided the basis for accession of countries with

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra n. 105, art. XXXIII & XXVI.
410

See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15 Am. U. Intl L. Rev.
1469, 1476 (2000).

411

Article XXVI.5 (c) procedure does not require a series of bilateral concession agreements, decision of
the Contracting Parties, or protocol of accession. Rather, the customs territory or newly independent
country obtains membership on the same terms and conditions as those that had been accepted by its former
colonial master on its behalf. Under GATT Article XXVI.5 (c) and procedures adopted during a 1957
GATT meeting, there is a period of de facto application of GATT obligations on a reciprocal basis between
the contracting parties and the customs territory or newly independent country. During that period, the new
country can adjust to the obligations, implement necessary trade policies, and decide whether it desires full
GATT membership. An affirmative decision leads to full membership after a prescribed reasonable period.
Id, at 1477.
412

For example, Bahrain (1993), Djibouti (1994), Kuwait (1963), Mauritania (1963), Qatar (1994), and
United Arab Emirates (1994) entered into the GATT through the sponsorship procedure. On the other hand,
Egypt (1970), Morocco (1987), and Tunisia (1990) joined the GATT through the full accession process.
Arab countries, like other countries, that were contracting parties in GATT automatically became members
of WTO once they ratified the Marrakesh agreement.
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centrally planned economies.

Jordan could have also used this provision for its

accession given its interventionist trade policy.
Jordan could have acceded to the GATT in 1960's and 1970's and acceded on much
easier terms than under the WTO. In those decades, GATT was related mainly to trade in
goods. In other words, Jordan would have had to negotiate only on border measures, such
as tariffs and quotas. Therefore, there would not have been negotiations on reforming
internal regulatory practices in areas such as services, agriculture, and intellectual
property.
Article XII of the WTO Charter, which echoes article XXXIII of GATT, governs the
WTO accession process.

This accession process is based on a case-by-case

methodology. The WTO accession process begins with an official notification to the
office of WTO Director-General of the intention to join by the country in question.

15

Any application for accession must first be approved informally by the General Council.
Thereafter, the General Council formally establishes a working party of countries that are

Non-market economy is an economy where enterprises make decisions not on the basis of economic
factors, but rather on the basis government directives. The purpose of article XVII is to regulate the market
behavior of state trading enterprises. However, the drafters of GATT were unsure about their role
especially that they emerged from the difficult wartime. Therefore, the drafters maintained flexibility in
article XVII so they can apply to state trading countries and not only to state trading enterprises. See Anna
Lanoszka, The World Trade Organization Accession Process, Negotiating Participation in a Globalizing
Economy, 35 J.W.T. 575, 579 (2001).
Article XII of the WTO charter provides that any state or customs territory possessing full autonomy in
the conduct of its external commercial relations may accede to the WTO on terms to be agreed between it
and the WTO.
415

Usually, a country applies for membership in the WTO after enjoying the status of observer. As an
observer, a country can attend WTO meetings and participate in discussion. However, the country may not
participate in decision-making process. Some meetings may be confidential and thus an observer may be
excluded from such meeting. The observer country must apply for membership within five years of being
observer. Id. at 579.
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interested in evaluating the application. ' The working party and the acceding country
engage in round(s) of questions and answers in writing before the first meeting of
working party. After basic policies have been sorted out with the working party,
interested WTO members enter into bilateral negotiations with the applicant over specific
commitments that are prerequisites to joining the WTO. Once the bilateral negotiations
are finalized, bilateral concession agreements are drafted. The best concessions for
market access in goods and services obtained in the bilateral negotiations process extend
to all other WTO members.417
Jordan wanted to become a WTO member for many reasons. By acceding to the
GATT/WTO, Jordan's exports would be subject to lower tariffs and other trade barriers.
Consumers would enjoy a wide variety of products.

Jordan would be considered on the

same footing as any other member of the WTO and would avoid becoming isolated in its
relations with other countries, an important consideration in an increasingly interrelated

The applicant submits a trade policy memorandum that describes its foreign trade policies and
administrative system that may have bearing on the WTO agreements. It is a fact-finding document that
includes relevant statistical data, laws and regulations, the current tariff schedule, domestic support
measures and export subsidies in agriculture set in a specific pattern and tabular format, and policies that
affect trade in services. This memorandum establishes the basis for negotiations between the applicant and
the working party. Id at 591-593.
417

The protocol of accession represents the terms of entry into the WTO.. The protocol outlines the
applicant's current trade laws and policies, while noting the differences between that regime and the
minimum WTO requirements. It explains how and when the applicant intends to correct these differences.
The final package of accession includes the working party report, the protocol of accession, and the
annexed schedules of the applicant's commitments. The Ministerial Conference or the General Council, in
case the Ministerial Conference is not in session, makes a decision by two-thirds majority on the accession
report. If the two-thirds majority favors the accession, the applicant may sign the protocol and join the
WTO.
418

Consumers in Jordan benefit from trade liberalization by purchasing many commodities. Cars are
commodities on point. Private car ownership, from affordable compact cars to high-end cars, is ubiquitous.
Mobile phones, among several other popular personal electronics, are another hot commodity. Jordan has
24 percent mobile penetration rate. See Special Report: Telecoms, 48 Middle East Econ. Dig, 26 (No. 15,
Apr. 9, 2004) (citing total number of GSM subscribers as of 2003 as 866,000 gaining 56.50 percent share
of total telephone subscribers).
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world. It was prestigious for Jordan, as an Arab country, to accede to the WTO,
especially in the Arab region where WTO membership or effective participation in the
WTO has been the exception rather than the rule.
Jordan started negotiations to join the GATT in January 1994. In 1995, after the
WTO was established, Jordan's application was transferred to the WTO working party.
At this time, Jordan imposed a self-declared deadline of 1999 for accession. The 1999
deadline was prescribed because 1999 is the year that the WTO would launch the
"Millennium Round" at the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference. Jordan wanted to
accede by 1999 because the "Millennium Round" would raise the bar to accede and the
terms of entry would become enormous. It was felt that the sooner Jordan acceded to the
WTO the earlier it could have a say in future trade rounds.
Many Arab countries, including Egypt, Kuwait, and Morocco, urged other WTO
members to accept Jordan at an earlier point in time. Additionally, the U.S. supported
Jordan's accession to the WTO. Momentum on Jordan's accession was also provided by

The working party held five meetings starting Oct. 1996. See Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at para. 2. This means that Jordan's delegation had to travel to Geneva
five times and incur the costs of traveling and accommodation during its stay there. Originally, the working
party consisted of 20 members headed by K. Kesavapany, Singapore's WTO ambassador and former
chairman of WTO General Council. As the number can change at any time during negotiations, the
working party on Jordan's accession first changed from 20 to 27, and then from 27 to 33. Those 33
members are usually the exporting countries that have interest in the Jordanian market. For example, the
working party on Jordan's accession included members as diverse as Argentina, Australia, Morocco,
Switzerland, India, the U.S., Canada, and the EC. These countries may not have the same interest as others
in Jordan's market. See Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, Membership and Terms of Reference,
WT/ACC/JOR/5 (Nov. 1, 1996). However, one might say that, pragmatically, the U.S., Canada, and EC
geared the working party in which the U.S. and EC, using trade lingo, playing good cop, bad cop in turn.
Moreover, since Jordan's accession to the WTO, Jordan has participated as member of a working party
only in one case. See Working Party on the Accession of Lithuania, Membership and Terms of Reference,
WT/ACC/LTU/1/Rev.l (June 14, 2000). This might be interpreted that Jordan's WTO mission in Geneva is
not well-equipped, in terms of finance or human resources, to participate in every acceding country
negotiating process, setting aside taking an effective role in the daily hustle and bustle of WTO
committees' meetings and negotiations.
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the lifting of Jordan from the U.S. watch list of countries that do not adequately protect
intellectual property rights.420 It was anticipated that Jordan's accession package would
be ratified during the Seattle Ministerial meeting of the WTO.421 However, the meeting
was interrupted and the approval was delayed. The General Council voted for Jordan's
accession package on December 17, 1999. Jordan became a member on April 11,
2000.

Thus, Jordan met its self-imposed deadline for accession to the WTO. The

following section discusses Jordan's commitments in its accession to the WTO.

420

Jordan Cleared to Join WTO: Removed from Watch List No. 22 Middle E. Exec. Rep. 8 (1999) (page
references not avail.). USTR removed Jordan from the watch list (WL) in an out-of cycle review (OCR).
Generally, WL is reviewed by the end of March of every year, but provisions allow for OCRs that can take
place any time during the year. Although not required by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, USTR publishes lists of countries with various intellectual property concerns: priority foreign
country (PFC), priority WL, WL, and under observation. Priority WL country is one notch under PFC
which undergoes investigation that could lead to trade sanctions.
421

The real reasons for the impasse at Seattle meeting was due to multiple factors. Before the Seattle
meeting, it took WTO members almost a year to select the new Director General of the WTO agreeing at
the end that Mike Moore would assume the post first for three years (non-renewable) followed by Supachai
for another three years (non-renewable). Developing countries pleaded for their plight in implementing the
results of the Uruguay round, but neither developed countries listened nor the appellate body in its
interpretation of special and differential rules for developing countries. They wanted to extend the
moratorium on non-violation cases of TRIPS. There was a tension mood even among developed countries
themselves exaggerated through the Beef-Hormone case, Banana case, and agriculture. In Seattle meeting,
the USTR adopted the "green room module" by limiting negotiations to some 30 countries while excluding
others who felt being marginalized. Then, President Clinton during a late-than-supposed luncheon with
representatives of WTO members stated that the U.S. proposes establishing a working party on trade and
labor and using trade sanctions to enforce labor rights violations. The failure to launch the Millennium
Round was due to internal factors not to the thousands of protestors in the streets. For more see Dilip K.
Das, Debacle at Seattle; The Way the Cookie Crumbled, 34 J.W.T. 5, 181-201 (2000).
422

Jordan ratified the WTO accession package in March 2000. See WTO Director-General, Protocol of
Accession of Jordan: Notification of Acceptance and Entry into Force, WT/Let/333 (Mar. 14, 2000).
Jordan's working party report to the WTO is 114 pages long 8 1/2 x 11-page format (this is compared with
the 50 pages of Oman's working party report). It took 35 specific commitments in the working party report
covering not only WTO agreements but also pricing rationalization that should reflect cost, privatization
programs, and reforming domestic tax system.
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VI. Protocol of Accession and WTO Commitments
Jordan agreed on a broad range of obligations in areas such as tariff reductions,
services, agriculture, intellectual property rights, and transparency.

This section

examines some of Jordan's obligations in its accession to the WTO, the extent of
Jordan's initial compliance with its WTO obligations, the current status of
implementation of these obligations, and the issues of concern that have surfaced in
Jordan's WTO membership.
A. Market Access in Goods
1. Tariff Reduction
When a country joins the WTO, it enjoys market access rights, i.e. entry and exit. In
return, an acceding country must offer equivalent market access concessions. For
purposes of tariff reduction, products and their tariff lines are grouped together into
several categories, in what can be seen as a sectoral approach.

Jordan made substantial

market access commitments as part of its WTO membership negotiations.

Jordan has

low average tariffs with single or two digit rates, ad valorem-only duties with some

Given that some documents on Jordan's accession to the WTO and implementation of its commitments
may be restricted to the public, unless one is considered an "insider" whether in the WTO or Jordan's
ministries and agencies, most of the materials used are in public. Documents of the WTO working party
related to accession are automatically derestricted once the working party report is formally completed.
424

See WTO, Goods Schedule of Jordan, Staging Annex,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/jordan_e.htm (Dec. 3, 1999). It is unclear how Jordan
made its decision to group products and their tariff lines into categories and/or lower its import tariffs.
Perhaps, it fixed reduced import tariffs according the situation or sensitivity of the domestic industry
defined by the level of import penetration, productivity, job losses, and prices.
425

This is despite Jordan's efforts in convincing WTO members that further tariff cuts would damage its
fragile economy in 1998 with mounting trade deficit.

exceptions where specific duties apply, and nearly 100 percent tariff bindings.

Jordan

may have binding overhangs, which is the difference between bound tariff rates and
applied tariff rates, in its tariff schedule.427 To deal with sensitivities in tariffs reduction,
Jordan was granted staging and product exclusion rights.428 As Jordan has a longer
implementation period for tariff reductions, it made some degree of cuts in tariff rates
several months after the date of accession, which has the effect of securing for WTO
countries some immediate tangible results from the negotiations.
Since, Jordan has acceded to the 1997 WTO's Information Technology Agreement
(IT A), it has committed itself to reduce tariffs to zero and bound them at that level on IT
products.

In other words, computer and computer-related products, including semi-

conductor chips, are not subject to tariffs. Since Jordan is not a major exporter of IT A

Jordan agreed to impose zero or very low tariffs on all chemical products perhaps in light of the
Chemical Tariff Harmonization Agreement of the Uruguay Round (CTHA). Specific duties, as opposed to
ad valorem duties, are not transparent and have the effect of increasing trade protectionism.
427
Bound tariff rates are the maximum tariffs Jordan can apply under its WTO commitments. Applied tariff
rates are the actual tariffs in place.
428

Jordan has a 10-year transition period for implementing reduction commitments. Tobacco and alcohol
maintain high tariff peaks. See WTO Approves Accession of Jordan to Trade Body, 17 Intl. Trade Rep. 29
(BNA) (Jan. 6, 2000). See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at para.
55. It is noticeable that rather than outright prohibition on imports of tobacco and alcohol, Jordan opted to
impose higher prohibitive tariffs between 150 percent and 200 percent.
429

The ITA provides for the elimination of tariffs on a wide range of some 180 information technology
products in five major categories: computers and peripheral devices, semiconductors, printed circuit boards,
telecommunications equipment (except satellites), and software. The tariff cuts, which began in July 1997,
affect more than 93 percent of world trade in information technology products. Developed countries had
until Jan. 1, 2000, to phase out tariffs while developing countries were given extended deadlines to
eliminate tariffs on certain products deemed sensitive. The ITA takes account of the rapid pace of
development in information technologies by establishing procedures for consultations on, and review of,
product coverage, as well as non-tariff measures that might impede market access for information
technology products. Under the first ITA review, known as ITA II, U.S. high-technology companies urged
the then Clinton Administration to expand the ITA to include hundreds of new products, from
photocopying machines, digital cameras, thermistor devices, to multi-chip packages. See Charles Owen
Verrill, Jr., Peter S. Jordan, Timothy C. Brightbill, International Trade, 32 Intl. L..319, 323-324 (1998). It
is quite obvious that U.S. high-tech companies are major exporters of information technology products.
These companies include Cisco Systems Inc., Compac Computer Corp., and Intel Corp., to name few.
Therefore, the ITA provides greater market access to Jordan and other countries.
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products, the ITA provides Jordanians with an access to wide varieties of IT A products at
low costs. This should help build up Jordan's IT sector and other IT-related sectors such
as telecommunications.
These tariff reductions did not require changes in Jordanian domestic law. The
Customs Law of 1998 provides that goods entering Jordan are subject to customs duties
as prescribed in the customs law. However, if there is a special provision for a tariff in an
international agreement to which Jordan is a party, a tariff shall be imposed in accordance
with the provisions of such agreement.430 Additionally, the Council of Ministers will
issue decisions related to tariff changes.431 Regarding compliance with the WTO's ITA,
Jordan included its amended tariff schedule in its WTO accession agreements, thus
negating the need to make changes in its domestic law and submit separate modification
document that indicates its compliance with the ITA.
In total, Jordan made tariff concessions with regard to 2790 tariff lines for industrial
products and 462 tariff lines for agricultural products.

The imbalance of tariff

concessions between industrial and agricultural products is due to Jordan's emphasis on
industrial products in international trade rather than on agricultural products.
Jordan can use its tariff rates for several goals. First, Jordan can rely on tariff rates as
bargaining leverage in future multilateral trade rounds. Second, Jordan can rely on tariffs
as a method by which to protect some domestic industries, raise revenue, and redistribute
income. However, there is one potential pitfall for relying on tariffs as bargaining

430

See Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, art. 9, supra n. 397.

431

Id. at art. 14.

432

See Jordan Schedule of Market Access on Goods, supra n. 424.
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leverage in negotiations. As a result of several trade rounds, a large number of countries
might lower their tariffs, thus depriving Jordan of its bargaining power. This is a scenario
where the law of diminishing return would apply to Jordan.
In approaching future rounds of trade negotiations, Jordan should argue in favor of a
mathematical formula (linear cuts) in which the tariff rate applies across the board with
lower tariff cuts per tariff line. The reason for favoring linear cuts is because of the nature
of Jordan's current tariff schedule. Close to 2131 tariff lines are above 20 percent tariff
rate while about 7110 tariff lines are set below that percentage. Therefore, a
harmonization formula, which applies for higher cuts on higher tariffs and lower cuts on
lower tariffs, may not be desired. In addition, there is a need to exempt certain imported
inputs from tariffs and other domestic taxes. The tariff exemptions would reduce
production costs for domestic producers and give them a much needed competitiveness
through cost savings.

2. Agriculture
The agriculture sector in Jordan is a recipient of government subsidies.

As a result

of an economic crisis in the late 1980's, Jordan adopted a structural adjustment program

In the wheat sector, the government bought wheat production from producers at prices higher than
international wheat prices. Jordan also had a history of subsidizing agriculture inputs such as water,
electricity, and credit. Farmers could obtain loans either from the Agriculture Credit Cooperation (ACC) or
from commercial banks. However, since the ACC provides loans at an interest rate below that of
commercial banks, many farmers borrow from the ACC. The average interest rate on loans given by the
ACC is below that of commercial banks by 3.5-5.5 percent. See Working Party on the Accession of Jordan,
Introduction to Jordan's Agriculture Sector and Agricultural Policies, WT/ACC/JOR/14, at 14-17 (July 1,
1998).

to reform the agriculture sector.

In addition, Jordan passed a new law that would

abolish the Agricultural Marketing Organization (AMO).435 This law dismantled the
AMO authority over import and export sales.436 Additionally, Jordan abolished the
system of fixed prices and allowed the private sector for the first time to import almost
any agricultural product.
Partially motivated by WTO accession, Jordan abolished the AMO and the Ministry
of Supply. The policies of the AMO and the Ministry of Supply may have violated
Article XVII of GATT 1994 or article 4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
However, this does not mean that AMO or the Ministry of Supply themselves are invalid
but rather that their respective practices and policies may be invalid. Rather than
abolishing these entities, Jordan could have streamlined their operations by resolving
internal disputes, removing stalemated bureaucracy and budget constraints, and changing
their practices.

434

In 1996, Jordan adopted the agricultural policy charter. The objective of the charter, among others, is to
maximize the role of the private sector in agriculture and limit the government role to the provision of
institutional support such as research and infrastructure investments. Id. at 16.
435

See Provisional Law on the Cancellation of the Agricultural Marketing Organization No. 22
of 2002 al Jaridah al Rasmiyah (Official Gazette No. not avail.) (May 16, 2002).

436

The AMO set the quantities and types of agricultural products to be imported or exported and the dates
of importing or exporting. For example, prior to 1998, it was responsible for determining imports on a
monthly and quarterly basis. It also participated in determining the prices of agricultural products. Under
market mechanism, prices would be determined by market forces. See Law of the Agricultural Marketing
Organization No. 40 of 1988, art. 4(b) & (g) al Jaridah al Rasmiyah (Official Gazette No. not avail.)
(1988). See also An Introduction to Jordan's Agriculture Sector and Agricultural Policies, supra n. 433, at
21.
437

Under earlier practice, the Ministry of Supply had exclusive rights in wheat imports and brand
distribution of Halibuna, type of dried milk. The Ministry also fixed the prices of essential food such as
bread, sugar, and rice.
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In 2002, Jordan introduced a new Law on Agriculture.438 The new Law on
Agriculture defines SPS measures in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).439 The Law on
Agriculture also authorizes the Ministry of Agriculture to enact SPS measures to the
extent necessary for the protection of human, animal, plant life or health, so long as these
measures are based on scientific principles.440 Furthermore, Jordan established an inquiry
point or trade desk to provide information on SPS measures.441 Therefore, it is fair to say
that the Law on Agriculture embraces the concepts of the relevant WTO relevant
agreements.
Jordan has made several commitments to bring its agricultural practices in line with
WTO rules. Jordan has eliminated quotas and other restrictive measures on imports of
agricultural products.
inspection of carcasses.

In addition, Jordan has committed itself to abolishing double
It has also agreed to reduce domestic support for agriculture,

438

Provisional Law on Agriculture No. 44 of 2002, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4558 (Official Gazette)
(Aug. 1, 2002).

439

The Law defines SPS measures as those laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures, which
include, inter alia, end product criteria, process and production methods, testing, inspection, certification
and approval procedures, quarantine treatment including relevant requirements associated with the
transport of animals or plants, statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment,
and packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety. Id. at art. 2. Thus, article 2 of the
Law copies the language of annex A.l of the SPS Agreement.
440

Id. at arts. 6.a & 7. Articles 6.a & 7 of the Law on Agriculture are in compliance with basic rights and
obligations under article 2 of the WTO SPS Agreement. Id. at art. 6.a.

441

See Notification from Jordan, Implementations of Transparency Obligations, G/SPS/27/Rev.7 (Nov. 1,
2000). This is in compliance with annex B of the WTO SPS Agreement which requires members to
establish one enquiry point.
During 1994-1996, Jordan imposed quotas on imports of olive oil and chicken meat.
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which previously amounted to JD1.5 million, to 13.3 percent over seven years period.444
Jordan does not have a history of export subsidies since it does not have the money to
support its domestic agricultural production or agricultural exports as does the U.S. or
EC.445
The WTO accession has led to the establishment of different bureaucracies in Jordan.
Jordan's current food safety and inspection network consists of several government
agencies, including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Jordan Institute
of Standards and Metrology (JISM).446 The establishment of the Jordan Food and Drug
Administration, which is similar to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, could lead to

443

It has been the practice in Jordan to inspect imported meat at the border as well as after it cleared the
customs. Some WTO members argued that such practice appear to be more trade-restrictive than necessary.
The representative of Jordan confirmed that, as from the date of accession, unnecessary inspections of
imported meat products would be eliminated and national treatment would be accorded fully to such
products. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 379, at 147, 149.
444

See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at para. 189. See also
Notification from Jordan, Domestic Support of Jordan, G/AG/N/JOR/1 (Sep. 17, 2002).
445

The Farm Bill of 2002 sets out U.S. farm spending plans through the 2007 marketing year. It includes
export credit guarantees, marketing loan payments, rural development loans for things such as power lines
and power plants, countercyclical payments, farm conservation and renewable energy funds, and step 2
programs. It also provides direct payments to producers of nine commodities based on historic acreage and
yields. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7918 (West Supp. 2005)
See Ann Saccomano, Free but with a Price, J. Com. 13, 14 (Dec. 9, 2002) (citing that the new farm bill
provides for a subsidy of $180 billion to farmers over the next ten years). For more on the U.S. agricultural
policy see J.W. Looney et al, Agricultural Law: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing Farm Clients 5-10,
191-205 (ABA 1990) (many of the U.S. support programs date back to the farm financial crises of 1930s
and 1980s. Certain reasons may provide as an explanation for the divergent treatment of agriculture in the
U.S. First, farming is viewed as a unique way of life dependant on natural forces which are beyond the
farmer's control. Farmers also viewed as stabilizing element in society because of their vital role in food
and fiber production. Farmland is a major source of aesthetically and psychologically pleasing open space
and locale for many non-farm recreational activities. Farmers are distinct minority in the U.S. They
constitute about 2 percent of the total population. Farmers receive specialized legal treatment as an attempt
to protect them from the generally urban orientation of law and government. Lastly, their lack of
participation beyond the production stage of agriculture is a contributing factor to their inability to attain
adequate income).
446

The new Law on Food Control stipulates that the Ministry of Health is the sole authority responsible for
food safety for imported as well as domestically processed products. See Provisional Law on Food Control
No. 79 of 2001, art. 3, al Jaridah al RasmiyahNo. 4522 (Official Gazette) (Dec. 13, 2001).

an overlap in inspection, lack of coordination, and different enforcement tools.

It is

unclear where the line can be drawn between the jurisdictions of these entities. These
jurisdictional issues between these entities must be addressed through internal
regulations.
Issue that affects trade in food products include shelf-life, i.e. how long a product can
stay on the shelf, reclassification (chilled vs. frozen) and other requirements. Usually,
U.S. industry cites short shelf-life standards in Jordan and other Arab countries as an
important non-tariff barrier to trade in processed fruits and vegetables.448 Shelf-life
requirements in Jordan were considered inconsistent with the WTO agreements.44 For
example, it has been the practice in Jordan that imported foodstuffs must have half the

See Michael S. Schumann et al, Food Safety Law 2, 8-11 (Van Nostrand Reinhold 1997) (explaining
the an ongoing problem involves the division of responsibility between the two primary agencies: the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USD A) which oversees meat and poultry inspection and regulations and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which oversees almost all other food products. This arrangement is
not quite as simple as it sounds. For example, the two organizations share jurisdiction for egg products.
Under the USD A, food products must be pre-approved prior to marketing. Food products under FDA's
jurisdiction can be marketed without pre-approval and are subject only to postmarketing surveillance and
enforcement. The USDA has the major labeling requirements for food while the FDA's requirements
generally refer to artificial flavoring, coloring, and chemical preservatives, as well as saccharin. Regarding
warning labels on food and food products, the FDA has historically mandated relatively few warnings for
food products while the USDA has mandated that safe handling instructions appear in labeling).
448

See U.S. International Trade Commission, Processed Foods and Beverages: A Description of Tariff and
Non-Tariff Barriers for Major products and Their Impact on Trade, Inv. No. 332-421, Pub. No. 3455 (Oct.
2001) (In some Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, processed fruit and vegetable products are
given a shelf-life of 12 months, without regard to the packaging technology used, and must have 50 percent
of their shelf-life remaining upon entry into the country. However, many of these products are produced
once a year from fresh products harvested in season and distributed from inventory. Shelf-life restrictions
prevent the year-round distribution of these products. Moreover, these standards are in place regardless of
the packaging technology employed that may give a product a longer shelf-life than those listed in the
shelf-life standards of these countries).
449

Shelf-life requirements were based on Jordan Standard 288/1994 for foodstuff and Jordan Standard
401/1997 for infant and children's foodstuff specifically. The working party on Jordan's accession stated
that such requirements do not have a sound scientific justification. See Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 144. Jordan can impose restrictions on imports of food for safety
reasons but not for quality concerns. Generally, shelf-life standards function as quality indications.

shelf-life at the time of importation.

This practice could amount to restrictions on

importing fresh food products because of the time required for processing, shipment, and
customs clearance, which sometimes lasts several days or weeks. Jordan agreed to phase
out the government-mandated shelf life for shelf-stable products.451 Therefore, Jordan
would accept manufacturers who use of their own "sell by" dates or open dating.432
Jordan requires that the percentage of imported ewes or yearlings, i.e. female sheep
of 1-1.5 year of age, cannot exceed 10 percent of the total number of imported sheep.
This age restriction was justified on the ground that imported female sheep of old age are
usually more prone to carrying diseases.453 A WTO member can challenge the age
restriction unless it is scientifically proven that there is a basis to distinguish between
female sheep imported at the age of 1-1.5 years and older female sheep. In other words,
Jordan's age restrictions claim must be scientifically supportable. Otherwise, the
distinction could be considered arbitrary.

450

M a t 144.

4

' Shelf stable means that the product's life is too short, i.e. must be consumed within 5 days. Jordan
confirmed in its accession that it would eliminate shelf-stable products from the coverage of these standards
by June 30, 2000. See id. at 145. Jordan's move to processors' dates from the government-mandated shelf
life standards would be accomplished without an interim period over a short period of time ending in 2000.
452

In the U.S., product dating is not required by the federal government except for poultry, infant formula,
and baby food. However, there are some 20 states that mandate dating for some food. Dates are applied by
either the manufacturer or the store. The terms used for dating are flexible since there are no standards. For
example, "best by" is a quality and flavor assurance date. It does not mean that the food is unsafe after that
date. This kind of date is often placed on cereals. The term "sell by" is indication for the retailer to pull off
the product on the shelf by the last date. The term "packaged date" is the date for food such as meat in
which it was packaged or processed. It is not indication of safety. Expiration date refers to the date on
which food must be used or eaten. "Born on" refers to the freshest beer and "coded" date refers to letters or
numbers that allow the manufacturer to track food. See The Dating Game, Consumer Rep. 9 (Mar. 2004).
453

See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 176.
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In its accession negotiations, Jordan attempted to apply for certain agricultural
products such as olive oil, sheep, and poultry meat as special safeguard goods (SSG).454
If Jordan were able to designate those agricultural products as SSG, the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture would have applied to them.455 However, Jordan was not able to designate
olive oil, sheep, and poultry as SSG. Instead, WTO working party members determined
whether a product of an acceding country such as Jordan merited designation as SSG or
not but not for Jordan itself. Other WTO members were concerned that if Jordan was able
to designate certain agricultural products as SSG, it would set a precedent for future
acceding countries who would request designating their own agricultural products as
SSG. This would have created a situation that seemed to be unacceptable for members of
the working party on Jordan's accession to the WTO.

454

Even after Jordan acceded to the WTO, Jordan argues for SSG designation for olive oil, sheep, and
poultry meat. See Proposal by Jordan, WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/140 (Mar. 22,
2001) (page references are not avail.).
455

Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is a special safeguard article for agricultural products.
However, in order to apply this special safeguard provision, any non-tariff measure imposed on the
imported agriculture product in question would have to be converted into tariff. Additionally, the
agricultural product must be designated as SSG. Moreover, there are two conditions the presence of either
one of them is sufficient to trigger the special safeguard. First, the volume of imported agricultural product
will have to exceed a trigger level. Second, the price of imported agricultural product must fall below the
trigger price in the base period (1986-1990). If the first condition is satisfied, then an additional duty will
be applied for the rest of the year in question (the additional duty may not exceed 33.3% of the ordinary
tariff in effect the year the action was taken). If the second criterion is met, then additional duty will be
imposed on a shipment-by-shipment basis. Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is a special
provision since it does not require a serious injury test, the safeguard measure will in the form of additional
duty only, and no retaliation is allowed. This is contrary to the WTO Safeguards Agreement which requires
an injury test, a safeguard measure could be in the form of tariff or quota, and there could be counterretaliation. In order to obtain SSG status, an acceding country has to convert non-tariff trade measures into
tariffs. Jordan did not convert non-tariff trade measures into tariffs as required under article 4 of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, a condition that is vital for applying SSG measure. Rather, Jordan set tariffs on
agricultural imports at lower levels and bound them.
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3. Trade Remedy Laws 5
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards prescribes that each member to adopt
appropriate domestic legislation before it imposes safeguard measures.457 On the eve of
its accession to the WTO, Jordan enacted the first WTO-compatible safeguard law,
known as the National Production Protection Law No.4 of 1998 (NPP Law) and
Regulation on Safeguard of National Production.458 In 2002, Jordan enacted the NPP Law
No. 50 of 2002.459 The NPP Law of 2002 is a framework law that does not cover, as its

456

Discussion in this section will be limited to fair trade laws and regulations since Jordan invokes
safeguard measures frequently and it has never applied an antidumping or countervailing duty order.
Therefore, this section does not deal with antidumping, subsidies and countervailing regulations. Moreover,
considerations of time and space do not permit for treating antidumping and countervailing laws and
regulations. For more on unfair trade regulations see Provisional Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Regulation
No. 26 of 2003, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4587 (Official Gazette) (Mar. 2, 2003). There could be a
number of reasons for the passive use of antidumping or countervailing measures. First, the Jordanian
market, until recently, was protected from foreign imports through high tariffs and other non-tariff trade
barrier. Second, by the time of trade liberalization, some Jordanian industries maybe adjusting to open
market. Third, there could be lack of experience (legal, accounting, and human resources) in administering
a complex anti-dumping or countervailing investigation and/or enforcing antidumping or countervailing
duty orders. However, as more sectors in Jordan are opened to foreign competition, it becomes likely that
some industries may petition the government to initiate antidumping or countervailing proceedings.
457

Jordan committed in its accession to the WTO that it would not apply an anti-dumping, countervailing,
or safeguard measure to imports from WTO members until it had notified and implemented appropriate
laws in conformity with the provisions of the WTO agreements on safeguards, subsidies and countervailing
measures, and antidumping. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at
107.
458

See Regulation on Safeguard of National Production No. 55 of 2000, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4465
(Official Gazette) (Nov. 16, 2000). The Regulation on Safeguard of 2000 has a total of thirty-nine articles.
In these articles, the Regulation sets forth basic principles and concepts. It stipulates the conditions,
investigation, forms, time limits, and review of safeguard measures.

459

See Provisional Law on National Production Protection No. 50 of 2002, al Jaridah al
Rasmiyah No. 4560 (Official Gazette) (Aug. 15, 2002). The new NPP Law is essentially modeled on the
old NPP Law of 1998. However, the new NPP Law has been elaborated upon in terms of adding new
articles such as article 3 which states explicitly that NPP Law of 2002 applies to agricultural as well as
industrial products or new definitions such as that of like products and serious injury.
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name might suggest, all trade remedy legislations, including antidumping and
countervailing duties.
The organization in charge of the NPP Law is the Directorate of National Production
Protection.461 In particular, the Safeguards Department, a non-independent organ under
the umbrella of the MIT, is in charge of administering safeguard cases.462 The Safeguards
Department conducts safeguard investigations with regard to serious injuries caused by
increases imports, recommends initiation of investigations, and suggests relief
463

measures.
The NPP Law of 2002 and the Regulation on Safeguard reflect, to a large extent, the
WTO Safeguards Agreement. However, there are certain shortcomings regarding
Jordan's safeguard law and practice. For example, the NPP Law defines domestic
industry for the purposes of a safeguard investigation. However, the NPP Law does not
address the case when a domestic producer imports one product and produces a different
kinds of products including the one subject to a safeguard investigation. Additionally, an
issue is whether or not domestic industry should be interpreted to include producers who
have special arrangement, through joint ventures for example, with importers or exporters
4

° Jordan had to follow up the adoption of the NPP Law with implementing regulations. It seems that
Jordan was not able to counter-argue that no implementing regulations were needed given that the NPP
Law contained description of investigation concepts such as injurious practices, increase imports, and
serious and material injury.
461

The National Production Protection Directorate, which was set up in 2001, is divided into two
departments: the Safeguards Department and the Anti-dumping Department (on file with author). There is
also the Council on Tariff which is entrusted in recommending the application of safeguard measures to the
Council of Ministers.

462

As of 2004, the Safeguards Department comprises seven permanent staff who presumably is appointed
by the minister of industry and trade. It includes persons experienced in cost accounting and economics (on
file with author).
See Regulation on Safeguard of National Production No. 55 of 2000, supra n. 458, arts. 6, 11 & 23.
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and there is a coincidence of economic interests between them. Since Jordan is a small
country, the case of a regionally dispersed industry in a safeguard invesitgation, as
supposed to national market, would not raise a controversy.4 4 Therefore, Jordan would
not have a regional industry.
In principle, safeguard measures cannot be targeted at imports from a particular
country and safeguard investigations should not be country specific. In other words,
safeguard measures should be applied to an imported product irrespective of its source.4 5
However, in the case of China, a safeguard measure could be country/product-specific.
Therefore, Jordan may want to implement paragraph 16 of China's Protocol of Accession
to the WTO into domestic law.

464

In the U.S., in some instances the ITC may conduct a regional market analysis in dumping or
countervailing duty investigations. See Venez. Cement v. U.S., 372 F.3d 1284, 1287-1288, 1290 (11th Cir.
2004) (in performing a regional market analysis, the ITC must find on a case-by-case basis a concentration
of dumped imports into the regional market. In this context, the ITC must decide whether the ratio of
subject imports to consumption is clearly higher in the regional market such as in Florida region than the
rest of the U.S. market. Additionally, the ITC must find that imports in the region in question must account
for a substantial portion of total subject imports entering the U.S.).
465

466

See Provisional Law on National Production Protection No. 50 of 2002, supra n. 459, art. 19.

Paragraph 16 of China's Protocol of Accession provides that where products of Chinese origin are being
imported into the territory of any WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause "market disruption" to the domestic producers of like or directly competitive
products, the WTO Member so affected may request consultations with China with a view to seeking a
mutually satisfactory solution, including whether the affected WTO Member should pursue application of a
measure under the Agreement on Safeguards. If consultations do not lead to an agreement between China
and the WTO Member concerned within 60 days of the receipt of a request for consultations, the WTO
Member affected "shall be free", in respect of such products, to withdraw concessions or otherwise to limit
imports only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy such market disruption. The application of
China's safeguard provision shall be terminated 12 years after the date of accession. See The Ministerial
Conference, Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, para. 16 (Nov. 23, 2001). Rather
than adopting a "market disruption" standard, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards in article 2.1 requires
that a product is being imported under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause "serious injury" to
the domestic industry.
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The Regulation on Safeguard of 2000 does not refer to article XIX of GATT 1994.467
There is no reference in the Regulation of the circumstance of "unforeseen
developments," as stipulated by article XIX. 1(a) of GATT 1994, which is a prerequisite
for imposing other safeguard conditions.468 As it stands, the Safeguards Department is not
obligated by the NPP Law of 2002 or the Regulation to examine the existence of
"unforeseen developments" in its investigations.469 Requiring a WTO member to define
establish import surges as "unforeseen developments" as a condition for its application of
safeguards could make it difficult for a member to utilize safeguard measures because
such import surges may not easily be said to be unforeseen.
Proper and accurate translation seems to be an issue with respect to NPP Law and
Regulation on Safeguard in Jordan.470 Mistranslation could affect the application of the

467

The WTO Agreement on Safeguards and article XIX of GATT 1994 must be read cumulatively. This is
supported by article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards which states that the Agreement establishes
rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean those provided for in
article XIX of GATT 1994.
468

According to some commentators, earlier in the history of article XIX of GATT, the requirement of
"unforeseen development" was not required. See Ezra Ginzburg, An Analysis of Article XIX: The Safeguard
Problem after the Uruguay Round, 17 Neb. L. Rev. 566, 568 (1992) (the unforeseen development
requirement has little meaning. It has been read out of existence under the GATT). However, recent WTO
Appellate Body decisions have restored the requirement of "unforeseen developments" in applying
safeguard measures. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh,
Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R, at para. 69 (May 1,
2001).
469

In actuality, the Department had factored "unforeseen developments" requirement in all safeguard cases
it examined. However, this practice may not be satisfactory until the Regulation is amended to explicitly
make reference to "unforeseen developments" requirement. The WTO Appellate Body in the Lamb case
rejected the U.S. argument that the "unforeseen developments" needed to justify a safeguard measure could
be inferred from the factual record of the investigating authority and demonstrated during WTO dispute
settlement proceedings. See Appellate Body Report, supra n. 468, at para. 67 & 74. Sources in the
Safeguards Department indicated that it currently prepares a daft regulation implementing the requirement
of "unforeseen developments".
470

See Notification from Jordan, Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices-Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures-Notification of Laws and Regulations under Articles 18.5 and 32.6 of the

NPP Law. For example, precision in translating one of the most important terms in the
safeguard provisions, serious injury, could pose a problem. Mistranslation of certain
terms should not be regarded as inconsequential. Inaccurate or deliberately misleading
translations of WTO safeguard provisions may make the translated law or regulation
subject to criticism by other trading partners. Therefore, Jordan would have to update its
vocabularies to reflect the WTO Safeguards Agreement or utilize equivalent terminology
to be found in the WTO Safeguards Agreement.
In effect, Jordan adopted a unified system in its safeguard law. In other words, one
organ, the Safeguards Department, investigates increases in imports and serious injuries
to the domestic industry.471 This unified system is reasonable because the Safeguards
Department can perform its function quickly and efficiently. In contrast, this could be
disadvantageous because by centralizing the authority into the same Department, the
investigation of increased imports and judgment regarding injuries may lack objectivity.
Jordan, in its attempt to improve its regime of safeguard measures, must take note
that the WTO Agreement on Safeguards is a procedural agreement establishing certain
minimal procedural requirements.472 Jordan does not have to adhere to the exact words of
the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. In other words, Jordan could modify its law
in a way that is different from the Agreement. For example, athough the WTO

Agreements, G/ADP/N/l/JOR/2/Corr.l (June 8, 2004) (stating that a material error affected the translation
of article 11(a) (2) [in the NPP Law of 2002] as the word "public" was replaced by "personal"). Certain
linguistic characteristics such as the use of passive voice sentences and different tenses could contribute to
further problems in translation.
471

This is compared with the dual system in which two organs, whether independents or not, conduct the
investigation of increase imports and the judgment of an injury.
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards does not impose a simple arithmetic standard for determining
increased imports or requires a certain pattern of imports.
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Agreement on Safeguards allows the use of safeguards for up to eight to ten year, Jordan
could apply safeguards measures for only three years. Moreover, Jordan must take into
account the WTO panel decisions. For example, recent WTO panel decisions have
brought to life both the requirement of "unforeseen developments" as well as the
requirement that competent authority must provide "explicit" findings that are "clear and
unambiguous" and "do not merely imply or suggest an explanation".473
To meet the future demand of relief measures, Jordan must put in place a plan to help
small and medium-sized firms access the safeguard system. The current system may pose
problems for these companies with respect to the costs of complying with the NPP Law
of 2002 or Regulation on Safeguard requirements, which include paper burdens, the
formality, complexity, duration of the process, lack of knowledge and expertise about the
safeguard law and its procedures, the need to work with other small producers or
producer associations, and the cost of hiring external counsel.
hi certain instances, the Safeguards Department should self-initiate safeguard
investigations rather than wait for the domestic industry itself to petition for an
investigation. Self-initiation of a safeguard investigation may enable the Safeguards
Department to limit imports more quickly. If the domestic industry petitions for
safeguard measures, it would take a longer period of time to impose restrictions on
imports because the safeguard investigation would require a longer process. Therefore,
self-initiation of safeguard investigation could produce faster results by cutting the time

None of these terms appears in article 3.1 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards which requires only
publication of the findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law. The
ordinary meaning of these terms does not establish any level of clarity for the competent authority or
require that it states its findings with a particular explicitness.
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needed to conduct an investigation. Courts in Jordan have not yet developed an extensive
jurisprudence in the area of trade remedy laws. This state of affairs reveals the
inexperience of Jordanian courts in reviewing remedy law cases. This also indicates that
the trade remedy system is relatively young; it was not until 2000 that Jordan introduced
trade remedy laws and regulations.

4. Customs Law
Customs laws and procedures are considered an important part of the trade system in
Jordan. These laws and procedures regulate the flow of goods across the borders. One of
the main functions of the Customs Department is the clearance of goods. Importers
seeking to introduce goods into Jordan must file the appropriate documents and follow
certain procedures and entry techniques. In some instances, traders could face opaque
customs procedures that re associated with customs transactions.474 For example, Jordan
requires consularization or legalization of commercial bills by Jordanian consulates and
chambers of commerce in the country of exportation for goods intended for export to
Jordan.475 Consularization or legalization of commercial bills may not be warranted
because it adds to the costs of traders and could be considered, in effect, a non-tariff trade
barrier.

See Pete W. Moore, Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and
Kuwait 162, 166 (Cambridge U. Press 2004) (stating that some traders are concerned about the increase in
the size and power of the Customs Department. They claim that bureaucratic problems with the Department
are legion. Sometimes, completing a customs importation document requires 17 signatures).
475

Jordan committed to phase out consularization of commercial bills by Dec. 31, 2002. See Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 72. Jordan has yet to rectify the practice of
consularization as it committed itself. For example, as of 2005, the Embassy of Jordan in Washington, D.C
requires legalization of commercial bills and charges $84 per document as a legalization fee. Commercial
bills must also be legalized by the National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce.

Goods may enter Jordan for consumption, transit, warehousing, temporary
importation, inward processing, or entry into a foreign trade zone.

These different

forms of entry could be designed to serve the different interests of importers.
Warehousing, entry into a foreign trade zone, and inward processing share one common
feature- the deferral of customs duties.477 Deferral of customs duties may help the
financial situation of importers.
The owner of imported articles or the owner's designated customs broker must file a
customs declaration at the port of entry.478 The customs declaration could be
accompanied by certificate of origin, bill of lading, or air waybill. Imported articles
cannot be withdrawn unless customs procedures are completed and duties are paid.479
However, the Customs Law of 1998 has provisions for releasing imported articles before
final payment of tariffs or settling other customs issues, so long as the payment of tariffs
can be insured through cash, bonds or other financial guarantees.

A system of posting

financial guarantees separates between clearance of goods and customs matters such as
tariffs. Depositing financial guarantees protects the government by securing tariffs owed
whereas at the same time expedites the clearance of goods for importers. However, small
importers may find it difficult to deposit financial guarantees.

476

Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, art. 65, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4305 (Official Gazette) (Oct. 1,
1998) as amended by Law No. 27 of 2000, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4443 (Official Gazette) (July 2,
2000).

477

Id. at arts. 88, 104, 122 & 133.

478

W. at art. 61.

479

Customs procedures include inspection and laboratory testing and analysis. Id. arts. 69, 73 & 82.
Inspection and testing of imported articles suggest delays depending on the number of samples.
Id. at arts. 75, 82, 83, 85 & 87.
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The Customs Law of 1998 provides the right of appeal against Customs rulings
initially lies withm the Customs Department.

Additionally, decisions of the Customs

Department may be contested before the Customs Court.4 2 The emphasis should be
placed on administrative appeal, rather than on judicial appeal, as administrative
procedures could resolve any customs-related dispute more quickely with lower costs for
importers.
Because of the WTO, the Customs Department of Jordan has been aggressively
overhauling its customs procedures by moving to upgrade its customs facilities and
automate some aspects of the paper-based customs system. Moreover, the Customs
Department has adopted many concepts and practices of trade facilitation. For example,
the Customs Department provides green lane treatment to companies through expedited
shipments free of or with de minimis inspections upon arrival at ports of entry.
Movement and clearance of imported articles would be based on a risk-management
technique, which is essentially a methodical process for identifying high-risk
shipments.

The risk-management system allows for the speedy clearance of low value

or low volume imports. The risk-management system also allows for the speedy
4

' A committee of three senior officials within the Customs Department would examine disputes
concerning value, origin, characteristics or tariff classification of imported articles. Id. at art. 80.a.

482

Customs Law of 1998 establishes Customs Court of First Instance and Customs Court of Appeal. In
certain circumstances, decisions of the Customs Court of Appeal could be appealed before Court of
Cassation. Id. at arts. 80.d, 222.a, 224.a & 225.

483

See Jordan Customs Department, Selectivity in the ASYCUDA System, http://www.customs.gov.jo/
publication.asp (accessed Mar. 4, 2005).
484

See Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, supra n. 476, art. 84. The idea of inspecting all imported articles is
impractical and a poor use of limited resources. The risk-management technique limits the physical
inspection of imported articles. It includes random sampling at different rates. The technique starts with the
Customs Department when goods are imported and continues through inspection. All information related to
goods will enter into a computerized system that would enable inspectors for later retrieval.

clearance for articles imported by a reliable company that has a long history of
compliance with Customs Department rules.
Although the adoption of risk-management techniques is a step in the right direction,
it will take time and resources to truly activate these techniques. Additionally, since
Jordan depends to a certain degree on tariffs, the role of the Customs Department would
be devoted largely to collecting revenue for the Treasury. Customs officials may delay
imported articles for hours or days while waiting verification as to classification and
valuation.485
The Customs Department makes available customs related laws, regulations,
administrative rules, information on customs process, conditions for importation, charges
applicable to Customs Law, tariff rates, tariff classification opinions, and bilateral and
regional trade agreements.486 The Customs Department provides advanced rulings based
on requests from traders who seek clarification on specific matters, such as classification
and applicable tariff rates. Advance rulings prior to importation provide certainty and
reduce delays. Advance rulings may also help small and medium-sized companies
ascertain their respective risks before they enter into commercial transactions.

4.1 Tariff Classification and Valuation
Customs standards in Jordan have been streamlined in accordance with WTO rules.
Among the most important changes was the development of a standardized method for

Until there is further lowering of tariffs, there could be mistrust between customs officials and
importers regarding smuggling and under-valuation for purpose of evading payment of tariffs.
The information is available at the Customs Department website with translation in English. See
<http://www.customs.gov.jo>.
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imposing duties. While in the past questionable methodologies were used in customs
valuation, now customs duties have become more predictable and are based on the WTO
Customs Valuation Agreement.487 Every imported product that enters into Jordan must be
classified and valued. Selecting the appropriate tariff classification is significant for an
importer because the classification determines which tariff rate will be imposed. Usually,
an importer categorizes an imported article in such a way that provides the lowest tariff
rate.
There are several methods to classify imported products. These methods include the
description, physical characteristics, and usage. The issue of tariff classification may lead
to divergent administrative and judicial interpretations. Courts in Jordan render their
decisions based upon the proper classification of imported products using one or more of
the above listed methods. For example, the question presented in one case related to the
appropriate classification of imported tractors for semi-trailers.

The Customs

Department divided the imported tractors for semi-trailers into tractors classified under
item 87/4 of the tariff schedule subject to 400 fils per kilo weight and semi-trailers
classified under item 87/14 subject to 40% ad valorem duty rate. The plaintiff contested
the classification given and claimed that imported tractors for semi-trailers should be
properly classified under item 87/1/b and be duty-free.489 The Court of Cassation

Jordan confirmed that it would fully implement the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement from date of
accession without recourse to any transitional period. Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
Jordan, supra n. 379, at 94. According to article 20.1 of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement,
developing countries were given until Jan. 1, 2000 to implement its provisions. However, the Customs
Valuation Agreement contains provisions for extending the deadlines.
See DecisionNo. 95/1554, Journal of the Jordanian Bar Association p. 1368 (No. 6 1996).
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concluded that imported tractors for semi-trailers fell under item 87/1/b based upon the
name, description, and the specific use of tractors for hauling semi-trailers, noting that a
coupling device, located behind the chassis, is used to hold semi-trailers.49 The Court of
Cassation seemed to consider tractors for semi-trailers in their entirety rather than divided
into parts because each part could not be used independently.
In essence, customs classification of imported products is usually about choosing
between two or more competing tariff lines. The Court of Cassation may consult with
rules of interpretation of the integrated tariff schedule of the Arab League, opinions of the
Customs Cooperation Council, scientific authorities, testimony of witnesses, and other
information to determine the meaning of a specific tariff provision.491 The Court of
Cassation's reasoning in classification cases deserves some discussion. The Court of
Cassation has, in some cases, agreed with the lower court decisions, while in other cases
it has overruled their decisions. In a different set of cases, the Court of Cassation upheld
and respected the decisions of the Customs Department. In customs classification cases,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving that Customs Department's classification is not
correct and that its claimed classification is valid. The Court of Cassation has used, on a
case-by-case basis, different means to classify imports due the wide variety of products.
Once an imported product is properly classified, its customs value must be
determined for the purpose of assessing the appropriate tariff. To comply with WTO

491

See Decision No. 89/669, Journal of the Jordanian Bar Association p. 1193 (No. 6, 7 & 8 1991).
Decision No. 95/1067, Journal of the Jordanian Bar Association p. 1620164 (No. 1, 2 & 3 1996). See also
Decision No. 90/1104, Journal of the Jordanian Bar Association p. 2332 (No. 12 1991).
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rules, Jordan has shifted from a normal value scheme and database pricing to compute
tariffs to transaction value methodology.

The normal value scheme calculates tariffs

based on the price that goods would theoretically fetch in an open market between a
buyer and a seller independent of each other. In database pricing, customs officials used
prices stored and collected in databases to determine tariffs for imported products. Under
the new customs valuation system, transaction value means that tariffs levied on imports
are based on the invoice price of the item, as agreed upon by the importer and exporter.493
Customs valuation rules in Jordan mirror the language set out in the WTO Customs
Valuation Agreement. The new Jordanian valuation system has the advantage of stability
and consistency in evaluating the value of imported products and will hopefully
encourage trade. The new Jordanian valuation system could also help speed the
movement of goods as it requires the Customs Department to release imported goods
immediately. Under the old valuation system, customs officials could have more
discretion. Normal value and databases pricing could be fixed at levels higher than the
actual price of imported products, which resulted in higher tariffs. The new valuation
system would leave little room for the discretion of customs officials. Additionally, the
new valuation system will likely contribute towards greater transparency in the Jordanian
customs valuation system.

492

In mid-1996, a reference price database for valuation of products had been initiated, but this database no
longer existed. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 90.
4 3

Customs value could include the cost of loading, transport, and insurance as long as this is made on the
basis of objective and quantifiable data. Transaction value is the primary basis for determining customs
value. However, Customs Law of 1998 lays down rules and guidelines on how to determine customs value
whenever customs officials have reasonable ground to doubt the authenticity of the declared import value.
Customs officials could use the price of product when sold domestically in cases where transaction value
cannot be determined or the computed value of the product. See Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, supra n.
397, arts. 28 & 29.
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Since Jordan did not have the advantage of additional time to set up the necessary
infrastructure to ensure compliance with WTO rules, it could face technical,
administrative, and financial problems in implementing and complying with the
complicated WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation.494 The implementation of the WTO
Customs Valuation Agreement could stretch the capabilities of the already understaffed
Customs Department. The Customs Department has to retrain its personnel for the new
valuation system. To meet concerns regarding fraud and undervaluation, Jordan could
introduce post-entry audits that would give customs officials authority to audit accounts
and commercial documents to help verify the accuracy of customs declarations.
Moreover, Jordan could also exchange information with the exporting country regarding
the value of export products to ensure accuracy and reduce fraud.

4.2 The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of Jordan
Jordan uses the Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System as a basis for its national customs tariffs.495 The Harmonized System is an
international six-digit commodity classification developed under the auspices of the
Customs Cooperation Council.496 Individual countries can extend the classification to 8
digits for export purposes and to ten digits for customs purposes.497

See Lael Brainard, Ready for Launch? The Prospects for Global Trade Negotiations, 19 Brookings Rev.
14, 16 (2001) (implementing trade agreements can be extremely costly for developing countries. Some
estimate that a typical developing country must spend $150 million to implement just three of the WTO's
many agreements on intellectual property, customs valuation, and technical standards).
495

The Convention entered into force on January 1, 1988 with 36 contracting parties, including Jordan,
ratified it. See Hironori Asakura, The Harmonized System and Rules of Origin, 27 J.W T 5, 8 (1993).

183
The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of Jordan (JHTS) is updated regularly and extends
to over 9241 tariff lines.498 JHTS is represented in a tabular format incorporating 4
columns, each with specific information.

The first column is the H.S Code, which has

4 and/or 6 digits. In other words, this column is the Heading/Subheading column. As part
of its HS system, Jordan has, in some cases, replaced the fifth and/or the sixth digit with
"0" or "00" in accordance with article 4.3 of the Harmonized System Convention. The
second column is the "article description" column and contains a description of the
product. The third column is the "Collection Unit," which determines the appropriate unit
of measure. The entire collection unit column in JHTS is based upon the value of the
item. The fourth column appears under the heading "Duty Rate" and contains the

496

The Harmonized System is divided into 21 sections. Each of these sections groups together goods
produced in the same sector of the economy. Each section comprises one or more chapters, with the entire
nomenclature being composed of 97 chapters. Some chapters are reserved for future use. For example,
section one (Chapters 1-5) covers live animals and products thereof, section two (Chapters 6-14) covers
vegetable products, and section three (Chapter 15) covers animal and vegetable fats and oils. In the
Harmonized System goods are classified by what they are. The Harmonized System nomenclature is
logically structured by economic activity or component material. For example, animals and animal products
are found in one section and machinery and mechanical appliances, which are grouped by function, are
found in another. Chapters of sections I to XV are grouped by biological structure or by the component
material from which articles are made. For those chapters in which goods are grouped by raw material, a
vertical structure is used in which articles are often classified according to their degree of processing: raw
materials, semi-manufactured, and manufactured products. For example, Chapter 44 contains items such as
rough wood, wood roughly squared and some wooden finished products such as wooden tableware.
Articles may also be classified according to the use or function. The classification by function mainly
occurs in section XII and sections XVI-XXI. For example, section XVII contains chapters 88 (aircraft) and
89 (ships). See International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
(June 14, 1983), 1035 U.N.T.S. 3.
497

Id. at art. 3.3.

498

The tariff schedule is accessible at the Customs Department website. See
;http://www.customs.gov.jo/downloads.asp> (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
See appendix 1, table 8, infra p. 337.
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different tariff rates that apply to the product in question.

JHTS does not contain a

column marked "stat. Suffix" for the collection of trade data.
Approximately 98 percent of JHTS is based on ad valorem tariff set as a percentage
of the value of the imported product.5 The JHTS does not contain quotas, that is to that
Jordan has abolished quantitative import restrictions. The JHTS is a rationalized tariff
schedule, but not a complex one.502 Tariffs rates are in the following six bands: zero, 5,
10,15, 20,and 30 percent, with the exception of tobacco, manufactured tobacco
substitutes and alcoholic beverages that are subject to prohibitive rates in the range of 50
percent to 180 percent, and unwrought gold which is subject to a 0.5 percent tariff. One
should immediately notice that Jordan's tariffs are concentrated on few levels and are not
on a wide range. There is no multiplicity of tariff rates that would involve many different
types and levels of tariffs. Thus, the JHTS structure renders greater tariff uniformity.

The U.S. bases its rates of duty into three different tariff levels for all importable goods based on
classifications of countries. Column 1 tariffs apply on the basis of MFN to all countries. Column 1 tariffs
have been lowered over time through the GATT/WTO rounds of negotiations. Within column 1 there is a
special rate of duty for imports from countries that the U.S. has a free trade agreement with such as Israel,
Mexico, Canada, and Jordan or recipients of the Generalized System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative, and the Andean Initiative. Column 2 tariffs, the highest level of tariffs, apply to countries denied
MFN status such as non-market economies. Column 2 tariffs were enacted at the peak of the U.S. trade
protectionist era in 1930s. They have not been lowered since their implementation. See TariffAct of 1930,
19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000). The U.S. harmonized tariff schedule is prepared for publication by the Office of
Tariff Affairs and Trade Agreements and published by the Office of Statistics of the ITC.
501

Ad valorem tariff rate is assessed on the basis of CIF which includes the costs of imported products in
the country of origin at the time of clearance plus any other costs incidental to delivery at the port of entry
in Jordan such as insurance and freight. For example, if imported pocket-size radio cassette-players, tariff
line 852712000, valued JD100 were subject to 30 percent ad valorem tariff, then JD30 must be paid upon
importation. In few cases, Jordan's HS has mixed or compound tariff that consists of ad valorem tariff and
specific tariff, the latter being flat rate set per quantity or unit. For example, tariff line 010410000 of
imported sheep is subject to 5 percent ad valorem tariff and JD2 per head. Therefore, one could say that ad
valorem tariffs cover most tariff lines in Jordan.
502

For example, Jordan's tariff schedule does not have complex tariffs that would assess a tariff rate on the
basis of a maximum or minimum rate or on the basis of a product's attributes.

In addition, products imported into Jordan are subject to general sales tax (GST).
Because of the national treatment principle, the same GST must also be imposed on
domestic products. However, if there is no local production of the imported product, then
the general sales tax on imported products will be a tariff-equivalent rate. A special sales
tax is imposed on certain imported products such as vehicles in addition to GST.
The only complex aspect of Jordan's tariff system relates to imported vehicles.
Currently, imported automobiles are taxed, excluding general and/or special sales taxes,
at a 10 percent to 30 percent duty rate depending on vehicle age or weight.

For

example, passenger cars that are less than five years old are subject to a 25 percent tariff
rate. Trailers may be subject to a 10 percent tariff rate. Buses and cars for the transporting
often people or more and that have diesel engine would be subject to a 15 percent tariff
rate. This vehicle tariff system does not use a flat rate of, for example, 10 percent on all
vehicles. Moreover, the vehicle tariff system does not allow for a special tariff section for
fuel economy or hybrid vehicles.504 Customs personnel would compute the value of
imported vehicles as a function of basic characteristics of the vehicle.

See Jordan Customs Department, How can you make a Self-Assessment of Duties and taxes Payable on
your car, http://www.customs.gov.jo/viewins.asp?id=222&title=Instructions (last updated Jan. 26, 2005).
504

However, a note attached to the calculation method states that standard safety and environment
equipments value is exempted from tariffs and general sales tax, provided it does not exceed 15 percent of
the car value.
505

For 2004 models, price lists represented by car agents in Jordan would be used. To calculate duties/taxes
payable on a car, the customs department states "you should know the value of your car, which may not
necessarily be the value you declared or the car purchase price. It is in fact the price lists presented by car
agents in Jordan for the brand new (2005) models". Prior to 2004 models pricing must cover depreciation
of equipment using a depreciation schedule. For example, while for 2005 models there is no depreciation,
for 2004 models an 85 percent depreciation rate applies.
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Jordan's vehicle tariff system raises two interesting points. First, the vehicle tariff
system presumes that the declared value of a car is dubious. The vehicle tariff system
presumes that the importer is guilty of fraud. Second, the vehicle tariff system indicates
that the Customs Department uses price catalogues to determine the customs valuation of
imported vehicles. The use of price catalogues may result in arbitrary customs values.
Moreover, the use of reference prices in catalogues is contrary to the WTO Customs
Valuation Agreement, which requires the use of the actual transaction value of imported
products, unless Jordan has asked for WTO permission to continue applying reference
price on imported vehicles. Jordan uses price catalogues for imported vehicles because of
consistent undervaluation by importers.
5. Pre-shipment Inspection
Jordan, in its protocol of accession to the WTO indicated that it i non-user of WTO
Pre-shipment Inspection (PSI).506 However, Jordan agreed that if in the future it uses PSI
services, it will comply with the PSI.507 This would involve hiring PSI companies to carry
out their activities in a non-discriminatory manner and ensuring that such inspections do
not result in less favorable treatment to the inspected goods as compared to like domestic
products.

Furthermore, PSI services should take place in the exporting country or, if

that is not possible, in the country where the goods are manufactured.5

506

See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 102.

507

Id. at 103.

508

See WTO Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, art. 2.1& 2.

509

M a t 2.3.

Moreover,
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Jordanian hired PSI companies would have to apply pre-shipment inspection services in a
transparent manner.5'°
No obvious reason exists to explain why Jordan is not a user of the PSI procedure.
Pre-shipment inspection involves an inspection by a private firm in the country of export
before exportation to Jordan.511 The inspection will help alleviate some of the bottlenecks
in customs procedures. It is possible that Jordan felt that its Customs Department and
other government agencies have the administrative institutional capacity to undertake the
same functions that PSI companies would do and there have been few cases of corruption
of customs officials or custom duty fraud.
In 2003, Jordan contracted with Bureau Veritas/BIVAC International to conduct preshipment inspection and issue certificates of conformity for products that meet the
required standards.512 Products subject to mandatory pre-shipment inspection include
vehicles, electrical and electronic products, toys, and personal safety devices.

Food

products are subject to voluntary pre-shipment inspection. Pre-shipment inspection of
these products had lead to shipping delays.514

Id. at 2.5. The WTO established a London-based entity to deal with disputes arising from pre-shipment
inspections.
511

PSI companies check the shipment details of goods purchased abroad such as price, quantity, and quality
in order to ensure that tariffs are fully paid on the goods.
512

Jordan pre-shipment inspection system is similar to that of Saudi Arabia which was established in 1996,
named International Conformity Certification Program. Saudi Arabia contracted with Inchicape Testing
Services of Britain. The certification fee was set at 0.4 per $10,000 or above and 0.5 percent for less than $
10,000 fob. The Saudi system is designed to insure product quality and safety. The Saudi system requires
inspection and certification of seventy-six kinds of imports such as food, electric goods, and vehicles. See
See Ex. Ref. Man. (BNA) 95:33 (Jan. 22, 2004).
M a t 95:33.
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B. Market Access in Services
Jordan has agreed to extensive liberalization undertakings under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which would open some sectors which were
previously closed or restricted to foreign investment and participation.515 Jordan has
undertaken horizontal commitments in the cross-border movement of individuals and
commercial presence covering all types of services. For example, in cross-border
movement of individuals, Jordan attached requirements related to duration of stay, preemployment conditions, recognition of professional qualifications, economic and labor
market needs tests, and work permits.516
Jordan has made specific commitments in eleven major service sectors and 128 subsectors and activities. For example, in the business sector, Jordan has agreed to eliminate
restrictions on market access and national treatment in legal services in the four modes of
supply.517 Thus, Jordan eliminated its rules, if any, that could restrict the rights of
Jordanian and foreign lawyers to enter into partnerships or that could impose restrictions
on the nationality of a foreign law firm. However, legal services of foreign law firms are

On several occasions, Jordanian companies claim that Bureau Veritas has not been adhering to standard
requirements and its activities have become obstacles to international trade. Jordanian companies have
voiced specific complaints about what they see as unwarranted demands and unnecessary delays in clearing
shipments.
In addition to GATS, WTO members negotiated sectoral agreements such as the Agreement on Basic
Telecommunication Services of 1997 and the WTO Financial Services Agreement of 1997. The detailed
undertakings of Jordan for trade in services are included in a 39-page report. See Working Party on the
Accession of Jordan, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, WT/ACC/JOR/33 (Dec. 3,
1999).
51

1

Id. at 3-6 (paragraph references not avail.).

Id. at 5. The four modes of supply are: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence,
and presence of natural persons.
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limited to "advice" on "foreign law" only.518 As a result, a U.S. law firm can advise or
consult on international or U.S. law but it cannot advise clients on Jordanian domestic
law.519 Other fields of legal services, such as domestic litigation are not open to foreign
lawyers.520 Only Jordanian lawyers are allowed to litigate or plead before Jordanian
courts. Although att first glance, it may seem that Jordan has opened its legal service
sector to foreign lawyers, but, upon closer scrutiny, most legal activities remain off limits
to foreign law firms.521
Jordan has granted limited market access to foreign auditing firms.522 Auditing of
financial records or verification reports of domestic companies by foreign auditors are
restricted. Auditing must be performed by resident Jordanian auditors who pass
qualification tests. However, foreign accounting firms can give opinions on company
results, open representative offices in Jordan, or invest in joint ventures. These activities
should help enhance transparency and improve accountancy standards.
In addition, Jordan has made concessions in architectural, engineering, urban
planning, and landscape architectural services by allowing up to a 50 percent ceiling on

518

Id. at 6.

519

A foreign law firm can advise or represent Jordan in its accession to the WTO since its international law
but cannot do the same regarding domestic family law in Jordan.
520

Id. at 6.

521

Jordan permitted foreign law firms to advise on foreign law only in order to preserve the integrity of the
legal profession in Jordan by prohibiting the entry of unqualified foreign lawyers or protect the domestic
legal bar against global law firms. See International Trade in the 21st Century 227-228 (Khosrow Fatemi
ed., Elsevier Sci. 1997) (the United States leads the world by a wide margin on the total number of lawyers
and lawyers per million. It is also very interesting, or perhaps frightening, to further note that 35 percent of
the lawyers in the world in 1992 lived, and presumably practiced law, in the United States).
See Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 515, at 6.

foreign shareholding.5 Foreign firms, however, are required to train and upgrade the
technical and management skills of local employees. This seems to be an offset
requirement for undertaking commitments in these service areas. In the field of medical
services and health care, Jordan has removed all foreign equity restrictions, which means
that foreign-owned medical services can offer medical services without these
restrictions.524 As a result, Jordan has two-tier health care system: the state-run medical
system provided through state-owned enterprises or directly from the state and the private
sector, which specializes for rich clients and high-end services.
Jordan has provided market-opening commitments in telecommunication services by
opening its government-controlled telecommunications system to unfettered competition
o r

and foreign telecommunications companies.

In the audio-visual and related delivery

services, Jordan has made commitments, regarding market access and national treatment,
in motion picture and videotape productions services, motion picture projection services,
and sound recordings.5 Jordan has, however, imposed foreign ownership restrictions
and a nationality requirement for distribution services in this sector.527 It is unclear

523

Id. at 7.

524

Id. at 8, 25.

525

All restrictions on market access would be phased out by the end of 2004. Jordan commitments cover
basic services which include mobile and wireline voice and data services, local and long distance domestic
telephony, mobile radio (cellular, paging and personal communications services), international
telecommunications, satellite services, private leasing services, network carrier and network access
business and value-added services defined as email, voice mail, online information database storage and
retrieval, online data processing, internet access service, internet content service, and videoconferencing
services. Id. at 13-16.
526

M a t 16.
Id. at 16.

whether the commitments scheduled by Jordan in this sector cover radio and television
services or note.
Jordan has imposed several restrictions on distribution services, defined as
commercial agency, wholesaling, retailing, and franchising services. Some of the
restrictions include commercial presence requirements for cross-border trade, restrictions
on the type of corporate entities that maybe established, and foreign ownership
restrictions.528 Despite these restrictions, foreign wholesalers and retailers, through joint
ventures, may be able to establish outlets, chain stores, and wholesale operations in
Jordan in which they may sell their goods.
Jordan has removed and reduced obstacles of the transmission of educational
services across its borders or the establishment of educational facilities including schools
and offices.

Thus, Jordan has created favorable conditions for suppliers of higher

education and adult education services. Additionally, education consumers can purchase
their education abroad. Jordan has hoped that education liberalization may help lure
foreign universities into establishing branches in Jordan.

It is my belief, however, that

education in Jordan is and must be a government function. Liberalization of educational
services should not erode the government ability to regulate education. Private education
services ought to supplement and not displace public education. For example, private
education could offer services that are not currently offered by government schools.

™ Id. at 18-19.
530

In 2005, the Chicago-based DePaul University opened a branch in Jordan offering programs in
information privacy and secrecy, software engineering, knowledge management, and information system
management (on file with author).
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Permitting private and public education to coexist in Jordan may help inject competition
in the education system; but universities should not act more like commercial firms rather
than academic institutions.
Jordan has also scheduled several commitments that cover areas such as life and nonlife insurance services (e.g. transport, aviation, and accident insurance) and banking and
other financial services (e.g. derivative trading and the provision and transfer of financial
information).

There are no limitations on the number of service suppliers in the form of

quotas, exclusive providers, or economic needs tests, local currency lending restrictions,
restrictions on geographical expansion, and capital requirements. Jordan has, however,
n o

imposed several restrictions such as the type of establishment allowed.

Therefore,

suppliers do not have the freedom to choose a preferred form of commercial presence
whether a branch, subsidiary, or joint venture. Other restrictions include the level of
equity participation and permitted business lines.533 Liberalization of financial services
may allow suppliers to supply certain financial services on a cross-border basis in
reinsurance and retrocession services, insurance intermediation services, and services
auxiliary to the provision of insurance.
Under article II of GATS, MFN treatment means that measures should be applied to
all service transactions without discrimination among countries. However, members are
permitted to list MFN exemptions in the service sector. Jordan listed 12 MFN

1

Id. at 20-25.

[

Id. at 20.

;

Id. at 22.

exemptions.

Four exemptions are cross-sectoral exemptions related to movement of

natural persons such as work permit fees or investment such as preferential measures and
purchase of land. Eight of the exemptions are sector-specific exemptions. These sectorspecific exemptions are related to professional services, audiovisual services, travelrelated services, press services, and land-based transport services.
Jordan made market-opening commitments across a whole range of services ranging
from business and telecommunications to education and transportation. The coverage of
the service sector is relatively complete. However, there are differences in terms of broad
liberalization and full bindings in different service sectors. For example, Jordan
liberalized its education, telecommunications, and recreational services while imposed
limits on financial services, auditing services, and architectural and engineering services.
Many of Jordan's limitations on market access are in the form of residency limits, form
of legal entity, foreign equity, and nationality.
GATS provided some flexibility to Jordan in scheduling its commitments to
liberalize trade in services. However, this flexibility can be challenged by recent WTO
dispute settlement cases such as Mexico's telecom case and the U.S. gambling case.535
Therefore, Jordan must take care in scheduling future commitments. Alternatively,
Jordan can liberalize its service sectors without being written in its schedule of specific

Id. at 36-39. The twelve MFN exemptions apply indefinitely. Therefore, Jordan may not need to phase
out these exemptions. However, in future trade negotiation rounds, Jordan could eliminate MFN
exemptions. It is unclear to what extent some of these exemptions are applied in reality or have substantial
significance.

See Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2,
2004). See also Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).

commitments. Moreover, Jordan can modify or withdraw some of its commitments under
GATS, but other countries would seek compensatory trade concessions. Jordan is
building a new economy based on knowledge-based industries. Trade in services may
offer Jordanian service providers, small and medium-sized businesses, great potential for
opportunities. At the same time, liberalization of the service sector in Jordan could harm
service firms, since they have weaknesses in resources, management, and know-how.
C. Protection of Intellectual Property in Jordan
The intellectual property regime in Jordan proved to be a stumbling block for
Jordan's accession to the WTO. Jordan committed in its accession to the WTO to comply
fully with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), from the date of accession, without recourse to any transitional period.536 The
question of Jordan's compliance has gained importance, especially given the decision by
the USTR to unlist Jordan from the watch list of Special 301 in 1999.537 Compliance with
TRIPS and the un-listing from the U.S. watch list of Special 301 helped Jordan accede to
the WTO.
It is beyond the scope of this section to give a very comprehensive analysis of the
history and various forms of intellectual property rights. Therefore, it suffices to highlight

536

See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 230. Despite several
attempts by Jordanian officials and negotiators, Jordan was not given a transition period to comply with its
TRIPs obligations. The U.S. and EC firmly held their no-transition position by arguing that every acceding
country must comply with TRIPs immediately upon accession.
537

Jordan had been on the U.S. watch list for quite sometime, where the U.S. has closely watched Jordan's
intellectual property regime. The situation worsened when there was discussion in 1998 on whether Jordan
would be targeted with trade sanctions under Special 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act for failing to adequately protect U.S. copyrights, patents, and trademarks. However, one could say that
imposing sanctions against Jordan under Special 301 would have been counterproductive because that
would interfere with other U.S. foreign policy priorities.

the mam areas where changes in Jordan's intellectual property regime were driven by
TRIPs. This section seeks to compare Jordan's current intellectual property laws with its
obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. The main intellectual property rights are set out
below.
1. Copyright Law
The international conventions that protect copyright works are the Berne Convention
and the TRJPs Agreement. Countries acceding to the WTO must comply with the TRIPs
n o

Agreement as well as the Berne Convention.

However, the TRIPs Agreement does not

recognize moral rights of copyrighted works.

Moreover, the TRIPs Agreement

addresses aspects of copyright related to new technologies, such as computer programs.
Jordan's copyright law can be primarily found in the Copyright Law of 2001. Under
the Copyright Law, the subject matter of copyright protection is literary, scientific, and
artistic works.540 These conventional works include written materials, music, works of
fine arts, such as paintings and photography, and technology-based works such as
computer programs.541 In addition, Jordan's Copyright Law of 2001 includes software
within the ambit of copyright protection. Foreign software developers would rely on
explicit provisions for protection before licensing their best technologies. Article 3.d of
538

Article 9.1 of TRIPs requires members to comply with articles 1 through 21, with the exception of
article 6bis, of the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention and the Appendix thereto (that is, the
substantive provisions of that Convention). Jordan joined the Berne Convention in 1999.
539

In fact, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly excludes article 6bis of the Berne Convention on moral rights
from its application. See TRIPS, art. 9.1.
540

See Provisional Copyright Law No. 52 of 2001, art. 3.a, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4508 (Official
Gazette) (Oct. 1, 2001). This is in compliance with article 2 of the Berne Convention.
1

M a t art. 3.b.

the Copyright Law also mandates protection for encyclopedias, an area not previously
covered, which by reason of selection or arrangement of contents constitute intellectual
creations as such. The list in the Copyright Law is not at all inclusive, but illustrative.542
Copyright protects the expression of thoughts but not the ideas itself.543 For example,
if somebody writes a book about Jordan's accession to the WTO, his/her expressions are
protected, but not the idea or the topic of Jordan's accession to the WTO, since anybody
could write about Jordan's accession to the WTO.

Under Jordan's Copyright Law,

innovative expressions are protected.545 The inquiry that must be pursued by courts and
commentators in Jordan is whether the Copyright Law should protect a work as a whole
(for example a statistical form), including original expressions, non-original expressions,
and facts, or if it should protect the original expressive elements of a work so as to
identify them with as much certainty as possible. In other words, the question is whether
to adopt the "work as a whole" approach or the "element by element" approach.

542

This is supported by the use of the word "in particular". Id. at art. 3.b.

543

See TRIPS, art. 9.2.

544

A Copyright does not preclude others from independently creating similar expressions.

545

Copyright Law of 2001 provides that a work is made when it is reduced to writing or other material
form. There are no other formalities for copyright to be acquired or as pre-condition of filing a lawsuit. For
example, there are no requirements for registration of the work, recordation, or copyright notice. See
Provisional Copyright Law No. 52 of 2001, supra n. 540, art. 3.a &b. Article 38 of the Copyright Law
addresses filing of best edition of a published work with the Filing Center in the National Library
Department. However, it seems that the Law established a policy of flexibility by stating in article 45 that
non-filing cannot be considered a violation of the Law. As such, filing is considered a procedural step and
not condition to secure copyright protection. Depositing a published work in the Filing Center would help
the flow of materials to the Department, evidentiary use in the judicial system, and serve the public interest
in an open and comprehensive registry.

The Copyright Law applies to published or unpublished works of Jordanians and
foreigners.54 The Copyright Law requires Jordan to extend its copyright law protection
to nationals of other countries in a non-discriminatory manner.5 7 Thus, the Copyright
Law recognizes the personal status of the author as a Jordanian citizen or national
(including resident) of another country as a connecting factor to secure copyright
protection in Jordan.
There are certain works that are excluded from protection under the Copyright Law.
For example, legislations, regulations, judicial decisions, and other official texts of a
legislative, administrative or legal nature are not protected.54 However, these official
texts are protected to the extent that they involve innovation in their arrangement. For
example, if a person compiles Jordan's trade laws, bilateral trade agreements, and WTO
Agreements in a supplementary book by providing indices, certain selections for
publication, or brief commentaries at the end of each article, then the compilation could
be copyrighted. There is no copyright in news information per se. Political or legal
speeches are copyrightable if they are literary works reduced to writing or other material
form.

546

M at art. 53.a.

547

However, under article 53.b of the Copyright Law of 2001, copyright protection would apply based on
reciprocity, not national treatment, for non-members of an international copyright agreement (the Berne
Convention). In any case, Jordan will have to apply its copyright law to works of all TRIPs members even
if they are not parties to the Berne Convention by virtue of the principles of national treatment and MFN
incorporated in the TRIPs. On this basis, one can argue that Jordan is obliged to protect works of TRIPs
parties who may or may not be parties to the Bern Convention.
Id. at art. 7.a.

Folklore communicated to the public by performers are protected under the
Copyright Law.549 The Minister of Culture will exercise his/her authority as the owner of
folklore by providing protection against distortion or misrepresentation.550 In other
words, the Minister of Culture will exercise his authority over these works as "moral
rights". Thus, protection of the vast, ancient and invaluable cultural expression is
afforded, when there is distortion or misrepresentation, by all means without limitation in
time. The provisions the Copyright Law, however, do not speak of the Minister of
Culture exercising economic rights over these works, although he could.
1.1 Exclusive Rights
There are two types of rights under the Copyright Law. These are economic rights,
which allow the author of a work to derive financial reward (through licensing) from the
use of his/her work by others, and the other is moral rights, which allow the author to
take certain actions to preserve the personal linkage between him and the work.551 The
Copyright Law sets out a number of exclusive rights which are to be granted to an author.
The right of the author of a copyrighted work to exclude others from making copies of
his/her work is the basic right under copyright law. Economic rights involve commercial
exploitation of protected works including the right of publishing.552 Other economic

Examples of folklore include such artistic expressions as a tribal dance, folklore pillow covers, and
folklore wall hangings.
Because works of folklore do not have a single identifiable author capable of exploiting these works, the
Copyright Law gives ownership of such works to the Minister of Culture.
551

Id. at arts. 8 & 9.

552

Id. at art. 9.a, b.

rights include the right of broadcasting, the right to authorize distribution, the right of
reproduction, the right of commercial rental, and the right of public recitation.553
The Copyright Law protects acts of translation and adaptation.554 Since translation
and adaptation are works protected by the Copyright Law, an authorization must be
obtained for any reproduction or publication of translated or adapted copy from both the
owner of the copyright of the original pre-existing work as well as the adaptator or
translator. Furthermore, article 23 of the Copyright Law covers neighboring or related
rights.

The Copyright Law confers rights on performers, broadcasting organizations,

and producers of phonograms.556 In principle, the rights of holders of these related rights
are similar to the rights of holders of other copyrighted works.

1.2 Moral Rights
Moral rights of authorship and integrity are distinct from the bundle of economic or
exploitation rights that are usually associated with copyright. Economic rights of the type
mentioned earlier can be transferred or assigned to others in return for royalties.

553

The right of rental is not available under the Berne Convention. However, it is made available under
article 11 of TRIPs. The right of rental is important because technological advances such as digital audio
tape made it very easy to copy computer-based programs, films, or sound recordings by customers of rental
stores. Therefore, the right to control commercial rental practices is necessary in order to safeguard the
copyright owner's sales market and royalties.
Id. at arts. 9.c & 5.a. Translation means the expression of a work in a language other than that of the
original version. Adaptation means the modification or conversion of a work to create another work such as
converting a novel into a motion picture.
Neighboring rights is named as such because they build upon and relate to already protected copyrighted
works. For example, a singer that performs a composer's work to the public is considered a holder of a
neighboring right.
556

The right of performers is recognized because their creativity gives spirit to the body of poems for
example. The same recognition also applies to broadcasting organizations because of their contribution of
making works available to the public. Additionally, producers of sound recordings are recognized because
their creativity in contributing to the work.

However, the second type of rights, moral rights, cannot be transferred. Moral rights are
inalienable and perpetual. Moral rights always remain with the original author of the
copyrighted work.
Article 8 of the Copyright Law recognizes moral rights.557 The basis for these rights
is the personal linkage between the work and its author. The author has the right to
claim/disclaim a work as his own (authorship or paternity) and to safeguard the work
from distortion, mutilation, and other amendments which would be prejudicial to his
reputation or honor (integrity). Based on moral rights, an author in Jordan can prevent
others from passing off his work as theirs or he can block usage of a work, such as in
parody, which he feels will prejudice his honor.

1.3 Exceptions
There are certain exceptions or limitations to the general rule of prior authorization
from the owner of a work. Some of these exceptions fall under a three-step test of article
13 of the TRIPs Agreement. Other limitations fall under article 9.1 of the TRIPs
Agreement that include the appendix of the Berne Convention of 1971. The former
limitations could be labeled as "fair uses", and the latter as "non-voluntary licenses".
Both of these exceptions are covered under the Copyright Law.558 The difference
between the fair use and non-voluntary license is that under free use exploitation of a
copyrighted work is carried out without any authorization or an undertaking to

557

The often-used translation in Arabic (in Jordan) for the word "copyright" is the author's right. The use
of the term "author's right" places more emphasis on moral rights (with a personality link), as opposed to
only economic rights of the author, such as reproduction, of the author. Article 6bis of Berne Convention
requires members to recognize the author's moral right of integrity and the right to claim authorship.
558

Article 11 of the Copyright Law governs non-voluntary licensing and article 17 governs fair use.
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remunerate the owner of copyrighted work for the use. On other hand, exploitation under
the non-voluntary license is carried out without any authorization, but with the obligation
to compensate the owner of rights.559
For example, under the fair dealing defense of the Copyright Law, individuals are
allowed to make a single copy of the work for private personal purposes, provided that
such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.560 Other examples
supporting the fair dealing defenses include reproduction of articles published in
newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or religious topics, reproduction
for research, illustration for teaching purposes, library use, short extracts for criticism, or
review within the limits justified and with proper citation.

There are certain factors that

courts in Jordan take into account when judging whether the case in question involves a
fair use defense. These factors could include the purpose of the use, nature of the work
used, amount of quotation or use of the copyrighted work, and amount of financial gain,
if any.
The other limitation on the exclusive rights of the owner of a copyrighted work is the
non-voluntary license, which allows for the use of works under certain circumstances and
conditions without the authorization of the owner.562 Article 11 of the Copyright Law sets

" " M a t a r t . ll.d.
560

Id. at art. 17.b. This is in compliance with article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement. In Jordan, fair use
defenses are limited to "published" works. It seems that there is a distinction between published and
unpublished works for fair use purposes. As such, a biographer or historian may not cite excerpts from an
unpublished biography.
1

Id. at arts. 17.d, 18&20.
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out a scheme whereby citizens of Jordan can apply under certain conditions to the
Minister of Culture or his assignee for permission to translate foreign works for the
purposes of teaching, scholarship and research.563 However, for any work translated or
reproduced via a non-voluntary license, by virtue of the Copyright Law, fair
compensation must be paid in respect of the use.564 The purpose of non-voluntary
licensing in the Copyright Law is the dissemination of copyrighted works to the public
where the national legislature fears that the non-availability of these works could hinder
the dissemination and development of knowledge.

1.4 Copyright Term
The copyright period required by the Copyright Law is the life of the author and 50
years after his death.

The term of protection for cinematographic and television works,

any work whose author or right holder is a legal entity, any work published for the first
time after the death of its author, and anonymous and pseudonymous works is 50 years
from the date of publication.

However, photographic and applied art works are

The Copyright Law in article 11 authorizes non-voluntary licenses. Therefore, non-voluntary licenses
are determined specifically in the law and do not result from the discretion of any person including the
copyright owner. Article 11 is in line with the Appendix of the Berne Convention of 1971 that allows these
exceptions for developing countries. Article I of the Appendix limits the application of the Appendix to
countries which are regarded as developing in conformity with the established practice of the General
Assembly of the U.N. Any developing country member of the Berne Convention which wishes to introduce
the special compulsory licenses is required to deposit a declaration notification with the Director General of
WIPO.
563

Id. at art. ll.a&c.

564

M a t art. ll.d.

Id. at art. 30. Term of protection under Jordan's Copyright Law is in line with article 7.1 of the Berne
Convention which provides protection for lifetime plus 50 years after death. It is also in compliance with
article 12 of the TRIPs Agreement.
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protected for 25 years.

This is because the Copyright Law does not assimilate applied

art and photographic works, for example to other literary works, but rather provides them
with protection for shorter periods.
The period of protection for performers and producers of phonograms is until the end
of 50 years from the end of the year in which the fixation was made or the performance
took place.568 The term of protection for broadcasting organizations is 20 years from the
end of the year in which the broadcasting took place.569 As stipulated under the TREPs
Agreement, the Copyright Law granted the minimum period of protection.

1.5 Remedies
The Copyright Law expressly deals with the question of available remedies for a
copyright infringement.570 Enforcement provisions are to be found in articles 46-52 of the
law. These measures could be divided into provisional measures, civil remedies, criminal
penalties, and measures taken at the border. Provisional measures include search and
seizure of infringing copies, and evidence of infringement on a protective basis in an
interlocutory proceeding. These measures have the purpose of preventing infringements

566

Id. at art. 31.

567

Id. at art. 32.

568

Id. at art. 23.d. The TRIPs standard is higher since the period of protection under the Rome Convention
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations is only 20
years.
569

Id. atari. 23.e.

570

The Copyright Law grants the staff of the Copyright Protection Office within the National Library
Department the status of judicial police. The staff of the Copyright Protection Office, which is limited in
number and finance, can search premises without the need for a warranty or being accompanied by police
officers, or stop and board a vehicle suspected of having in its possession goods which violate intellectual
property rights. Id. at art. 36.
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from occurring and preserving relevant evidence.571 Civil remedies compensate the
owner of rights for economic injury suffered because of infringement.572 Criminal
sanctions are intended to punish those who commit acts of infringement, theft, or piracy
of copyright and related rights and, as in the case of civil remedies, to deter further
infringement.573 The final category of remedies are measures to be taken at the borders.574
The Copyright Law does not cover border measures, but rather such measures are
covered under the Customs Law.575

2. Trademarks
Jordan passed the Trademarks Law of 1999 to comply with the TRIPs Agreement
and its obligation to comply with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (1967). The Trademarks Law describes a trademark in the broadest sense as any
visually perceptible sign, such as a word, logo, number, letter, slogan, or color.576 The

571

Id. at art. 46.c & d.

572

Id, at art. 49.

The Copyright Law requires an intention, for purposes of imposing criminal penalties. Id. at art. 51 .a.
The purpose of punishment is served by imposing a substantial fine or sentencing that corresponds to the
seriousness of the crime particularly in cases of repeat offenses. Under the Copyright Law, criminal
penalties are imprisonment for a period between 3 months to 3 years and a fine of JD1000-3 000, or one of
these two sentences. In cases of repetition, penalties would be applied to the maximum.
574

Border measures are different from other enforcement measures in that they involve actions by customs
authorities at the borders, rather than by the judicial authorities.
575

The rights holder may petition the court, after depositing a cash or bank guarantee and submitting
sufficient evidence, to suspend the release of suspected infringing products. In case of suspected
infringement of intellectual property rights related to copyright and trademark, the clearance of imported
goods can be suspended if there is a prima facie case of infringement. See Customs Law No. 20 of 1998,
supra n. 397, art. 13.
576

The Trademarks Law defines a trademark as any visually perceptible mark used or shall be used by any
person to distinguish his goods or services from the goods or services of others. See Trademarks Law No.
34 of 1999, art. 7, 7.1, 4 & 12 al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4389 Official Gazette (Nov. 1, 1999). This is in
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Trademarks Law does not apply to nontraditional trademarks such as sound or smell.577
The Trademarks Law recognizes service marks, which is an area that was previously not
recognized.578 Given the fact that almost 70 percent of Jordan's GDP comes from
services, protection of service marks is essential in the services industry.
The Trademarks Law determines the conditions and procedures for the filing and
registration of trademarks. Under the Law, a trademark has to meet the requirement of
being distinctive.579 For example, the word "vegetable" cannot be registered as a
trademark for carrots, since it is a generic term for carrots. However, factual
distinctiveness, as supposed to inherent distinctiveness, could be acquired through use.
In other words, these marks could be protected if they acquire secondary meaning.
The Trademarks Law addresses the intent-to-use system, and does not require actual
use of a trademark as a condition for filing a registration.581 An intention to use the
trademark for the goods, with respect to which the trademark is to be registered is

compliance with article 15 of the TRIPs Agreement which states that a member "may" require, as a
condition of registration, that a sign be visually perceptible. In respect to colors, the limitation of a
trademark to a color(s) may be a basis for the establishment of distinctiveness. Colors themselves such as
the color orange could be treated as trademarks.
577

For example, a fragrance trademark can never be registered. The registration of fragrances or sounds
would present complex challenges for trademark examiners in MIT in Jordan. It is unclear how fragrances
or sounds would be categorized, catalogued, preserved during the registration period, or searched and tested
for confusing similarity.
When a mark is used in connection with services, it is sometimes referred to as a service mark. See
Trademark Law Amendment Enacted, Published, 14.3 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 15, 2000)
(prior to the amendment of Jordan's Trademarks Law, applicants could only protect service marks under
class 16 for publication and printed material).
579

See Trademarks Law No. 34 of 1999, supra n. 576, art. 7.1.

5S0

Id. at art. 7.3 & 8.7.

1

Id. at art. 11.1.

sufficient. The intent-to-use requirement may lead to an increase in the number of
trademark applications. Evidence of intent-to-use could be demonstrated through an ongoing business.
The Trademarks Law allows opposition during the prosecution of a trademark
coo

application.

In such cases, a petitioner must show a valid ground as to why the

applicant is not entitled to register his trademark.583 The Trademarks Law does not
specify statutory grounds which would negate the entitlement to the registration, such as
the requirement that the opposer proves fraudulent information or economic damage.
Concurrent use of a trademark on identical or similar goods does not prevent
registration.

However, a concurrent use registration may be granted upon the

discretion of the Registrar. Moreover, the Registrar determines the circumstances and
conditions for such registration.585
Under the principle of territoriality, a trademark has to be registered in Jordan before
being protected.586 The Trademarks Law grants protection in 10-year renewable terms.587
The owner of a registered trademark has the exclusive right to prevent third party not
having obtained his/her consent from usage in the course of trade, identical or similar

582

Id. at art. 14.

583

Id. at art. 14.2.

584

Id. atari 18.

For example, a registration could be granted if the use does not result in misleading the public and is not
contrary to the public interest
5S6

Id. at art. 34.1.

587

Id. at art. 20. The pre-1999 Trademarks Law set the initial term of registration and subsequent renewal
terms at seven and fourteen years respectively.

signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those registered trademarks
where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.588 This means that the burden
of proving consent of the proprietor would fall on the defendant.
The Trademarks Law provides penalties against offenders who misrepresent goods
or use counterfeit trademarks.

The Trademarks Law provides for a cease and desist

order.590 The Trademarks Law also provides for an interlocutory seizure of goods, which
would take place at the request of the owner of a trademark. Moreover, the Trademarks
Law specifically provides for destruction or disposal of materials or tools used in the
infringement of trademarks.591
2.1 Well Known Marks
Protection of well known marks in Jordan an area where some reform was needed to
ensure compliance with the Paris Convention and the TRIPs obligation to protect well
known marks. Due to the lack of explicit provisions preventing the registration of well
known marks, many local Jordanian companies filed applications to register well known
marks under their own names.

The simplistic approach to register trademarks in Jordan

588

Id. at art. 26. 1. Where an identical sign is used for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion
is to be presumed. This is in compliance with article 16 of TRIPs.
589

The Trademarks Law provides penalties that include JD100-3000 fine, 3 months-1 year imprisonment,
or both.
590

Id. at art. 39.

591

Id. at art. 39.4.

592

See Amir H. Khoury, The development of Modern Trademark Legislation and Protection in Arab
Countries of the Middle East, 16 Transnatl. L. 249, 269, 321 (2003) (this is not to say that well-known
marks were without protection. In fact, two practical defenses against unauthorized use of well-known
marks were employed. First, an examiner that identifies a certain mark as being owned by a third party
may, based on his own personal knowledge, refuse to register the mark in the name of the applicant.
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contributed to the registration of well known marks.5 3 Trademark rights were granted to
the first persons or entities to register in Jordan regardless to prior use in Jordan or
elsewhere.

This approach allowed a third party to acquire rights to internationally

famous marks by registering them in Jordan as their own.
Many foreign owners of well known trademarks had to litigate in Jordan because of
the trademark registrations by Jordanian persons. For example, Shaheen International
Corporation Co. filed an application to register the mark PILLSBURY in its name in
Jordan.5

5

In another example, Hani Al-Qudsi & Partners, a Jordanian Company, filed a

trademark application to register the mark "7ELEVEN" in class 16.596 Farid Khalaf
Company, a Jordanian company, filed to register the mark "MILLER" in Jordan in class
32 for beers.5 7 In other cases, foreign owners of well known marks were unable to

Second, any party who claimed right to a well-known registered mark was entitled to institute opposition
proceedings against its registration).
The Jordanian law is rather lax regarding documentation that is required when applying for a trademark.
All that is required is a general or specific power of attorney. Id. at 271.
594

Id. at 309.

595
However, the Pillsbury Company filed an opposition contesting such registration and contending that its
PILLSBURY mark is a well known mark used to market its ready-made dough and bakery products
worldwide including in Jordan. As a result, a settlement was reached whereby Shaheen agreed to assign the
trademark registration over to the Pillsbury Company in return for the latter's agreement not to initiate legal
action for damages or compensation. Id. at 321.
596

The Southland Corporation, a U.S. corporation, filed an opposition claiming that the Jordanian applicant
was not entitled to such registration since it uses and owns registrations of the mark "7ELEVEN" in various
countries worldwide. The Southland Corporation prevailed in its opposition not so much on the merits but
rather on points of procedure. The Jordanian Company did not submit its response to the opposition on
time. Id. at 321.
9

Miller Brewing Company, owner of the famous mark MILLER, filed an opposition and contended that it
was the owner of the famous MILLER trademark that is registered and used in several countries
worldwide. It further contended that the fact that its MILLER mark was not registered in Jordan should not
adversely affect the opposition. The Jordanian trademark registrar ruled in favor of Miller Brewing
Company and rejected Khalaf s application. The registrar reasoned that Khalaf s registration would cause
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prevent registration of similar marks by Jordanian persons. For example, a Jordanian
company, Jordanian Trico & Yarn Factory Co., filed a trademark application for "AL
TIMSAH" mark, in class 32, which means a crocodile in Arabic, similar to that filed by
La Chemise Lacoste, a French company.
Since 1999, well known marks are expressly protected. The Trademarks Law sets out
special provisions to protect well known marks. The Law defines well known trademarks
as marks that are widely known to the relevant public in Jordan and that enjoy a high
international reputation.5 Therefore, in judging whether a mark is a well known or not,
one determine whether the mark has surpassed the borders of its country of origin and
that the mark is well known to the relevant consumer segment in Jordan.
The Trademarks Law prohibits the registration of a trademark which constitutes a
reproduction or translation, liable to create confusion, of a well known mark on identical
or similar goods.600 Moreover, the Trademarks Law prohibits the use of a well known but

consumer deception and constitute unfair competition and false indication of origin of the goods bearing
the mark. The Jordanian High Court of Justice affirmed the registrar's decision. Id. at 322. In another
example, Al-Nasser & Mosely Company, a Jordanian company, filed a trademark registration in
"SUBWAY" trademark in class 30. The Registrar also cancelled the registration often other trademarks,
which included the characters of WINNIE THE POOH, DUMBO, ALADDIN, and LION KING, registered
in the name of the Jordanian Halawani Industrial Company for potato chips because they were well known
marks owned, registered, and used worldwide by the Walt Disney Company.
598

The Registrar rejected Lacoste's opposition for the registration of "AL TIMSAH" mark on the basis that
the two marks, AL TIMSAH and LACOSTE, were in different classes and there was no likelihood of
confusion. Id. at 324. In another case, Time Warner Entertainment Company filed an opposition against the
registration of the trademark TOTO, a depiction of the famous cartoon character Tweety, in Jordan. The
Jordanian application was filed by Sobhi Jabri & Sons Co and was intended to cover goods in class 30
(food). In its opposition, Time Warner contended that it owned the rights over its famous "Tweety"
character and its opposition should be accepted. However, the Registrar rejected the opposition ruling
because no convincing evidence was submitted to prove that Time Warner was using the "Tweety"
character with respect to goods in class 30. In addition, the Registrar reasoned that this cartoon character is
only protected by copyright law and not trademark law.
See Trademarks Law No. 34 of 1999, supra n. 576, art. 2.

210
unregistered trademark on dissimilar goods and services, provided that the use of that
trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection between
those goods or services and the owner of the trademark, and provided that the interests of
the owner of the trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.

!

Thus, a well known

mark may be defended even if it is not registered or the owner does not carry on a
business in Jordan.

2.2 Parallel Importation
The Trademarks Law does not clearly address whether parallel imports infringe
trademark rights. The Trademarks Law provides the trademark owner, who registered
his/her mark in Jordan, the exclusive right to "use" that trademark.

However, there is

no clear definition of the word "use" per se in the Law. Courts in Jordan have yet to
interpret the term to determine its scope.
A commercial agent is an importer, distributor, and trader and a foreign supplier is an
exporter.604 Therefore, a corollary dimension arises in relation to the application of the
laws on agency, which is the controversial subject of parallel importation.605 Customs

600

Id. atari. 8.12.

601

Id. atari. 26.1.
It could be better to register well marks to avoid any dispute.

603

See Trademarks Law No. 34 of 1999, supra n. 576, art. 26.1.

604

Commercial Agency Law No. 28 of 2001, art. 2, al Jaridah al Rasmiyah No. 4496 (Official
Gazette) (July 16, 2001).

605

Parallel imports or gray market goods are genuine goods and not counterfeits, whereby a trademark is
misappropriated. Parallel imports involve the importation of genuine goods outside the authorized
distribution channels. In other words, a parallel import is the importation of these goods from a foreign
source by bypassing the authorized local distributor and trademark licensee therefore allowing the sale of
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officials in Jordan do not bloc parallel imports. There is no blanket policy of blocking
such parallel imports officially, though they may be blocked privately by agreement
between the supplier and the distributor. If there is a violation of the terms of a
commercial agency/exclusive license agreement, the agent/distributor could enforce his
rights in courts but not through Customs.606
Many parallel import cases in Jordan involve trademarks and commercial agency
laws.

7

The Commercial Agency Law deals with exclusive agency contracts, distribution

of goods, distribution channels, and territorial limits. In one case, Jordan Mechanical
Engineering Company, a Jordanian company, acted as an agent and distributor of
"Maggi" chicken stock cubes, which is a product of Nestle, a Swiss company.

It came

to the knowledge of Jordan Mechanical that some Jordanian traders, such as AbdulFattah Qinno, imported about 1000 boxes of Maggi cubes (a product of Egypt), which did
not conform to the required specifications. The Court of Cassation found that Jordan
Mechanical was entitled to preserve its rights as the authorized agent of the
manufacturing company for marketing certain goods. In addition, the Court found that

goods directly to retailers or consumers. See Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Import, 23 World Econ. 1269
(2000).
606

The Commercial Agency Law vests in courts the jurisdiction over any dispute involving agency
agreement. See Commercial Agency Law No. 28 of 2001, supra n. 604, art. 16.1.
607

Copyright law does not mention the right to import, although the right to distribute may include
importation rights. Moreover, there is no mention for parallel importation among exceptions from copyright
protection. See Provisional Copyright Law No. 52 of 2001, supra n. 540, art. 9, 11& 17. There have been
no cases addressing parallel imports in copyright law. Courts in Jordan can protect the copyright owner in
regards to parallel importation, based on court decisions in trademark cases.
See Decision No. 95/1418, Journal of the Jordanian Bar Associationp. 957 (No. 6 1996).

Jordan Mechanical company was entitled to protect its rights in the trademark that was
registered for Maggi cubes.
As the facts of the Maggi case illustrate some parallel importers such as AbdulFattah Qinno imported genuine goods that are subject to an agency agreement probably
with the purpose of circumventing the agent. The effect of the Court of Cassation
decision is that as the Swiss company could not enjoin sales of gray market goods in
Jordan, its agent and distributor succeeded in obtaining remedies by having the goods of
the parallel importers impounded, destroyed, exported, or requested compensation.
Apparently, the quality of Maggi differs from Maggi cubes specifically designed for the
Jordanian market. Maggi of Egypt was not designed to comply with consumer
specifications in Jordan. By bringing the Maggi case, the agent sought to protect regular
trade channels. In this context, the agent raised violations of trademarks and agency laws.
Another lesson learned from the Maggi case is that Customs may not seize gray
market goods at the borders. This means that an authorized agent or distributor has to
bring a private action against the importer of gray market goods, a task that could prove
difficult for several reasons. First, the distributor has to identify the identities of parallel
importers.609 Secondly, bringing a private action is time consuming. Second, a Jordanian
authorized distributor can bring a lawsuit based on an array of theories which embraces
trademark, unfair competition, consumer concerns, and agency law.
Neither the Trademarks Law nor Customs Law does address clearly parallel
importation. In reality, foreign manufacturers appoint as their agent/distributor a

For example, in the Maggi case it seems that in some way it came to the knowledge of Jordan
Mechanical that some traders imported Maggi cubes.
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Jordanian firm which is the exclusive importer and distributor of their goods. Therefore,
parallel importation could be practically blocked. The matter of parallel importation can
be addressed through case law. Since the current intellectual property regime in Jordan is
new, it remains to be seen how court decisions will interplay with many treaties signed by
Jordan, parallel imports, trademarks law, commercial agency law, public interest, and
free trade.
Some merchants in Jordan argue that exclusive agents or distributors abuse the
domestic market. Parallel imports would not be sold in competition with goods subject to
an exclusive agency agreement. Prohibiting parallel imports in connection with goods
subject to exclusive agency agreement can only benefit powerful merchants and local
elites. As a result, small merchants are not able to benefit from price differences in
different markets. Closed distribution channels impede free trade, competition, and
consumer choice in terms of product and price.
The opposing view to parallel imports counter-argues that local agents or distributors
have built the goodwill of imported products by offering marketing plans, promotional
efforts, and product warranty through after-sale servicing. The purpose of all these plans
and efforts is to maintain clients and increase the sale of goods. Agents provide services
and incur costs that parallel importers may not provide or incur.

Therefore, parallel

importers get a free ride at the expense of authorized distributors. In addition, parallel
importers could damage product quality control, which causes consumer confusion and
can diminish the reputations of the manufacturers and agents.

610

The agent or distributor is required to provide spare parts and other items which are necessary and
sufficient for maintenance of the imported goods. See Commercial Agency Law No. 28 of 2001, supra n.
604, art. 11.
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3. Patents
In 1999, Jordan introduced its patent legislation, Patents Law of 1999, replacing the
Patents and Designs Law which had been in effect since 1953. The 1999 Patents Law was
further amended in 2001.611 The Patents Law sets out the definition for a patentable
invention. All inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields are covered.

The

Patents Law requires inventions to be new, inventive, and capable of industrial
application.

Novelty is assessed on a worldwide basis, as supposed to an assessment on

what has been disclosed in Jordan, as was the case under the old Patent Law.614
The Patents Law requires applicants to disclose the invention in their application in a
manner sufficiently clear and complete, so that for the invention can be carried out by a
person skilled in the art.615 Additionally, the Patents Law requires applicants to disclose
the best method of making the invention work, and any existing foreign applications and
grants.616 The Patents Law requires one invention per application.617

611

As was typical of former colonies and protectorates of the United Kingdom, Jordan followed the laws of
England in many areas, including patent law. See Provisional Patents Law No. 71 of 2001, al Jaridah al
RasmiyahNo. 4520 (Official Gazette) (Dec. 2, 2001).
612

Id. at art. 2.

613

Id. at art. 3. These requirements meet those stated in article 27.1 of the TRIPs Agreement.

614

Patents Law of 2001 grants a one year grace period to file a patent application for an invention that has
been disclosed. It provides cases of how the disclosure happened such as actions taken by the applicant or
abuse by third parties. Id.
615

616

Insufficiency of specifications is a ground for revocation Id. at art. 8.a & c.

Id. at art. 8.a. Article 29 of TRIPs permits members to require applicants to indicate the best mode of
carrying out the invention. Thus, this is an optional matter but Jordan does require it to be disclosed.
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The Patents Law set outs the search and examination procedures.618 In practice,
patent examiners in Jordan rely on the substantive search and examination results of a
corresponding application of a foreign patent office, such as the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) or the European Patent Office that may have granted the
corresponding patent. The reasons for such practice could be to expedite the process and
facilitate the task of examiners in Jordan who would only examine the application with
respect to formal requirements. However, it is preferable if such a practice is codified so
as to set forth the procedures under which patent examiners in Jordan may accept the
examination carried out by other foreign offices. Moreover, it remains to be seen how a
court would rule on a patent granted in Jordan based on this practice.
The Registrar can deny patentability for an invention on the grounds of public policy,
public order or morality.619 For example, the Registrar can disallow patents on inventions
involving gambling devices or products used to perpetrate fraud, because they would not
be socially acceptable. Other non-patentable inventions include discoveries, diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods necessary for the treatment of humans or animals, and
living matters such as plants and animals other than microorganisms.
A patentable invention grants its inventor or owner certain rights. In the case of
product patents, these rights include preventing non-authorized making, using, offering
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If there are related inventions, then documents must show a unity of invention. This would allow claims
to different inventions that fall under the same inventive concept. All the claims in the application must be
clear. Id. at art. 8.a & 9.a.
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Id. at art. 8. In addition, articles 18-24 of the Patents Regulation of 2001 addresses examination
procedures.
619

The Patents Law further clarifies that invention shall not be so regarded only because it is prohibited by
any law in force in Jordan. Id. at art. 4. This is in compliance with article 27.2 of TRIPs.
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for sale, or importing for these purposes, the product in question.

In the case of process

patents, these rights include preventing non-consensual use of the process, use, offer for
sale, sale, and importation for these purposes, products obtained directly by the
process.621 Patent protection lasts twenty years from date of filing.622 In patent
infringement proceedings, the court may impose jail terms, monetary fines, or award
damages.

The Patents Law sets out special provisions regarding the burden of proof in

civil proceedings in infringement of process patents.

3.1 Compulsory Licensing
The Patents Law governs granting compulsory licensing without the permission of
the patent holder to prevent an abuse of patent rights.

Jordan does not have broad or

general compulsory licensing provisions because the Patents Law sets out specific cases
where the granting of a non-voluntary license is allowed. The Patents Law authorizes
granting a compulsory license for the services of the government for national defense,
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Id. at art. 21.a.
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'Id. atari. 21.a.
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Id. at art. 17. Previously, patents were protected for a period of sixteen years. Thus, the Patents Law of
2001 extended the term to twenty years. This is in compliance with article 33 of TRIPs.
623

Id. at art. 32.

624

Where a process patent is allegedly have been infringed through the use of a product made directly by
that process, it can be very hard for the patentee to prove that the defendant's product, though identical, was
made through the use of the patented process. Accordingly, the Patents Law provides that any identical
product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall be deemed to have been obtained by
the patented process if there is a likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the
owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used. Id. at
art. 34. This is in compliance with article 34 of TRIPs.
Id. at art. 22-26.

emergency, or for public noncommercial use purposes.

However, to date, there has

never been a single national defense case that would justify a compulsory license. The
Patents Law stipulates another case for granting a compulsory license whereby the
patentee abuses his rights by preventing others from competing fairly.

27

Finally, the

Patents Law grants compulsory licenses in cases of a failure to work the patent or
insufficient working.
The Patents Law requires certain conditions for granting a compulsory license.
First, these conditions include the attempt to seek a voluntary license from the patent
holder and then offering adequate remuneration to the patent holder. In addition, the
Patents Law requires the license to be non-exclusive and non-transferable, and that the
use of the license meets the demands of the local market only. The compulsory license
would be terminated if the circumstances that led to it ceased to exist.

30

The High Court

of Justice will review decisions relating to compulsory licensing.631 The Patents Law
does not specify which products can be covered by a compulsory license. For example, a
compulsory license could be issued for pharmaceuticals, medical technologies, or other
products and services.
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Id. at art. 22.a.

627

Id. at art. 22.c.
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However, no compulsory license may be granted on this ground before expiration of a period of four
years from date of filing or three years from date of grant whichever is later. Id. art. 22.b (1).
629

Id. at art. 23. The conditions for granting a compulsory license under the Patents Law must meet the
requirements of article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement.
630

Id. at art. 24.

631

Id. at 26.
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3.2 The Jordanian Pharmaceutical Industry and the TRIPs Agreement
Pharmaceutical industry in Jordan is several decades old, where the first domestic
maker started business in the early 1960s.632 Today, the pharmaceutical industry consists
of seventeen small to medium-sized private firms employing approximately 8,000
people.

Domestic drug makers export about 60 percent of their production while the

rest is destined for local consumption.634 Hence, the pharmaceutical industry is an
important source of foreign exchange. However, the industry's export intensity makes it
risky if foreign markets are closed or restricted.
The pharmaceutical sector has been highly fragmented and its profits squeezed by
competition. Some companies wittnessed their operating income drop. Thus, the
pharmaceutical industry was poised for a change. In recent years, there has been a
consolidation spree among pharmaceutical firms motivated by cost-cutting savings and
market expansion.635 One could anticipate that industry consolidation would continue as
the enhanced financial strength of the largest producers provides the means to actively
explore potential takeover targets. Mergers and acquisitions could be an important step to

See Implications of WTO/TRIPS for Technology Transfer in the Pharmaceutical Industry, U.N.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, at 31, U.N Doc. E/ESCWA/TECH/1997/7 (1997).
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Id. at 31.
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Production is confined to generics, packaging of imported formulations, and production of formulations
based on imported active ingredients. Most raw materials, packaging equipment, and other auxiliary
materials are imported. Some drag formulation and packaging activities are conducted under licensing
agreements with multinational corporations. Id. at 32-33, 35.
635

See JMP and Al Razi Mark Jordan's First Merger in the Pharmaceutical Sector, Jordan Times 11 (Nov.
27, 2002). See Down the Aisle Again, Jordan Times 11 (Jan. 12, 2003). See also Merger Announcement
Applauded by Bankers but Urge Incentives, Jordan Times 11 (Feb. 24, 2003).
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weather competition and expand the market. Small producers, competitive as they may
be, might not be able to remain as stand-alone operations. Jordanian firms could explore
partnerships with foreign firms as strong patents offered by Jordan ought to make
vigorous partnerships that would speed the advance of technology.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers in Jordan face several obstacles in accessing
neighboring countries' markets such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as these countries create
home-grown pharmaceutical industries. These obstacles include registration procedures,
market authorization, and procedural barriers. One way to help manufacturers is for
Jordan to engage in bilateral negotiations that could eventually lead to a reciprocal
market access agreement that would standardize rules and procedures. The agreement
could be open to other incomers into the region.
The regulatory drug pricing system in Jordan relies on some forms of price controls.
One form of price controls is the use of reference pricing, involves establishing a price
based on a basket of prices in other countries. Other direct methods used involve setting
the sale price and barring sales at a price higher than those in other countries. Although
these price controls yield lower revenue for drug firms by preventing them from charging
market-based prices, they address wider health policy considerations such as access and
affordability. Price controls are used to maintain and ensure drug prices are in check. If
prices increase drug consumption could decrease. These price controls could also be used
to manage spending on pharmaceuticals in government health budget.
The problem of the intellectual property regime in Jordan was acute in the
pharmaceutical sector, where patented drugs were manufactured without licenses. The

Patents and Designs Law of 1953 was deemed as an inadequate.

This state of affairs

led to patent infringements of pharmaceuticals.637
After modifications, the Patents Law permits the granting of patents for foodstuffs
and pharmaceuticals.

However, these modifications will only come into effect three

years after Jordan becomes a WTO member.

In the meantime, a provision was made

for securing a filing date for applications for pharmaceuticals.640 Additionally, a
provision was made for obtaining exclusive marketing rights during this period.

]

Therefore, pharmaceuticals, drugs, and agriculture chemicals, previously not patentable,
are now patentable under the Patents Law.
The Patents Law will bar domestic firms from copying patented drugs. Jordanian
drug firms will no longer be able to reproduce patented medicines simply by using a
different process. It is early to predict the impact of Jordan's Patent Law on its
pharmaceuticals industry. The shift to product patent system could make prices of
medicines increase.
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See 1997 Special 301 Report, available at http:// www.ustr.gov/pdf/special.pdf (Apr. 30, 1997) (citing
the shortcomings of the patents law regarding pharmaceuticals).
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See 1998 Special 301 Report, available at http:// www.ustr.gov/pdf/special.pdf (May 1, 1998). See also
1999 Special 301 Report, available at http:// www.ustr.gov/pdf/special.pdf (Apr. 30, 1999).
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See Provisional Patents Law No. 71 of 2001, supra n. 611, art. 36.a. Even though the TRIPs Agreement
does not directly extend patent protection to pharmaceuticals, they are however afforded patent protection
by virtue of article 27.2 & 3 which specify what products are non-patentable. In that list pharmaceuticals
are not included.
639

Id. at art. 36.e.

640

W.atart.36.b.

641

Id. at art. 36.d.
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4. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
Having laws that comply with the TRIPs Agreement is half the story of compliance
with WTO rules. The second half is the enforcement of these laws. The point often
argued is that intellectual property rights are included in the WTO for the benefit of the
"big three" in the developed countries, namely pharmaceuticals, recorded entertainment,
and software.642 This is supported by the fact that the U.S. has been the most persistent in
promoting the adoption and enforcement of intellectual property regimes. However, it is
argued that adhering to a stronger policy of protecting intellectual property rights is a key
for the dissemination of technology by developed countries. For example, intellectual
property protection increased production and employment in Jordan ever since it adopted
or reformed IP laws to meet international standards.
Although intellectual property laws in Jordan are in conformity with the TRIPs, they
are considered to be relaxed and not enforced. Enforcement of intellectual property rights
in Jordan is an area where many factors inform policy enforcement which reflects the
current status of enforcement of intellectual property rights. Enforcement of intellectual
property rights is not cheap.644 Enforcement of intellectual property rights requires

Many observers argue that the main effects of TRIPS are to redistribute economic rents from the poor
countries to the rich. See Keith E. Maskus, Regulatory Standards in the WTO: Comparing Intellectual
Rights with Competition Policy, Environmental Protection, and Core Labor Standards, 1 World Trade Rev.
135, 137-138 (2002). In return for agreeing to include intellectual property rights within the WTO, the
developing countries were able to secure other trade advantages from the developed countries in terms of
increase market access in textiles and apparel, and liberalization in agriculture. See also May L. Harris,
TRIPS: Historical Overview and Basic Principles, 12 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 454, 457 (2001).
643

After the 1990's reform, the total sale of software IT-related services were $22.3 million. In 2001, IT
companies in Jordan generated $130 million in total revenue, over half generated through software,
employing about 5,000 IT workers. Moreover, Jordan attracted $60 million in FDI. See Eric Garduno &
frank J. Pietrucha, Intellectual Property Rights in the Arab World, 4.1 Geo. J. Intl. Aff. 60-62 (2003).

appropriation of millions of dollars that would capture a good portion of the annual
budget of Jordan. Therefore, any action plan such as raids, seizures, arrests, or education
campaigns, to reduce intellectual property infringement is constrained by limited
financial resources.
Jordan also experiences lack of sufficient human resources. For example, the
Industrial Property Protection Directorate at MIT has thirty-five professional, trademark
and patent examiners, and support staff equipped with computers.

Until recently,

examiners were not required to be lawyers with intellectual property knowledge and
expertise, having background in science and technology, or taking patent bar-like exam.
Moreover, an effective intellectual property regime requires an effective well-trained
customs service.

In Jordan, there is no special court for intellectual property.

Other factors that are attributed to the plight of enforcement of intellectual property
rights in Jordan include the sentiment that a religiously-based law is necessary barrack
against Westernization and the domination of Western culture.

Therefore, violating

See Patents and the Poor, Economist 22 (June 23, 2001) (the cost for a poor country to build just a barebones infrastructure to implement TRIPS is roughly $1.5-2 million. WIPO gives technical assistance to
countries trying to draft intellectual property legislation or set up their patent offices).
645

See Report on Industrial Property Protection Directorate of Ministry of Industry and Trade 3 (on file
with the author). This number constitutes a fraction of the some 7000 employee at the USPTO. However,
this is understandable since the U.S. patent system has been in existence since 1790.
646

Among the new tasks for modern customs service, there is a focusing on smuggling, accurate goods
classification and tariff collection, compliance with security measures, and enforcement of intellectual
property. For example, while caring about the rights of intellectual property right holders may be important,
it is also of equivalent importance not to restrict trade. The customs service in Jordan may adopt a
"selective" system as in the health and food safety rules whereby certain selected imports maybe examined
to detect intellectual property violations.
Article 41.5 of TRIPs does not require members to establish a special judicial system for intellectual
property rights.
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intellectual property rights are a means of revenge for the West's colonization. Moreover,
relationships in Jordan are based on mutual cooperation and sharing in common. There
are different segments of the Jordanian society which would be affected by the high cost
of acquiring intellectual property product because intellectual property is based on
individual rights and paid access for those who can afford it.649
In Jordan, effective enforcement of intellectual property rights has increased by
establishing educational programs.650 Moreover, in the past it has never published that
law enforcement was officially rading pirates' places to clamp down on intellectual
property violations.

5

Moreover, there are news accounts of dispatching teams of

inspectors nationwide.

52

In the period of 2000-2004, the National Library prosecuted

985 copyright-related cases, with an estimated of 75 percent of these cases ending in
individual convictions.

See John Carroll, Intellectual Property Rights in the Middle East: A Cultural Perspective, 11 Fordham
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent L.J 555, 574 (2001).
649

See Suha Ma'ayeh, Improved IPR Enforcement Gets Mixed Reviews, Jordan Times 10 (May 10, 2001)
(Without pirated software, my son could not have excelled in an Auto Cad program which I purchased for
JD3, said one Jordanian citizen, adding that the price of the original software is way beyond his reach).
In addition to the statutory changes [in Jordan's intellectual property laws to comply with TRIPs]
national intellectual property associations and intellectual property courses have proliferated in
collaboration with WIPO.
651

See Jordan Police Intensify Action Against Piracy, Jordan Times 18 (May 15, 2001). One solution to the
problem of paid access would be to engage into agreements with foreign software developers to sell their
software at discounted prices. This solution would be reasonable especially if the software would be used
for educational purposes. This solution would encourage Jordanian individuals to buy legal software at a
reasonable price without having to pay a large sum.
652

See Copyright Infringements Referred to Courts, Jordan Times 5 (Nov. 14, 2003) (the National Library
has referred 729 cases to prosecution since 2000. Infringed items include tapes, pirated books, software,
and satellite smart cards).

Despite the dejure protection of intellectual property rights in Jordan, a de facto
system operates. Some local software houses only sell originals of local software as a
gesture of support to the local software industry.

53

This could be a form of local

protectionism.
Taking into account the different approaches adopted by Jordan, enforcement of
intellectual property should be a success. However, hardcore, street-level, and resultoriented enforcement activities will hardly change the mentality or belief of Jordanians
that intellectual property rights are not imposed by developed countries. These developed
countries did not protect intellectual property while they were in the stage of developing
their economies.654 Developed countries took decades to improve their norms, standards,
and enforcement while Jordan changed its norms and standards in only a few years. The
acceptability of intellectual property is critical for Jordan because the enforcement will
depend upon the legitimacy of intellectual property.
D. Commitments of Jordan in Relation to Transparency
The concept of transparency is a core component of the WTO. Generally, every
WTO agreement contains a provision related to transparency.

Article X of GATT

1994, which is based to a large extent on the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act, forms
the basis for commitments on publication of laws, regulations, judicial decisions,
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See Carroll, supra n. 648, at 592.

4

See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries, 31 CM. L. Rev. 1245, 1247 (1994) (when developed countries, like the Netherlands, were
industrializing in the nineteenth century, they chose not to protect intellectual property. For example, from
1869 to 1910 the Netherlands abolished patent law).
655

Article 7 of the SPS Agreement, article 6 of the TRIMS Agreement, and article 63 of TRIPS address
transparency.
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administrative rulings, and trade agreements. Moreover, article X of GATT 1994 requires
the administration of laws, regulations, and administrative and judicial decisions that
affect international trade in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner.
The purpose of article X of GATT 1994 is to ensure predictability in an open
multilateral trading system, as it embraces the rule of law. The rule of law, siyadat alqanun in Arabic, means authority would be exercised in a fixed and predictable way,
rather than one based on unlimited personal discretion. In other words, rule of law means
that the government would act according to a set of rules promulgated in advance. Rule
of law is a necessary foundation for free trade and economic development. Rule of law
undercuts corruption and cronyism. Absence of rule of law discourages investment and
commerce. Therefore, free trade and rule of law are not only linked but they also ought to
be used interchangeably.
Jordan has committed in its accession to the WTO to publish all laws, regulations,
and judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application as they pertain to
international trade.656 Currently, there are three journals that publish laws, regulation and
judicial and administrative decisions.657 In some instances, laws, regulations, and judicial
and administrative decisions could be published in daily newspapers.

See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 239.
657

These are the Official Gazette, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association, and the Judicial Journal. The
Department of Official Gazette in the Prime Ministry publishes the Official Gazette. The Ministry of
Finance distributes the Official Gazette. The Jordanian Bar Association issues the Journal of Jordanian Bar
Association covering final judicial decisions of the Court of Cassation and the High Court of Justice, news
of the Bar Association, and selected research. The Judicial Institute of Jordan publishes the Judicial Journal
which covers decisions of the Court of Cassation and High Court of Justice. A published judicial decision,
identified by number, covers names of judges who issued the decision, parties, brief time line for the case
until appeal, reasons for appeal, summary of the decision, and dissenting opinion, if any. Journal of
Jordanian Bar Association and Judicial Journal do not detail the entire decision. These journals publish a
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The administration of laws, regulations, and administrative decisions affecting
international trade in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner could prove difficult in
Jordan. Discrepancies in the interpretation and application of laws and regulations
involve several factors. Jurisdiction lines among agencies and ministries may overlap.
Moreover, some laws or regulation are drafted in a way so as to leave some terms
ambiguous. Authorities could exploit ambiguity to implement laws and regulation as they
see fit.
The circumstances and the level of development of the legal system in Jordan affects
the rule of law. The constitution may not be considered a living legal document.

5

Usually, laws emanate from the executive authority which has extensive control over
drafting laws.660 Judge-made law does not exist in Jordan. Therefore, judges do not make

summary of the arguments and the decision. Decisions of inferior courts and courts of appeals are usually
not reported or published. Decisions of inferior courts and courts of appeals are filed with the clerk of the
court and available for inspection by interested persons. Published judicial decisions in Jordan are not a
replica of published judicial decisions in the U.S. According to the U.S. style of publishing judicial
decisions, defined by names, of state courts of appeals are published in consecutively numbered volumes
called "reports". West Publishing Company publishes states reports in regional reporters such as Atlantic
(A. or A.2d). Federal district courts decisions are published in the Federal Supplement (F.Supp.). Decisions
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals are found in the Federal Reporter (Fed., F.2d). Decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court are published in the United States Supreme Court Reports (U.S.), Supreme Court Reporter
(S.Ct.), and Lawyers Edition (L. Ed). The difference between the U.S. style of publishing judicial decisions
and Jordan's style could be attributed to the fact that the U.S. legal system is a case law based system. On
the other hand, Jordan is a civil law country where case law is of secondary value.
See for example, Draft Law implementing the Free Trade Agreement between Jordan and the U.S., AlRai, 27 (Feb. 28, 2001). See also Draft Law on Arbitration of 2001, Ad-Dustour, 5 (June 23, 2001).
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Constitutions in Arab monarchies as well as republics, are symbols of independence. They were enacted
on the eve of independence or the prospect of independence. Constitutions serve the purpose of organizing
state authority especially in succession. The Arab constitutional experience and practice allow freedoms to
be defined by laws rather than constitutions. Arab constitutions do not go beyond mere description of the
political society. See Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World 35, 49, 61-63 (St. U. N.
Y. Press 2002).
660

See Nathan J. Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts In Egypt and the Gulf 51 (Cambridge
U. Press 1997) (some Arab governments use certain techniques to contain the legislative authority. For

public policy statements. Additionally, Jordan needs to revise and improve the legal
profession which includes more than 8,000 lawyers, some of whom are poorly trained
and underpaid.
Publication of laws and regulations, though important, are not enough. Consistent
and fair application of existing laws and regulations are of utmost importance.
Transparency and rule of law commitments will improve the trading system in Jordan.
Moreover, transparency and rule of law are effective modes to limit government abuse
that would disrupt trade.
E. Other Selected Commitments
Jordan's WTO working party accession report covers fiscal and monetary policy,
foreign exchange and payments, privatization, and price policies.

l

Price rationalization

or privatization policies are not explicitly covered in the WTO agreements. Moreover,

example, the parliament consists of two branches; deputies and senate. People would select deputies while
the head of state would select the senate. The senate would act as a counterbalance against some unwelcomed proposals from deputies. Members of the legislative branch are given shorter periods of time to
speak in parliament. If they exceed their time, the speaker will exercise his privileges to quiet members.
Deputies may not have knowledge or experience in all the matters set before them. Many proposals,
including draft laws, emanate from ministries and the deputies can agree to them. Some deputies may also
be ministers. Thus, it would be hard to counter-argue the government where these deputies hold seats in it.
If parliament exceeds its authority, it is dissolved). The fact that members of parliaments in Arab countries
may not have knowledge or experience in all the matters set before them such as international trade is not
limited to Arab countries. In the U.S., some congressmen may not have the knowledge or experience in a
subject matter. However, each U.S. congressman has a staff that would advise and assist him. There no
equivalent staff readily available for members of parliaments in Arab countries is available because of
limited financial resources.
661

Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 9-32. A price control system is
designed to ensure the poor can afford basic commodities and prevent price skyrocketing. In the past, the
government of Jordan determined a fair price for dozens of essential goods and services in intricate detail.
The list of goods included meat and flour. However, price-setting system could be inefficient and prone to
corruption. Moreover, the government cannot effectively monitor price compliance. A price control system
is for countries that are not yet ready for a completely free market just yet. It is a system used in central
planning.
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Jordan undertook commitments in trading and distribution rights.

Trading and

distribution rights allow private Jordanian and foreign companies to import, export, set up
after-sale networks, and sell their goods throughout Jordan.

These trading rights will

enable U.S. companies to import and export goods without using Jordanian trading
companies. Distribution services will allow U.S. companies to sell their goods without
establishing joint ventures with Jordanian companies.
Jordan committed itself to observe the requirements of article XVII of GATT 1994
which govern state trading enterprises.664 Currently, there are five state trading
enterprises that have the exclusive right to import or export.665 These state trading
enterprises must observe the conditions stipulated in article XVII of GATT 1994 in their
purchase or sale. For example, purchases of state trading enterprises must be conducted
in a non-discriminatory treatment, based on commercial considerations, and afford
enterprises of other countries the opportunity to compete in such purchases or sales based
on customary business practice.
Jordan agreed in its accession protocol to the WTO that it would request an observer
status under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).666 Moreover, Jordan

bbZ

Id. at 50.
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Under Jordan's trading rights regime, foreign equity in Jordanian trading companies is limited to 50
percent. Jordan committed to permit foreign companies exercising trading rights without limitation on
foreign equity or capital. Id. at 45.
664

M a t para. 161.

665

These state trading enterprises are: Jordan Tanning Company, Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company,
Jordan Cement Factories Company, Jordan Phosphate Mining Company, and Vegetable Oil Industries.

Id. at 169. The GPA, signed by some two dozen countries, applies only to those countries which are
members of the Agreement. The GPA applies to contracts for purchasing goods and services worth more
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confirmed that, upon accession to the WTO, it would initiate negotiations for
membership in the GPA.667 It also confirmed that, if the results of the negotiations were
satisfactory to the interests of Jordan and the other members of the agreement, it would
complete negotiations for membership within a year of accession. However, Jordan is not
a member yet, and it has to offer a detailed plan or timetable.
In its accession to the GPA, Jordan will weigh the possible benefits to its budgetary
efficiency and industries, as a result of opening its government procurement sector to
foreign competition. First, the share of Jordan's industries in the government
procurement market of other countries is negligible. Moreover, Jordan's industries lack
experience in competing in contract tendering. Therefore, the benefits from joining the
GPA are marginal. U.S. companies are not interested in the small Jordanian government
procurement market. Rather, U.S. companies are interested in major projects that are
worth billions of dollars, such as the Kansai airport of Japan or valuable procurement
markets such as that of Hong Kong. In addition, in acceding to the GPA, Jordan must
modify its current practices which give preference to domestic suppliers of goods and
services.

Jordan acceded to the WTO multilateral agreements which are considered the

most important step and thus there is little interest in joining the GPA.

than $175,000 for central government procurement tenders and about $270,000 for contracts with
provincial and state authorities. The GPA contains substantial and procedural obligations. In terms of the
substantial obligations, members of the GPA are required to extend the MFN and national treatment rules
to goods and services of other members. The procedural obligations included in the GPA are related to
transparency through the publication of notices inviting tenders, post-award notices, and establishing an
independent review body to consider complaints by domestic or foreign suppliers related to any violation of
the Agreement.
667

Id. at 170. Currently, Jordan is in the process of accession to the GPA. See Application from Jordan,
Application for Accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement, GPA/38 (July 19, 2000).
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Finally, Jordan is committed in its accession to the WTO to observe the provisions of
article XXIV of the GATT 1994 in its trade agreements.669 The purpose of free trade
areas and customs unions is the liberalization of international trade. Jordan is a member
to a myriad of international and regional trade agreements. For example, Jordan signed a
free trade agreement with Egypt and a member of the Arab Common Market
Agreement.670 In addition, Jordan signed other trade agreements such as the U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement.

668

These practices are tied to industrial, political, and social policies that are difficult to modify.

669

See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra n. 379, at 247.

670

Id. at 243
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Conclusion

Jordan's accession to the WTO was a lengthy and costly process. Jordan did not
accede to the trade body until other WTO members were satisfied that Jordan made
sufficient concessions. The terms and conditions for accession were easier prior to the
creation of the WTO.671 Jordan agreed to reduce tariffs, open its service market, reform
its intellectual property regime, and accede to the IT A. Jordan enjoyed special and
differential treatment in few areas. For example, Jordan was granted an adjustment period
to cope with the implementation of tariffs reduction, but was not granted transitional
periods for the implementation of the TRIPs and customs valuation. Moreover, Jordan
was not able to designate olive oil as a special safeguard good. Other WTO members did
not grant Jordan special and differential treatment so as not to set a "bad" precedent for
other acceding countries and to maintain the "integrity" of the WTO system by not
creating a two-tier system for developed and developing countries. In its accession to the
WTO, Jordan turned from an applicant to a supplicant.
The degree of open market commitments Jordan undertook in its accession to the
WTO was the culmination of several factors, which included domestic policy-making
debates, interest groups, and pressure from foreign governments such as the U.S., EC,
Australia, and Switzerland. Generally, countries acceding to the WTO are required to
make changes to their laws and regulations prior to joining the trade body. Jordan met
some of its commitments at the time it joined the WTO. In addition, Jordan committed to

671

See Doha Ministerial Conference, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 9 (Nov.
14, 2001) (We [WTO members] also welcome the accession as new members, since our last session, of
Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Lithuania, Moldova and Oman, and note the "extensive" market-access
commitments already made by these countries on accession).
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meet other requirements after its accession. Therefore, Jordan should meet many of its
commitments in the post-accession period.
The WTO agreements required fundamental changes in the domestic laws and
regulations of Jordan. For example, nearly 100 laws were new or fundamentally
changed.

72

Many of the laws promulgated were provisional and adopted in haste in prior

to the 1999 self-imposed deadline for accession to the WTO. In the months ahead, the
National Assembly must approve the laws and regulations in order to honor Jordan's
commitments. However, the National Assembly, for the sake of proving that it is not a
rubber-stamp Assembly and to ensure good legislative practices, may strike down or
modify these laws and regulations in a degree less consistent with Jordan's obligations
under the WTO. In Jordan, there are many layers of ministries and administrative
agencies entrusted with implementing these laws and regulations, and the enforcement of
these laws and regulations largely depends upon the discretion of these ministries and
agencies access to their decrees.
Counsels must research several bulletins and sources to access laws and regulations.
Unfortunately, even the most exhaustive investigation can miss important points because
there is no central location where all the necessary information is available. Therefore, a
functional website should be established, so that all the laws and regulations of Jordan
can be accessed to the public, both in Arabic and English.
In Jordan, many areas of implementation of the WTO agreements require heavy
administrative and financial investment. For example, the implementation of the TRIPs

672

See Nail-Biting: Jordan's Fairly Fair Election, Economist 38 (June 21, 2003) (some 160 laws have
been promulgated, which some say they are good for promoting a program of economic liberalization in the
absence of the parliament).
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required the introduction of new laws, the creation of administrative bodies, the training
staff, and the establishment of buildings and equipments, which all costs millions of
dollars. However, financial aid from international donors and technical assistance from
the WTO can alleviate the difficulty of implementing Jordan's commitments.
The government of Jordan must introduce policies aimed at cushioning the most
vulnerable groups from the effects of trade liberalization. These policies include reemployment projects, diversified education, and funds to offset the extreme adverse
effects of trade liberalization. Alternative sources of revenue must be developed that
include decreasing military expenditures and establishing an effective system of valueadded and sales taxes.
Jordan will undertake Trade Policy Review in 2006 which will provide Jordan and its
trading partners the chance to examine its trade policies and practices.673 The Trade
Policy Review will present a challenge considering the volume of documentation and
information needed to draft a national report. Jordan, however, can draw on the
experience of Morocco, one of the first countries that underwent Trade Policy Review in
the 1989 cycle.
Jordan will compete in the international market on the basis of the rule of
comparative advantage. Many products that Jordan cannot produce it can purchase from
other countries, and vice versa. The process of trade liberalization could inject new
dynamism into the stagnant industry sector. Moreover, the process of trade liberalization
will create winners and losers. Jordan's membership in the WTO is only five years old

673

In the Trade Policy Review, Trading partners of Jordan and the WTO Secretariat would praise Jordan's
progress on trade liberalization, and take notice of matters, and air concerns over certain issues
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and is still in the pipeline of liberalization. Since this researcher is not a futurologist, the
coming years will show whether the optimists' or pessimists' position on Jordan's
accession to the WTO have credence.

CHAPTER IV
THE U.S.-JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Chapter IV gives a step-by-step account of the legislative history and text of the
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (US-JO FTA). In addition, Chapter IV includes a
comparison between the US-JO FTA, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (US-Israel
FTA), and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).674 Chapter IV also
provides an analysis of the elements of the US-JO FTA, including rules of origin, trade in
services, and trade remedy laws. Finally, chapter IV examines the extent to which the
US-JO FTA achieves its stated objectives and provides a viable model for the proposed
US-Middle East Free Trade Agreement (US-Middle East FTA).675
These FTAs were chosen for the purposes of analysis because only the US-Israel FTA and NAFTA had
preceded the US-JO FTA. In addition, Israel is a next-door neighbor.
675

President Bush announced the U.S. intent to launch a 10-year effort to form a US-Middle East free trade
area. See Mike Allen & Karen DeYoung, Bush Calls Trade Key To Mideast; President launches Plan For
U.S. Pact in Region, Wash. Post A01 (May 10, 2003). See also Grary G. Yerkey, President Bush Lays Out
Broad Plan for Regional FTA with Middle East by 2013, 20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 856 (May 15, 2003)
(stating that the U.S. will employ a "building-block" approach. This approach requires, as a first step, a
Middle East country to accede to the WTO or concluding Trade and Investment Framework Agreement(s)
(TIFA). Afterward, the U.S. will negotiate FTA with individual countries. Finally, preferably before 2013,
a critical mass of bilateral FTAs would come together to form the broader US-Middle East FTA). It is
unfortunate that the U.S. adopted such approach by concluding bilateral free trade agreements rather than a
joint free trade agreement at the outset (bundling approach). The U.S. approach will place these Arab
countries in weak position on the bargaining table. In FTA negotiations using the bundling approach,
Middle East countries would be represented by a panel of representatives from each Middle Eastern
country. Moreover, one has to question the utility of negotiating FTAs with small Middle East countries
such as Bahrain rather than with the Middle East as a whole. In addition, it seems that the U.S. follows the
EC footsteps by adopting hub and spoke system in which the U.S. would conclude a series of bilateral
agreements with relatively small countries. In such a system, trade between each spoke and the hub will be
more than trade among the spokes themselves. Since achieving U.S. goal of U.S.-Middle East FTA takes
time, some members of Congress proposed enacting the Middle East Trade and Engagement Act of 2003
(H. 1121, S. 1121), a trade preference program, that provide immediate improved access to the U.S. market
for qualifying Middle Eastern countries.
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Since the US-JO FTA is a treaty, the starting point for the analysis is to consult the
relevant rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 676 This approach is
similar to that followed by the WTO panels and Appellate Body.677 The terms of the USJO FTA are interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning given
to such terms in light of their context, object, and purpose.

An interpreter of the US-JO

FTA should analyze the text in honesty, fairness and reasonableness, adopting a literal or
textual interpretation of the FTA's words, and in light of the intentions of the FTA's
drafters.679

The terms "agreement" and "treaty" are used here in the manner defined and described in article 2 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23,
1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
677

The Appellate Body in the United States-Reformulated Gasoline case stated regarding article 3.2 of the
DSU that "that direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in
"clinical isolation" from public international law". (Emphasis added). See United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Apr. 29, 1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17.
78

The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. Moreover,
article 32 is related to the supplementary means of interpretation. It states that recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n. 676, art. 31.
679

Moreover, an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility. See Appellate Body, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, at 12 (Oct. 4, 1996). Thus, the interpretation of the US-JO FTA is based solely
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I. The US-JO FTA: Introduction
The US-JO FTA was the "first" FTA in two respects. First, it was the first FTA to be
concluded with an Arab country. Second, it was also the first FTA to include labor and
environment within the text of the FTA itself, compared with the side agreements on
environment and labor in NAFTA. The FTA was the "second" FTA between the U.S. and
a low middle-income country, after the U.S. and Canada expanded their FTA to include
Mexico.
There are several reasons that led the U.S. to negotiate a free trade agreement with
Jordan. The failed WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999 lead U.S. trade officials to
analyze the possibilities for a free trade agreement that would include certain provisions
that are resisted at the multilateral trading level.680 Moreover, the U.S. and Jordan had
signed a trade and investment framework in 1999, which is usually a precursor for a
FTA.681

on the Vienna approach, including the use of judicial economy, excluding consideration for making
interpretation that satisfy both parties or responding to political signals (whispers) that he has gone far than
supposed to. In other words, the principle of effective interpretation will be followed, effet utile, by giving
the terms their full meanings. Additionally, little attention will be paid to preparatory work or negotiating
history of the FTA because of lack of records and the possibility of conflicting negotiating statements by
both parties. Moreover, where necessary, reference will be made to decisions of the WTO panels and
Appellate Body especially that some articles of the US-JO FTA refers directly to WTO agreements or
indirectly to WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions. Finally, the U.S. and Jordan are assumed to share a
relatively common legal understanding of precedents.
0

In the wake of protests by environmentalists and human rights activists at the WTO summit in Seattle in
late 1999, then president Clinton promised to link future trade accords to labor, environmental, and human
rights issues. See Eric M. Uslaner, The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored, 6
NAFTA: L & Bus. Rev. Am. 347, 359 (2000).
681

See U.S., Jordan Sign Framework For Trade and Investment Pact, 16 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 468 (Mar.
17, 1999) (then USTR Charlene Barshefsky stated that the agreement would put in place institutional
foundation for trade relationship. The agreement opened dialogue on issues such as agriculture, intellectual
property, services, investment, and trade-related aspects of labor and environmental policy).

Jordan was also the right candidate for a FTA in terms of economicas and politics.
Economically, U.S. exports to Jordan would increase as a result of the FTA while
Jordanian imports to the U.S. would not threaten U.S. industries.682 The FTA could also
spur Jordan's economic growth, allowing for the possibility that it would become less
dependant on foreign aid. Moreover, the U.S. needed to negotiate a FTA because it was
losing ground to the EC which, which had concluded association agreements with several
Mediterranean countries.683 By signing the FTA, the U.S. could catch up to the EC with
respect to economic dominance in Arab countries.

A study conducted by the Office of Economics and the Office of Industries of the USITC, found that
"Jordan's exports to the U.S. would not have a measurable impact on U.S. industries, U.S. employment,
and production. Based on 1999 trade figures, U.S. imports from Jordan totaled $31 million as compared to
total US imports of $1 trillion. See U.S. International Trade Commission, Economic Impact on the United
States of a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 5-1 Pub. No. 3340 (Sep. 2000) (an FTA with Jordan is not
expected to have a measurable impact on U.S. imports from Jordan for the 15 sectors reviewed. For one
sector, textiles and apparels, a likely rise in U.S. imports of apparel is expected to have a negligible effect
on total U.S. imports).
683

The official movement towards a closer relationship between the EC and its Mediterranean neighbors
was launched at a meeting of the European Council in Lisbon in 1992. It takes place between the EC and
12 countries to the east and south of the Mediterranean. The major premise of the partnership is to create an
enormous zone of free trade between Europe and several countries of the Middle East by the year 2010.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was created in 1995 in Barcelona with the signing of the Barcelona
Declaration by the EC and 12 Mediterranean Countries. The 12 Mediterranean countries are as follows:
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, The Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus,
Malta, and Turkey. This partnership will lead to a series of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements.
The purposes of this partnership is EC's recognition that peace and security in the Middle East is of great
interest and concern to the EC (EC efforts to create policy in the Middle East could create considerable
tension in Washington, DC, where the administration believes it has a strong role to play in the
development of peace in the Middle East), creation of the world's largest free trade zone-comprising more
than 800 million people-by the year 2010 to rival NAFTA, and providing Middle Easterners with greater
opportunities within their own countries, thus they will be less likely to want or need to immigrate to the
EC for employment reasons. Euro-Med trade zone provides free trade in industrial goods and services.
However, certain sectors where some countries have a comparative advantage are excluded. For example,
agriculture is excluded and would be subject to quotas (Tunisia for example has been granted tariff
concessions of 46,000 ton per marketing year for olive oil. The EC made concessions for Israel on cut
flowers and citrus). Moreover, Euro-Med trade zone has restrictive rules of origin. In order for a product to
access the EC market duty free, the majority of it must be produced in the country of export. The EC
intends to permit "diagonal cummulation" among the Mediterranean countries. This will allow inputs
originate in one country to be incorporated in the final product of the other party to have free access to EC
markets, provided that both countries belong to the free trade area. The EC pursues selective cooperation
with Middle Eastern countries, which could eventually lead to increasing tensions. Already, Arab countries

Politically, the FTA reflects the U.S.'s appreciation for Jordan's role in the Middle
East peace process and cooperation with international counter-terrorism activities. In
addition, the FTA signals to other Arab countries the benefits to maintain peace.
Economic growth will also enhance political stability and encourage peace in the Middle
East. For its part, the U.S. would be able to market Jordan's economic growth as a
product of Jordan's peaceful relationship with its neighbors, especially Israel. In other
words, a wealthy Jordan is good for Israel.

So long as Jordan remains poor its citizens,

who are mostly Palestinians, will continue to blame their poverty on Israel. Therefore, the
FTA would also help alleviate the pressure on Israel and reduce its security risk.
On June 6, 2000, King Abdullah II and then President Clinton declared that the U.S.
and Jordan would launch negotiations for a free trade agreement.
signed in a record time on October 24, 2000.

The US-JO FTA was

It was the first FTA to be concluded in

have argued forcibly that Libya, the Arab country with the longest Mediterranean coastline, should be
included. These efforts have been rejected by the EC. See Jacqueline Klosek, The Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership, 8 Intl. Leg. Persp. 173 (1996). It seems that the EC and the U.S. view Middle East countries as
markets not as trading partners since there is rivalry between the U.S. and the EC.
4

Of particular importance are the opportunities the agreement potentially provides Palestinians living in
Jordan and operating in QIZs. For these individuals, nearly all of whom at present live in poverty and have
little chance to improve their lives, FTA changes the equation and offers real hope. Significantly, it offers a
tangible alternative to violence. President Kennedy who said "trade, not aid". See Sen. Comm. on Finance,
Hearing on Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman). That view is held by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, who, on his first visit to Washington as
prime minister, urged Congress to pass this historic trade agreement.
See U.S., Jordan Make "Substantial" Progress in Talks on Free Trade Agreement, USTR Says, 17 Intl.
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1224 (Aug. 3, 2000) (stating agreement to initiate negotiations was announced by U.S.
officials following a meeting between President Clinton and King Abdullah on June 6 in Washington,
D.C.).
686

This record time of approximately four months can be compared with the 15 months of intensive debate
between the U.S. and Israel which resulted in the conclusion of the US-Israel FTA. See Andrew James
Samet & Moshe Goldberg, The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement 1.02 (Bus. L. 1989). NAFTA
parties completed negotiations in 1992 after 14 months of negotiations. Along the lines of the US-JO FTA,
the US-Bahrain FTA of 2004 was concluded within four months starting January 2004 and ending in May
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the absence of fast track authority, which had lapsed since 1994.

Without fast track

authority, congressional approval for the FT A would be subject to regular procedures.
Congress could have made amendments to the FT A, voted it down, delayed its passage,
added amendment(s) and filibustered (unlimited debate) it.688 The FTA negotiators took a

of the same year. Early conclusion of the US-JO FTA negotiations could be attributed to the fact that
probably there were not matters that would hold up the negotiations. The ground for the FTA had been laid
down in Jordan's economic reforms, its accession to the WTO, and in talks with the U.S. under the existing
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
687

The fast track authority is a procedure, delegated by the U.S. Congress, gives the U.S. executive the
authority to enter into trade negotiations under certain procedural requirements. It was used to conclude the
Tokyo Round of 1979, the US-Israel FTA of 1985 whereby a specific section (section 401) of the U.S.
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 was designed as "trade with Israel", the US-Canada FTA of 1988, NAFTA of
1993, and the Uruguay Multilateral Trade Round of 1994. Since then, the fast track authority was not
revived, despite various attempts, until the year 2002. For more on fast track authority see I.M Destler,
Renewing Fast-Track Legislation 8 (Inst. Intl. Econ. 1997). Section 401 of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1984
required the FTA negotiated with Israel to be submitted to Congress under fast track authority. For
negotiating with other countries, the country in question must first request to negotiate an FTA with the
U-S. and that the House Way and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee approve such
negotiations.
688

The following represent the chronicle and timeline for the passage of the US-JO FTA implementing
legislation: 1/6/2001 then-president Clinton submitted the FTA along with implementing legislation to
Congress (despite that the U.S. President had no time limit for submitting implementing legislation to
Congress after concluding negotiations, then-president Clinton could not submit the FTA implementing
legislation earlier than 1/6/2001 since it would had taken time to customize the FTA, the Congress was in
winter recess which would make it difficult to pass it in a lame duck session, there might be no enough time
to finalize the implementing legislation, and U.S. elections. The Clinton administration could not submit
the implementing legislation of the FTA until 2 months after the FTA was signed), 7/24/2001 the bill (H.R.
2603) was referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on the
Judiciary, 7/26/2001 Committee consideration and Markup Session Held (mark-up session is where the bill
is formally introduced as it is or a new version, amended if any, considered line by line, section by section,
and page by page, and voted on by members of the committee. Non-mark up session focuses mainly on
draft legislation), 7/27/2001 Referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 7/31/2001 House
Committee on Judiciary Granted an extension for further consideration ending not later than July 31, 2001,
7/31/2001 Mr. Thomas, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, moved to suspend the rules
and pass the bill (when the House moves to suspend the rules, floor amendments are not permitted. A move
to suspend the rules indicates that the bill is not controversial), 7/31/2001 Received in the Senate and Read
twice and referred to the Committee on Finance, 9/24/2001 Senate Committee on Finance discharged by
unanimous Consent (unanimous consent means that senators all agree to follow certain procedures and
ignore standing rules. It also indicates that the bill is uncontroversial. Thus, there is no need to file for
cloture on the legislation. Cloture requires 60 votes and if approved the holds on a legislation are overcome
the legislation can be considered on the floor), 9/24/2001 Passed Senate without amendment by Voice Vote
(Voice vote, as the name indicates, means the implementing legislation of the FTA was approved through a
public decision in which congressmen approved the legislation by voicing their votes loudly, not by a show
of hands. It is the fastest voting method), 9/24/2001 Message on Senate action sent to the House, 9/24/2001
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gamble when they concluded the FTA without clear indications that it would be accepted
by the U.S. Congress.689 However, these fears were unfounded as the FTA moved
through Congress largely as negotiated. This is an indication that the absence of a fast
track authority may not prevent the conclusion of an FTA, although this may also depend
on the country with whom the FTA has been concluded.690
The National Assembly of Jordan ratified the US-JO FTA by acclamation in May
2001.691 The U.S. House of Representative approved the US-JO FTA Implementing
legislation in July 2001.

2

The U.S. Senate approved FTA Implementing legislation in

September 2001.693 President Bush signed the FTA into a law on September 28, 2001.694

II. The Terms of the US-JO FTA

Cleared for the White House, 9/25/2001 Jeff Trandahl, clerk of the House, presented the bill to the
President, 9/28/2001 Signed by President, and 9/28/2001 Became Public Law. During consideration of the
US-Jordan FTA implementing legislation, hours of debate were reduced to 2 hours in the Senate. For more
on U.S. Congressional terms see Charles Tiefer, Congressional Practice: A Reference, Research, and
Legislative Guide 167-186, 349-351 (Greenwood Press 1989).
689

The Clinton Administration, during former USTR Mickey Kantor office, considered negotiating an FTA
with Jordan in 1994, but later it decided not to do so because it was too ambitious and the administration
lacked fast track authority.
690

Interview with Edmund R. Saums II, Director for Middle East Affairs, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, in Washington, D.C (Oct. 27, 2004).
691

The US-JO FTA was approved during the extraordinary session of the National Assembly starting April,
22, 2001. See Royal Decree, Official Gazette No. 4486, page 1664 (Apr. 1, 2001).
692

A bill (H.R. 1484) cosponsored by 30 Democrats and 0 Republicans to implement the US-JO FTA was
presented on April 4, 2001 to the House. The House bill, nevertheless, died.
693

See The United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Area Implementation Act, Sen. 2603,
107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).

See United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 2001, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 n.
(2000).

The US-JO FTA is comprised of a preamble, nineteen articles, three annexes, joint
statements, memorandums of understanding, and side letters. The preamble of the US-JO
FTA lists the aims of the agreement. For example, the FTA partners desire to further the
historic bonds of friendship between them.695
A. Trade in Goods
The US-JO FTA is designed to "eliminate" substantially all tariffs between the two
parties by 2010.696 This means that products eligible for tariff elimination will enter the
customs territory of the other party duty free. For the purpose of tariff reductions, the
parties adopted a tariff cut formula that divides their tariff schedules into four baskets.
Each basket of products has its own implementation schedule. To facilitate a smooth
transition toward freer trade and minimize the economic and social costs associated with
such movement, the elimination of tariffs will be fully implemented in four separate
stages over a period often years.697
Tariff concessions of the FTA parties are balanced in baskets A and B. For example,
Jordan has more items in basket D (approximately 2384 tariff items) and basket B
(approximately 1016 tariff items), while the U.S. put more items in basket A

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I. L. M. 63 (entered into
force Dec. 17, 2001), preamble.
696

Id. atari. 2.1.

697

The US-Israel FTA provides for the elimination of tariffs on non-agricultural products as of 1995.
NAFTA provides for the elimination of all tariffs and other trade barriers within 15 years. See NAFTA,
annex 302.2, 32 I.L.M 289, 299 (1993). Additionally, article 308 of NAFTA provides for harmonization of
MFN rates among NAFTA parties for certain automatic data-processing goods and their parties. Perhaps, it
was thought that it would contribute to deeper integration.

(approximately 2920 tariff items) and basket B (approximately 1765 tariff items).
Although the FTA parties divided their tariff schedules into baskets, which have their
own tariff implementation schedule, under the general mandate the FTA, the parties can
agree to accelerate the removal of tariffs on any range of products.699
The U.S. has adopted a "pay-as-you-go" budget rule to fund the US-JO FTA.700 The
U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estamited that the probable loss of revenue
resulting from the FTA would be about $15 million over a five fiscal year window.
Considering the minimal loss of revenue as a result of the FTA, the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget will not likely consider imposing fees or taxes on U.S. citizens
to pay for the FTA during the five fiscal years. Jordan, in contrast, could offset loss of
revenue resulting from lower import tariffs through economic growth that would be
generated by the FTA. For Jordan, the FTA may be a tax cut, but it is not tax expenditure
as it will make goods and services less expensive.

698

With this in mind, one must notice that tariff lines of the U.S. and Jordan may vary from 6 to 10 digits
due to disaggregation. As such, the U.S. tariff schedule has two or three as many tariff lines as Jordan with
different item definition.
699

If Jordan desires to accelerate tariff commitments under the FTA, it ought first to identify its priority
products and secondly secure acceptance of the U.S. The FTA allows the Joint Committee "to review the
results of the agreement in light of the experience". See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between
The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade
Area, supra n. 695, art. 15.2.
700

The "pay-as-you-go" rule of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 requires
the government to offset any loss of revenue from reduced import tariffs through the FTA by raising taxes,
cutting on tax subsidies, or by reducing mandatory/discretionary spending. See Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. § 904 (2000).

B. Trade in Services
The multilateral trading system of the WTO not only covers trade in goods but it also
covers trade in services. The US-JO FTA also includes a provision regarding trade in
services.

As the two parties expect the FTA to expand trade, it was important to insure

that trade in services also flows freely between the two countries
The purpose of the service provision in the US-JO FTA is to prevent discriminatory
treatment between foreign and domestic suppliers of services.702 Moreover, the FTA
ensures that there is a minimum threshold of treatment below which one party cannot
treat a service provider of the other party. For example, a U.S. firm operating in Jordan
will market its services under the same conditions as a Jordanian firm marketing like
services.
In the US-JO FTA, Jordan agreed to more liberalization commitments for trade in
services more than it had made in its accession to the WTO. Jordan gave U.S. suppliers
of services preferential treatment in many sectors. For example, Jordan made new

701
See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 3. The US-Israel FTA
covers trade in services. However, The US-Israel FTA provides a general rule, rather than a detailed
provision. For example, the US-Israel FTA states that the parties recognize the importance of trade in
services and the need to maintain an open system of services exports which would minimize restrictions on
the flow of services between the two nations. To this end, the parties agree to develop means for
cooperation on trade in services pursuant to the provisions of a [Declaration] to be made by the parties. See
US-Israel FTA, 24 I.L.M. 657,664 (1985). NAFTA has multiple chapters that are related to the service
sector. NAFTA liberalizes trade-related services, in chapter 12, by applying the basic principles of national
treatment and MFN treatment to the service sector. Chapter 12 of NAFTA does not address
telecommunication and financial services since chapter 13 and 14 of NAFTA respectively cover these two
sectors. Moreover, chapter 12 of NAFTA does not apply to energy and petrochemical service sector since
chapter 6 governs energy. For more see Harry G. Broadman, International Trade and Investment in
Services: A Comparative Analysis of NAFTA, 27 Intl. L. 623, 624 (1993).
702

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 3.2.b.
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commitments in veterinary services.703 In addition, Jordan liberalized the research and
development subsector.704 Jordan also made commitments in leasing and rental services,
advertising, public opinion polling services, services incidental to agriculture,
manufacturing, services incidental to fishing, services incidental to energy distribution,
convention services, audiovisual sector, environmental services, and maritime services.
The movement of natural persons (Mode 4) was of particular importance to Jordan.
However, temporary entry into the U.S. is limited to executives, managers, or specialists
of a Jordanian company that has a physical presence in the U.S. in the form of branch,
subsidiary, or affiliate.

Such entry is limited to three years with a one-time two years

extension. The U.S. commitment, while covering the intra-corporate movement of senior
personnel, does not extend to other categories of workers. Moreover, a corporate
employee cannot move to the U.S. his company already maintains a commercial presence
in the U.S. The commercial presence requirement makes it difficult for Jordanian workers
to enter the U.S. service market.
The US-JO FTA permits trade in a wide range of services offered by U.S.
institutions. While Jordan made new commitments that covered veterinary, audiovisual,
health and education, and maritime transportation services, the U.S. did not make any
new commitments. Rather, the U.S. incorporated its GATS service schedule in the FTA

See US-JO FTA, Jordan Schedule of Specific Commitments, annex 3.1, page 7, at
<http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/ann31Jor.pdf>.
704

Id. at 9.

705

Id. at. 11-28.
See U.S. Service Schedule, 4, at <http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/ann31US.pdf>.

without modifications.

In contrast, in the FT A, Jordan made further commitments that

went beyond those it made under GATS. Therefore, Jordan's service commitments in the
US-JO FTA may be considered "GATS-Plus".
Trade in services is a major trade issue for the U.S. The U.S. is a major service
exporter in areas such as motion pictures, banking, and franchising. Indeed, the U.S. was
among the leaders to recognize the importance of trade in services and to push for its
inclusion in the Uruguay Round. It may be impossible to analyze precisely what effects
the FTA commitments will have on Jordan's marketplace and infant service sector.

C. TRIPs-Plus Commitments in the US-JO FTA
One of the objectives of the US-JO FTA is to emphasize the relationship between
trade and intellectual property.708 The TRIPs agreement of the WTO sets minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights. The US-JO FTA builds on the
commitments Jordan made in acceding to the WTO. Article 4, which is TRIPs-Plus, of
the US-JO FTA occupies five pages out of twenty pages of the FTA and is the longest
article in the whole text of the FTA.709

Indeed, the U.S. services schedule of the US-JO FTA makes reference to liberalization dates for certain
sectors such as road transport as of 1997 knowing that the US-JO FTA was concluded in 2000. Id. at. 90.
For comparison see GATS, U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/90 (Apr. 15, 1994).
708

The preamble of the US-JO FTA emphasizes the desire of both parties to foster creativity and
innovation and promote trade in goods and services that are subject of intellectual property right. See
United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, preamble.
709

The US-Israel FTA which has only one general paragraph addressing intellectual property. NAFTA
chapter 17 (Intellectual Property) has twenty-one article. Chapter 17 covers copyright, sound recordings,
encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, trademarks, patents, layout designs for semiconductor
integrated circuits, trade secrets, geographical indications, and industrial designs. See Kent S. Foster &
Dean C. Alexander, Opportunities for Mexico, Canada, and the United States: A summary of Intellectual
Property Rights under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 20 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 67

The US-JO FTA defines the nature and the scope of intellectual property rights.71
The US-JO FTA protects copyrights, trademarks, and patents and encourages each party
to make "its best effort" in ratifying or acceding to the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1984
and the 1989 Madrid agreement concerning the international registration of marks.711 The
FTA provides the possibility of protecting geographical indications through trademarks.
The US-JO FTA requires each party to provide to the nationals of the other party
treatment no less favorable than it gives to its own nationals with respect to the protection

(1994). See also David Price, The U.S..-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement and Intellectual Property
Protection, 7 J.W. Intell. Prop. 829, 830 (No. 6, 2004) (the FTA between the U.S. and Bahrain derives its
detail from the US-Jordan free trade agreement. Many of the required changes go far beyond the TRIPs).
710

Each party to the FTA will have to give effect, at minimum, to the provisions of article 4. See United
States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.1.
711
As of 2004, Jordan is not a party to the PCT and the Madrid protocol while the U.S. is party to both of
them. Id. at art. 4.2. Since all intellectual property rights are territorial, an inventor for example has to file a
patent application in every country that he/she wishes to protect its invention within. To ease this
burdensome process, WIPO administer the patent cooperation treaty, better know as PCT, for the filing,
searching, publication and examination of international applications. The PCT makes it easier to obtain
patents in other countries by providing for the filing of one international application, which may be
subsequently prosecuted in the different designated national or regional offices of countries party to the
PCT. However, the ultimate decision to grant a patent is left to those designated offices. Thus, the purpose
of the PCT is to facilitate the filing of patent application. See WIPO Members Agree to New Filing Fees
Under Treaty, Reduced Electronic Filer Fees, 20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1649 (Oct. 9, 2003). By the same
token, WIPO administers an international registration of trademarks through what is known as the Madrid
system. It is composed of two treaties that complement each other. These two treaties are the Madrid
agreement of 1891and the Madrid protocol of 1989. The Madrid system works in the same manner as the
PCT by filing an international application for the registration of a trademark, but the ultimate decision is
left to the designated countries whether to afford protection to a trademark or not. To apply for
international registration under the protocol, an applicant must be a national, or domiciled, or have an
effective and real business or commercial establishment in one of the countries that are members of the
protocol. The registration of a trademark in one of the members serves as the basis of an international
application (known as the basic application). The international application must be submitted through the
trademark office of the basic application. Then, after verification, the international application is submitted
to the International Bureau of WIPO. The International Bureau then examines the international application
to determine whether the filing requirements and fees have been met. If the application is regular then the
International Bureau registers the mark and publishes it in the WIPO Gazette of International Marks. Every
designated country in the international application will examine the application under its own laws. See
PTO Issues Rules, Amendments To Implement Madrid Protocol Act, 20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1647 (Oct.
9, 2003).

and enjoyment of all intellectual property rights.

The US-JO FTA requires Jordan to

undertake commitments and regulatory changes that go beyond what Jordan agreed to in
its accession to the WTO. For instance, the FTA protects through patents business
methods. The FTA adoes not address folklore protection and technology transfer.

1. Trademarks and GeoRraphical Indications
The FTA specifically addresses trademarks and geographical indications (GIs).
71 "\

Trademarks include service marks, and collective marks and certification marks.
According to the FTA, trademarks may include GIs.714 Thus, the FTA merges GIs and
trademarks, meaning that a GI could be trademarked.715 The U.S. exported its complex
intellectual property statutes and judicial decisions into the language of the US-JO FTA.
U.S. courts have developed goods/place association test to distinguish between primarily
geographical descriptive marks and primarily geographical deceptive misdescriptive
marks.716 The language in the FTA affirms the U.S. opposition for the protection of GIs.

712

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.3.
1

Id. at art. 4.6. The FTA parties are not obliged to treat certification marks as a separate category in their
national laws, as long as such marks are protected.
' A GI will be considered a trademark if it "consists" of any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of
identifying a good or service as originating in the territory of a party, or a region or locality in that territory,
where given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good or service is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin. Id. art. 4.6.
7,5

Under TRIPS, the distinction between the two concepts is that trademarks indicate a single source of
goods while geographical indications can indicate multiple sources of goods, as long as they come from the
same geographical origin. See John R. Renaud, Can't Get Therefrom Here: How NAFTA and GATT Have
Reduced Protection for Geographical Trademarks, 26 Brook. J. Intl. L. 1097, 1115 (2001).
71

In re Nantucket, Inc. case, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decided that in determining
whether the mark is geographically deceptive misdescriptive it adopted goods/place association test. In
other words, if the goods do not come from a geographical area and consumers do not associate the goods

249
The U.S. does not have a geographical indication law, but rather it protects geographical
indication through trademark law.717
The FTA obligates each party to afford owners of registered trademarks the
exclusive right to prevent any party from using an "identical or similar" mark for a
"related" good or service for which the trademark is used.718 The US-JO FTA also
protects against the use of a well known marks.719 The protection of well known marks is
an area of concern in Jordan.
The FTA addresses the non-recordal of a trademark license.720 The FTA stipulates
that the non-recordal of a license does not affect the validity of the registration of a
trademark or protection of rights for that trademark.

If a trademark holder licenses the

from that place, then consumers will not be deceived and the mark is not deceptively misdescriptive.
Moreover, it must be proved that the alleged misrepresentation would be a material factor in the decision of
consumers to purchase the product. See In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A.1982). The current
U.S. statute reads that primarily geographical descriptive mark can be registered as a trademark if it obtains
a secondary meaning. On the other hand, geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark can never be
registered. See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property In the New Technology Age 559 (3rd ed.,
Aspen Publishers 2003).
717

The U.S. did not historically placed cultural or economic importance for geographical indications, many
geographical indications developed as generic terms when early European immigrants came to the U.S. and
brought with vine to plant in the U.S. The U.S. is hostile to geographical indications because they provide
protection indefinitely, and it believes that no one can obtain an exclusive right to use geographic name to
preclude others from using the geographical term. See Stacy D. Goldberg, Who Will Raise the White Flag?
The Battle between the United States and the European Union over the Protection of Geographical
Indications, 22 U. Pa. J. Intl. Econ. L. 107, 136 (2001). Examples of GIs in the U.S. protected by trademark
law include Chablis, Darjeeling tea, Florida citrus, Vidalia onions, Maine lobsters, and Budweiser beer.
718

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.7.
719

Id. at 4.8.

720

Non-recordal is a problem area in the ongoing negotiations of amending Trademark Law Treaty of 1994
by WIPO membership.
721

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.9.

use of his mark to a licensee, any use by the licensee may constitute a use by the holder
and any subsequent rights would accrue to the holder.

2. Copyright and Related Rights
The US-JO FTA addresses copyright and related rights. The FTA also addresses how
these rights function in cyberspace.7 2 The US-JO FTA covers the right of reproduction,
exclusive importation, and broadcasting. There is also a provision relating to the
communication of works of producers of phonograms and performances.723

111

The US-JO FTA incorporates article 1(4) of the WCT and articles 7 and 11 of WPPT. Both treaties,
WCT and WPPT of 1996, have no parallel in TRIPs. It should come at no surprise that these two treaties
are absent from TRIPs since they were concluded in 1996, two years after TRIPs came into existence. Id. at
art. 4.10. WIPO's Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions
convened in 1996. In the end, the participants reached a consensus on treaties dealing with copyright and
performances and phonograms. The treaties were created in response to the arrival of the digital age and
known as the "Internet treaties". See Susan A. Mort, The WTO, WIPO & the Internet: Confounding the
Borders of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 173, 176, 195
(1997). See also See Julie S. Sheinblatt, The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535 (1998).
723

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.10-12. The WCT and
WPPT do not incorporate the exclusive right of importation. The right of importation, which would have
given copyright holders the exclusive right to authorize importation of their works, fell during the
negotiations of the WCT and WPPT. The U.S. supported the proposal to include the right of importation
during the negotiations of the WCT and WPPT. See WIPO, Basic Proposal on the Substantive Provisions
of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be
Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, CRNR/DC/4, 8.10-12 (Aug. 30, 1996). Additionally, the TRIPs
Agreement does not mention importation rights for copyright or trademark owners. The exclusive right of
importation under article 4.11 of the US-JO FTA is very broad. It gives the copyright holder the exclusive
right to authorize or prohibit the importation of copies even if they were made with the authorization of the
copyright holder. The FTA provides performers and producers of phonograms the "exclusive right" to
authorize or prohibit the whether delivered through a cable, a satellite dish, a terrestrial broadcast, or
streamed via the Internet. The language would allow performers and producers of phonograms to control
and/or to be compensated for the various ways in which their creations are used and enjoyed by others. In
order to achieve a balance of interests, article 4.12 makes it clear that parties have the flexibility in
establishing exceptions to the exclusive right of performers and producers of phonograms. For example, a
party may provide exceptions for analog transmissions and non-subscription over-the-air programming. As
such, free broadcast signals are not compensable. Moreover, a party may provide, through legislation,
licenses for non-interactive services that do not conflict with the normal exploitation of phonograms or
performances. A key element in granting statutory license is the requirement that the service must be noninteractive. Unless a service meets this criterion, it is ineligible for the statutory license. In that case, it must
negotiate a voluntary agreement with performers and producers of phonograms. An example of noninteractive service could be the traditional practices of FM radio broadcast stations through which
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The US-JO FTA covers anti-circumvention measures by prohibiting the
794

circumvention of effective technological measures that protect copyright.

For example,

under the FTA it is illegal to disable a technology that is designed to prevent burning of
the content of a CD. The source of the FTA language is the U.S. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, which protects intellectual property in the digital environment.
The FTA requires each party to prohibit both civilly and criminally the manufacture,
importation, or circulation of any technology, device, or service that is designed,
produced, performed or marketed for engaging in such prohibited conduct or has only
limited commercially significant purposes or uses other than enabling or facilitating such
conduct.726 As a result of the FTA anti-circumvention provisions, manufacturer may face
uncertainty as to whether a device is "used" for commercial purposes or to circumvent
technological measures.
individuals can request the station to play a sound recording as part of its general programming available to
members of the public at large. The determination as to whether a service is interactive or not requires a
case-by-case analysis.
724

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.13.
725

See U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201 (2000). The DMCA makes
exceptions from the anticircumvention measures language for nonprofit libraries, reverse engineering to
make software interoperable, encryption research, protecting personal information, security testing, and
preventing minor access to inappropriate materials. These exceptions are not included in the FTA. The FTA
incorporates article 11 of the WCT and article 18 of the WPPT by reference. However, the WCT and
WPPT provide general obligation to adequately protect against circumvention of technological measures.
726

Article 4.13 of the US-JO FTA prohibits "manufacture" of a device that is designed to circumvent
technological measure. This language could be called "anti-production" provision. Moreover, article 4.13
of the FTA prohibits "importation" or "circulation" of such a device. This is could be called "anticommercial activity" provision. Moreover, article 4.13 of FTA distinguishes between two cases. The first
case is the prohibition against a device that is "designed", "produced", "performed", or "marketed" for
engaging in such prohibited activity. In other words, the primary purpose of the device is to circumvent
technological measure. The second case is where the device has "only" limited commercial significance
purpose or use other than enabling or facilitating the prohibited conduct. The second case requires
weighing whether the device has significant commercial purpose, other than to circumvent technological
measures.

The FTA allows copyright owners to assign economic rights by any means that are
considered appropriate without limitations and restrictions.727 The FTA requires that the
U.S. and Jordan enact appropriate laws, regulations, or other measures that provide all
* •

77R

government agencies use "only" computer software authorized for a legitimate use.
The purpose of requiring government agencies to use legitimate computer software is to
set an example for private parties, which is a step towards combating copyright piracy.
The use of legitimate software by government agencies means that American software
companies, such as Microsoft Corp., will provide products and services to the small
Jordanian government software procurement market.
The FTA provides an exception to the exclusive rights of copyright holders. Any
exception, however, must be confined to certain cases that do not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
79Q

right holder.

An example of an exception to the exclusive rights of copyright holders is

the creation of back-up copies of a computer program. Few cases have been decided by
7^0

WTO panels regarding the interpretation of these exceptions.

Thus, WTO panel

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.14.
728

M. at art. 4.15.

729

Id. at art. 4.16. The FTA language is identical to article 10 of the WCT, article 16 of WPPT, and article
13 of TRIPS.

730

The WTO panel in the US-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act case defined article 13 of the TRIPS
agreement as exception that articulates the scope of the so-called "minor exceptions" doctrine. The panel
further delineated that limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights can only be made if three conditions are
met: (1) the limitations or exceptions are confined to certain special cases; (2) they do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work; and (3) they do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder. See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, para.
6.58 (June 15, 2000).

decisions may provide guidance as to how a U.S. or Jordanian citizen can act within the
exception of the FTA.

3. Patents
The US-JO FTA also covers patents and determines the conditions for patentability.
Any invention in any field of technology if it is new, involves an inventive step, and be
•y-5 1

capable of industrial application is patentable.

In addition, the inventor must disclose

the information pertinent to the creation of his invention so that others skilled in the art to
may be able to carry out the invention.732 The FTA excludes from patentability any
invention the exclusion of which is necessary to protect ordre public, morality, human,
-7TT

animal or plant life or health, or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.

In

addition, the FTA excludes from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans or animals.734 However, the FTA does not exclude
731

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.17.
732

Id. at art. 4.21. The US-JO FTA stipulates that if it is not possible to provide "sufficient written
description" of the invention to enable other skilled in the art to carry out the invention, the U.S. or Jordan
shall require a deposit with an international depository authority as defined in the Budapest Treaty on the
International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganism for the Purposes of Patent Procedure of 1980.
The Budapest Treaty is primarily concerned with procedural matters associated with microorganism-related
inventions and leaves substantive rules to national laws. The Treaty provides for the establishment of
International Depository Authorities (IDAs) to collect cultures. Under the regulations of the Budapest
Treaty, samples of biological materials deposited with an IDA maybe furnished to interested industrial
property offices, the depositor or those authorized by the depositor and parties which are legally entitled to
obtain a sample. A single deposit with an IDA satisfies the deposit requirement in all countries that are
members of the Budapest Treaty. In addition, the application must prove that the sample and any
information accompanying or resulting from it will be used only for the purposes of said patent procedure.
See Richard I. Gordon, Facilitating the Exchange of Scientific Information: Institut Pasteur v. United
States, 6 B.U. Intl. L.J. 179, 207, 212 (1988).
733

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.18.a.
Id. at art. 4.18.b.

from patentability life forms, which is an issue of tremendous importance for U.S.
biotechnology companies.735
The Memorandum of Understanding of the FT A expands the patentability provisions
to include business methods and computer-related inventions.736 The issue of patenting
business methods is derived from U.S. laws and practices. In 1998, the U.S. introduced
the concept of patenting business methods.

Moreover, U.S. courts granted patents for

735

The TRIPS agreement in article 27.3.b excludes from patentability plants and animals, and biological
processes for the production of plants or animals. The U.S. proposed, in a document submitted to the WTO
in preparation for the Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999, that the TRIPS Council should initiate a work
to see whether it is desirable to modify the TRIPS agreement to eliminate the exclusion from patentability
of plants and animals. See Communication from the United States, Preparation for the 1999 Ministerial
Conference, WT/GC/W/115 (Nov. 19, 1999). In 1988, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued a
patent covering an animal, known as Transgenic Mouse. Thousands of gene-related patent applications
have been filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Although products of nature are not patentable,
various courts in the U.S. have upheld patents on isolated and purified natural substances. For example, the
1912 case of Parke- Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co. upheld a patent on adrenaline, a natural hormone
that was found in animal glands. The patent applicant identified, isolated, and purified the active ingredient,
adrenaline. This discovery created a product that did not exist in nature in that precise form and that could
be used for medical treatment. On the other hand, the EC's Biotechnology Directive considers certain
subject matter to be per se unpatentable including processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also
animals resulting from such processes. See Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing
Commercial Incentives with health Needs, 2 Hous. J. Health L. & Policy 65 (2002) (publication page
references not avail). The divergent views of the U.S. and EC are due to different legal standards of
patentability. Generally, the U.S. law entertains broad subject matter patentability, while the EC is more
circumspect in the subject matter of patentability. See Barbara Looney, Should Gene be patented? The
Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement, 26
Law & Policy Intl. Bus. 231, 234 (1994).
3

Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum reads "Jordan shall take all steps necessary to clarify that the exclusion
from patent protection of "mathematical methods" in article 4 (B) of Jordan's Patent Law does not include
such "methods" as business methods or computer-related inventions". See Memorandum of Understanding
on Issues Related to the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eumed/middleeast/memopro.pdf (Mar. 15, 2003). To meet this requirement, Jordan could modify its patent
law to state clearly that business methods or computer-related inventions are patentable, it can adopt a
regulations that clearly state the same, or adopt any other measure that would meet its requirements under
the Memorandum.
737

A business method can be defined as a method of administering, managing, or otherwise operating an
enterprise or organization. The term "business method" means:
(1) a method of(A) administering, managing, or otherwise operating an enterprise or organization, including a technique
used in doing or conducting business; or
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methods of doing business.738 Under the FT A, anything under the sun made by man is
patentable.739 The provisions relating to the patentability of business methods were
drafted to meet the interests of the U.S.
The US-JO FTA permits the use of a subsisting patent by a third party to support his
application for the marketing approval of a product.740 A subsisting patent should be used
for the purpose of obtaining marketing approval only and not for sale. The US-JO FTA
also addresses compulsory licensing.741 It allows the issuance compulsory licensing in
only three cases: to remedy a practice determined to be anti-competitive; for public non-

(B) processing financial data;
(2) any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal skills;
(3) any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in paragraph (1) or a technique described
in paragraph (2). See the Business Method Patent Improvement Bill of 2000, 2000 H.R. 5364, 106th Cong.,
2d Sess. (2000).
738

In a case involved a method for processing financial data in hub and spoke system for mutual funds
accounting and administration, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that such method is not
excluded from patentability. See St. St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
In another case, Amazon.com and other inventors filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office a patent
application for a method and system for placing an order to purchase an item via the Internet, known as the
"1-click" method. In 1999, Amazon.com filed suit against Barnesandnoble.com, claiming that
Barnesandnoble.corn's "Express Lane" ordering feature infringed Amazon.com's patent. Amazon.com
obtained a preliminary injunction against the use of its business method by barnesandnoble.com. In 2001,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the
case, ruling that all the necessary prerequisites for granting a preliminary injunction were presently lacking.
The Court of Appeals decided that the District Court erred by not recognizing prior art reference. For
example, CompuServe's Trend Service, which allowed CompuServe's subscribers to purchase stock charts,
appeared to use a single-action ordering technology. Another prior art reference, a book, copyrighted in
1996 and entitled Creating the Virtual Store addressed the single-action method. See Sue Ann Mota,
Internet Business MethodPatents-The Federal Circuit Vacates the Preliminary Injunction in Amazon.com
v. Barnesandnoble.com, 19 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L., 523, 528 (2001). In 2002, Amazon and
Barns and Noble eventually reached a confidential settlement. See Robert C. Scheinfeld & Jeffrey D.
Sullivan, Internet-Related Patents: Are they Paying Off? N.Y L.J. 5 (Dec. 10, 2002).
739

See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (the case held that an engineered oil-eating
bacteria is patentable).
740

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.19.
1

Id. at art. 4.20.

commercial use or national emergency or other circumstances of extreme emergency; and
if there is a failure to meet working requirements.742 In contrast, the TRIPs Agreement
left open the grounds for issuing compulsory licensing.

The compulsory licensing

language of the US-JO FTA reflects U.S. policy. The U.S. treats compulsory licensing as
an exceptional policy tool to be used only in limited cases rather than a standard part of
the intellectual property regime.
4. Data Exclusivity and Pharmaceuticals
The FTA requires that the U.S. and Jordan protect confidential clinical test data in
marketing approval applications from misappropriation.7

The FTA does not limit the

protection foreign companies receive for their clinical test data of pharmaceuticals. Data
exclusivity, however, can delay the introduction of generic competition for life saving
drugs for example. Under the FTA, drug regulatory authorities will not allow a drug
originator's registration files to be used to register a therapeutically equivalent generic
variation of a medicine for a fixed period of time. The FTA effectively extends
monopolies by drug originators and affects access to medicines. Generics will effectively
be barred from entering the market, even if patent terms have expired and even if a

42

The FTA does not define national emergency for purpose of invoking compulsory licensing. The FTA
considers importation of the patented product as working. See Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights
and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27
Yale J. Intll. 365, 366, 369 (2002) (the U.S. sought in TRIPS negotiations to bar any possible obligation or
remedy there might be for a patentee's failure to work locally. It also sought to restrict compulsory
licensing to national emergencies and anti-competitive abuses).
743

Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement sets specific conditions for grant compulsory licensing but does not
list or define the cases where a license may be granted. Daniel Geravis, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting
History and Analysis 250 (2d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2003).
744

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of lordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.22.

country has issued a compulsory license for a product that is on patent, until the
monopolies on the use of the data expire.
The US-JO FTA extends the patent term for pharmaceutical products.745 Extending
the patent term vindicates the expectations of inventors who did not receive a twenty-year
term at the time the patent was first filed. Extending the patent term especially applies in
the case of pharmaceutical products that undergo human and animal tests to ensure their
safety for use before being granted marketing approval. The use of patent extension
depends on the existence of an efficient drug approval system in Jordan.
The FTA mandates that the U.S. and Jordan "make available" an extension of the
patent term, which indicates that patent term extensions were not intended to be
mandatory. The U.S. and Jordan are obliged to provide access to an extension by giving
the inventor the chance to file an application for an extension. The FTA does not
determine the period of extension of a patent term. However, textually, the use of the
term an "extension" in a singular form may be textually interpreted to mean that an
extension of the patent term is allowed only once.
5. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
The US-JO FTA includes provisions governing private enforcement of intellectual
property rights, including the availability of injunctions, damages, and other remedial
measures.746 In cases of a knowing infringement of trademark, copyright and related
rights, judicial authorities can order the infringer to pay the right holder "adequate

M a t art. 4.23 .a.
Id. at arts. 4.24-28.
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747

damages".

The FTA makes use of a mathematical formula to compute how much

injury the right holder sustained in order to calculate the amount of damages. An injury
determination is based on the value of the infringed-upon item according to the suggested
retail price of the legitimate product (SRP) or other equivalent measures established by
the right holder for valuing authorized goods.

Using the SRP will increase the value of

the product and thus increase the amount of damages awarded beyond what could have
been awarded if actual retail price have been used.
The FTA imposes statutory fines on infringers. It requires the U.S. and Jordan to
increase their statutory-based fines sufficiently to deter future acts of infringement
through the removal of the monetary incentive of the infringer.

Furthermore, the FTA

requires authorities to seize all suspected pirated copyright and counterfeit goods, related
implements that are used predominantly to commit the offense, and documentary
evidence of infringement.75 With respect to criminal actions and border measures, the
FTA requires national authorities to act ex officio, i.e. upon their own initiative, without
the need for a private party or right holder to lodge a formal complaint. This allows rights
holder to protect their rights while avoiding time-consuming legal proceedings. The FTA
also establishes a rebuttable presumption that the author, producer, performer, or

The right holder must prove that the infringer has engaged in the infringing activity "knowingly". In
other words, the infringer must posses the intention to engage in the infringing activity.
748

Id. at art. 4.24.

749

Id. at art. 4.25.

The use of the term "predominant use" is unclear. For example, it is unclear if 60 percent use of the tool
is for committing piracy suffices the FTA requirement.

publisher of a work whose name appears on the work is the person entitled to bring a
civil infringement case to protect his copyright.751
The FT A changes the conventional definition of piracy. It defines willful copyright
piracy on a commercial scale as involving significant willful infringement that has no
direct or indirect motivation of financial gain.

Piracy is a term that has no uniform

definition. While it is most often used to refer to an egregious infringement of copyright,
it is also used to refer to the intentional and systematic infringement with the purpose of
profit-maximization.753 According to the FT A, an infringer with no direct or indirect
financial motive is liable for copyright piracy, similar to a willful infringer motivated by
financial gain.
The US-JO FTA sets a timetable for the parties to comply with their intellectual
property obligations. Each party is required to comply with article 4.1.c (WCT), 4.1.d
(WPPT), and articles 4.10-16 (copyright and related rights) within two years from the
date the FTA enters into force.754 Each party should also comply with article 4.1.b
(UPOV) within six months from the effective date of the FTA. The FTA further
mandates that each party shall promptly protect undisclosed data or tests for purposes of
marketing approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products. Finally, each
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Id. at art. 4.27.
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Id. at art. 4.28.
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J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy's Desk Encyclopedia of Intellectual Property 325 (2d e<±, Bureau Natl.
Affairs 1995).
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See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.29
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party is required to protect new chemical entities within three years form the date the
FTA enters into force.
The transitional period given to Jordan to implement its intellectual property
obligations is a form of special and differential treatment. However, the TRIPs
Agreement allows developing countries special treatment with respect to fulfilling their
obligations; thus similar provisions in the FTA are not unique. Moreover, the FTA does
not define how Jordan should implement its obligations. For example, to comply with the
FTA, Jordan can redraft its domestic laws or simply make additions or clarifications to
those laws. There is a vacuum, however, because it does not determine a transitional
period for compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding on Issues Related to the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, which include provisions relating to the
patentability of business methods.

6. General observations
There are certain points worth mentioning about the FTA intellectual property
provisions. Some of the intellectual property provisions are very general. For example,
the FTA does not specify in which cases an invention may be excluded from
patentability. Furthermore, under the FTA, there are only three cases in which a
compulsory license may be issued. In contrast, subsequent to the TRIPs Agreement,
WTO members adopted a Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, which
grants countries the right to issue compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
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grounds upon which such licenses are issued.755 As party to the US-JO FT A., Jordan
cannot benefit from the Declaration because it locked in the cases in which a compulsory
license may be granted. Moreover, there are many exceptions to the intellectual property
rights codified in the TRIPs Agreement. In contrast, the FTA includes only few
exceptions.
The intellectual property provisions of the FTA are one-sided. They were drafted to
protect U.S. intellectual property rights. The FTA does not address communal rights,
such as traditional knowledge and folklore expressions. As party to the FTA, Jordan
adopted a U.S.-style intellectual property regime. For example, the FTA affords patent
protections to business methods. The FTA represents a homogenization of intellectual
property laws between the U.S. and Jordan. This harmonization of standards may not be a
desirable objective. It is preferable to have separate policy instruments for each party
rather than one single policy instrument covering both parties.
The US-JO FTA does not contain provisions relating to the transfer and
dissemination of technology. The preamble of the FTA focuses only on "creativity and
innovation" but does not refer to the transfer and dissemination of technology or the
interest of the public. The FTA should have linked the enforcement of intellectual
property rights with the transfer of technology and investment.

See Doha Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, para. 5(b) (Nov. 14, 2001).
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D. Balance of Payments
In order to prevent either party of the US-JO FTA from circumventing its obligations
under the FTA, a provision was needed to discipline trade restrictions imposed to
improve a country's balance of payment.75 For this end, the US-JO FTA requires that
any measure imposed for balance of payment purposes has to be in compliance with the
WTO.757 In fact, the US-JO FTA balance of payments provision utilizes the language of
the similar WTO provision and does not add further restrictions.

E.. The US-JO FTA and Electronic Commerce
The US-JO FTA is the first FTA to include a provision concerning electronic
commerce (e-commerce).758 The US-Israel FTA and NAFTA do not contain parallel

756

The term "balance-of-payments" refers to a "statement showing all of a nation's transactions with the
rest of the world for a given period. It is divided into current and capital accounts. While current account
flows consist primarily of goods and services, capital account flows are flows in the ownership of foreign
and domestic assets. In other words, current account is concerned with trade and capital account is
concerned with portfolio foreign direct investment. A balance-of-payments problem occurs when a drop in
demand for a country's currency, as result of reduction in export earning and/or investment, is so steep that
it creates downward pressure on its currency value. This problem renders citizens unable to purchase
everyday necessities, known as "consumption crisis". To prevent balance of payment crisis, a government
can use monetary policy to increase demand and reduce supply of domestic currency by exchanging foreign
currency for domestic currency. A government can fund these exchanges with its foreign reserves, or with
borrowed money. Another possible solution is the use of trade policy to counterbalance the increased
demand for imports by imposing import restrictions to force a reduction in the trade deficit. For more on
the dynamics of balance of payment see Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payment Crises in the Developing
World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15 Am. U. Intl. L. Rev.
1249,1251-1254(2000).
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See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 11. Two principal articles
of the WTO relate to balance of payments (article XII and XVIII. section b GATT 1994). Article XII can
be invoked by all WTO members, developed and developing countries. However, article XVIII. 1 can be
imposed by the developing countries only.
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Thomas Cottier, The Impact of New Technologies on Multilateral Trade Regulation and Governance, 72
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 415, 426, 435 (1996) (concluding that the new technologies are the most important
driving force in the process of globalization of the economy).
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provision regarding e-commerce.

This is understandable as the US-Israel FTA and

NAFTA are fifteen and six years older, respectively, than the US-JO FTA. In the time
since since the drafting of the US-Israel FTA and NAFTA, e-commerce has become more
developed with the advent of the internet.
The e-commerce provision of the US-JO FTA applies to goods and services traded
over the medium of the Internet. The FTA covers e-commerce but does not define the
term.761 The FTA also uses the term "digitized products" without providing a definition.
The FTA could have listed illustrative examples of digitized products, such as
electronically traded software, books, and music. The FTA requires that the parties do not
deviate from their "existing practice" of not imposing tariffs on electronic
transmissions.762 This language is based on the U.S. Internet Tax Freedom Act of
1998.763 The FTA also requires that the parties do not establish "unnecessary" barriers

However, article 1302 of NAFTA's chapter 13, Telecommunications, could be considered an article
related to e-commerce. It contemplates in its subparagraphs access to and use of public telecommunication
networks for information services, privacy, security, and confidentiality.
760
The Internet has changed the way international trade is conducted. National boundaries become
secondary to network borders. For example, a simple transaction may involve data captured in one country,
a transaction authorization system at a remote computer site located in a second country, and settlement of
the transaction in a third country on another computer system. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Electronic
Communications and Legal Challenge: Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the
Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 287, 304 (1993).
' There is no universally agreed definition of e-commerce. However, in the WTO Work Program on
Electronic Commerce, e-commerce is understood to mean the production, distribution, marketing, sale or
delivery of goods and services by electronic means. A commercial transaction can be divided into three
main stages: the advertising and searching stage, the ordering and payment stage, and the delivery stage.
Any or all of these stages may be carried out electronically and may therefore be covered by the concept of
e-commerce. In other words, a buyer may purchase a book via the Internet and be delivered physically later
on or he can purchase and download the book via the Internet. In either case, the purchase of the book
could be said that it is conducted through e-commerce means. See WTO Secretariat, Development
Implications of Electronic Commerce, WT/COMTD/w/51 (Nov. 23, 1998).
762

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 7.1 .a.

on electronic transmissions, which include digitized products. The FTA requires the U.S.
and Jordan to make publicly available all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting ecommerce.
The e-commerce provision of the US-JO FTA does not extent to all e-commerce
matters, such as domain name, Internet security, and intellectual property.764 The FTA
covers border trade measures only such as, tariffs, unnecessary trade barriers, and
services that facilitate e-commerce. The FTA does not determine if digital products
should be treated as goods or as services.765 Determining whether an e-product is a good

The act, which has the purpose of promoting universal access and less burdensome Internet tax policy,
imposes a moratorium on all taxation of Internet access and on "multiple" or "discriminatory" taxes on ecommerce. The act also includes a declaration that the Internet should be free of tariffs, trade barriers, and
other restrictions. Moreover, the act asks the U.S. President to pursue "international agreements" to ban
such tariffs and other trade barriers. See Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000). The
moratorium begins on Oct. 1, 1998 and ends on Nov. 1, 2003. On Nov. 19, 2004, the Congress passed
legislation S.150 that reinstated a four year moratorium on Internet access taxes and multiple and
discriminatory taxes on e-commerce. The new legislation applies retroactively to Nov. 2003. Thus, the new
legislation will expire in 2007.
764

Legal questions brought about by e-commerce but not discussed here include, but are not limited to,
domain names in cyberspace and trade marks. See Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the
Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 309 (2002). See also Serge G. Avakian, Global Unfair
Competition in the Online Commerce Era, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 905 (1999). For the effects of new methods,
such as price comparison, cookies, exclusive provision by Internet Service Provider (ISP), and business
alliances, used by e-retailers to sell their products online that may raise issues of anticompetitive practices
see Alan E. Wiseman, The Internet Economy: Access, Taxes, and Market Structure, chapter four
(Brookings Instn. Press 2000). For discussion of privacy issues such as cookies on user's personal
computers and unsolicited commercial communications without the consent of the addressee (opt-in
system) in the age of e-commerce and the U.S. reliance on market oriented industry self-regulation
approach of handling personal data see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic
Commerce, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 771 (1999) For discussion on consumers concern regarding identity,
privacy, data collectors, and security of financial information see Nicole Ladouceur, Calibrating the
Electronic Scale: Tipping the Balance in Favor of Vigorous and Competitive Electronic Market for
Consumers, 25 Can.-U.S. L. Rev. 295 (1999). For discussion of cyber-security issues and how not only
legal but architectural responses are needed see Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control,
112 Yale L.J. 2261 (2003).
765

There is disagreement among WTO members on this point. In other words, it is unclear whether digital
products delivered over the Internet should be classified as goods or as services for the purpose of WTO
regimes and rules. E-products include books, music, videos, software, and other newly emerging media,
which in a rapidly growing digital market may arguably be developed in strictly computerized forms
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or service is a crucial assessment. If an e-product is a good, then it will be subject to the
national treatment rules of the FTA. In conrast, if an e-product is a service, then each
party may impose restrictions on market access and national treatment.766
The vagueness of the e-commerce provision of the US-JO FTA suggests that
negotiators faced a dilemma while drafting it. On the one hand, the FTA parties had to
recognize the importance of e-commerce to world trade. On the other, there is no
universal regulatory system for e-commerce within the WTO that would have guided the
FTA negotiators.7 7 The U.S. and Jordan adopted an approach whereby the current rules
of trade that apply in the physical world would also apply in the virtual world. For
example, the e-commerce provision of the US-JO FTA holds to the existing rules
regarding market access, services, and transparency. Thus, the drafters of the US-JO FTA
did not create entirely new rules for the new virtual environment.
The next question that must be addressed is how to identify the party benefits from
the e-commerce provision of the US-JO FTA. The U.S., as of 2004, has the largest
number of internet users, estimated at 200 million, and about 70 percent of all Internet

simply to avoid tariffs and strict international legal standards on physical goods and services. See Kristi L.
Bergemann, A Digital Free Trade Zone and Necessarily-Regulated Self-Governance For Electronic
Commerce: The World Trade Organization, International Law, and Classical Liberalism in Cyberspace, 20
John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 595, 600-601(2002) (discussing the option for self-governance of the
Internet based on existing quasi-legal norms within the cyber-community, rather than regulatory framework
within national governments or supranational organization).
766

The U.S. has been the primary advocate of the position that digitized products should be classified as
goods. See Stewart A. Baker et al, E-Products and the WTO, 35 Intl Law. 5,7 (2001).
767

The first time the WTO addressed Internet trade, although under GATS, was its ruling on U.S.
restrictions on cross-border Internet gambling services. The ruling found that online gambling restrictions
imposed by the U.S. at the federal and state levels violated its market access commitments under sub-sector
10.D (other recreational services) of its GATS schedule which corresponds to CPC heading 96492. The
restrictions denied Antiguan-based gaming operators access to the U.S. market. See WTO Panel Report,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).

websites are based in the U.S.768 Even more, 85 percent of the world's internet revenue in
1996-97 was generated in the U.S.769 In 2003, online retail sales in the U.S. were $55
billion.770 In contrast, in Arab countries, including Jordan, online commerce is
771

negligible.

779

In 2001, Jordan had only 120,000 internet users.

Most commercial

websites in Jordan are aimed at cataloging and advertising products rather than selling
online. Online commerce requires use of modern financial and credit transactions and
payments via consumer credit cards. One of the obstacles for the development of ecommerce in Jordan is the fact that the number of credit card holders is small.773 One can
describe Jordan as a cash-transaction society. 7 In contrast, the U.S. is cashless society.
The differences between the U.S. and Jordan with respect to internet accessibility,
efficient telecommunication infrastructure, and volume of e-commerce should have been
768

See E-Commerce Takes Off, Economist 3, 20 (May 15, 2004) (In the U.S., women outnumber men
online).
769

See Catherine L. Mann et al., Global Electronic Commerce: A Policy Primer, 16 (Inst. Intl. Econ. 2000).
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See Economist, supra n. 768, at 3 (the figure, according the U.S. Department of commerce, excludes
online travel services. For example, the owner of Seattle-based expedia.com and hotels.com sold $10
billion worth of travel in 2003 (some 20 percent of travel in the U.S. is bought online). It also excludes
pornography which made $ 2 billion in the U.S. in 2003. The figure excludes also sales of financial
services, ticket-sales agencies, online dating, tracing ancestors, and gambling. The gambling business is
worth $ 6 billion. About $ 24 billion worth of trade was done in 2003 on the California-based ebay, the
biggest online auctioneer. Used-car sales are now one the biggest online growth areas). See also Barrett J.
Willingham, Electronic Commerce and the Free Trade of the Americas, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rev. Am.
483, 491 (2000) (by 2003, business-to-business trade within the U.S. would soar to $1.3 trillion, an amount
that would represent more than nine percent of total U.S. business).
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See Trade Facilitation and E-commerce in the ESCWA Region, U.N. Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia, at 5, U.N Doc. E/ESCWA/ED/2001/2 (2001).
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Id. at 36.
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Id. at 36.
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Buying through using credit card is not the norm. Cash is the norm. Generally, credit cards are accepted
at major hotels, restaurants, and other establishments. There might be a lack of system of credit history
check.

an indication for the FTA negotiators that a more balanced provision would be needed to
accommodate the e-commerce environments in each country. The FTA lacks legal
obligations or recommendations that the two parties share information and experience
regarding policies intended to encourage the development of e-commerce.
F. Visa Obligations in the US-JO FTA
The US-JO FTA addresses entry of nationals of one party into the territory of the
other.775 The FTA allows nationals of one party to enter into the territory of the other
party solely to engage in "substantial trade," including trade in services and technology.
The FTA does not define "substantial trade". The U.S. Department of State regulations
define "substantial trade" as the quantum of trade "sufficient" to ensure a "continuous
flow" of trade items between the U.S. and the treaty country.776
The FTA also allows nationals of one party to enter into the territory of the other to
establish, develop, administer, or advise on the operation of an "investment".777 The FTA
qualifies investment by requiring that a national or the companies that employ that
national to "have committed" or be "in the process of committing" a "substantial amount
of capital or other resources to that investment. Thus, the FTA requires a significant
amount of up front investment, which may take the form of transferring money before the
national of Jordan can obtain a visa. The purpose of such language is to prevent fraud.

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 8.
See Treaty Trader, Treaty Investor, or Treaty Alien in a Specialty Occupation, 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (j)
(2005).
777

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 8.2.
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The FTA does not define "investment" or "substantial amount of capital". However, the
U.S. Department of State regulations define investment to mean that an investor places of
capital, including funds and other assets, "at risk" in a commercial sense with the
objective of generating a profit.778 An investor under the FTA must play a key role in the
investment whether through its establishment, development, administration, or advice in
order to be eligible for a E-2 visa. The purpose of this language is to prevent visa fraud.
For the first two years of the operation of the FTA, there have been no E-visas issued
to Jordanian nationals under the visa provisions of the FTA.779 This could be interpreted
as to lack of interest in or understanding of these visa provisions by Jordanian nationals.
Traders in Jordan may also face obstacles in meeting the threshold requirements of
"substantial trade" or "substantial amount of capital" for investment.
Chapter 16 of NAFTA is dedicated to temporary entry for business persons.780 It
created four categories of business persons who may be granted temporary entry. These
four basic categories are: business visitors; traders and investors' intra-company

The U.S. regulations require treaty investors to be "in possession" of and "have control" over the capital
invested or being invested. Additionally, the U.S. regulations condition that capital in the process of being
invested or that has been invested must be "irrevocably" committed to the enterprise. Moreover, the
investment must not be passive or virtual but rather a "real" and "active" commercial or entrepreneurial
undertaking, producing some service or commodity for profit and must meet applicable legal requirements
for doing business in the particular jurisdiction in the U.S. Finally, the Department of State regulations
require that the projected future capacity of the enterprise should generally be realizable within five years
from the date the alien commences normal business activity of the enterprise.
Ltr. from Cher Young, Consular Assoc, U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan, to Bashar H. Malkawi,
Student, Am. L. Sch., Number of Visas Issued under the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (Aug. 5, 2003)
(on file with author).
780

See NAFTA, supra n. 697, art. 1601. Chapter 16 of NAFTA consists of eight Articles and
supplemented by annexes. Chapter 16 of NAFTA was modeled on chapter 15 of the US-Canada FTA of
1989 titled "Temporary Entry for Business Persons". However, with the implementation of NAFTA,
chapter 15 of the US-Canada FTA was suspended. See Kenneth A. Schultz, The North American Free
Trade Agreement: The Provisions for the Temporary Entry of Canadian and Mexican Business Persons
into the United States, 15 SPG Intl. L. Practicum 50 (2002).
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transferees; and professionals. Business visitors who are engaged in international
business activities may enter a NAFTA member country for the purposes of conducting
research and design, and participating in growth, manufacture and production.

NAFTA

also provides E-l and E-2 visas for traders and investors. The third category of NAFTA
visas is a L-l visa for a business person employed by an enterprise that seeks to render
services for that enterprise or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof, in a capacity that is
managerial, executive or involves specialized knowledge.782 The last category of visas
under NAFTA is professional visa (TN category), which is a unique kind of visa for
NAFTA nationals and is not available for nationals of other countries.783 One year after
NAFTA came into force, 220 accountants from the U.S. entered Canada independently,
and 62 U.S. accountants entered as intra-company employees. In addition, 965 engineers
from the U.S. and 7 from Mexico, and 224 American intra-company engineers and 3
Mexicans were issued entry documents. There were 34 lawyers independently and 9 as
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For a description of the four categories of temporary entry of business persons see William J. Benos,
The Movement of Professionals, Technicians, and other Workers across NAFTA Borders, 8 US-Mex. L. J
25, 26 (2000).
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See NAFTA, supra n. 697, appendix 1603.C.1.

See Benos, supra n. 781, at 27. H-1B status, which also provides for the entry of professionals, should
not be confused with TN category under NAFTA. The preamble to the INS interim rule specifically stated
that admission pursuant to NAFTA to engage in professional level activities does not imply qualification as
a "professional" under the Immigrant and Nationality Act. The H-1B category is for "specialty
occupations", namely, those in occupations for which an entry level requirement is customarily a university
degree at the American baccalaureate level. On the other hand, NAFTA seeks to simplify the admission
process for a select and "precisely" defined group of Canadian and Mexican professionals. See Schultz,
supra n. 780, at 52. Under NAFTA, certain categories of professionals who meet minimum educational
requirements, or posses designated credentials or licenses and experience, and who seek to engage in
professional occupations in a NAFTA member country, may be admitted for example into the U.S. for up
to one year.

intra-company employees came from the U.S.; no Mexican lawyers moved to work in
Canada.784
The U.S. could have incorporated provisions in the US-JO FTA similar to the TN
category of NAFTA. This would have given Jordanian professionals an opportunity to
acquire contacts and experience, which could translate into an increase of trade between
the U.S. and Jordan. However, it seems that immigration issues and problems with the
recognition of credentials prevented the incorporation of such a provision. The U.S. was
concerned that Jordan may dump its citizens in the U.S., although placing a cap on the
number of TN visas issued annually would have mitigated this concern. U.S. trade
negotiators feared a potential backlash from Congress if a provision relating to
professional visas was incorporated in the FTA, as this could have been seen as setting a
precedent for future FT As especially in light of the fact that the US-JO FTA is an
agreement with a low-income country.7 5 The U.S. could have permitted entry of
Jordan's traders or investors as long as they submitted a declaration containing a good
business plan. A similar declaration could be submitted to extend the length of business
visas. Jordanians are human beings and have a baccalaureate degree. They are part of free
trade.785 As the language of the US-JO FTA currently stands and practice so far proves,

m

See Schultz, supra n. 780, at 52.
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The power over immigration rests in Congress. Congress has the power to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization. See U.S. Const, art. I, 5 8, cl. 4. See also Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (The
passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores
belongs to Congress. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations).
786

Mr. Mazzoli, then chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Law,
Immigration and Refugees, during a heated debate over NAFTA chapter 16 and the differential treatment
for Mexicans under that chapter said, "what is the difference? They are human beings, and they have a
baccalaureate degree. They are part of the free trade operation". See H.R. Subcomm. on International Law,
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the US-JO FTA is a trade agreement concerned with the movement of goods and
services, but not the movement of persons.
G. Government Procurement
The US-JO FTA addresses government procurement by requiring the parties to enter
into negotiations with regard to Jordan's accession to the WTO GPA.787 As of this date,
Jordan has not acceded to the GPA.788 Until Jordan accedes to the WTO GPA and its
firms are able to compete in bidding, Jordanian firms will face discrimination in
supplying goods and services to U.S. governmental agencies.789 However, Jordan may be
able to gain access to the U.S. government procurement market if the U.S. president
designates Jordan as a beneficiary country.

H. Trade Remedy Measures of the US-JO FTA
According to the US-JO FTA, parties can apply safeguard measures based on
bilateral or global basis.791 Either party can take safeguard measures against originating

Immigration, and Refugees of the House Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Immigration-Related Issues in the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 103d Cong. IstSess. 134 (Nov. 3, 1993).
787

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 9.
788

Earlier section discussed, among others, Jordan's accession to the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement and some thoughts on its hesitance to accede. Hence, the current section will discuss the U.S.
law on government procurement.
789

The U.S. law overtly "bans any country" that is not member of the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement from participating in bidding to supply goods and services to U.S. governmental agencies. See
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2513 (2000).
790
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/J.at§2511.

The terms safeguard measures, escape clause, and emergency actions are interchangeable. Chapter eight
of NAFTA is titled "emergency action". They carry the meaning that a country can escape its obligations

272

goods of the other party in situations in which such goods may cause or threaten to cause
serious injury. The imposition of a safeguard measure under the FTA is tied to
obligations. There must be a link between increased imports and the FTA's tariff
concessions.7 2 However, such a link is subject to a proviso that "only" the reduction or
elimination of a duty is a "significant cause" that leads to an increase in imports, but need
-7QT

not be equal to or greater than any other cause.

The requirement that tariff concession

be a "significant cause" of increased imports is extracted from U.S. law.794 To imose a
safeguard measure, Jordan will have to meet what could be christened as "double test".
First, Jordan must prove that tariff concession is a "significant cause" of increased
imports.795 If successful, then Jordan will have to prove that increased imports are
"substantial cause" of serious injury. There is a presumption that increased imports are
not the result of tariff concessions, unless proven otherwise.

of a free trade agreement under certain conditions. NAFTA also establishes two safeguard actions.
Safeguard actions can be imposed on "originating goods" from NAFTA region that are imported in such
quantities that cause or threaten to cause serious injury. Additionally, NAFTA party can impose safeguard
measures on imported goods from "all countries", including NAFTA region. See NAFTA, supra n. 697,
art. 801& 802.
792

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 10.1.
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Id. at art. 10.1.
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See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (2000). Section 406 of the Trade Act permits safeguard
measures to counter market disruption from communist countries where rapid imports is "significant
cause", but need not be equal to or greater than any other cause, of material injury.
795

Absence the test for the link between tariff concession and increase imports, the safeguard provision of
the US-JO FTA would be a mere measure for determining what is an unacceptable level of imports without
the need to meet such a difficult test. Moreover, "significant cause" is not defined in the FTA. Is it the same
as "substantial cause", less, or more? Does significant cause require cut-off such as 50 percent or 60
percent threshold among other causes? Significant cause requires analysis on a case-by-case basis.
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To impose safeguard measures under the FTA there must be an importation of goods
in increased quantities, in either absolute or relative terms.796 Moreover, imports of goods
must constitute a "substantial cause" of serious injury, or threat thereof to a domestic
industry that produce like or directly competitive product. The term "substantial cause" is
defined as a cause that is "important" and "not less than any other cause," a definition
derived directly from U.S. trade remedy law.797 According to this definition of substantial
cause, two prongs must be met. First, imports must be an "important" cause of serious
injury. Second, imports must be "not less than any other cause". This "substantial cause"
test has so difficult to overcome that section 201 of the the U.S. Trade Act has fallen
largely into disuse. Aggrieved industries now rely upon the less stringent burdens of the
countervailing and antidumping provisions of U.S. trade law to address injuries and
threats from imports.798

Under NAFTA, a party may impose a safeguard measure if there is increase in import in absolute
quantities only. See NAFTA, supra n. 697, art. 801. 1.
797

Section 201 of the U.S. trade act of 1974 permits imports to be restricted, for a limited time, and on a
non-discriminatory basis, if they are substantial cause of serious injury to U.S. firms or workers. Under the
U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, imports must have been "the major factor" causing injury. The Tariff
Commission, now called the ITC, has interpreted this to mean that the increased imports were a more
important cause of injury than all other causes combined. It is obvious that this interpretation was too
restrictive. See Peter Bernardi, The Great Escape, 7 D.C.L. J. Intl. L. & Prac. 69, 80 (1998). By adopting,
the substantial causation test, the U.S. Congress intended to provide a lower burden of proof than that
contained in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Moreover, article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards
allows a member to apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that member has determined that such
product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to "cause" or threaten to cause
serious injury to domestic industry. It is noticeable the absence of "substantial cause" from the language of
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
798

The only success story recalled for section 201 petitions is Harley-Davidson case of 1983 of imposing
tariffs on inventories of motorcycles from Japan of 700cc models. See United States International Trade
Commission, Annual Report, 1-2 (1983) (tariffs increased on completed heavyweight motorcycles by 45
percent ad valorem, declining to 35, 20, 15, and 10 in subsequent years). In 1987, before the end of the
safeguard protection period, Harley-Davidson requested the termination of the safeguard since the company
has adjusted to competition from Japan.

Under the FTA, a safeguard measure may be imposed for a period of time no more
than four years.7 After the expiration of the transition period for imposing a safeguard
measure, neither party can impose such a measure unless the other party consents. One
can reason that this discrepancy in the ability to apply a safeguard measure without
consent during the transition period and the requirement of obtaining consent after the
transition period is based on the thought that the free trade area formed by the US-JO
FTA would make a safeguard measure less necessary. It is also thought that local
industries will have adjusted to trade competition by the time that the transition period
ends.
Article 10 of the US-JO FTA establishes procedural obligations for conducting a
safeguard investigation and providing notification and consultation with respect to that
investigation.800 The US-JO FTA stipulates that an investigation must be conducted by a
comptent authority.801 For purposes of conducting an investigation, the US-JO FTA also
incorporates some provisions of the WTO Agreement on Safeguard. For example, while
conducting an investigation, either party to the FTA must provide reasonable public
notice, a public hearing, and publish a report that sets forth the "findings" and "reasoned
conclusions" reached on all pertinent issues of facts and laws. Moreover, either party to
the FTA must evaluate all relevant factors of an "objective and quantifiable" nature that
have a bearing on the situation of the industry seeking protection.

United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 10.2.d.ii.
S00

Id. atart.l0.2.c.

1

Id. at art. 10.2.
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The US-JO FTA covers "global action" safeguards.

Any safeguard measure

imposed according to the "global action" provision must comply with the requirements of
article XIX of GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safeguard. Any safeguard
measure must be applied on a MFN basis.803 The "global action" provision allows a party
to impose a safeguard against the other as part of a multilateral safeguard action taken
under article XIX of the GATT and WTO safeguard agreement. However, imports of one
party to the FTA may be excluded from an MFN safeguard measure if such imports are
not a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof. The FTA is silent as to whether
imports from a party alone constitute substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic
industry, what should the form of the safeguard measure be, or the type of compensation
to be provided.

The FTA parties could have agreed that imports less than 10 percent of

total imports would not be considered substantial.
The US-JO FTA has an industrial policy language aimed at protecting some
industries that initially cannot offer competitive prices and quality as competing imports
but nonetheless by giving them breathing room can develop over time into competitive
price and quality industries.805 An infant industry is defined, in the US-JO FTA, as an

*uz "Each Party retains its rights and obligations under Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards". Id. at art. 10.8.
803
According to article 2.1 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguard, safeguard measures shall be applied to a
product being imported irrespective of its source.
804

Under NAFTA for example, in order to determine in global action whether imports from NAFTA party
are substantially cause serious injury to the domestic industry, imports from that NAFTA party must be
among the top five suppliers of the good. See NAFTA, supra n. 697, art. 802. 2.a.
805

The FTA states that the Parties recognize that, because it has recently begun to produce a like or directly
competitive product described in paragraph 1 [originating good of the other party], an infant industry may
face challenges that more mature industries do not encounter. As such, each Party shall ensure that the

industry that has recently begun to produce like or directly competitive product. It is not
clear whether the infant industry provision applies to infant industries that existed prior to
the conclusion of the FTA or is limited only to infant industries established after the FTA
came into existence. Based on the FTA language, an infant industry is a new industry.
This definition does not include an already established industry that produces a new line
of product or an expansion of an already existing industry supplying small proportion of
the domestic market, or an industry that had previously been destroyed as a result of
hostilities or natural disasters. The definition of an infant industry has a narrow scope.
The FTA infant industry provision suggests that Jordan can shield its domestic
industries by keeping out U.S. competitors. Depending on how a panel may interpret the
infant industry provision, the provision may be found to have little value. First, even
assuming that the FTA gives preferential consideration for Jordan's infant industry
preferential treatment is limited to procedures used in conducting a safeguard
investigation. In other words, the investigation authority in Jordan may give an infant
industry more time to respond for a request for a public hearing, present its evidence, or
provide a counter-argument against an exporter or importer. The preferential treatment
does not mean that an infant industry will be guaranteed a positive determination by
imposing a safeguard measure. Second, the ultimate purpose of the US-JO FTA is to

procedures described in paragraph 2 [the procedures for safeguard investigation] do not create obstacles to
infant industries that seek the imposition of such measures". See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement
Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a
Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 10.5.
806

The definition of an infant industry in article XVIII.2 of GATT 1994 is broader. It includes new
industry, a new branch of production in an existing industry, substantial transformation of an existing
industry, expansion of an existing industry supplying a relatively small proportion of domestic demand, and
an industry destroyed or substantially damaged as a result of hostilities or natural disasters.
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liberalize trade; the industrial policy article is at odds with this objective. While article
XVIII of GATT 1994 allows additional facilities for infant industry such as tariff
protection, government assistance through non- tariff measures, and subsidies, the FT A 's
infant industry provision restricts in scope and time Jordan's ability to provide protection
for its infant industries.
The only import relief mechanisms available under the US-JO FTA are safeguard
measures. The FTA does not have a provision on antidumping or countervailing duties.
The inclusion of a safeguard measures under the US-JO FTA reflects the U.S.
requirement that all trade agreements must have, at minimum, a provision for safeguard
measures.

Thus, the US-JO FTA leaves domestic antidumping and countervailing duty

laws untouched.

I. Rules of Origin in the US-JO FTA "
The FTA contains provisions relating to preferential rules of origin. These rules are
designed to guarantee that tariff concessions are enjoyed only by products of the
countries that are parties to the FTA.809 The FTA contains two types of rules of origin: a

The discussion has focused so far on the assumption that the FTA article applies only to infant industry
of Jordan. The question that arises is whether the FTA infant industry language applies also to the U.S.
which is often acknowledged as having no industrial policy. See Fair Trade and Harmonization:
Prerequisites for Free Trade 306-309 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., MIT Press
1996) (the United States has not had an avowed industrial policy. However, some critics have contended
that the U.S. does in fact have an industrial policy in the broad sense. The U.S. has an implicit and
decentralized industrial policy. The U.S. government and laws do advantage some industries over others).
808

Following World War II, the U.S. president continued this policy by issuing an executive order
requiring the presence of an escape clause in all future trade agreements. See Paul C. Rosenthal & Robin H.
Gilbert, The 1988 Amendments to Section 201: It is not Just for Import Relief Anymore, 20 Law & Policy
Intl. Bus. 403, 406 (1989).
809

Paragraph 1 of article 14 of the US-JO FTA states "The parties recognize that the rules regarding
eligibility for the preferential tariff treatment... are crucial to the functioning of this Agreement.. .shall
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general rule that applies to all exported industrial and agricultural products, and a specific
rule for textiles and apparel that are considered import-sensitive.
Under the FTA general rule of origin, in order for products to qualify for preferential
treatment, the product must be "wholly" the growth, production or manufacture of
Jordan.

The concept of "wholly growth" is interpreted narrowly since all the inputs

must be produced in the exporting country to qualify for preferential treatment; third
party inputs are not allowed. Moreover, constituents of a product must not have
undergone processing in any other country at any stage of production. The "wholly
growth" rule of origin applies to agricultural products, primary products, and processed
or manufactured products using raw materials solely from Jordan.811
If a product is "not wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of the party", then it
must be "substantially transformed" into a "new and different article of commerce",
having a new name, character, or use distinct from the article or material from which it
was transformed.812 The disjunctive "or" means that one of three parts of substantial

strive to administer such rules effectively, uniformly, and consistently with the object and purpose of this
Agreement and the WTO Agreement". See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United
States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area,
supra n. 695, art. 14.1.
810

Id. at annex 2.2, art. 1 .a. Wholly growth, product, or a manufacture of a party means a product that has
been "entirely" grown, produced, or manufactured in a party and to all materials that are incorporated in the
product, that have been entirely, grown, produced, or manufactured in the party's territory.
811

A list of primary products for example would include mineral products, vegetable plants, and sea fishing
products such as fish or shellfish.
812

The language of the US-JO FTA regarding rules of origin is based on U.S. law. Country of origin means
country of manufacture, production or growth of article of foreign origin and that further work or material
added to article in another country must effect a substantial transformation in order to render such other
country the "country of origin". Substantial transformation means fundamental change in form, appearance,
nature or character of article which adds to value of article an amount or percentage which is significant in
comparison with value which article had when exported from country in which it was first manufactured,

transformation test (change in name, use, or characteristic) must occur.

l

The

"substantial transformation" test is subjective as it leaves to the custom authorities of the
importing country the discretion to determine whether a certain product has undergone
substantial transformation. Because of this subjectivity, it is unclear at what time and to
what extent a product has to undergo a substantial transformation.814
Since the substantial transformation test may not suffice by itself to confer origin, the
FTA also contains a mathematical requirement, known as the value-added rule or
QIC

percentage rule.

_

The value-added rule requires, in conjunction with the substantial

transformation rule, that the sum of 1) the cost or value of materials produced in Jordan
produced or grown. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (West 1930). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court defined substantial transformation further in Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association case. See
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. U.S., 207 U.S. 556, 561 (1908) (the case involved corks imported from
Spain to be incorporated in bottles for re-export. The court decided that manufacture implies a change, but
every change is not manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labor, and
manipulation. There must be transformation: a new and different article must emerge, having a distinctive
name, character, or use. Therefore, the careful selection and thorough treatment of corks would render
corks a new article of commerce). The phrase "substantial transformation" is composed of two words. First,
"transformation", whether modified by an adjective or not, means a fundamental change, not a mere
alteration, in the form, appearance, nature, or character of an article. Second, "substantial" means more than
"fundamental" because if that were its only meaning it would be redundant because transformation also
means fundamental change. Therefore, "substantial" means a very great change in the article's "real worth
value".
813

Change in name only could not be in and of itself the determinative factor to meet the "substantial
transformation" test. The CIT decided that the name factor in meeting the "substantial transformation" test
is the weakest evidence of meeting the test. See Juice Prod. Assn. V. U.S., 628 F. Supp. 978, 989 (Ct. Intl.
Trade 1986). Change from producer's product to end-use product may not be of significance in determining
that an imported product has undergone substantial transformation. See U.S. V. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163,
1170 (1st Cir. 1980) (Although Chinese glue was blended with other glues in Holland that changed from
processor's good to consumer's good, it did not increase in value).
1

For example, suppose that Jordan imports orange from Syria. Then, it manufactures or transforms the
orange into orange juice in a factory in Jordan. In this case, it is clear that the orange juice is of Jordanian
origin, with different name, use, or characteristics, which makes it eligible for preferential tariff treatment
by the U.S. However, suppose that Jordan imports frozen concentrated orange juice from Syria. Then, it
processes the frozen concentrated orange juice into liquid orange juice. In the latter case, it is not that
obvious whether the liquid orange juice has undergone substantial transformation in Jordan.
81

In some instances substantial transformation may confer origin by itself, but with low value such as 10
percent.
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plus 2) the direct cost of processing operations performed in Jordan must not be less than
35 percent of the appraised value of the product at the time it enters into the U.S.816 The
value-added test is designed to ensure that the process of transformation has resulted in
the inclusion of a significant degree of Jordanian content. The value-added test may be
internally discriminatory when evaluated in light of Jordan's cheap labor. For example, if
a U.S. worker applies eight hours labor to an imported input, the valued-added test could
be met easily because of high productivity. A Jordanian worker, on the other hand, may
fail to raise the value of the product when employing the same amount of hours because
of low level of productivity.
The FTA requires that an exported product must be shipped directly from Jordan to
Q 1 "7

the U.S.

Technically, this requirement does not mean that the product cannot pass other

countries on its way from Jordan to the U.S. As long as the product does not enter into
the channels of commerce in other countries, the product will likely be deemed to be a
product imported directly from Jordan.818 This requirement that products be transported
directly from Jordan to the U.S. also means that Jordan is forced to transport its products
through other countries, which will likely be members of the EC. The "direct import" rule
may discriminate against Jordan, which is landlocked and distant from the U.S. In rules
816

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, I.e.
Id. at art. l.b. Imported directly means that the shipment passed from Jordan to the U.S. without passing
through an intermediate country.
18

If the bills of lading do not indicate that the U.S. is the final destination, then there are three tests that
must be met. First, the shipment must remain under the control of the customs authority of the intermediate
country. Second, the shipment does not enter into the commerce of the intermediate country except for sale
other than at retail and imported as a result of an original commercial transaction between the importer and
the producer or his agent. Third, the shipment did not go through any activity other than loading and
unloading.
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of origin, physical proximity matters, and transportation costs may have effects similar to
those of tariffs. Moreover, Jordan may lack adequate transportation infrastructure, which
may add to transaction costs.
One may argue that the cumulation rule in the FTA, which states that the costs or
values of materials produced or originated in the U.S. may add up to 15 percent of the 35
percent, may lessen the impact of 35 percent value added test. There are several points
that illustrate the abortive nature of the cumulation rule. First, firm costs and structures in
the U.S. are different from those of Jordan. In other words, the industrial structure in the
U.S. is different from Jordan. As such, it is unlikely that U.S. inputs would end up as
inputs final products of Jordan. Second, U.S. inputs may be priced at a high level that
would make it difficult for Jordanian manufactures to produce final products at a
reasonable profit margin. Finally, U.S. inputs may not be suitable quality and price for
Jordanian manufactured products. Inputs from other perhaps more efficient non-FTA
sources will be excluded because only U.S. inputs may be incorporated in the final
products destined for the U.S.
While the US-JO FTA applies the "substantial transformation" test if a product is not
wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of one party, NAFTA adopts the "tariff shift"
rule, i.e. non-originating materials must shift from one tariff heading/subheading into
another as a result of production that occurs in a NAFTA party.819 Moreover, under the

819

For the first time in the U.S., the concept of change in tariff heading was used first in the US-Canada
FTA and then NAFTA. Chapter Four (rules of origin) in NAFTA has a general rule that applies to all
products exported from one party to the other. The general rule determines that a good is considered to
originate in North America if 1) the good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the territory of one or
more of the parties to NAFTA 2) the non-originating materials used in the production of the good
undergoes an applicable "change in tariff classification" as a result of production occurring entirely in the
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US-JO FTA the value added content is at lower threshold than under NAFTA. For
example, the RVC is 62.5 percent for certain vehicles based on net cost method of the
product. The high threshold for rules of origin under NAFTA may be explained by a long
expressed concern that Asian companies were using Mexico as an "export platform,"
from which Asian parts and components would undergo "final assembly" and then be
exported to the U.S. duty-free.

Additionally, the US-JO FTA does not incorporate a de

minimis rule as in NAFTA whereby the tariff shift rule does not apply to non-originating
materials if they account for no more than 7 percent of the transaction value of the goods.

territory of one or more of the parties to NAFTA 3) the good is produced entirely in the territory of one or
more of the parties exclusively from originating materials in NAFTA region 4) the good is produced
entirely in the territory of one or more of the parties to NAFTA but one or more of the non-originating
materials provided for "as parts" of the good does not undergo a change in tariff classification because the
good 1) was imported into the territory of a party in an unassembled or a disassembled form but was
classified as an assembled good or 2) the heading for the good describes both the good itself and its parts
and is not further subdivided into subheadings, or the subheading for the good describes both the good
itself and its parts provided that the regional value content (RVC) is not less than 60 percent under
transaction value method or 50 percent under net cost method. Under the transaction value method, RVC =
TV - VNM / TV X 100. RVC is the regional value content, expressed as a percentage, TV is the transaction
value of the good adjusted to a F.O.B. basis, and VNM is the value of non-originating materials used by the
producer in the production of the good. Under the net cost method, RVC = NC - VNM / NC X 100. NC is
the net cost of the good and VNM is the value of non-originating materials used by the producer in the
production of the good. NAFTA defines the net cost as the total cost less the following specific costs: sales
promotion, marketing and after-sales service costs, royalties, shipping and packing costs, and nonallowable interest costs that are included in the total cost. In calculating the net cost, the producer may use
several allocation methods. The difference between the two RVC methods in NAFTA is that the
transaction-value method includes some costs that are excluded in the net cost method. NAFTA bases the
transaction-value method on the price actually paid or payable for a good or material, and may thus include
all costs plus profits. To compensate for this difference, the transaction value method requires a higher
percentage of RVC. NAFTA rules provide for calculations based on the total price or the total cost, with
deductions for certain cost items and/or the value of non-originating materials. See Marie Kately St. Fort, A
Comparison of the Rules of Origin in the United States under The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
(CFTA), and Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 13 Wis. Intl. L.J. 183 (1994).
820

NAFTA is best understood if it is recognized as a "preferential" trade agreement rather than a free trade
agreement. Mexico desired to make certain that NAFTA will serve as a tool for medium- and long-term
economic development and industrialization. Final assembly operations by Asian companies in Mexico are
described as "screwdriver" facilities. See David A. Gantz, Implementing the NAFTA Rules of Origin: Are
the Parties Helping or Hurting Free Trade? 12 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 367, 376 (1995).
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The second set of rules of origin in the US-JO FTA is specific to for textile and
apparel products. These specific rules of origin for textile are protectionist and were
enacted to mitigate the likely effects of textiles and apparels trading on the U.S. clothing
industry.

These rules were taken verbatim from U.S. regulations on rules of origin for

textile products.
The old U.S. rules of origin for textiles and apparel products are found in
subparagraph 9.b.iv of annex 2.2 of the US-JO FTA.822 The old U.S. rules of origin for
textiles and apparels are known as the "four operations" rule".823 Under the "four
operations"rule, a textile product will be considered a product of Jordan if the fabric is
dyed and printed in Jordan and the dyeing and printing is accompanied by two or more of
the following operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping, decating, permanent
stiffening, weighting, permanent embossing or moireing. Under the "four operations"
rule, it does not matter if the fabric is actually woven in Jordan. For example, the fabric

821

The reasons for protectionist policies in the textile sector are to be found in the importance of the textile
sector for employment policy in developed countries. Textile is a labor-intensive industry which requires
low skilled workers who if laid off could encounter hard time to find a new job. See Franklin Dehousse et
al., The EU-USA Dispute Concerning the New American Rules of Origin for Textile Products, 36 J.W.T. 1,
69(2002).
822

823

See Textiles and Textile Products, 19 C.F.R. § 12.130.(e) (i) (2005).

See Dehousse, supra n. 821, at 71. In a case of first impression, first before the U.S. CIT and then the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1987 elaborated more on the U.S. textiles country
of origin rules. The Court decided that "marginal operations" performed on the cotton fabric in Hong Kong
did not substantially transform the fabric originated in China allowing it to enter to the U.S. duty-free. An
article "usually" will not be considered to be a product of a particular country by virtue of merely having
undergone dyeing and/or printing of fabrics or yarns. The court decided that there must substantial
transformation: dyeing of fabric and printing when accompanied by two or more of the following finishing
operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping, decating, permanent stiffening, weighting, permanent
embossing, or moireing. See Mast Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 882 F. 2d. 1069 (Fed. Cir.1987) (the case involved
cotton fabric in greige form [fabric before it is bleached, dyed, or processed] from China processed in Hong
Kong. The court noticed that the textile regulation was adopted in a regulatory vacuum where ad hoc
determinations had been the rule of the day, resulting in inconsistent import treatment).
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could be woven in Syria, but the dyeing, printing, bleaching, and shrinking can occur in
Jordan.
Under the FT A, the application of the "four operations" rule is limited to silk, cotton,
man-made fiber, or vegetable fiber. Wool is excluded from the "four operations" rule, but
subject to the Breaux-Cardin rule.

Under the Breaux-Cardin rule, it may not enough for

the fabric to be dyed and printed in Jordan in some cases the constituent fibers actually
must be woven in Jordan.
The restrictive rules of origin for textiles and apparels in the US-JO FTA are not an
exceptional. NAFTA has even more restrictive rules of origin for textiles. Under
NAFTA, textiles and apparels must be produced from yarn or fiber produced in the
NAFTA region, which is known as the "yarn or fiber forward" rule.825 This means that
everything from the yarn forward up the production chain of an article must be of U.S.,
Mexican, or Canadian origin.The "yarn forward" rule restricts the ability of a

In order to offset the liberalization the U.S. took by agreeing to the WTO Agreement of Textiles and
Clothing, it hardened the rules of origin for textile. The new U.S. rules of origin for textile products, the
same as in annex 2.2 of the US-JO FTA subparagraph (a)(i), (a)(ii), or (a)(iii), under title "general
rule", states that a product is considered to originate in Jordan for example if the product is 1) "wholly
obtained" or "produced" in Jordan 2) the product is a yarn, thread, twine, cordage, rope or braiding, and the
"constituent staple" fibers are "spun" in Jordan or the continuous filament is extruded in Jordan 3) the
product is a fabric and the "constituent fibers", filaments or warns are woven, knitted, needled, tufted,
felted, entangled or transformed by another fabric-making process in Jordan "or" 4) the product is any other
textile or apparel product that is "wholly assembled" in Jordan from its component pieces.
825

See Renee T. Legierski, Out in the Cold: The Combined Effects of NAFTA and the MFA on the
Caribbean Basin Textile Industry, 2 Minn. J. Global Trade 305, 314 (1993). See David. A. Gantz, A PostUruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L.
7, 141 (1995). NAFTA establishes a Subcommittee on Labeling of Textile and Apparel products for
purposes of harmonization of textile and apparel labeling among NAFTA parties. See Joshua A. Escoto,
Technical Barriers to Trade under NAFTA: Harmonizing Textile Labeling, 7 Ann. Surv. Intl. & Comp. L.
63, 82 (2001) (for example, the U.S. in 1998 as part of the harmonization process, the FTC amended the
U.S. Textile, Wool, and Fur Regulations to harmonize and eliminate the disclosure "Fiber Content on
Reverse Side".) NAFTA contains an exception, known as tariff preference level three (TPL 3), that allows
up to 25 million square meter equivalents of apparel made from yarn originating outside NAFTA region to
be imported into the U.S. duty-free as long as the fabric is first cut in the U.S. and then sent to Mexico for
assembly before shipped again to the U.S. TPL 3 for NAFTA is scheduled to expire on Jan. 1, 2005.
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manufacturer to source its inputs.

The "yarn or fiber forward" rule may also cause

tariff escalation since the cost of using foreign yarn from a non-NAFTA party results in a
higher tariff for the entire product. The US-JO FTA adopts the "fabric forward" rule,
allowing the use of unlimited third-country yarn, fiber, or fabric components in the
making of apparels that may be eligible for preferential treatment.
Rules of origin in the US-JO FTA are difficult to use and protectionist in nature.
The most challenging aspect of these rules is the "substantial transformation" test, which
is based on U.S. common law.

The FTA rules of origin leave importers and exporters

with uncertainty. Minimum differences in manufacturing processes or techniques may
affect the treatment of products exported from Jordan. Theoretically, the "tariff shift" rule
adopted in NAFTA is easier to administer than the "substantial transformation" test in the
US-JO FTA. In the "tariff shift" rule, the customs authorities of the importing country
can look at the tariff schedule to see if non-originating materials shifted from one heading
to another as a result of the manufacturing process.829 The FTA rules of origin for textiles

826

However, the yarn forward rule may allow for third party inputs such as thread, trim, or elastic other
than major components of an article to benefit from preferential treatment.
827

828

The US-JO FTA has 12 different rules and sub-rules of origin.

See John Simpson, Reforming Rules of Origin, J. Com. 12A (Oct. 4, 1988) (the rule of substantial
transformation is too imprecise, too subjective requiring further interpretation. It is based on a case-by-case
basis. The law of origin in the U.S. is highly confused). See also Paul Demaret et al., Regionalism and
Multilateralism after the Uruguay Round: Convergence, Divergence and Interaction 349 (European Interu.
Press 1997) (the substantial transformation rule is familiar to common-law legal system by building upon
precedent, reasoning by analogy, and taking one step at a time. The rule will work in a court charged with
deciding appealed cases that will create case law upon which the rule will depend. Consequently,
substantial transformation is likely to be unworkable as a rule of origin for a free trade area). Thus, the
substantial transformation rule works well in the U.S. but may not work that well in the Jordanian legal
system.

and apparels are restrictive rules designed to protect the U.S. textiles industry.

For

certain groups of textiles and apparel products, separate rules of origin may apply for
each individual product, which makes production and exports way too complicated.
These complex rules of origin offset the benefits of tariff reduction. The US-JO FT A
does not include a de minimis rule that allows a percentage of non-originating inputs to
be incorporated in the final product without undergoing substantial manufacturing
process to confer origin. Additionally, the FTA does not provide an advance ruling for
origin purposes, which may allow exporters or importers to know the origin of their
products before trading.831 The de minimis rule and advance origin ruling could provide
more certainty for exporters and importers.
The U.S. could have adopted a more enlightened, transparent, and fairer approach
tailored to Jordan's specific circumstances. The U.S. not only adopted the "four
operations" and Breaux-Cardin rules for most textiles and apparel products, but also the
U.S. designated that textiles and apparels are subject to longer tariff phase-outs. Rules of
origin under the US-JO FTA seem to be contrary to their proclaimed purposes of
ensuring affectiveness, uniformity, consistency, and administrability.832 Fortunately,

As a matter of fact, the advantage of the harmonized tariff schedule is its classification of goods into
heading and subheading of four digits that would make it easier to certify shifting among headings as a
result of manufacturing processes.
830

One may add that changes made to U.S. rules of origin for textile and apparel products were made to
meet EC exporters' interests especially Italian designers and producers.
831

An advance ruling could start by a letter from the importer/exporter to district director of customs in
certain state inquiring on the origin of certain products. The letter would contain brief or detailed
description of the product and the manufacturing process that would be conducted on the product. It may
provide also cost information, if necessary.

article 14.2 of the US-JO FTA requires consultation, when appropriate, to comply with
the FTA's rules of origin.
One method to reduce the complexity and costs of rules of origin is to liberalize these
rules for certain products that are subject to very low or zero MFN tariff rates. Whether
these products are exported from Jordan or a non-FTA party is irrelevant because these
products will enter the U.S. at a low tariff rate. Alternatively, the U.S. or Jordan may
conduct a study of different industries and use the results as a basis to potentially allow
deviations from rules of origin of the FTA. These alternatives seem workable when
compared with other suggestions, such as lowering value-added content, creating a
government-sponsored trade manuals published via the internet, or establishing FTA
education and outreach activities to educate small and medium size Jordanian firms about
the FTA. This is because exporters still have to meet the other rules of origin
833

requirements.
J. Consultations and Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Articles 15, 16, and 17 of the US-JO FTA are related to the dispute settlement
mechanism.834 Theses articles provide an umbrella under which any dispute may be

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 14.1.
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For example, the U.S. embassy in Jordan maintains a manual on the FTA rules of origin. See Embassy
of the United States in Jordan, Rules of Origin Manual, http://www.usembassyamman.org.jo/FTA/Rulso.
pdf (Aug. 2001).
834

Articles 17 (Joint Committee), 18 (Notice and Consultation), and 19 (Dispute Settlements) of the USIsrael FTA are related to the dispute settlement mechanism. See US-Israel FTA, supra n. 701. Chapter 20
of NAFTA (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures) covers disputes settlement
under the agreement.

resolved. The provisions apply to all legal disputes arising from the FT A, with the
exception of matters involving services, which is found in article 3, and intellectual
property rights, which is found in article 4.835
1. The Joint Committee of the FTA
Articles 15 and 16 of the US-JO FTA emphasize the settlement of disputes through
consultations. The US-JO FTA establishes a permanent body, called the Joint Committee,
to review the implementation of the FTA.

The Joint Committee plays a conciliatory

role in the dispute settlement process, and any consultation to resolve a dispute that arises
under the FTA must pass through this committee.
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According to the FTA, any dispute

that is not resolved through a bilateral consultation may be referred to the Joint
Committee.838

Subparagraph 17.4.a of the FTA provides "A Party may invoke a panel under paragraph l.c of this
Article for claims arising under Article 3 [services] only to the extent that a claim arises with regard to a
commitment that is inscribed in the Party's Services Schedule to Annex 3.1 to this Agreement, but is not
inscribed in the Party's Schedule of specific commitments annexed to GATS. Such commitment may
include a market access or national treatment commitment in a sector, a horizontal commitment applicable
to a sector, or additional commitment". Additionally, subparagraph 17.4.b provides "Except as otherwise
agreed by the Parties, a Party may invoke a panel under paragraph 1 .c of this Article for claims arising
under Article 4 [intellectual property] only to the extent that the same claim would not be subject to
resolution through the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes".
836

The Joint Committee has a vast authority to review all issues pertinent to the FTA. The Joint Committee
reviews the general functioning of the agreement and the results of the agreement from experience gained
during its functioning, considers and adopts any amendment or modification to the agreement subject to the
domestic legal requirements of each party, and develops guidelines, explanatory materials, rules on the
proper implementation of the agreement, and discusses the review performed by each part as to the
environmental effects of the FTA. In summary, the Joint Committee conducts a stock-taking exercise. The
Joint Committee is composed of representatives of the parties headed by the USTR on behalf of the U.S.
and Jordan's minister that is primarily responsible for international trade, or their designees. See United
States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 15.2.
Id. at art. 15.2.c.

2. Consultations
The FTA parties are required to exert every effort to settle any contentious matter
through cooperative consultations, which are intended to be cooperative and negotiated in
nature, rather than adversarial and litigious.839 Any party can request these
consultations.

However, any party may also recourse directly to the dispute settlement

mechanism under the FTA without first undertaking bilateral consultations.
3. Standard of Review
Article 17 of the FTA provides for a formal dispute settlement mechanism if other
methods fail to resolve the matter at issue. The FTA provides the basis of the dispute
settlement mechanism and a standard of review.841 It provides for the comprehensive
coverage of matters that could fall under the dispute settlement mechanism. The
determination of whether a party has failed to carry out its obligations under the FTA
depends on the judgment of the other party bringing the claim.

SjS

Id. at. art. 17.1.b.

839

"The parties shall at all times endeavor to agree on the interpretation and application of this Agreement,
and shall make every attempt to arrive at mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter that affects the
operation of the agreement". Id. at art. 16.1.
840

The FTA requires that each party affords the other party adequate opportunity for consultations, prompt
reply to the request for consultations, and good faith in negotiating. These technical requirements are
mandated to ensure that each party has the chance to present its views and accommodate a solution within
reasonable period of time. Id. at art. 16.2.
841

The basis of a dispute under the US-JO FTA is related to the interpretation of the agreement, if either
party has failed to carry out its obligations under the agreement, or any party considers measures taken by
the other party as severely distorts the balance of trade benefits or substantially undermine fundamental
objectives of the agreement. Id. at art. 17.1.a.
This is supported by the use of the sentence that a party "considers" that the other party failed to carry
out its obligation. Id. at art. 17.1.a.ii.

The FTA covers violation and non-violation cases. A party can bring a case where
the other party takes an action that severely distorts the balance of trade benefits or
undermine the fundamental objectives of the FTA.843 Even if the one party to the FTA
takes an action that is consistent with the letter of the FTA, the other party may still claim
that that action is inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement and thus severely distort
the balance of trade benefits.
4. Establishment of a Panel and its Procedures
If the FTA Joint Committee does not resolve the dispute within 90 days, either party
may refer the matter to an ad hoc dispute settlement panel.844 The FTA does not require
notice to establish such a panel. The panel consists of three members.845 The FTA does

Id. at art. 17.1.a.iii. The language of this article is borrowed from article XXIII.b of GATT 1994.
However, article XXIII.b of GATT uses "nullification and impairment" language. Thus, it seems that the
GATT language imposes a lower bar since a measure can nullify or impair a benefit though not severely
distort the balance of trade benefits. In considering the application of the non-violation provision, it is
important to note that it must be interpreted narrowly as set under GATT practice. In order to make a
successful claim under the non-violation provision, a FTA party must demonstrate the following elements:
(1) taking of a measure by another party, (2) a benefit accruing under the FTA, and (3) sever distortion of
the benefit or substantial undermining of the fundamental objectives of the FTA resulting from taking of
the measure. The GATT panel in the oilseed case recognized that article XXIII: 1(b) serves mainly to
protect the balance of tariff concessions. Furthermore, it confirmed that the non-violation nullification or
impairment remedy should be approached with caution and treated as an exceptional concept. The panel
justified its reasoning on the ground that the idea underlying article XXIII is that the improved competitive
opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by
measures prohibited by the GATT but also by measures consistent with GATT. See GATT Panel Report,
European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds
and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991). Non-violation
cases not only covers tariff concessions but also other cases. See GATT Panel Report, United StatesRestrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar- Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Waiver
and Under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.)
at 228, para. 5.21(1990).
844

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 17. I.e.
Each party appoints one member and the two panelists will appoint the third one who will serve as a
chairman of the panel. Id. at art. 17.1 .c.
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not prescribe a time limit within which the panel should be called or what happens in the
case when the parties do not agree on the panel's membership. However, according to the
FT A, within 180 days of the entry into force of the FTA the parties should develop rules
for the selection and conduct of the members of the panel and model rules of procedure
for such panels.846 By creating these rules, the FTA parties can determine the
qualifications, expertise, nationality, and remuneration for panelists serving on a panel.
Model rules of procedures may include policies, practices, and procedures for receiving
initial and rebuttal written submissions, and how oral hearings will be conducted before a
panel.
The FTA dispute settlement panel issues only one non-binding final report.

The

panel's report includes "findings of facts" and a determination as to whether either party
has failed to carry out its obligations under the FTA or that a measure taken by either
party severely distorts the balance of trade benefits or substantially undermines the
fundamental objectives of the FTA.848 If the panel finds that either party has failed to
honor its obligation, it may provide recommendations as to how to resolve the dispute.
However, such recommendations depend on the request of both parties. The panel has

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 17.3. In the FTA text, the
article number is "17.2", which is followed immediately by 17.4, instead of "17.3". This discrepancy might
be response to a typographical error.
847

It is unfortunate setback that the FTA does not require an interim report issued by the panel and
submitted to the parties for comments before it issues a final report. It is important to issue an interim
report because the panel would estoppel the parties from coming backing and accuse the panel of
misstating their arguments, ignoring their point of view, or denying them the right to present their
argument. Therefore, the panel by issuing an interim report would give the parties once and for all the last
chance to present their comments.
Id. at art. 17.1.d.

only the authority to make a finding of whether a party has failed to carry out its
obligation, but it does not have the authority to determine hdw either party would bring
its laws or regulations into compliance with the FTA.
The FTA requires the Joint Committee resolve disputes taken into account the panel
report when appropriate.

In most cases, the panel report will be taken into

consideration because it represents an objective and articulate decision that may help to
resolve the dispute. Further, due to the publicity surroundingthe panel decision, the Joint
Committee may face pressure to comply with it or, at minimum, take the report under
review.
If the Joint Committee does not resolve the dispute within 30 days from the date the
panel presented its report, the affected party is entitled to take any "appropriate" and
"commensurate" measures.850 The FTA establishes the right to take countermeasures
unilaterally and without authorization of the Joint Committee. However, the right to take
countermeasures is contingent upon the exhaustion of alternative methods, including
consultations, panel procedures, and joint committee deliberations.
To ensure transparency, a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and
Jordan requires the publication of parties' submission to the panel, publicity of oral
hearings before the panel, the acceptance and consideration of amicus curia briefs, and
releasing the panel's report to the public at the earliest possible time,

hi theory, the

S4

* Id. at art. 17.2.a.

850

The use of the term "commensurate" after "appropriate" is to emphasize that the measure taken must be
in proportion to the violation. The term "commensurate", which is a quantitative term, is hard to quantify
practically. Id. at art. 17.2.b.
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dispute settlement process takes approximately nine months to reach a conclusion.

The

table below illustrates the timeline of the dispute settlement process under the US-JO
FTA.

60 days

Bilateral Consultations

90 days
shorten this period)

Joint Committee Consultations (It can agree to extend or

90 days

Panel Report

30 days

Joint Committee Endeavor after Panel Report

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism under
the FTA because there is no enough data that shows how many disputes are settled
through consultations, brought before panels, or withdrawn. The absence of such data
indicates that the dispute settlement system of the FTA is under-utilized. One reason for
this may be that Jordan cannot retaliate against the U.S in the case of a violation.
However, one could argue that Jordan could retaliate against the U.S. by disregarding the

851

The US-JO FTA adopted the Appellate Body approach of the WTO by ruling that WTO dispute
resolution panels may accept amicus briefs from well-monied, western-type of non-governmental
organizations. See Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibition of Shrimp and
Certain Shrimp Products, supra note 138, at 82, 100 (The Appellate Body decided in that case that a panel
has the "discretionary" authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted
to it, whether requested by a panel or not). Under the FTA, a panel is "obliged" to accept and consider
amicus curia of whatever type filed by individuals, legal persons, and non-governmental organizations.
See USTR, Memorandum of Understanding on Transparency in Dispute Settlement Under the Agreement
Between the United States and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, para. 2.c,
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/memodis.pdf (accessed Apr. 29, 2003). For more on
amicus curiae see Padideh Ala'i, Judicial Lobbying At the WTO: The Debate over the Use of Amicus
Curiae Briefs and the U.S. Experience, 24 Fordham Intl. L.J. 62, 67, 84, 86 (2000).
852

It is not unusual for specified dispute settlement process deadlines to be disregarded in certain cases for
many factors such as the significance of the case, political ramification, and lack of resources to draft panel
reports on time.
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protection of intellectual property rights in the the FTA becase the FTA is silent on the
sectors in which either party may retaliate.

K. General and Security Exceptions under the US-JO FTA
The FTA includes exceptions that are the same as those found in the WTO. The
FTA negotiators, especially the U.S. negotiators, did not consider it necessary to modify
the existing WTO exception rules. The FTA parties did depart from the WTO language
QC-5

by specifically referencing to "living and non-living" exhaustible natural resources.
However, by inserting the language of the WTO into the FTA, the U.S. adopted new
developments in international trade, which is articulated by the WTO panel and Appellate
Body decisions.854
The FTA allows the U.S. or Jordan to adopt or enforce measures necessary to protect
public morals or human, animal, or plant life or health.

The FTA, also, allows a

member to adopt a measure that "relates" to the conservation of exhaustible natural
853

Id. at 86.

See GATT Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990), GATT Panel Report, United States- Restriction
on Imports on Tuna, Sep. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) 155 (1991), Appellate Body Report, United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), Appellate
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R
(Oct. 12, 1998), and Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 21, 2001). These cases involve article XX
exceptions of the GATT 1994. The decisions of these cases erupted a volcanic controversy toward the
WTO. For discussion of these cases, except the Asbestos case, see Padideh Ala'i, Free Trade or
Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to
Trade Liberalization, 14 Am. U. Intl. L. Rev. 1129, 1171 (1999) (arguing that the Appellate Body proposed
a balancing test to be applied on a case-by-case basis between article XX exceptions and the WTO goals of
market access and trade liberalization.. .even though supporters of article XX interests may have lost the
case, the prospects look good for winning the war).
855

Other exceptions include measures relate to the importation or exportation of gold, the products of
prison labor, the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archeological value. See United
States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 17.I.e.
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resources if this measure is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption. The US-JO FTA states that article XX (g) of GATT 1994
applies to "living and non-living" exhaustible natural resources.856 The U.S. in the FTA
effectively adopted the "not static but evolutionary" test, which was developed by the
Appellate Body decision in the United States-Shrimp case.857
The FTA also encompasses several security exceptions. The FTA allows either party
to take measures which that it deems necessary for the protection of its "essential security
interests". In a post September 11, 2001 world trade, the U.S. may wish to invoke the
security exceptions of the FTA such as by imposing export/import control programs. The U.S may consider such restrictive measures necessary for the protection of its essential
i

security interest when they are taken in a "time of war" or during an "emergency in
QCO

international relations".

The U.S. may also restrict exports, through the use of million

Id. at art. 12.1. By comparison, article XX (g) of the GATT 1994 does not define whether a measure
applies to "living and non-living" exhaustible natural resources.
857

In the United States-Shrimp case, the appellees, India, Pakistan, and Thailand, argued that the term
"exhaustible" refers to finite resources such as minerals rather than biological or renewable resources.
However, the Appellate Body was not convinced by the appellees' argument. It stated that exhaustible
natural resources are not limited to mineral or non-living natural resources. Living resources are just as
finite as petroleum. The Appellate Body states that "the words of article XX (g) were actually drafted more
than 50 years ago". It supported it conclusion by citing the preamble of the WTO Charter which
incorporates the concept of "sustainable development" while GATT 1994 does not incorporate such a term.
Therefore, the generic term "natural resources" is not static in its content or reference but is rather by
definition "revolutionary". See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, supra n. 854, at 127-130.
858

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has issued approximately 150 "no load" orders prohibiting
shippers from loading oceangoing cargo bound for the U.S. due to inadequate manifest information, under
a new rule requiring 24-hour advance cargo notification before lading. The department is planning to apply
the same rule with shipping companies for the air, rail and trucking industries. Under the Trade Act of
2002, the 24-hour rule requires that sea carriers and non-vessel operating common carriers provide
complete cargo manifests 24 hours prior to loading the cargo in a foreign port through an approved
electronic data interchange system. The U.S. adopted several measures to insure food security against agroterrorism. See DHS Official Defends 24-Hour Rule, Cites 150 Orders Barring Cargo Unloading, 20 Intl.
Trade Rep. (BNA) 13 (Mar. 27, 2003). See also U.S. Trading Partners Concerned With Rules for Food

theoretical operations per second (MTOP) thresholds, which relate to high-performance
computers used for weather services, software design, and microprocessor technology to
Jordan because such technology could be used for military purposes, missile-related
equipment and technology. The U.S. may also wish to restrict thiodiglycol chemicals,
which are used in the production of textiles and if combined with other acids could form
mustard gas or kidney machine triggers that can be used to trigger nuclear bombs.

Registration Under the Bioterrorism Act, 20 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1158 (July 10, 2003) (A regulation has
been established under the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 that would require foreign food-handling facilities that
manufacture, process, pack, or hold food destined for animal or human consumption to register with the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration by Dec. 2003. The registration would allow the Food and Drug
Administration to act quickly in responding to a threatened or actual terrorist attack on U.S. food supply by
giving the Administration information about all facilities handling U.S.-bound food products. Additionally,
the rules require each facility to employ an agent in the U.S. to serve as link between the firm and the FDA.
The rules require each facility to notify the FDA of the manufacturer, the grower, the country of origin, the
estimated quantity, and the shipping country. Each facility will receive a confidential facility number. The
cost of hiring an agent will be on average $ 1,000). The Food and Drug Administration requires recordkeeping system and prior notice electronically of food imports 8 hours before arrival by sea. Additionally,
the U.S. developed the Container Security Initiative (CSI) which requires the Customs service to pre-screen
sea cargo containers bound for the U.S. at certain large ports such as port of Naples. CSI is a reciprocal
program giving participating countries the option of sending their customs officers to countries seaports to
pre-screen cargo containers bound for their countries. In 2004, Dubai Ports became the first Middle Eastern
port to participate in the CSI. To improve sea container security, the U.S. created a pilot program,
Operation Safe Commerce, which would develop a technology to follow the movement of container
through the supply chain. It also developed Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program. It is a voluntary government industry partnership, with some 7,000 members, designed to
beef up the security of the U.S. supply chain industry from factory to loading docks. Certified companies
under C-TPAT program receive reduced number of inspections at the border. They can also benefit from
expedited customs processing programs such as Free and Secure Trade Program (FAST) in which goods
are being processed quickly at select border sites in designated traffic lanes. The U.S. is adopting "one face
at the border" initiative which includes hiring new officers that will have the combined duties of
immigration, customs inspectors, and agricultural inspectors. Under the Maritime Transportation Security
Act, port facilities must receive Coast Guard approval letters for security plans otherwise risking partial or
total shutdown. The U.S. is also codifying the "known shippers" program, as part of securing air cargo,
thus inspecting some 3 percent of the U.S. air cargo. For Jordanian producers, these rules, which are
designed to intercept terrorists and weapons, might be costly, burdensome, complex, and might divert
scarce resources for production to meeting these requirements. For example, Jordan may need to purchase
or borrow X-rays machines to screen the interior of containers without impeding the flow of trade. It seems
that these rules are intended to create "fortress" America.

L. Miscellaneous Articles of the US-JO FTA
One of the difficult questions regarding the FTA is how to define its relationship
with other international agreements.859 The FTA does not explicitly stipulate that it
prevails over other agreements in case of conflicts.860 The U.S. and Jordan could have
agreed on a clear conflict clause, similar to article 104 of NAFTA. The lack of a conflict
clause may be interpreted to mean that the FTA negotiators were occupied with the
substantive provisions of the agreement rather than what could had been deemed a
superficial issue.
The FTA covers economic cooperation and technical assistance between the U.S. and
Jordan.861 The language on economic coopertaion was drafted broadly. It does not carry
any specific methods on how to foster economic cooperation between the U.S. and
Jordan. Even more, the provision does not carry any legal obligation and has no timeline
within which thic coopertation must be implemented. It is vague and exhortatory as it
does not list specific and detailed means by which the U.S. will help Jordan through the

Article 1 of the FTA provides that the Parties reaffirm their respective rights and obligations with
respect to each other under existing bilateral and multilateral agreements to which both Parties are party,
including the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)". See
United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 1.2.
860

This is contrary to the US-Israel FTA which provides, under article 3, that its language shall govern in
the case of any inconsistency with other agreements, such as the GATT, though the parties reaffirmed their
respective rights and obligations under the GATT, which would govern any issue not addressed by the
FTA. See US-Israel FTA, supra n. 701, art.3. Article 103.2 of NAFTA states that in case of inconsistency
between NAFTA and other agreements, NAFTA will prevail to the extent of inconsistency. As such,
NAFTA prevails in case of inconsistency with other agreements including GATT.
861

The FTA states, in part, that to realize the objectives of the FTA and contribute to the implementation of
its provisions "the parties declare their readiness to foster economic cooperation". The FTA also states that
"in view of Jordan's developing status, and the size of its economy and resources, the United States shall
strive to furnish Jordan with economic technical assistance, as appropriate". See United States (U.S.)Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art, 13.

provision of economic technical assistance.

Moreover, the only assistance potentially

offered by the U.S. under this provision is "economic technical assistance". Any
economic technical assistance offered by the U.S. is qualified by the term "as
appropriate".
The FTA considers annexes and schedules as an integral part of the FTA. However,
the FTA also has many side decisions and understandings.863 These understandings and
decisions raise questions about how to define their relationship with the main text of the
FTA and how to resolve any conflict with the main provisons of the agreement. Taking
into consideration the language of the FTA, which makes only annexes and schedules as
part of the FTA, these side understandings and decisions have an ambiguous legal value
because it does not seem that they are integral of the main document. These side
understandings may be political documents and not legal texts. The advantage of such
side understandings may be that they can easily be amended when circumstances change.

Clearly, one may argue that leaving paragraph 13.b without specificity would work better rather than
being ceteris paribus. It ought to be vague to remain flexible and useful because it could be adapted to
necessary changes. However, lack of specificity in paragraph 13.b lends itself to uncertainty and insecurity.
The reason for this uncertainty is the lack of test that would guide the parties leading to discretionary
interpretation.
863

The US-JO FTA has 7 side understandings and decisions. See Memorandum of Understanding on Issues
Related to the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Memorandum of Understanding on Transparency
in Dispute Settlement, Joint Statement on WTO Issues, Joint Statement on Technical Environmental
Cooperation, Side Letters on Marketing Approval of Pharmaceutical Products, Side Letter on GATS article
5, and Letters Designating Entry Into Force Date, at <http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/USJordanFTA.shtml>. Many of these side decisions and joint statements declare some aspiration. The Side
Letters on Marketing Approval of Pharmaceutical Products and the Side Letter on GATS Article 5 are
notable exceptions. These letter provide that the understanding concerning marketing approval of
pharmaceutical products and the understanding on GATS article 5 be treated as an integral part of the FTA.
See USTR, Side Letter on Marketing Approval of Pharmaceutical Products, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/
eu-med/middleeast/IPRcb.pdf (accessed Mar. 30, 2004). As such, based on the suggestion of the U.S.,
marketing approval of pharmaceutical products is given priority over the Joint Statement on Technical
Environmental Cooperation and other side letters.
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All references to GATT 1994 in the FTA refer to GATT 1994, which was in effect
on the date of entry into force of the FTA.864 The US-JO FTA does not take into account
any further clarifications or modifications to GATT 1994, which would come as a result
of concluding further trade negotiation rounds under the auspices of the WTO. Therefore,
the parties have limited the scope of the FTA to the existing rights and obligations of
GATT 1994. Further, the FTA operates indefinitely. However, the FTA does have a
contract-out provision, which provides for the right of each party to terminate the FTA
after giving a six-month notice.

5

The FTA does not specify whether either party can

partially or totally terminate the agreement. The FTA does not impose any requirements
that must be included in the written notice to justify the termination of the FTA.

III. Implementations and Expectations
This section will attempt to quantify some of the costs and benefits associated with
the implementation of the US-JO FTA. Before the conclusion the US-JO FTA, Jordan
was designated as eligible beneficiary country under the U.S. GSP program.

However,

the GSP program is authorized only for a specific time, but is subject to renewal by
legislation. The range of products under the GSP is also limited. Moreover, the GSP has a
competitive need limits, which means that the GSP stops after the value of goods shipped

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 18.4.
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Article 2205 of NAFTA also provides the right of each party to withdraw from the agreement upon six
months notice.
866

Jordan is still an eligible beneficiary country under the U.S. GSP program even after the conclusion of
the US-JO FTA. See U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, note 4 (2003). This is contrary to Mexico which
lost its GSP status after the conclusion of NAFTA. However, it is unclear if Jordan would still be eligible
for GSP scheme once the FTA phases in completely in 2010.
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to the U.S. from a country reaches a certain limit, which changes annually, unless a
country-specific waiver has been granted. On the other hand, the US-JO FTA is a
permanent arrangement that has wide coverage. Therefore, between the GSP program
and the US-JO FTA, Jordan has now two tracks for presumably preferential treatment.
However, the US-JO FTA is the most viable track, and Jordan's GSP status may
ultimately become irrelevant. The FTA would provide certainty that may attract more
investors and better develop markets. Moreover, the FTA may provide the U.S. with a
reciprocal market access in Jordan.
As Jordan opens its market as a result of the FTA, it has become an export and
import destination vis-a-vis the U.S. goods. At the time the US-JO FTA entered into
force in 2001, Jordan had a trade deficit with the U.S. As of 2004, Jordan ran trade
surplus with the U.S. This drastic shift in trade balance with the U.S. has been in mainly
in the textiles and apparel sector, a traditional labor-intensive industry (manufacturing
processes are sewing and tailoring) with limited capital and technology (technology is a
sewing machine).867
Although it is too early to read much from time-series data, the trade surplus with the
U.S. reveals certain characteristics. The trade surplus with the U.S. is modest in dollar
value ($8 million in 2002, $181 million in 2003, and $541 million in 2004). U.S. exports
to Jordan also have been relatively constant. In 1993, total U.S. exports were $360.6
million, in 1995 were $335.3 million, in 2001 were $339 million, and exports reached a

See Appendix 1, table 9, infra page 338. Trade balance statistics are regularly published by the Bureau
of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. For example, the U.S. knows on a monthly basis whether it has
a favorable or unfavorable trade balance with Jordan.
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peak of $552.1 million in 2004.868 This may reflect the fact that U.S. exporters do not
have much interest in Jordan's market because it is not a large import market with high
profitability. Another interpretation for the constant U.S. exports to Jordan is the fact that,
currently, Jordan has a high unemployment rate ranging between 15-20 percent. Further,
17-30 percent of population is below the poverty line, measured as the amount of income
needed to purchase basic necessities. Jordan's GDP is a fraction of that of the U.S.
Simply put, a Jordanian with an income lowest in the Middle East may not be in a
position to buy U.S. products.

However, as Jordan increases its exports to the U.S., its

economy may expand and its people may gain purchasing power for U.S. goods.
Moreover, once Jordan fully implements its commitments under the FT A, one may see a
rise in U.S. exports to Jordan.
The major sector in which Jordan has its trade surplus with the U.S. is in apparel
products. Top apparel exports to the U.S. include some basic higher-volume apparel
articles such as men's shirts, women's trousers, sweaters, ladies' outfits and blouses, and
sportswear.

There are a few high value-added apparel articles such as men's wool suits

and jackets. To improve this sector, however, Jordan must create a structure to help
manufacturers focus on higher-end products.

If one would compute retained U.S. imports into Jordan (imports minus re-exports), U.S. exports could
be lower in volume. At any rate, the increase in Jordan's imports from the U.S. in 2004 is likely the result
of tariff reduction under the FTA. It remains to be documented whether increase of Jordan's import from
the U.S. was due to high domestic demand or substitution of domestically produced products.
869

See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Jordan 20, 27 (2003).
See Appendix 1, table 10, infra page 339.

Jordan's exports to the U.S. are mamly within the woven or knit apparel orbit and do
not advance into other non-traditional export sectors, including light manufacturing
industries, cultural industries, ethnic food industries, or olive oil production. In 2004, knit
or crochet apparel articles and accessories captured 60.60 percent of total U.S. imports
871

from Jordan.

This may mean that unless Jordan moves to other sectors, it might be

displaced by more efficient, vertically-integrated producers of textiles and apparel
877

products from India, Pakistan, and China.

In several major garment categories,

including men's or boy's cotton knit shirts, shirts, and trousers, China currently has only
a small share of the U.S. market because of tight quota constraints. However, once these
constraints are lifted, China is likely to capture a larger portion of the U.S. garment
import market, which is worth more than $70 billion annually.
The main U.S. exports to Jordan are capital goods and farm products. These exports
cannot be produced in Jordan, and they have to be imported because they are necessary
for the industrial structure of Jordan. The top exports in 2004 list are: cereals, which
capture a 16.68 percent share; vehicles, except those used for railway or tramways, which
are 12.10 percent of exports; nuclear reactors, boilers, and machinery, which amount to
11.99 percent of exports; electric machinery, sound equip., and TV equip., which capture
a 8.70 percent share; and aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof, which capture a 6.68
871

This is followed by not knit apparel articles and accessories which captured 26.87 percent of total U.S.
imports from Jordan and of precious metal and stones which had 8.35 percent share (on file with author).
872

See William Armbruster, China Syndrome, J. Com. 38, 39 (Nov. 18, 2002) (China is likely to suck up
the apparel business. The Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Taiwan can kiss their
apparel and textile exports good-bye. U.S. importers [such as J.C. Penney Co., Liz Claiborne Inc., and Polo
Ralph Lauren Corp.] may shift all their sourcing to China since dealing with few vendors is easier for
product quality control, on-time delivery, and compliance with security regulations. China's reputation for
quality, price competitiveness, and efficient supply chains make it attractive supplier).

percent share.

The other major export item is cereals (e.g. wheat, meslin, rice, corn,

buck wheat, millet, canary seed, and grain sorghum), which could fall under U.S. food
aid programs (donation, food for peace, and food for progress) or export credits and
intermediate export credit programs, such as General Service Manager programs "GSM1, GSM-2". These programs seem to be tailored for Jordan because it experiences a
shortage of foreign exchange earnings and difficulty meeting its food needs through
normal commercial channels. Other U.S. high-value added exports are aircraft parts,
which are likely to be purchases from the Chicago-based Boeing company.
In 1996, among 225 countries, Jordan ranked 132 on the list of U.S. imports from its
trading partners.874 By 2004, it scaled up to rank 69 capturing 0.07 of total U.S. import
market.875 On the export side, in 1996, Jordan ranked 72 as a destination for U.S.
exports.876 By 2004, it scaled up to rank 70 capturing 0.07 of total U.S. exports
worldwide.877 Although, these statistics are impressive, one certainly would not say that
the results are "unbelievable".

873

For the years 2001-2002 cereals were the top U.S. export product to Jordan (on file with author).

874

In 1997, Jordan ranked 138. In 1998, it went down the list to rank 146. The following five years Jordan
enhanced its rank. In 1999, it ranked 131, 2000 ranked 123, in 2001 ranked 95, in 2002 ranked 73, and in
2003 it ranked 72. (on file with author).
875

In an ascending order, Canada, China, Mexico, and Japan captured more than 50 percent of U.S. market.
Israel, in the 2004 list, ranked 20 with 0.99 market share. Id.
876

In 1997, Jordan ranked 72, 1998 ranked 75, 1999 ranked 81, 2000 ranked 75, 2001 ranked 74, 2002
ranked 73, and in 2003 it ranked 66. Israel, in the 2004 list, ranked 19 with 1.12 share of total U.S. exports.
Id.
877

In ascending order, Canada, Mexico, Japan, U.K, and China ranked the top destinations for U.S. exports
capturing about 50 percent of total U.S. exports. Id. This shows that Canada and Mexico are naturally born
trading partners.
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The majority of merchandise trade between the U.S. and Jordan is seaborne trade,
transported by vessel (sea) rather than air. Of all of the U.S. imports from Jordan in 2001,
which amounted to $228,970,856, $187,587,984 worth of goods were imported by vessel
while $35,581,880 worth of goods were transported by air.87 This means that goods take
a longer time to be transported over the 6,000 mile journey across the Atlantic. Estimates
indicate that the average shipping time between New York City, N.Y. and Aqaba, Jordan
is three to four weeks. Among all the 361 U.S. ports that receive approximately seven
million containers a year, more goods pass through the New York City, N.Y customs port
area than any other customs district of entry in the U.S., including the Port of L.A, which
is the largest U.S. container complex. In 2003, of the $673,466,552 in total U.S. imports
from Jordan, $406,776,222 passed through the New York City, N.Y customs port.879 This
is followed by Charleston, SC, Los Angeles, CA, and Savannah, GA. The need may arise
to diversify the routing of Jordan's cargo.
Statistical data shows that trade in merchandise, in the on whole, more important for
Jordan than for the U.S. It also shows that the U.S. is a high technology and agricultural
exporting country. In contrast, Jordan's economy may be characterized by its abundant
cheap labor. As noted earlier, Jordan's main exports to the U.S. are textile and apparel
products. Comparative advantage proves that Jordan is better at exporting textiles and
apparel products, while the U.S. is better at exporting machinery and agricultural

878

In 2002, of $ 412,234,634 total U.S. imports from Jordan $ 323,497,772 were imported by vessel while
$ 83,059,067 were imported by air. In 2003, of 673,466,552 total U.S. imports from Jordan $ 519,734,996
were imported by vessel while $ 149,942,601 imported by air. The U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of Trade
Data Services (on file with author).
879

Id.
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products. Data is not available regarding the trade in services between the U.S. and
Jordan under the FTA, though it is an important sector. The positive trade balance for
merchandise under the FTA may actually be in stark contrast to the service trade balance.
Additionally, there are no data on the costs and benefits of the intellectual property
provisions of the FTA.
Data alone, however does not provide a parameter to grade the US-JO FTA. The data
may not take into account political and economic factors, such as the political turmoil in
the Middle East or the full-fledged implementation of Jordan's commitments under the
WTO. It may be difficult to distinguish the economic effects of the FTA from those of
other economic and political forces that evolved around the same time as when the FTA
came into force. Moreover, the currently available data, which reflects only partial
implementation of the US-JO FTA, already shows the relative positive impact of the
FTA. It is impossible to determine whether the FTA alone has produced the increase in
trade between the parties and and lead to certain other improvements in Jordan's
economy.880 Also, it is difficult to estimate the full impact of FTA in absolute numbers.
The FTA is part of a dynamic trade integration process whose fruits are to ripen over
decades. Some economic indicators, however, already show limited gains, more
prospects for expanding markets for both countries, and increases in foreign investments.
There are other non-quantifiable benefits for the US-JO FTA that may not be directly
related to it. In 2002 the U.S. imposed high tariffs of up to 30 percent on steel imports.

For example, it would be an interesting to determine whether Jordan's exchange rate has been the
primary factor for trade performance since Jordan's Dinar is pigged to the U.S. dollar. At times, when U.S.
dollar is depreciating (cheap) exports become more competitive and imports become expensive. Thus,
Jordan is likely to benefit from cheap U.S. dollar.
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Israel, Canada, Mexico, and Jordan were excluded from this tariff measure. They are the
only countries that have FTAs with the U.S.881 On the other hand, during 1981-1985,
imports of steels increased forty fold from newly exporting countries. These imports,
which came from Jordan, consisted of black plate and galvanized sheet and strip.882 At
that time, Jordan could had been the subject of voluntary export restraint agreement. In
that case, the US-JO FTA would have provided an economic shelter for Jordan in the
future that otherwise would have not been available.
One should not lose sight concerning of the contribution of other special U.S.
programs, such as GSP and Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) programs, to the growth
of exports to Jordan.883 This data is important to determine the success of the FTA. One
could try to assert, following China's Deng Xiaoping's dictum, that "it does not matter
whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mouse," which means that the
data whether from the FTA, GSP, or QIZs, is not important so long as there is increase in
trade. However, the data reveals something more than simply impressive statistics.

881

The US-JO FTA states in article 10.8 that, in global safeguards, a party, the U.S. in the steel case at
hand, may exclude imports originating in the other party [Jordanjfrom safeguard measures, if such imports
are not a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof. The USITC recommended the exclusion of
Jordan from its application of the safeguard remedy on steel imports. Hence, the U.S. president, in a
presidential proclamation, excluded Jordan in addition to Israel, Mexico, and Canada. All have a free trade
agreement with the U.S. In rebuttal of the complainants' arguments regarding the issue of parallelism, the
U.S. stated that there is "virtually no imports of steel" from Jordan. The panel in the steel case decided that
the U.S. acted inconsistently with its obligations by including all steel imports in its safeguard investigation
but excluding imports from Israel, Jordan, Mexico, and Canada in applying the safeguard measure.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,
WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003). The WTO Appellate Body supported the panel's finding on parallelism.
See WTO Appellate Body Upholds Findings against U.S. Safeguard Tariffs on Steel, 20 Intl. Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1863 (Nov. 13, 2003) (the safeguard measure did not meet the parallel treatment for FTA partners).
See United States International Trade Commission, Monthly Reports on the State of the Steel Industry;
Publication No. 1942 (Jan. 1987).
883

QIZs is a trade arrangement between the U.S., Israel, and Jordan whereby products manufactured in
Jordan with certain percentage of input from Israel can enter the U.S. duty-free.
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Singling out the effects of the GSP and QIZs may lead to different conclusions. The
combined value of shipments under all special/non-special U.S. programs from Jordan
was $412,234,634 in 2002. Of this total, no exports were reported under the agreement on
trade in pharmaceutical products, $5,977,246 worth of goods from the GSP scheme,
$12,600,834 worth of goods from the US-JO FTA, and $369,455,485 worth of goods
from the QIZs program.884 In 2003, the combined value of shipments under all
special/non-special U.S. programs from Jordan increased to $673,466,552. Of this total,
$42,892 resulted from the agreement on trade in pharmaceutical products, $35,010,918
resulted from the GSP scheme, $27,919,294 from the US-JO FTA, and $563,928,229
from the QIZs program.885
The US-JO FTA did not benefit all sectors of the Jordanian economy. Few
companies actually benefit from the FTA. Other companies may be ill-prepared to benefit
from the FTA due to lack of marketing and support skills in the international market. The
number of Jordanians who benefit from the FTA is small. Pro-FTA camp focuses on
export growth and FDI, while others focus on growth in wage and per capita GDP
growth. Conversely, if the economic situation remains unchanged or even worsens, as the
case maybe, the FTA may not be seen as a success.

See The U.S. Census Bureau, supra n. 878.
885

The local pharmaceutical industry seems to be in a promising position. Exports quadrupled from none in
2002 to $ 42,892 in 2003. These exports are likely to be chemical additives or substances used for
medicine.

Conclusion
The US-Jordan FTA was designed both to spur Jordan's economic development and
to cement strategic ties between the U.S. and Jordan for geopolitical reasons. The US-JO
FTA was concluded swiftly while other trade agreements such as the US-Israel FTA and
NAFTA took more time to conclude. The US-JO FTA is much shorter than other
agreements. NAFTA is more than a two thousand pages long and contain two thousand
articles, whereas the US-JO FTA contains twenty pages of typewritten text, twenty-two
pages of annexes, understandings, joint statement, and side letters (excluding schedules
of commitments in services and goods).
The apparent assumption is that the US-JO FTA is not an agreement between equals,
politically or economically. Jordan entered into the deal with a heavyweight trade player
(or better called a hegemon), the U.S., with the former's eyes open on the lucrative U.S.
market. Jordan tried to secure as much assurance as possible that its interests will be dealt
with fairly. In practice, however, how Jordan is treated depends on the goodwill and the
strength of the heavyweight trade player. The U.S. in the FTA did not tak the interests of
Jordan into account. Although the FTA in many parts refers to "the Parties" or "each
Party," the reference is mostly directed to Jordan; if laws get changed as a result of the
US-JO FTA, it is most likely to be those of Jordan.
In many parts, the US-JO FTA reflects the laws and views of the U.S. For example,
the rules of origin for textiles and apparels, the definition of a substantial cause for
purposes of safeguard measures, anti-circumvention of technological products designed
to protect intellectual property rights, e-commerce, visa commitments, amicus curiae
briefs, and living and non-living resources for the purpose of natural resource definition,
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come from pre-existing U.S. laws and regulations. The approach adopted in drafting the
US-JO FTA is a "cut and paste" approach in which U.S. laws were incorporated into the
agreement with few changes. To adopt a contract law language, the entire US-JO FTA
was a contract of adhesion or an unconscionable contract, which was submitted by the
U.S. as a fait accompli. Trade negotiations require political will and administrative efforts
and skills, which are finite resources for Jordan. The US-JO FTA was negotiated with a
major power that obviously had its own objectives, while Jordan played the role of
demandeur. Jordan must be a "rule-maker", rather than a "rule-taker".
The US-JO FTA is a WTO-Plus agreement. The parties entered into asymmetrical
commitments. The two clearest examples of this are provisions relating to the service
sector and intellectual property. In the service sector, Jordan liberalized certain sectors
that previously had been restricted. Moreover, Jordan made further obligations with
respect to intellectual property that went beyond those made under the TRIPs Agreement.
These two sectors represent deeper integration, harmonization, or Americanization of
Jordan's intellectual property regime of domestic policies.
The US-JO FTA does not include an accession provision for other Middle Eastern
countries.886 As such, the U.S. would have to negotiate with every Arab country for a
separate FTA. The experience and lessons learned from the US-JO FTA must serve as a
base for a new approach for negotiating the proposed US-Middle East FTA. Due to the
economic and political disparities between many of the Middle East countries and

On the other hand, NAFTA sets the possibility that other countries may join it. Article 2204 states that
"any country or group of countries" may accede to NAFTA. Thus, NAFTA's accession provision is not
geographically confined. As a matter of fact Argentina, would-be independent Quebec of Canada, Chile,
Turkey, and Britain at one point showed an interest in joining NAFTA.
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disparity in the degree of liberalization achieved by those countries, the US-JO FTA may
not be the best template for a regional trade agreement. The US-JO FTA is not a "onesize-fits-all" agreement. The U.S. proposed agreements with some Arab countries may
require variations that take into consideration the different level of development in each
country. The question then would be how to qualify these different FT As if, for example,
they exclude certain sectors from coverage, adopt different coverage approaches, such as
what occurred with the coverage of agriculture under the US-Morocco FTA, or tailor the
margin of preference.

Arab countries may feel motivated by economic pressure created

by the formation of the FTA to join or form new FTAs.888

See U.S., Morocco Fail to Wrap up FTA Negotiations, To Resume Early Next Year, Inside U.S. Trade
(Inside Wash. Publishers) 7 (Dec. 12, 2003) (The U.S. and Morocco differ on market access in agriculture
in which Morocco has a half million small wheat farmers. Morocco negotiators refused to accept
substantial market access of wheat, red meat, chicken parts and legumes. The U.S. industry opposes the
exclusion of these products). The U.S. demands for greater market in agricultural products to level the
playing field with the EC that has played larger role in the Moroccan market. As a result of agricultural
concessions under the US-Morocco FTA, poor displaced Moroccan farmers may want to replace their crops
with hashish and other soft drugs so as to reclaim Morocco's old title as the largest exporter of hashish to
meet the EC's lucrative market. Alternatively, displaced Moroccan farmers can work as extras for the
domestic and foreign film industry especially that the FTA allows Morocco to continue subsidizing its film
industry. The US-Bahrain FTA would eliminate virtually all trade restrictions between the two parties as
soon as it takes effect. Under the agreements, all bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products will
become duty free immediately after it enters into force. Bahrain will provide immediate duty free access for
98 percent of U.S. agricultural products such as meats, fruits, cereals. It would phase out tariffs on the
remaining products such as alcohol and tobacco in 10 years. The U.S. in return will provide immediate duty
free access for all of Bahrain's current exports of consumer, industrial, and agricultural products. In the USBahrain FTA of 2004, Bahrain agreed to open its service market wider than other FTAs using the negative
approach. It also permits immediate duty-free trade in textiles and apparel products immediately provided
that these products contain either U.S. or Bahraini yarn or fabric. It also permits temporary transitional
allowance for textiles and apparel products that do not meet this requirement.
See U.S. and Egypt Beginning to See "Eye-to-Eye " on Need for FTA but No Talks Scheduled Yet, supra
n. 316 (quoting Boutros-Gali, Egypt's [former] foreign trade minister, saying that Egypt wants to begin the
[US FTA] negotiations "tomorrow"). Although Egypt has made some progress in certain areas such as
tariff reduction, customs administration, and tax reform, there are still some problem areas that need to be
resolved before FTA talks start. See Egypt's Trade Minister Calls for QIZ, Free Trade Accord with United
States, 21 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1883 (Nov. 18, 2004) (quoting Rashid Mohamed Rashid, Egypt's [new]
Foreign Trade and Industry minister, before the Institute for International Economics, that he hoped that
FTA talks with the United States could begin in 2005. He also hoped that agreement on "Qualifying
Industrial Zones" (QIZs) could be reached soon with the U.S. as a first step toward the free trade
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IV. The Social Clause of the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
OQQ

This section addresses the environmental and labor provisions of the US-JO FTA.
The environment and labor provisions of the FTA gives the agreement a human face
because they address issues other than traditional trade matters, such as tariffs and quotas.
The preamble of the FTA includes statements relating to sustainable development, the
environment, and labor.

The FTA covers environment and labor in articles 5 and 6

respectively.

agreement. However, USTR spokesman declined to comment on a possible time line for FTA talks saying
that the USTR is interested in reviewing bilaterally some of the problems U.S. companies face in the
Egyptian market [such as investment disputes, Egypt's authorization of copycat versions of U.S.
pharmaceuticals, suspension of U.S. beef imports without scientific basis, ban on imports of chicken, and
restrictions on imports of turkey]). The US-Bahrain FTA could function as a feeder to gain preferential
market access in the customs union of the Gulf Cooperation Council. For example, U.S. exporters could
use the US-Bahrain FTA to gain duty-free access to other Persian Gulf markets such as Saudi Arabia taking
advantage of the common external tariff of 5% and the elimination of tariffs on intra-Gulf trade starting
2003. This ultimately would break up the customs union among countries members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council. See U.S. Will Continue to Support GCC While Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade
Pacts, 22 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 197 (Feb. 3, 2005) (Catherine A. Novelli, assistant US. trade
representative for Europe and the Mediterranean, stated that the United States will continue to support the
existence of the GCC even as it negotiates FTAs with individual GCC members. The United States wants
the GCC to succeed and has no intention in breaking in it up).
889

See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Boundaries of the WTO: The Question of Linkage, 96 Am. J. Intl. L. 126,
127 (2002) (the use of the social clause terminology is traced back to former USTR Carla Hills. This is not
just a question of semantics. Underlying the determined efforts of these to-date mainly northern lobbies to
work their agendas into trade institutions and treaties is a public relations machine that rationalizes the
campaigns by arguing that there is an intrinsic, hence legitimate need to bring these agendas onto the trade
scene).
890

The FTA preamble states: [the U.S. and Jordan] Recognizing the objective of sustainable development,
and seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different level of economic development".
The FTA preamble also states: [the U.S. and Jordan] Desiring to promote higher labor standards by
building on their respective international commitments and strengthening their cooperation on labor
matters". See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, premable.
Sustainable development is a concept that contemplates the use of natural resources to meet the needs of
the current generation, without jeopardizing the resources for future generations. It embraces two concepts;
the concepts of rational development (or wise use) and some elements of eco-development. Therefore, it is
an inter-generational concept. It was enunciated in this format by the Brundtland Report, Our Common
Future, of World of the Commission on Environment and Development of 1987. It is unclear if the needs of
every individual must be met in the current generation or the needs of current generation on the whole. For
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Negotiations to incorporate non-trade related environment and labor provisions into
the FTA were undertaken to meet the demands of the U.S. administration.891 For the first
time in U.S. trade history, a trade agreement included provisions that address
environment and labor in the main text of the agreement.892 The inclusion of the social
clause in the FTA was determined more by economic and political needs that existed in
the U.S. than by pressures exerted by Jordanian trade unions and environmental groups.
A. Environmental Protection and the US-JO FTA
While the US-JO FTA includes specific references to environment in various
different articles, article 5 is the main environmental provision.

The US-JO FTA was

criticism of the concept of sustainable development see Michael McCloskey, The Emperor Has No
Clothes: The Conundrum of Sustainable Development, 9 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 153, 155 (1999).
See also Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the E. U, NAFTA, and WTO:
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 Am. J. Intl. L. 231, 232, 235 (1997) (the trade-environment
agenda is driven by wealthy states with relatively stringent environmental regulations which suggests that
richer countries will produce less pollution per unit of output than poorer countries-not that richer countries
produce less total pollution than poorer countries. Richer countries tend to be more powerful in trade
negotiations than poorer countries since, in the international trade context, "power" may be seen as a
function of relative market size. When powerful countries engage in an integration-deepening exercise,
they require enhanced trade-environment solutions as part of the package they bring home for domestic
ratification. For example, in the context of the EC, analyses show that German market power-the most
extensive in Europe-has dominated the process and the outcomes of the environment-trade debate.
However, in the WTO, the power of richer, greener countries' markets to bring about trade-environment
solutions is at its lowest).
892

See Howard Mann, NAFTA and the Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 Tul. Envt. L.J. 387, 409
(2000) (suggesting that the impact of trade agreements on sustainable development requires that the
environment be treated as an issue that is "over here", inside the agreement, not "over there" in another
agreement). See Jerome Levinson, Certifying International Worker Rights: A Practical Alternative, 20
Comp. Lab. L. & Policy 401, 405 (1999) (arguing that incorporating worker rights into the main body of
multilateral agreements has reached a dead end. The only path to progress now is unilateral actions on the
part of the U.S. The more effective way is to resort to aggressive unilateral action).
3

For example, the U.S. and Jordan may exclude from patentability certain inventions to avoid prejudice
to the environment. Additionally, the FTA incorporates by reference article XX of GATT 1994 including
environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and measures relating to
the conservation of "living and non-living" exhaustible natural resources. See United States (U.S.)-Jordan:
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the first trade agreement to include environmental provisions in its main text. On the
other hand, NAFTA contains environmental protection provisions in a side agreement,
known as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).894
The US-JO FTA considers lower environmental protection to be unfair trade.
Accordingly, the U.S. and Jordan "shall strive" not to waive or derogate from
environmental laws as an encouragement of trade with each other.

However, the FTA

language is non-binding because it uses mostly hortatory language.
The FTA permits each country to determine its own substantive environmental laws,
QQ-7

but requires that those laws provide high levels of environmental protection.

The FTA

Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 4.18 & 12.1.
894

See North American Agreement in Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M 1480.

895

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 5.1.
896

The purpose of the FTA is to prevent race to the bottom. The term "race-to-the-bottom" refers to a
progressive relaxation of state environmental standards, spurred by interstate competition to attract
industry, that also occasions a reduction in social welfare below the levels that would exist in the absence
of such competition. The widely accepted theoretical model for the race-to-the-bottom is non-cooperative
game theory, of which the classic Prisoner's Dilemma (John von Neumann (a mathematician) and Oskar
Morgenstern (an economist) wrote Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, the publication of which is
generally considered to have given birth to modern game theory. Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood at the
RAND Corporation first used the name "Prisoner's Dilemma" in 1950. When presenting the basic game to
a seminar at Stanford University, Albert W. Tucker created the prosecutor-prisoner story to go with the
game, which gave it the name of Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma was applied to the
generation of public goods as early as 1965 by Mancur Olson and applied specifically to environmental
problems in 1968 by Garrett Hardin in the Tragedy of the Commons) is perhaps the most well known
example. According to this model, although all states would be better off if they each cooperated with each
other by collectively maintaining optimally stringent environmental standards, the incentives are such that
each state will instead relax its standards in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to attract industry. On the other
hand, revisionist critics contend that the effects of state competition upon state environmental standardsetting are welfare-enhancing, rather than welfare-reducing. Revisionists argue that race-to-the-bottom does
not exist. For more on which theory is right see Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a "Race" and is it "to the Bottom, " 48 Hastings L.J. 271, 297 (1997).
"Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection
and environmental development policies, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws, each
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neither requires harmonization of environmental laws nor sets minimum environmental
standards. Therefore, the FTA does not override current Jordan or U.S. environmental
laws.898
The FTA requires that the parties "effectively enforce" their environmental laws.
However, the FTA does not determine how each party will enforce its environmental
laws. The FTA leaves to each party the choice of measure of enforcement. The FTA
speaks of "effective enforcement," which excludes actions by the U.S. Congress or
Jordanian National Assembly. In other words, the FTA applies only to the executive
actions and does not apply to actions by the legislature.
To measure whether either party of the FTA has failed to "effectively enforce" its
environmental laws, the agreement provides a two-prong test. This test requires a
"sustained or recurring" course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade between
the parties. The FTA does not define the terms "sustained or recurring." Although
"sustained or recurring" implies something that happens more than one time, the
definition may not be settled so easily. For example, "sustained or recurring" may be
defined as a failure to act twice every year, ten times in one month, or a failure to act

party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive
to continue improve those laws". United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of
America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695,
art. 5.2.
The environmental statutes of the U.S. have been recognized as some of the most rigorous in the world.
See Michael J. Kelly, Environmental Implications of North American Free Trade Agreement, 3 Ind. Intl. &
Comp. L. Rev. 361, 368 (1993). U.S. environmental statutes include: Clean Air Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §
7401 (2000), Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1251 (2000), The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000), The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000), The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (2000), and The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
899

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 5.3 (a).
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every two years. The second-prong of the test requires that the sustained action/inaction
be in a manner that affects trade. This prong determines what violation is actionable or
non-actionable. Only sustained action or inaction that "affects" trade is actionable.
Therefore, environmental obligations are linked to trade in a manner that would
otherwise be considered an intrusion into the domestic arena of the FTA parties. The
second-prong of the test does not determine if the FTA covers only trade under the
agreement only or extends to other trade arrangements such as the QIZs program.
The US-JO FTA reserves to each party the right to exercise discretion in the
investigation, prosecution, regulation, and compliance with environmental matters.900 The
FTA considers a party not in violation of its obligation to "effectively enforce" its
environmental laws if that party exercises reasonable discretion or makes a bona fide
decision as to how allocate resources. This language may be used to avoid the stringent
obligation of effective enforcement of environmental laws.
Environmental laws in the US-JO FTA are defined as statutes, regulations, or
provisions with the primary purpose of the protection of environment or prevention of a
danger to human, animal, or plant life or health.901 These environmental laws or
regulations include: those related to the prevention, abatement or control of the release,
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental contaminants, those related to the
control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, and those related to the

901

Id. at art. 5.4. The definition of environmental laws in article 5 of the FTA is wider in scope than that of
article 45.2 of the NAAEC. Environmental law in the NAAEC is defined as any statute or regulation the
primary purpose is to protect the environment, or to prevent a danger to human life or health. Thus, article
5 of the FTA includes the prevention of danger to animal or plant life or health.
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protection of wild flora and fauna and their habitat. Under the FT A, environmental laws
are defined narrowly to those laws and regulations "primarily" aimed at protecting the
environment or preventing a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health. Under the
FTA definition of environmental laws, agricultural law or mining law, for example, may
be excluded from coverage. The FTA does not determine the scope of what laws qualify
as environmental law.
The US-JO FTA fails to address the distinction between standards regulating a final
product and standards regulating the process of production of that product.902 The failure
to make the distinction will restrict the ability of the U.S. to exclude Jordanian products
produced in a manner that is damaging to the environment.903 In addition, the FTA does
not set forth the relationship between the FTA and international environmental
agreements that use international trade measures as enforcement mechanisms.904 The

The standards regulating the process of production of a product are known as process and production
methods (PPMs). PPMs specify criteria for how a product is manufactured, harvested, or taken. Terms such
as "made with", "produced by", and "harvested by" signify a PPMs standard. All PPM standards apply to
the production stage, for example before a product is placed on the market for sale. These standards specify
criteria for how a product is produced or processed. However, the PPM standard may address the
environmental effects of a product all during its life-cycle, for example effects which may emerge when the
product is produced, transported, consumed or used, and disposed of. For more on PPMs see Steve
Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPMs " in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J.
Intl. L. 59, 65 (2002) (the subject of PPMs is one of the knotty controversies in the debate over trade and
environment. The term "processes and production methods" originated in the GATT agreement of 1979 on
Technical Barriers to Trade and referred to product standards focused on the production method rather than
product characteristics).
903

In GATT Tuna/Dolphin II case, a case based on article XX exception of GATT 1994 which is
incorporated by reference in the FTA, the panel ruled that import restrictions may not be imposed on
products solely because they were made or obtained in an environmentally unsound manner outside the
jurisdiction of the importing country. The panel reasoned that measures designed to make other countries
change their policies, and that are effective only if such changes occur, are not considered justifiable under
Article XX (g). See GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M
839, para. 5.39(1994).
904

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 1.2. NAFTA in article
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absence of a definitive relationship between the US-JO FTA and these international
agreements may be seen as a major setback for those seeking to use trade as a vehicle for
environmental protection. Finally, the US-JO FTA does not force Jordan to use wealth
generated from trade resulting from the FTA for environmental protection.
The US-JO FTA was the second trade agreement to include environmental
provisions. NAFTA was negotiated with a side agreement concerning the environment.90"
The NAAEC and article 5 of the US-JO FTA both protect the environment and share
some substantive norms. For example, like the US-JO FTA, the NAAEC permits each
country to determine its own substantive environmental laws.906
There are several important differences between article 5 of the US-JO FTA and the
NAAEC. The NAAEC relies on moral persuasion, publicity, and dialogue to ensure
compliance. For example, the NAAEC requires each party to prepare and periodically
publish a report on the state of environment in its territory.907 On the other hand, the US-

104 provides that in the event of an inconsistency between NAFTA and the trade provisions of the listed
international environmental agreements, the obligation of a party to use a trade measure under the
international environmental agreements "shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that
where a party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such
obligations, the party chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of
NAFTA.
905

Originally, NAFTA was negotiated without an agreement concerning the environment and labor.
However, then president Clinton has indicated, when he took over presidency, that he would not submit
NAFTA to Congress until negotiations have been completed on several side agreements regarding the
environment, labor, and import surges. See Gustavo Vega-Canovas, NAFTA and the Environment, 30
Denv. J. Intl. L. & Policy 55, 56 (2001). The NAAEC was implemented to alleviate the concerns of many
NAFTA critics who feared that NAFTA would prompt economic growth at the expense of the
environment. See Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 Fla. J.
Intl. L. 471, 482 (1990) (citing criticism that came also from agriculture, consumer, human rights, and
religious groups). See also Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA Up to Its Green Expectations? Effective Law
Enforcement Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev.
1591, 1591 (1999).
906

See North American Agreement in Environmental Cooperation, supra n. 894, art. 3.
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JO FTA does not contain a similar provision requiring periodic reports on the state of
environment. Moreover, the US-JO FTA does not address some of the provisions that
were addressed in NAAEC. Under NAAEC, any non-governmental organization or
individual person may assert a claim to the NAAEC Secretariat that a party is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws.908 Because of this provision, many private
petitions have been filed that sought to challenge the enforcement of environmental
regulations in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.909
The NAAEC also establishes a state-to-state dispute settlement process for the failure
to enforce environmental laws.910 Thus, the NAAEC creates a two-tiered system: chapter
twenty dispute settlement mechanism for any dispute arising under NAFTA and the
separate NAAEC dispute settlement process. The NAAEC permits a dispute panel to
impose monetary fines against a country found to have engaged in a persistent pattern of
ineffective environmental law enforcement.911 The U.S.-JO FTA establishes a single

W1

Id. at art. 2.1.

908

NAAEC requires any submission to identify the organization making the submission and aim at
promoting enforcement and not to harass an industry. The submission must merit requesting a response
from the party in question. The Secretariat determines that a factual record is warranted, it shall do so upon
approval by the council of the Commission on Environmental Cooperation. The council can make the
factual record public upon two-thirds vote. Id. at art. 14.1.
909

Between 1995 and 2000, twenty-eight citizens' submissions on enforcement matters were registered:
nine regarding Canadian enforcement, eleven regarding Mexican enforcement and eight regarding U.S.
enforcement. Two factual records have been published to date. See. See Vega-Canovas, supra n. 905, at 61.
The first factual record was "The Cozumel Factual Record" of 1997 concerning port terminal project in
Playa Paraiso, Cozumel, Quintana Roo in Mexico. The second factual record was "The BC Hydro factual
record" of 1997 concerning hydroelectric dams in British Columbia, Canada. The third factual record was
"The Metales y Derivados Factual Record" of 1998 concerning lead smelter in Tijuana, Mexico. For more
on these factual records see Mark R. Goldschmidt, The Role of Transparency and Public Participation in
International Environmental Agreements: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
29 B.C Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 343, 376-383 (2002).
910

See North American Agreement in Environmental Cooperation, supra n. 894, art. 22.
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dispute settlement mechanism for all disputes under the agreement. While the NAAEC
imposes monetary fines, the U.S.-JO FTA imposes trade sanctions for failure to enforce
environmental protection. Trade sanctions under the US-JO FTA include tariff increases,
import bans, reductions in financial aid, or other financial penalties. The FTA does not
determine how to measure or quantify trade sanctions that would be commensurate with a
violation of an environmental provision of the FTA.
To ease concerns regarding imposing trade sanctions for environmental violations,
the U.S. and Jordan exchange side letters, whereby both parties expressed their intention
not to exercise trade sanctions for these violations.

These letters were requested by the

U.S. and not Jordan. They were the U.S. idea.913 Although the letters exchanged between
the U.S. and Jordan allay fears that trade sanctions will be invoked to enforce the
environmental provisions of the FTA, the validity of these letters is in question. Based on
the experience of the NAFTA sugar side letter, the U.S. and Jordan should have included
the language of the letters into the main text of the FTA so as to form a binding, legal
914

commitment.

911

Id. at art. 34.4.b.

912

On July 23, 2001, The letters were exchanged between former USTR Robert Zoellick and Jordan's
ambassador to the U.S.
913

See USTR Says Bush Administration Supports U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement "as it is, " 18 Intl.
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1013 (June 28, 2001) (Sen. Grassley suggested attaching "side letters" to the agreement
in which the United States and Jordan promise not to use sanctions to enforce labor and environmental
provisions of the accord). See also Bush Tells Abdullah He Will Push Hill To Adopt Jordan Free-Trade
Agreement, 18 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 632 (Apr. 19, 2001) (Jordanians indicated that they are going to
leave that [specifics of environmental and labor provisions] to the [U.S.] administration to work with
Congress directly).
914

During the NAFTA debate, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to a sugar deal that was attached as a side letter
to the text of NAFTA. However, the U.S. and Mexico are still litigating the validity of the letter.
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B. Labor Protection and the US-JO FTA
The US-JO FTA was the first trade agreement to include labor protection provisions
in its main text. The agreement requires the U.S. and Jordan to "strive" to ensure that
internationally recognized labor rights are recognized and protected within domestic
law.

In addition, the U.S. and Jordan reaffirmed their obligations as members of the

International Labor Organization (ILO).916 Jordan has ratified all of the ILO fundamental
conventions, of which there are eight.

17

In contrast, the U.S. has ratified only two of the

conventions: the convention concerning abolition of forced labor and the convention
eliminating worst forms of child labor.918 The language of the FTA not only indicates
trade inconsistency but it also indicates trade hypocrisy on the part of the U.S.
The FTA ensures that each party does not waive or derogate from its domestic labor
laws.

The U.S. and Jordan, separately, have a right to set their own domestic labor

standards. The FTA does not require the harmonization of labor norms. The FTA requires
each party to effectively enforce its labor laws. Thus, the FTA adopts the "enforce its
labor laws" standard, which is an indication that Jordanian labor laws comply with ILO

915

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 6.1.
NAALC is absent any linkage between ILO conventions and internationally recognized labor rights.
Reference to the ILO in NAALC is limited to article 24.1 which mandates that the ECE chairman be
selected from a roster of experts in consultation with the ILO.
See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Trade and core Labor
Standards 24 (2000).
Id. at 25. The U.S. have not ratified conventions on freedom of association, right to organize and bargain
collectively, equal payment, non-discrimination, and minimum age.
919

See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 695, art. 6.2.
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standards. The U.S. and Jordan may exercise discretion in allocating resources in the
enforcement of their labor laws.
The US-JO FTA recognizes cooperation as a mean for enhanced opportunities to
improve labor standards.920 The FTA defines labor laws as those statutes and regulations
that are directly related to internationally recognized labor rights.921 The FTA excludes
from its coverage of labor rights the right to strike and the right of non-discrimination in
employment.922 If gender equality was incorporated in the FTA, it may have generated
great criticism in Jordan due to cultural or religious concerns. International labor rights
are not culture-neutral but rather are culture-laden. Labor laws in Jordan reflect a balance
between religious and social forces.
While the US-JO FTA includes labor provisions within its main text, NAFTA
contains labor protection provisions in a side agreement. NAFTA originally was
negotiated without addressing labor issues. However, this sparked tremendous concern on
the part of unions.923 U.S. companies would potentially move to Mexico because of lower

,2

7(f. at art. 6.5.

These internationally recognized labor rights are: right of association, right to organize and bargain
collectively, prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, minimum age for the
employment of children, and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health. Id. at art. 6.6.
922

See Thomas Signals Support forU.S.-Oman FTA After Middle East Visit, Inside US Trade (Nov. 26,
2004) (there are serious labor rights problems in Oman and the United Arab Emirates, where there are
severe restrictions on workers' rights to organize and problems related to discrimination against women.
This is in contrast to Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain, which have "pretty decent" labor rights in the context
of the Middle East. NAALC includes laws against employment discrimination. See Reka S. Koerner,
Pregnancy Discrimination in Mexico: Has Mexico Complied with the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation! 4 Tex. F. C.L. & C.R. 235, 236-241 (1999).
923

Matthew J. Griffin, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A Flawed Attempt at
Promoting Continental Labor Standards, 21 Suffolk Transnatl. L. Rev. 113, 115 (1997) (noting American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) was major opponent of NAFTA
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labor and wage standards. 24 The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) came into existence to address these concerns.
The NAALC aims at improving working conditions and living standards.

It

acknowledges the right of each party to establish its own domestic labor standards.
However, the NAALC requires each party to ensure that its labor laws and regulations
provide high labor standards consistent with high quality and productivity in workplaces.
The NAALC provides an illustrative list of government actions that each party may take
to effectively enforce its labor laws.926
The NAALC created a Commission for Labor Cooperation to facilitate its objectives
in a cooperative and consultative manner.

The organizational structure of the NAALC

also includes a national component, the National Administrative Offices (NOAs). The
NAO is a unique institution that takes up labor rights issues outside the national
territory.928 Unlike the US-JO FTA, any government, non-governmental organization, or
individual may submit complaints regarding labor issues involving other NAALC

and importance of labor to Clinton's campaign and explaining that U.S. unions claim NAALC created to
obtain votes. U.S. labor unions objected to the lack of penalties within NAALC for violations of industrial
relations law and the cumbersome nature of NAALC process).
924

Then presidential candidate Ross Perot described Mexico as "great sucking sound". See Marley Weiss,
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC): Accelerating Development (s)? SE27
ALI-ABA 909, 911(1999).
925

See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 32 I.L.M. 1499, art. 1 (1993)

926

Id. at art. 3.

921

Id. at art. 8.

928

See Lance A. Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights Regime Takes
Shape, 3 U-S.-Mex. L.J. 159, 163 (1995) (a critical function of NAO is to review labor law matters in one
or both of the other NAALC parties, not domestic matters. In this sense, the thrust of the NAO's function
runs counter to the otherwise firm preservation of sovereignty under NAALC).

countries to the NAO of their own country. The main advancements in the NAALC
evolution were made through the NAO public complaints review.929 Since the NAALC's
entry into force, a total of twenty-three labor submissions have been filed.930
The NAALC created a dispute settlement mechanism to resolve disputes over any
matter that could affect the operation of the NAALC.931 However, the NAALC dispute
settlement mechanism applies only to occupational safety and health standards, child
labor issues, or minimum wage right that are trade-related and mutually recognized by
labor laws of each party.

Other labor principles such as forced labor, right of

association, right to organize and bargain collectively, and hours of work are not
covered.

Therefore, the basis for actionable violations is wider in scope under the US-

See Emmanuelle Mazuyer, Labor Regulation in the North American Free Trade Area: A Study on the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 22 Comp. Lab. L. & Policy J. 239, 244 (2001).
930
One of the well known submissions concerning labor law matter under NAALC public submission
procedure was the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), a U.S. labor union, submission. That
submission involved workers at a Honeywell electronics factory in Chihuahua, Mexico who were fired
after expressing an interest in joining an independent Mexican labor organization. In a report released in
Oct. 1994, the U.S. NAO found that the former Honeywell employees accepted severance pay from the
company and, thereby, had preempted an investigation by Mexican officials into their dismissals. On that
basis, the NAO declared that it could not conclude that Mexico failed to enforce its labor laws and that it
could not recommend that the dispute proceed to ministerial consultations. See David Lopez, Dispute
Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 Tex. Intl. L.J. 163, 196 (1997).

NAALC created four-step dispute settlement process that consists of: 1) initial consultations between
NAOs regarding the other party's labor law, its administration, or labor market conditions in its territory 2)
ministerial consultations regarding any matter within the scope of NAALC 3) expert evaluations regarding
patterns of non-enforcement of domestic labor law in each party country and 4) further consultations
whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by a party to effectively enforce occupational safety
and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards that may lead to non-binding arbitration.
See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, supra n. 925, art. 20.
932

Id. atari. 29.1.

933

Labor principles under NAALC are subject to different treatment. Right of association, right to organize
and bargain, and right to strike are subject only to review and consultation. Eight technical labor principles
concerned with forced labor, child labor, minimum wage and hour standards, employment discrimination,
equal pay for men and women, job health and safety, workers' compensation for occupational injuries and
illnesses and protection of migrant workers are subject to evaluation and recommendations by an ECE.
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JO FT A than under the NAALC. The NAALC was criticized for its failure to include
sanctions for basic labor-relations violations. In the history of the NAALC, no ni single
case has reached the arbitration process. The dispute resolution procedures established by
the NAALC are bureaucratic, byzantine, cumbersome, and protracted, all of which would
hamper timely settlements.934
The U.S., in the FT A with Jordan, assumes that labor standards in Jordan are not
adequately protected. The U.S. overlooks the fact it should itself begin protecting worker
rights by extending labor protection to agricultural workers. Otherwise, it seems
hypocritical on the part of the U.S. The U.S. labor laws favor employers over
employees.935 Moreover, the U.S. is a country where May 1st, the International Workers'
Day, is not considered a Federal holiday or even celebrated.936

Only violations of child labor, health and safety, and minimum wage and hour standards can go forward to
dispute resolution with the possibility of sanctions. In case of an alleged persistent of failure to enforce
occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wages technical labor standards, the last venue is
the dispute resolution by an arbitral panel, which may develop an action plan for effective enforcement of
national labor law. Failure to implement this plan may result in fines or trade sanctions
934

See Mazuyer, supra n. 929, 248.

935

See Andrew K. Stutzman, Our Eroding Industrial Base: U.S. Labor Laws Compared With Labor Laws
of Less Developed Nations in Light of the Global Economy, 12 Dick. J. Intl. L. 135, 142 (1993) (the U.S.
judiciary is reluctant to protect employee rights and that it construes worker projections narrowly in favor
of employers. Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly protect worker' rights).
936

The May 1st, International Worker's Day, dates back to the eight-hour working day movement. See
Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLASA, 19 Hofstra Lab. & Empl. L.J. 1,13 (2001) (the eight-hour
movement of the nineteenth century is based on a vision of working less, living more. It embraces workers'
desire for personal time from industrial order, and freedom for home life and cultural matters outside wage
and job concerns. (8 hours for work, 8 hours for sleep, and 8 hours for what we will).The movement
started. In 1886, Sameul Gompers, the leader of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions,
called for a nationwide strike by all workers on May 1st to achieve shorter working hours. This strike
became the first general strike in the history of the international labor movement. The U.S. Army and riottrained police surpassed the strike by use of force).
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In Jordan, the only existing union federation is heavily dependent on government
financial support.

The government subsidizes the union federation, which is considered

a restriction on the right to establish a free union. Even the U.S. AFL-CIO cannot escape
such criticism.

In the U.S. today only about one out of every seven workers belongs to

a labor union. The principal causes for the decline of U.S. organized labor are its overuse
of the work stoppage, tolerance for criminal infiltration or corruption, its philosophical
underpinnings, and its tolerance for the entrenchment of internal power.

937

See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, supra n. 917, at 94.

938

Organized labor is embodied in the U.S. umbrella confederation, the American Federation of LaborCongress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). The key forces behind the creation of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations had roots in socialism with events during and just after World War I effectively
purged organized labor of its radical elements. The AFL is composed mainly of the craft unions and the
CIO by contrast organized workers in the mass industrial sector, the basic industries. The American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations often quarreled over direction and
philosophy. The AFL had a horizontal structure-all electricians were in the electrician's union regardless of
their employer, and the CIO was organized vertically-all auto workers belonged to the auto workers union,
regardless of their job description-and these competing structures generated jurisdictional infighting. The
typical craft union member was also different from the typical industrial worker. The latter was more likely
to be a relatively recent Eastern European immigrant who brought some Marxist ideology along or a
worker from the ranks of the underprivileged social classes in America such as the southern Black workers
who had migrated northward and into the factories and manufacturing plants after World War I. See
Fredrick Englehart, Withered Giants: Mexican and U.S. Organized Labor and the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 29 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 321 (1997).
The Laborers International Union of North America was one of four major unions singled out as corrupt
by a presidential commission in 1985. Id. at 321.
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Conclusion
The FTA can be subdivided into two packages: the less controversial package of
tariff reductions and the more controversial relating to environmental and labor issues.
The US-JO FTA would have been of little value if it did not include environment and
labor provisions within the text of the FTA. The U.S. demanded that these provisions be
included within the text of the FTA.
The environmental and labor provisions of the FTA may be described as "not
unexpected, symbolic but dangerous, and material step but falling short". Applying all of
these terms can help form judgments about the significance of these provisions. The
social clause of the US-JO FTA may be described as "not unexpected" because it was
negotiated by the Clinton administration and its constituencies who advocate for the
protection of the environment and worker rights. The exchange of side letters between the
U.S. and Jordan was not expected by the Bush administration. The environment and labor
provisions, along with the side letter, reflect U.S. political party lines. The environmental
and labor provisions of the FTA are symbolic but dangerous. Considering the purpose of
FTA to cement the bonds of friendship and economic relations between the parties, the
possibility of invoking trade sanctions for violations of the social clause is remote but still
a threat. The FTA contains loopholes that may be exploited by interest groups in the U.S.
who would advance their own agendas.
Articles 5 (environment) and 6 (labor) of the FTA represent material steps towards
advancing an environmental and labor agenda by linking the FTA with non-trade
provisions. However, these articles fall short of expectations. For example, the U.S. and
Jordan have recognized in the FTA that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing
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domestic environmental and labor laws, but the FTA does not prohibit the parties from
doing so. The FTA does not define the relationship between the FTA and the multilateral
environmental agreements. Moreover, the FTA does not define terms such as "sustained
action/inaction". The social clause of the FTA was structured in a way that would avoid
the language of standards. The FTA contains a scapegoat clause that allows each party to
exercise discretion in allocating resources to enforce its environment or labor laws. The
FTA does not permit non-governmental organization to submit claims that either party is
failing to enforce its environmental or labor laws effectively. It will be several years
before analysis can determine the real effectiveness of the environmental and labor
provisions of the US-JO FTA.
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ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this dissertation I have argued that membership in the WTO should offer Jordan,
in collaboration with other developing countries, a better chance of securing and
advancing its interests rather than entering into bilateral trade deals with economic
hegemonies such as the U.S. where exists great inequality in bargaining power. In current
bilateral trade agreements, economic hegemonies such as the U.S. can dictate the rules
and weave them to their own advantage. Jordan and other Arab countries can maximize
their bargaining position at the WTO by collaborating closely with each other and
forming regional trading bloc. Specifically, Arab countries should consider that the free
trade ideology has links in Islam.
Islamic law is inclined toward free trade. Islamic law condemns imposing tariffs on
trade with other states. Even when tariffs are imposed, they are imposed on the basis of
reciprocity. Islamic law also advocates fair and moral trade by prohibiting trade in
illegitimate goods, such as pork, alcohol, and riba. Enough resources exist in Islamic
jurisprudence than can help Arab countries integrate into the modern multilateral trading
system while abiding by Islamic teachings.
The method in which the WTO, as an institution, conducts its business may not be
perfect. The WTO must accelerate the accession of Arab countries into the organization.
Political issues must not lead to the application of different rules for Arab countries than
are applicable towards other countries. The accessions of Syria and Saudi Arabia have
been blocked by the U.S. and other Western countries based on Syria and Saudi Arabia's
positions on human rights, religious freedom, democracy, and the trade boycotts on
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Israel. The WTO Secretariat should hire more staff from Arab countries and include
Arabic as a working language in the trade body.
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism requires preparing commercial data,
conducting studies, making economic modeling, and providing substantial
documentation. These activities are all very costly. Arab countries must share the legal
and financial burdens of engaging in such proceedings at the WTO. Spreading the cost of
litigating among Arab countries would make the process more affordable for the Arab
countries to be involved.
The agreements covered by the WTO and its judicial decisions are voluminous. Deep
understanding of the WTO texts and the effects of these agreements on Arab countries
and industries is of extreme importance to determine what their benefits and challenges
are. An Inter-Arab Academy for International Trade Law is needed to fill in the gap left
by the WTO technical assistance. The purpose of such an academy would be to send
candidates to be trained in international trade at different institutions. These candidates
can include officials, academia, or representatives from the private sector nominated by
their countries based on qualifications and not on political affiliations.
To improve the competitive position of the region, Arab countries would have to be
creative, generating alternative ideas and new solutions. The model for future regional
Arab free trade agreements must be grounded in economics and not politics. Future trade
agreements should cover agriculture, transportation, financial services, business
facilitation, and specific-sector initiatives. The model should move beyond classic tariff
reductions to cover unnecessary impediments that compromise trade flows between Arab
countries. For example, Arab countries must engage in regulatory harmonization for

different testing requirements, controls, and inspections. Arab countries should increase
labor mobility by lifting visa requirements for certain nationals of these countries.
Jordan's accession to the WTO was a lengthy and costly process. Jordan agreed to
reduce tariffs, open its service market, reform its intellectual property regime, and accede
to the IT A. Jordan enjoyed special and differential treatment in few areas, such as tariff
reductions. The Jordanian government must introduce policies aimed at cushioning its
most vulnerable citizens from the effects of trade liberalization. These policies include reemployment projects, diversified education programs, and funds to offset the extreme
adverse effects of trade liberalization.
Jordan's accession to the WTO has been seen as an end unto itself. Permanent
industry and non-industry trade advisory committees must be established to solicit the
opinions of all Jordanian stakeholders in the work of the WTO and ensure that their
views are considered when WTO-related decisions are made. Trade officials and
parliamentarians must be involved in WTO negotiations on a regular basis and should be
consistently updated as to negotiating positions. There is also a need for an economic
impact assessment of trade negotiations. This assessment would analyze the effects of
trade negotiations on consumers, industry, competition, and employment.
The US-Jordan FTA was designed both to spur Jordan's economic development and
to cement strategic ties between the U.S. and Jordan for geopolitical reasons. The U.S. in
the FTA did not adequately take the interests of Jordan into account. Although the FTA
in many parts refers to "the Parties" or "each Party," the reference is directed towards
Jordan. If laws must be changed as a result of the US-JO FTA, they are most likely to be
those of Jordan. In many parts, the US-JO FTA reflects the laws and views of the U.S.
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For example, provisions relating to rules of origin for textiles, definition of substantial
cause for purposes of safeguard measures, anti-circumvention of technological products
designed to protect intellectual property rights, e-commerce, visa commitments, amicus
curiae briefs, and living and non-living resources for the purpose of a natural resource
definition reflect U.S. laws and regulations. The US-JO FTA may be seen as a WTO-Plus
agreement. The FTA parties entered into asymmetrical commitments. The U.S. acted as
demander for including labor and environment within the FTA. In the FTA, Jordan
played the role of demandeur. Jordan should not be the "obedient guy" on the other
corner of the bargaining table. Jordan must be a "rule-maker" rather than a "rule-taker".
The experience and lessons learned from the US-JO FTA must serve as a basis for
the proposed US-Middle East FTA. The US-JO FTA may not be the best template. The
formation of the US-JO FTA may encourage other Arab countries, who are motivated by
economic pressure, to join or form new FT As. In concluding, I argue that the WTO
system has shortcomings. However, the WTO system, when compared with bilateral
trade deals such as the US-JO FTA, can offer Arab countries a better chance in advancing
their economic interests.

332

APPENDIX 1
Table 1. Multilateral Trade Negotiations Rounds
Number

Year

Round Name/Place

1

1947

Geneva/Switzerland

Number of
Participating
Countries
23

2

1949

Annecy/France

13

3

1950-1951

Torquay/England

38

4

1952-1956

Geneva/Switzerland

26

5

1960-1961

Dillon/Switzerland

26

6

1964-1967

Kennedy/Switzerland 62

7

1973-1979

Tokyo/Japan (Nixon
before)

102

8

1986-1993

Uruguay

123

Round Subject

Tariff
Concessions
Tariff
Concessions
Tariff
Concessions
Tariff
Concessions
Tariff
Concessions
Tariff
Concessions,
Antidumping
Code
Tariff
Concessions,
Non-tariff
barriers
Tariff
Concessions,
Non-Tariff
Barriers,
Agriculture,
Services,
Intellectual
Property,
Dispute
Settlement, the
establishment
of the WTO

Source: www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2002).
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Table 2. Total Arab Countries Exports and Imports as of 1999
Product

Exports

Imports

(%)

(%)

Food and Beverages

3.9

14.9

Raw Materials

2.4

6

Petroleum Products

68.2

4.1

Chemical Products

5.3

8.1

Machinery

3.7

34.2

Manufactured Products

15.8

30.5

Unclassified Products

0.6

2.2

Total

100

100

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, From
GATT to the WTO, at 18, U.N. Doc. E/ESCWA/CAB/2001/1 (2001) (Arabic version).
Table 3. Trade Patterns of Arab Countries as of 1999
Trading Partner

Exports

Imports

(%)

(%)

Arab Countries

9.8

9.6

The European Union

26.2

39.2

The United States

9.6

12.7

Japan

7.7

7.6

Southeast Asia

12.4

5.7

The Rest

25.2

25.2

Total

100

100

Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, From
GATT to the WTO, at 18, U.N. Doc. E/ESCWA/CAB/2001/1 (2001) (Arabic version).
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Table 4. Sectoral Contribution in Gross Domestic Production
Sectors

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Agriculture

4.9

5.0

4.4

4.8

3.7

3.8

Manufacturing

14.8

13.2

14.3

15.1

15.6

15.8

Mining

2.9

2.9

3.1

3.1

3.1

2.9

Construction

7.4

7.0

5.9

4.6

4.6

4.5

Services:

67.5

68.9

69.7

69.8

71.4

71.4

Tourism

5.9

6.3

6.0

5.8

6.0

5.1

Communication

13.9

14.8

14.6

16.8

18.0

17.8

47.7

47.8

49.1

47.2

46.4

48.5

Transportation
Other Services*

Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Statistical Issue of Jordan Central Bank (2000).
* Banks, hotels, and restaurants.

Table 5. Budget Balance (in millions of JD)
Fiscal Year

Revenue

Expenditure

Balance

1998

1700

2055

-355

1999

1784

2007

-223

2000

1801

2005

-204

2001

2067

2300

-233

Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Statistical Issues of the Central Bank of Jordan (19982001).
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Table 6. Trade Balance (in millions of JD)
Item
1991
1994
1996

1998

1999

2000

Exports

599

794

1005

1046

1051

1080

Imports

1711

2590

3044

2714

2635

3259

Re-

172

237

248

232

247

266

-940

-1559

-1791

-1436

-1337

-1913

exports
Total
Deficit
Source: Statistical Issue of the Centra IBank of Jordan (2000).

Table 7. Foreign Aid (in millions of JD)
Country

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Total

Arab

145.3

141.3

148

117.1

170

721.7

Japan

28.5

28.5

34.5

39.2

46.2

176.9

U.S.

11.1

41.4

35.4

91.9

35.7

215.5

E.U

54.8

32.6

None

None

25.5

112.9

Total

239.7

243.8

217.9

248.2

277.4

1227

countries

Source: Monthly Statistical Issue of the Central Bank of Jordan (July 2001).

336

Table 8. Jordan Harmonized Tariff Schedule (2004)

U.S. Code

Description

8527.00000

Reception apparatus for radio-telephony,
radio-telegraphy or radio-broadcasting,
whether or not combined, in the same
housing, with sound recording or
[reproducing apparatus or a clock

8527.10000

Other radio-broadcast receivers,
including apparatus capable of receiving
lalso radio-telephony or radio-telegraphy

8527.12000
8527.13000
8527.19000

8527.20000

iPocket-size radio cassette-players
jOther apparatus combined with sound
jrecording or reproducing apparatus
[Other
Radio-broadcast receivers not capable of
operating without an external source of
power, of a kind used in motor vehicles,
including apparatus capable of receiving
also radio-telephony or radio-telegraphy:

Collection I nit

Duiv Kale

Value

30%

Value

30%

Value

30%
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Table 9. Trade with Jordan in 2003 (in millions of U.S. dollars)
Month

Exports

Imports

Balance

January 2003

35.0

43.5

-8.5

February 2003

20.7

40.5 :

-19.8

March 2003

91.0

48.6

42.4

April 2003

18.5

47.0

-28.5

May 2003

37.2

41.0

-3.8

June 2003

25.9

45.3

-19.4

July 2003

|

36.7

64.2 ,

-27.5

August 2003

:

32.8

69.8 i

-37.0

September 2003

|

47.8

82.7

-34.9

October 2003

50.5

66.8

-16.3

November 2003

39.9

57.1

-17.2

December 2003

|

55.9

66.9

-11.0

TOTAL

1

491.9

673.4

-181.5

Source: The U.S. Census Bureau

Table 10. Value of The Leading 6 U.S. imports from Jordan under Different Trade
Programs
Value of The Leading 6 U.S. imports from Jordan in 2003 Where no Special Programs
Claimed
HS Description

Value (dollars)

980100 Imports of Articles Exported & Returned, No Change940

25,506,828

611020 Sweaters, Pullovers Etc, Knit Etc, Cotton

2,484,690

999995 Estimated Imports of Low Valued Transactions

1,565,604

611212 Track & Warm-Up Suits Etc, Knit Etc, Synth Fibers

1,480,708

490199 Printed Books, Brochures, Etc., Nesoi
611030 Sweaters, Pullovers Etc, Knit Etc, Manmade Fibers

940

:

1,062,652
:

1,020,125

USHTS tariff item 980100 covers U.S. goods exported and subsequently re-imported duty-free if the
returned goods have not been increased in value or improved in conditions by any process of manufacture
or other means while abroad (Jordan in this case). However, if U.S. goods exported and re-imported after
alteration or repair in a foreign country, the value added by the foreign country is dutiable. Returned U.S.
goods exported and re-imported without increase in value or improve in condition are considered goods of
U.S. origin. See Border Brokerage Co. v. U.S., 314 F. Supp. 788, 790 (Cust. Ct. 1970) (the case involved
tomatoes grown in Florida and then exported to Canada where they were unloaded, unpacked, sorted,
graded by color and size, and repacked. After which they were sold to Safeway Stores of Bellevue,
Washington. These tomatoes of U.S. origin were entitled to free entry as returned U.S. products upon
importation from Canada, though the tomatoes, while in Canada, had been unpacked, sorted and graded by
color and size as found in their natural condition, and repacked in smaller cartons since the treatment given
to them in Canada did not advance their value or improve their condition as tomatoes). As such, U.S.
courts apply as a rule of origin for 980100 items whether a product of U.S. origin has itself (apart from its
container) been advanced in value or improved in condition while abroad.

Value of The Leading 6 U.S. imports from Jordan in 2003 under the GSP
HS Description

Value (dollars)

711319 Jewelry and Parts Thereof, Of Oth Precious Metal

30,903,485

841582 Air Conditioning Mach Etc Incorp Refrig Unit Nesoi

966,230

711311 Jewelry and Parts Thereof, Of Silver

750,388

291890 Carboxylic Acids with Added Oxygen Func Etc Nesoi

414,596

870899 Parts and Accessories of Motor Vehicles, Nesoi

400,875

210410 Soups and Broths and Preparations Therefor

203,500

Source: Statistics are delivered from Trade Data Services, The U.S. Census Bureau (on
file with author).

Value of The Leading 6 U.S. imports from Jordan in 2003 under QIZs
HS Description

Value (dollars)

611020 Sweaters, Pullovers Etc, Knit Etc, Cotton

133,463,126

620462 Women's Or Girls'Trousers Etc Not knit, Cotton

115,187,864

611030 Sweaters, Pullovers Etc, Knit Etc, Manmade Fibers

48,451,781

610510 Men's Or Boys' Shirts of Cotton, Knitted or Crochet

40,103,367

610462 W/G Trousers Overalls Breeches Shorts Cotton, Knit

40,054,845

610610 Women's Or Girls' Blouses and Shirts Cotton, Knit

26,901,764

Source: Statistics are delivered from Trade Data Services, The U.S. Census Bureau (on
file with author).
Value of The Leading 6 U.S. imports from Jordan in 2003 under US-JO FTA
HS Description

Value (dollars)

711319 Jewelry and Parts Thereof, Of Oth Precious Metal

16,529,704

620462 Women's Or Girls' Trousers Etc Not knit, Cotton

1,422,775

620341 M/B Trousers Overalls Breeches Shorts Wool, NT Knit

1,295,974

711311 Jewelry and Parts Thereof, Of Silver

839,330

620331 M/B Suit-Type Jacket and Blazers of Wool, NT Knit

684,637

610230 W/G Overcoats Carcoats & Similar Art MMF, Knit

640,982

Source: Statistics are delivered from Trade Data Services, The U.S. Census Bureau (on
file with author).
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